ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    February 28,
    1991
    CLEAN QUALITY RESOURCES,
    INC.,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    PCB 90—216
    V.
    )
    (Landfill Siting)
    MARION COUNTY BOARD,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    MR. WILLIAM P. CRAIN APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER.
    MR. ROBERT SHUFF APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD BY
    (M.
    Nardulli):
    This matter comes before the Board on an appeal filed
    November 14,
    1990 pursuant to Section 40.1 of the Environmental
    Protection Act
    (‘tAct”)
    Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    ch.
    111 1/2,
    para.
    1040.1(a),
    1989.
    The petitioner, Clean Quality Resources
    (“CQR”), appeals the decision of the Marion County Board
    (“MCB”)
    to deny site location suitability approval to an aqueous
    treatment plant.
    The NCB held a total of fourteen hearings over
    a four month period in 1990 on CQR’s application for site
    approval.
    On October 11,
    1990, the NCB voted unanimously to deny
    CQR’s request for site location suitability approval on the basis
    that CQR did not satisfy criteria
    (1) and
    (3)
    of Section 39.2(a)
    of the Act.
    The MCB did not make any findings on criteria
    (2),
    (4),
    (5),
    (6), and
    (7).
    For reasons discussed below,
    the Board
    hereby remands the case to the MCD for clarification of its vote.
    The Board held a hearing on January 25,
    1991.
    CQR filed its
    post hearing Brief on January 31,
    1991.
    The NCB filed
    its Brief
    on February 11,
    1991.
    CQR’s Reply Brief was filed on February
    21,
    1991.
    Various interested parties that participated in the
    hearings before the MCB,
    including the City of Centralia, James
    B. Wham, Daniel R. Price,
    and Residents for Environmental Safety
    (“RES”) by its attorney Harold K. Pike, have filed petitions for
    leave to intervene or
    in the alternative to file amicus curiae
    briefs in this proceeding before the Board.
    CQR moved to strike
    these petitions.
    The Hearing Officer denied the motion to
    intervene but allowed the filing of amicus curiae briefs.
    The
    interested parties have filed amicus curiae briefs and a motion
    to reconsider the Hearing Officer’s denial.
    On February 25,
    1991,
    CQR moved to strike portions of the amicus curiae briefs
    filed by the interested parties.
    The Board hereby upholds the Hearing Officer’s decision
    denying leave to intervene and granting leave to file amicus
    119—59
    2
    curiae briefs.
    This is consistent with past practice and
    precedent of the Board.
    Laidlaw Waste Systems,
    Inc.
    v. McHenry
    County Board, PCB 88-27,
    90 PCB 135
    (June 16,
    1988).
    The Board
    notes that the interested parties have raised issues of
    jurisdiction and unconstitutionality of the statute.
    The Board
    will not address those issues at this time.
    The Board denies CQR’s motion to strike portions of the
    amicus curiae briefs.
    The Board is able to determine and exclude
    from its consideration material in these briefs which is outside
    the scope of the Board’s review.
    The Board accepts the amicus
    curiae briefs of the interested parties to the extent those
    briefs address issues properly before the Board,
    i.e., those
    discussions pertaining to criteria
    (1)
    and
    (3)
    of Section 39.2(a)
    of the Act.
    DISCUSSION
    Pursuant to Sections 39(c)
    and 39.2(a)
    of the Act,
    a new
    regional pollution control facility is required to request and
    receive siting approval from the local county board before
    a
    development or construction permit is issued by the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency
    (“Agency”).
    Section 39.2(a)
    provides that an applicant seeking site approval must demonstrate
    compliance with each of the enumerated criteria of this section
    before the county board can grant approval.
    The decision of the
    county board is reviewable by the Board pursuant to Section 40.1
    of the Act.
    The Board reviews a county board’s decision on each
    of the contested criteria to determine if that decision is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    In the case before
    the Board now, the MCB made a determination on only two of the
    applicable criteria.
    (R. at C3575-C3577.)
    The transcripts
    reveal confusion as to whether or not the MCD needed to make a
    determination on all the criteria.
    (R.
    at C3566—C3576.)
    Therefore,
    while not raised by the parties, the Board must
    address whether it is necessary to remand this case back to the
    MCB for clarification of its decision where a county board has
    made a determination on only two criteria.
    In E
    & E Hauling,
    Inc.
    v. Pollution Control Board,
    116
    Ill.App.3d 586,
    71 Ill.Dec.
    587 451 N.E.2d 555
    (2nd Dist.
    1983),
    the court confronted the issue of whether a county board must
    give specific reasons for its determination for a given criteria.
    In determining that the county board did not have to give
    specific reasons,
    the court stated that the county board needs to
    “indicate which of the criteria,
    in its view, have or have not
    been met,
    and this will be sufficient if the record supports
    these conclusions so that an adequate review of the
    .
    .
    decision may be made.”
    (Emphasis added.)
    In Waste Management v. Pollution Control Board,
    175
    Ill.App.3d 1023,
    125 Ill.Dec.
    524,
    530 N.E.2d 682
    (2nd Dist.
    119—60
    3
    1988),
    one issue presented to the court was whether the Board
    erred by reviewing only one of four contested criteria.
    On
    review from the county board,
    the Board determined that the
    county board’s decision on the one criterion was not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence and, because an applicant must
    satisfy each and every criteria, upheld the county board’s
    decision without addressing any of the remaining contested
    criteria.
    On appeal,
    the court stated,
    “Although
    the Act does not specifically require the
    PCB to review each of the challenged criteria in the
    event it can affirm on any one of the criteria, we
    believe the statutory duty to review the decision and
    reasons for the decision of the county board pursuant
    to section 40.1 requires the PCB to review and to
    decide whether all the challenged findings of the
    county board are against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    It is clearly more efficient for the PCB to
    conduct a complete review of all challenged criteria,
    thereby presenting a complete record in the event of an
    appeal.”
    “As a matter of judicial economy and efficiency,
    and in
    light of the PCB’s role as an administrative body possessing
    expertise in this area, we believe the PCB has a statutory
    obligation under section 40.1 to conduct a complete review
    of all challenged statutory criteria under the Act in its
    initial review of an appeal from the decision of a local
    board.”
    (125 Ill.Dec.
    at 533—534.)
    The court in Waste Nana~ementfound that the Board must
    review
    ~JJ,
    contested criteria because otherwise a partial review
    leading to a remand order from the courts “would extend the
    review process and promote multiple appeals.”
    The Board finds
    this same logic applicable to the county board level.
    The Act
    clearly indicates that the county board
    is to make the decision
    whether to approve or disapprove an application for siting
    approval based on the criteria of Section 39.2(a).
    At the county
    board level, all the applicable criteria require a finding.
    Remand is necessary to provide a complete decision for the Board
    to review, to prevent extending the review process and to conform
    with applicable case law.
    The Board now,
    for purposes of review, directs the
    MCD
    to
    clarify its position on each of the remaining applicable criteria
    of Section 39.2(a)
    of the Act.
    Anything less leaves an ambiguity
    which the Board itself cannot clarify.
    By remanding this case
    for a complete determination on all the criteria, the Board
    provides instruction to the MCB and avoids future confusion and
    uncertainty on what is required for a final decision.
    Nothing in
    this opinion should be construed to imply that the Board requires
    any additional hearings on this matter.
    119—61
    4
    This action does not activate either Section 39.2(e)
    or
    40.1(d) which provide for automatic approval if no final decision
    is made by the county board or the Board.
    The Second District
    Appellate Court has held that “the final action that a county
    board must take
    .
    .
    .
    need only be sufficiently final to justify
    an appeal to the PCB.”
    McHenry County Landfill v. Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency,
    154 I1l.App.3d 89,
    106 Ill.Dec.
    665,
    506 N.E.2d 372
    (2nd Dist,
    1987)
    .
    In addition,
    in City of
    Rockford v.
    County of Winnebago,
    175 Ill.App.3d
    1023,
    134
    Ill.Dec.
    244 530 N.E.2d 682
    (2nd Dist.
    1989)
    the court found that
    a remand order from the Board is a proper and final order within
    its 120-day decision period.
    ORDER
    The Board hereby remands this case back to the Marion County
    Board for a final determination on the remaining applicable
    criteria of Section 39.2(a).
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy N. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board
    hereby certify t~t the above Order was adopted on the
    __________
    day of
    ________________,
    1991, by
    a vote of
    Dorothy M(/Gunn,
    Clerk
    Illinois pollution Control Board
    119—62

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