ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 8, 2000
AMERICAN BOTTOM CONSERVANCY,
EAST ST. LOUIS COMMUNITY ACTION
NETWORK, KATHY ANDRIA, and JACK
NORMAN,
Petitioners,
v.
VILLAGE OF FAIRMONT CITY and
WASTE MANAGEMENT OF ILLINOIS,
INC.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
PCB 00-200
(Pollution Control Facility
Siting Appeal)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by C.A. Manning):
On May 24, 2000, petitioners filed an appeal pursuant to Section 40.1 of the
Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/40.1 (1998)). This appeal arises from the
decision of the Village of Fairmont City which approved local siting for Waste Management of
Illinois of a proposed expansion of the Milam pollution control facility located in the Village of
Fairmont City, St. Clair County, Illinois. The Board sets this matter for hearing.
In the instant petition, petitioners challenge the Village of Fairmont City’s decision on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, fundamental unfairness, and failure to provide a complete copy
of the application. Section 103.123(a) of the Board’s procedural rules, which implements
Section 31(d) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(d) (1998)), provides that the Board determine whether
this matter is duplicitous or frivolous. This section further states that if the complaint is
duplicitous or frivolous, the Board shall enter an order setting forth its reasons for so ruling and
shall notify the parties of its decision.
An action before the Board is duplicitous if the matter is identical or substantially similar
to one brought in another forum. Brandle v. Ropp (June 13, 1985), PCB 85-68. An action
before the Board is frivolous if it fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be
granted by the Board. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Reynolds Metal. Co. (May 17,
1973), PCB 73-173.
There is no evidence before the Board to indicate this matter is identical or substantially
similar to any matter brought in another forum, nor is there any evidence that the Board cannot
grant the relief requested. There is also no evidence before the Board to suggest that the
petitioners are so located as to not be affected by the proposed facility. The petition indicates
that the petitioners participated in the previous public hearing pursuant to the requirements of
Section 40.1(b) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/40.1(b) (1998)). At this time, therefore, the Board
finds that the petition is neither duplicitous or frivolous, that the petitioners participated in the
public hearing conducted by the Village of Fairmont City, and that the petitioners are or may be
so located as to be affected by the proposed facility. Accordingly, this matter shall proceed to
hearing.
While the matter may properly proceed to hearing as both Kathy Andria and Jack
Norman, as individuals, have standing to bring the action, there is an additional issue which
must be addressed concerning representation of the American Bottom Conservancy (ABC) and
the East St. Louis Community Action Network (ESLCAN) by Kathy Andria and Jack Norman.
The petition relates that the American Bottom Conservancy and the East St. Louis Community
Action Network are both not-for-profit public corporations incorporated in the state of Illinois
(Pet. at 2). Kathy Andria and Jack Norman are described as directors of the ABC. Kathy
Andria is also identified as the chairperson for ESLCAN.
1
Neither Kathy Andria nor Jack
Norman are identified as being an attorney.
Although the Board’s current procedural rules would allow ABC and ESLCAN to be
represented by a non-attorney (see 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.107(a)(2)), the Board recently held
that these rules violated the provisions of the Attorney Act (705 ILCS 205/1 (1996)) and the
Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1 (1996)). See In the Matter of:
Petition of Recycle Technologies, Inc. for an Adjusted Standard from 35 Ill. Adm. Code
720.131(c) (July 10, 1997), AS 97-9 (hereinafter RTI). Specifically, the Board found that a
non-attorney could not represent a corporation in an adjusted standard proceeding without
violating both the Attorney Act and the Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act. The
Board has also held that the rationale employed to find that a non-attorney was prohibited from
representing a corporation in an adjusted standard proceeding applies equally to the situation
presented in this matter. See Sierra Club and Jim Bensman v. City of Wood River and Norton
Environmental (October 2, 1997), PCB 93-43 (hereinafter Bensman). Accordingly, ABC and
ESLCAN must be represented by an attorney.
Rather than dismissing ABC and ESLCAN from the action immediately as some case
law would suggest, the Board finds that special circumstances of the type also found in RTI and
Bensman apply here. Consistent with RTI and Bensman, the Board grants ABC and ESLCAN
30 days in which to retain an attorney and for that attorney to file an amended petition in this
case on ABC’s and ESLCAN’s behalf. If an amended petition and attorney’s appearance are
not filed on or before July 8, 2000, ABC and ESLCAN will be dismissed from this action.
Pursuant to Section 40.1(b) of Act, the hearing is to be based “exclusively on the record
before the county board or governing body of the municipality.” Although the Act does not
specifically state who is required to file such record with the Board, the Board believes that the
Village of Fairmont City must prepare and file the record on appeal.
1
Although the petition also identifies Jack Norman as the chairperson of the Kaskaskia Group
of the Sierra Club and its Conservation Chair, and states that he is authorized to “represent the
Sierra Club before the Board,” The Sierra Club has not been named as a party. Pet. at 3.
The record shall contain legible versions of all documents, transcripts, and exhibits
deemed to pertain to this proceeding from initial filing through the including final action by the
local government body. The record shall also contain the originals of all documents and shall
be sequentially numbered, placing the letter “C” before the number of such page. In addition
to the actual documents which comprise the record, the Village of Fairmont City Clerk shall
also prepare a document entitled “Certificate of Record on Appeal” which shall be an index of
the record that lists the documents comprising the record and shows the page numbers upon
which they start and end. Seven copies of the certificate, seven copies of the transcript of
Village of Fairmont City hearing, and three copies of any other documents in the record shall
be filed with the Board; a copy of the certificate shall be served upon the petitioner. The
Village of Fairmont City Clerk is given 21 days from the date of this order to “prepare, bind
and certify the record on appeal.” See 155 Ill. 2d R. 324. If the record is not legible,
sequentially numbered, or fails to include an appropriate index of record, the Clerk of the
Board may refuse to accept the document for filing. For further guidance in preparing and
filing the record on appeal, the Village of Fairmont City may refer to the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules 321 through 324. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 321-324.
Section 40.1(a) of the Act provides that if there is no final action by the Board within
120 days, “petitioner may deem the site location approved.” Section 40.1(b) of the Act, under
which this action is brought, states only that “the Board shall hear the petition in accordance
with the terms of subsection (a) of this Section and its procedural rules governing denial
appeals.”
The Board has construed identical “in accordance with the terms of” language contained
in Section 40.1(b) of the Act concerning third-party appeals of the grant of hazardous waste
landfill permits as giving the person who had requested the permit: (a) the right to a decision
within the applicable statutory timeframe (now 120 days), and (b) the right to waive the decision
period. See Alliance for a Safe Environment v. Akron Land Corp. (October 30, 1980), PCB
80-184. The Board therefore construes Section 40.1(b) in like manner, with the result that
failure of this Board to act in 120 days would allow the site location applicant to deem the site
location approved.
A hearing on the petition should be timely scheduled in order to allow the Board time to
review the record and to render its decision within 120 days of the filing of the appeal.
Petitioner may, however, waive the statutory decision deadline pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.105. Absent any future waivers of the statutory decision deadline, the statutory decision
deadline is September 21, 2000. This matter will be handled at the Board meeting preceding
that date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
the above order was adopted on the 8th day of June 2000 by a vote of 7-0.
---+-++++
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board