ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June 20,
    1991
    THE GRIGOLEIT
    COMPANY,
    )
    Petitioner
    )
    )
    V.
    )
    PCB 89—184
    )
    (Permit Appeal)
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by J. Anderson):
    On May 30,
    1991,
    the Grigoleit Company (“Grigoleit”) filed a
    Motion asking the Board to impose sanctions upon the Agency for
    exceeding the scope of the Board’s November 29,
    1990 Opinion and
    Order.
    Grigoleit requests the Board to bar the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency (“Agency”)
    from filing any other
    pleadings in this matter, to direct the Agency to pay Grigoleit’s
    expenses in obtaining any order pursuant to its motion, and to
    order the Agency to issue an operating permit and declare the
    Agency’s April 25,
    1991 denial of Grigoleit’s operating permit
    null and void.
    On June 7,
    1991,
    the Agency filed a response to
    the motion.
    Before proceeding any further, we will first summarize the
    procedural history that lead to the current motion.
    On October
    12,
    1989,
    the Agency denied Grigoleit’s application for renewal
    of its air operating permit.
    Grigoleit appealed the denial on
    November 13,
    1989.
    On November 29,
    1990,
    the Board remanded the
    case to the Agency so that the Agency could elicit the
    information that it requested in subparagraphs 2(a)
    and
    (b)
    of
    its October 11,
    1989 permit denial letter and,
    in turn, determine
    whether Grigoleit was in compliance with 35
    Ill.
    Adm. Code
    215.301.
    Subparagraphs 2(a) and
    (b)
    of that letter read as
    follows:
    2.
    Your application fails to provide proof of
    compliance with 35 Ill. Adm. Code 215.204(h),
    (j)
    and 215.301.
    The following information
    is required to assess compliance with these
    rules:
    a.
    Provide usage and percentage by
    volume for each ingredient in ink
    and solvent used for each coating
    application.
    b.
    Provide the weight percentage of

    2
    the volatile organic compound in
    the ink and solvent and the amount
    of ink and solvent used per hour.
    In a letter dated January 10,
    1991, the Agency attempted to
    elicit certain information from Grigoleit.
    On January 25,
    1991,
    Grigoleit provided information to the Agency which it claims
    demonstrates that it is
    in compliance with 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    215.301.
    On April 25,
    1991, the Agency again denied Grigoleit’s
    application for renewal of its operating permit.
    Grigoleit filed
    its motion for sanctions in response to the Agency’s January 10,
    1991 letter and January 25,
    1991 permit denial.
    In its motion for sanctions, Grigoleit claims that the
    Agency, via its January 10,
    1991 letter and its April
    25,
    1991
    permit denial,
    exceeded the scope of the Board’s remand order and
    that the Agency has no authority to deny Grigoleit an operating
    permit or consider Grigoleit’s January 25,
    1991 letter an
    application for an operating permit.
    In its response, the Agency agrees that,
    in its January 10,
    1991 letter,
    it asked Grigoleit to provide information regarding
    compliance with 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 215.301.
    The Agency also notes
    that, because it obtained information which indicated that a new
    emission source was present at Grigoleit’s facility and that the
    operation of the various air emission sources at the plant may
    generate certain emissions, discharges,
    or wastes,
    it asked
    Grigoleit to provide information to demonstrate that its
    operation of the equipment and the emissions were in compliance
    with the regulations.
    The Agency also argues that the Board’s
    November 20,
    1991 Opinion and Order did not require the Agency to
    base any future permitting decision only on the state of affairs
    as of the date of Grigoleit’s first permit application
    (i.e.,
    July 12,
    1989)
    and that Section 39(a)
    of the Environmental
    Protection Act (“Act”) requires the Agency to examine the
    additional operations at the facility to ensure that the
    operations will not cause a violation of the Act or regulations.
    A review of the Agency’s January 10,
    1991 letter indicates
    that the Agency went beyond the Board’s November 20,
    1990 mandate
    in three respects.
    First, with respect to 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    215.301, the Agency went beyond the Board’s mandate when it
    attempted to elicit information regarding additional operations
    at Grigoleit’s facility.
    It appears that although Grigoleit
    informed the Agency of the existence of the additional operations
    in its July 12,
    1989 permit application, the Agency chose not to
    express any concern about the operations in its October 11,
    1989
    permit denial.
    Rather, the Agency waited until its January 10,
    1991 letter and until after the Board’s remand to express its
    concern over the additional operations.
    The Agency cannot now
    express concern about the additional operations in this permit
    appeal at this juncture, nor can it argue that the Board did not

    3
    require the Agency to base its review only on the state of
    affairs at Grigoleit’s facility as of the date of its earlier
    permit application.
    Although we did not explicitly state that
    our November 29,
    1990 mandate was limited in scope,
    it is
    implicit in any remand order that the order is limited to only
    those facts that were before the Agency when it denied the
    permit.
    To hold otherwise would allow the Agency,
    in effect, to
    conduct a de novo permit review on remand.
    Earl Bradd v.
    IEPA,
    PCB 90-173
    p.
    6
    (May 9,
    1991).
    As for the Agency’s argument that
    Section 39(a)
    of the Environmental Protection Act would not allow
    the Agency to issue a permit
    if Grigoleit’s operations would
    cause violations, we remind the Agency that it already made its
    39(a)
    determination in this case when it reviewed Grigoleit’s
    permit application and chose not to list its concerns regarding
    Grigoleit’s additional operations in its October 11,
    1989 permit
    denial letter.
    Second, the Agency went beyond the Board’s mandate when it
    attempted to elicit information regarding the violation of 35
    Ill. Adm. Code 215.204(h)
    and
    (j).
    In our November 29,
    1990
    Opinion and Order, we determined that there was sufficient
    information in Grigoleit’s permit application for the Agency to
    determine that Grigoleit’s emissions were exempt from and that
    Grigoleit did not violate these regulatory sections.
    (see
    Grigoleit at
    14,
    116 PCB 260
    (November 29,
    1990)).
    Accordingly,
    we will not allow the Agency to cite these two sections when we
    expressly limited the Agency’s scope of review on remand to
    a
    determination of whether Grigoleit is in compliance with 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 215.301.
    Bradd, PCB 90—173 p.
    6
    (May 9,
    1991).
    Third, the Agency went beyond the Board’s mandate when it
    attempted to obtain additional information regarding possible
    land violations at the facility that were first cited in the
    Agency’s October 11,
    1990 denial letter.
    Denial reason
    3 of that
    letter read as follows:
    You have been previously notified by the
    Agency’s Division of Land Pollution Control
    of apparent violations of 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code
    Sections 722.111,
    722.112, 722.134,
    725.152,
    725.116 and 725.273.
    Since these violations
    are still outstanding, pursuant to sections
    21 and 39 of the Act, no permit may be
    granted.
    In our November 29,
    1990 Opinion and Order, we struck denial
    reason
    3 and stated,
    in part,
    that if the Agency had waste
    concerns,
    the proper mechanism to address those concerns was
    through an enforcement action rather than the denial of an air
    permit.
    (see Grigoliet at 16,
    116 PCB 262
    (November 29,
    1990)).
    Accordingly, we will not allow the Agency to cite possible land
    violations when we expressly struck denial reason
    3 and limited

    4
    the Agency’s scope of review on remand to a determination of
    whether Grigoleit is in compliance with 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    215.301.
    Bradd,
    PCB 90—173 p.
    6
    (May 9,
    1991).
    Based on the above, we find that the Agency has not complied
    with the Board’s November 20,
    1991 Order.
    Accordingly, we hereby
    grant Grigoleit’s motion for sanctions.
    Rather than barring the
    Agency from filing any other pleading regarding any related issue
    or directing the Agency to reimburse Grigioleit for its costs
    associated with this motion, however, we find that the most
    appropriate sanction is to declare the Agency’s January 10,
    1991
    letter and April 25,
    1991 denial letter null and void.
    This
    matter is again remanded to the Agency for the sole purpose of
    eliciting the information requested in subparagraphs
    (a) and
    (b)
    of denial reason
    2 of the Agency’s October 11,
    1989 denial letter
    in order to determine whether Grigoleit is in compliance with 35
    Ill. Adm. Code 215.301.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Board Members J. Dumelle and B. Forcade dissented.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution control
    Board,
    hereby certify thaf
    he above Order was adopted on the
    _____________
    day of
    ___________________,
    1991 by a vote of
    ~z/~i
    );~.
    Dorothy M. ~ann, Clerk
    Illinois P~,llutionControl Board

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