ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June 21, 1990
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    Complainant,
    v.
    )
    PCB 90-89
    (Enforcement)
    FRED JOHNSON, HERMAN L. LOEB
    JOHNSON & BRIGGS TANK
    TRUCK SERVICE a/k/a/ JOHNSON
    & BRIGGS TANK TRUCK & HEATER
    SERVICE, an Illinois Corporation,
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (‘Dy 3’. Marlin):
    This matter is before the Board on Fred Johnson’s and Johnson
    and Briggs, Inc.’s (“Johnson”) Motion to Strike filed May 25,
    1990. The motion states that the Complaint filed against it by
    the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (‘Agency”) is
    insufficient in that it fails to allege any violation by
    Respondent of regulations, standards or permit requirements which
    led to its alleged violation of Section 21(j) of the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Act (“Act”). The Respondent also claims
    that certain allegations in Count I, II, and III of the Complaint
    are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that
    portions of the Complaint also fail to state with sufficient
    particularity the violations against Fred Johnson acting in his
    individual capacity.
    The Agency filed a Motion For Leave to File Complainant’s
    Motion for Extension of Time Instanter, with the accompanying
    motion, on June 12, 1990. In its Motion for Extension of Time
    the Agency requested that it be given additional time to responed
    to the ~kotion to Strike. The Agency filed its Response in
    Oppostion to Respondent’s Motion to Strike on June 13, 1990. As
    an initial matter, the Agency’s motion for leave to file
    instanter and the motion for extension of time are granted. ~1e
    now turn to the merits of Johnson’s motion to strike.
    The motion claims that in Count I the Agency did not plead
    with sufficient particularity, the viclationsof Section 21(j) of
    the Act Johnson is said to have committed. Our reading, however,
    of Count I of the complaint reveals “sufficient information as
    reasonably informs respondent of the nature of the claim
    respondent isi called upon to meet’~ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch.
    110, par. 2—612(b)). ParagraDhs 21, 22, 25 and 28 contain the
    information upon which the People rely to present their cause of
    112—411
    —2—
    action against the respondent. In our opinion each of these
    paragraphs relate back to the claimed violation of Section 21(j)
    and do so with the particularity required by statute. Therefore,
    the motion to strike Count I is denied.
    In addition, we have reviewed the Complaint in its entirety
    concerning 3’ohnson’s assertion that the complaint fails to state
    a cause of action against him individually, as opposed to his
    corporate capacity. While we believe that the People’s
    allegations made against Fred Johnson individually, i.e. outside
    Johnson’s authority as an official of Johnson & Briggs, Inc., do
    not precisely differentiate between the two capacities, this
    failing is not sufficient to strike them. As we read it
    respondent is alleged to have violated certain statutes while
    acting in one or both capacities.If respondent wishes to assert
    the distinction as a defense at hearing, he may do so.
    We turn, finally, to Johnson’s contentions that all
    allegations. of violations which occurred prior to May 1, 1986
    (five years prior to the filing of this Complaint) are barred by
    the statute of limitations. ~e find that the Fifth District
    Appellate Court’s decision in Pielet Brothers Trading, Inc. v.
    Pollution Control Board, 110 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757—8 (5th Dist.
    1982) controls. There the court stated:
    “Unless the terms of a statute of limitations expressly
    include the state, county, municipality or the
    governmental agencies, the statute, so far as public
    rights are concerned, as distinguished from private and
    local rights, is inapplicable to them. Id. at 758.
    We do not find Respondent’s claim that the general five year
    limitation statute applies persuasive. Therefore, Johnson’s
    motion to strike all allegations of conduct occurring prior to
    May 1, 1986 is also denied.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board hereby cert~fy that the above Order was adopted ~on the
    ~ day of
    _______________
    ,
    1990 by a vote of
    ______________
    /~
    ~-;‘
    ~
    ,1 ~,
    Dorothy M. ~‘unn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    112—412

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