ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    May 9,
    1991
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    Complainant,
    AC 90—79
    )
    (EPA No.
    369-90-AC)
    v.
    )
    (Administrative Citation)
    )
    AL SPRINGMAN,
    )
    Respondent.
    MR.
    WILLIAM
    SELTZER
    APPEARED
    ON
    BEHALF
    OF
    THE
    ILLINOIS
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
    MR.
    AL SPRINGMAN APPEARED PRO SE.
    OPINION
    AND
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by J.
    C.
    Marlin):
    This matter comes before the Board upon a petition for review
    of an administrative citation
    (“citation”)
    filed by Al Springman
    on October
    2, 1990.
    The citation was issued on August 31,
    1990 by
    the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (“Agency”)
    pursuant
    to Section 31.1(d)
    of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
    (“Act”)
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1001 et seq.)
    Hearing was held
    on January
    4,
    1991
    at the Jersey
    County
    Courthouse,
    Jerseyville,
    Illinois.1
    No
    members
    of
    the
    public
    attended.
    The Agency presented one witness, Allyn Colantino, field
    investigator for the Agency.
    Mr. Alan Woahi testified on behalf
    of Mr.
    Springman, who also testified in his defense.
    The Agency
    filed its brief on February 13,
    1991.
    Mr.
    Springinan did not file
    a
    brief.
    The
    Hearing
    Officer,
    Joseph
    Kelleher,
    filed
    his
    Memorandum of Hearing and Order on December 19,
    1990.
    The Order
    stated that Respondent’s credibility was at issue in this case.
    BACKGROUND
    The citation was issued to Springman as the owner of a tract
    of land located in Piasa Township, Jersey County,
    Illinois.
    The
    tract
    carries site code number 0838060005
    by the Agency and
    is
    known
    to
    the
    Agency
    as
    Piasa
    Township/Springman.
    It
    is not
    a
    permitted landfill.
    The 80 acre site is flatland in agricultural
    use but contains
    a
    rolling wooded
    area
    (R.37).
    The site also
    contains
    a
    drained
    pond,
    which
    is
    abutted by
    a
    ravine
    on
    its
    1 The transcript is cited as
    “R.
    —.
    122—147

    2
    southern side.
    A small rental house is situated on the back of the
    site.
    On the basis of an inspection conducted by Allyn Colantino on
    July
    7,
    1990,
    the Agency determined that Springman had operated
    the site in violation of Section 21(q) (1),
    (q) (4) and
    (q) (5) of the
    Act
    and requested the
    Board
    to
    impose
    a
    penalty
    of
    $1,500.00.
    Springman filed a timely Petition for Review.
    APPLICABLE
    LAW
    Section 21(q)
    of the Act states:
    No person
    shall
    in violation of subdivision
    (a)
    of
    Section
    21,
    cause
    or
    allow
    the open
    dumping of any waste in a manner which results
    in any of the following occurrences at a dump
    site:
    1.
    litter;
    4.
    deposition
    of
    waste
    in
    standing
    or
    flowing
    waters;
    5.
    proliferation of disease vectors;
    Penalties in actions of this type are $500 for each provision,
    plus any hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency.
    Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1042(b) (4).
    DISCUSSION
    The Agency
    initially inspected Mr.
    Springinan’s property
    on
    July 7,
    1990.
    At that time, the inspector noted what he considered
    to
    be
    several
    violations,
    three
    of
    which
    were
    cited
    in
    the
    administrative citation.
    A site sketch and numerous photographs
    were introduced in support of the inpsector’s testimony.
    The Agency based their allegation of open dumping resulting
    in
    litter upon the presence of
    “white goods”,
    refuse and sewer
    sludge.
    According to the inspector’s testimony the “white goods”,
    e.g., porcelain coated objects such as refrigerators,
    stoves and
    utility items, stood next to an outbuilding (R.39-40)
    alternately
    referred to as a rental property.
    A nearby area contained what the
    Agency inspector termed an “open dump site” measuring approximately
    150 feet by 150 feet.
    This dump site contained white goods, tires,
    car parts,
    a motorcycle,
    landscape waste, clothes, wire,
    fencing,
    122—148

    3
    couches,
    chairs,
    T.V.s,
    a piano,
    toys,
    paper,, cardboard,
    windows
    and
    frames,
    rugs,
    glass,
    pipe,
    •lawn
    mowers,
    lumber,
    dry
    wall,
    treated sewage,
    garbage, used diapers,
    food containers,
    bottles,
    cans
    and
    food waste
    (R.14).
    A
    neighbor
    purportedly
    told
    the
    inspector that Mr. Springman dumped on his property once a week on
    the average and that the dumping had been going
    on for
    13 years
    (R.35).
    The
    Agency
    also
    charged the
    Respondent with
    open
    dumping
    resulting
    in
    the
    deposition
    of
    refuse
    in
    standing
    or
    flowing
    waters.
    Parts
    of
    the
    waste
    and
    debris
    described
    above
    were
    deposited into standing or flowing water..
    The standing water was
    contained in a ravine described as twelve feet deep
    (R.23).
    This
    ravine was located
    south
    of’ a
    dam
    in the pond area
    (R.40—41).
    Various appliances,
    plastic, tires,
    lumber, wind—blown debris and
    paper were in the water
    (R.24).
    Colantino also testified that treated sewer sludge had been
    deposited
    on the premises
    (R.lO).
    Mr.
    Cruthis
    of the Brighton
    treatment plant told the inspector that approximately 150 tons per
    year
    were
    annually deposited
    on
    the Springman
    property at
    the
    owner’s request.
    Mr. Springman does not have a permit to accept
    such
    sludge
    or to
    operate
    a
    sanitary
    landfill
    on his property
    (R.11).
    The inspector testified that he was told that the sludge was
    being used for agronomic purposes as a fertilizer substitute.
    If
    applied at agronomic rates,
    •the inspector testified, no permit is
    required.
    If
    incorporated
    into
    the
    ground
    by
    “knifing”
    or
    injecting,
    the Agency considers the application to be agronomic,
    he stated.
    The inspector testified that this sludge, however, “was
    just being dumped”
    (R.l3).
    A subsequent phone conversation with
    Mr. Springman revealed that Mr. Springman was not incorporating the
    sludge into the soil
    at that site
    as
    it would destroy the crop
    necessary for the set—aside program
    (R.22).
    The
    final
    charge
    against
    Mr.
    Springman
    concerned
    the
    proliferation of disease vectors.
    The inspector observed a rat at
    the
    site
    (R.25).
    The inspector testified that
    it was the first
    time he had seen a rat at a facility
    (R.34).
    Some of the waste
    deposited was raw garbage, which could be eaten,
    and clothing and
    rags,
    which
    could
    be
    used
    for
    nesting
    by
    rats
    (R.36).
    The
    inspector also testified that neighbors complained that the area
    was infested with rats.
    (Id.)
    The neighbors were not produced as
    witnesses at hearing.
    Mr.
    Alan Woahi,
    a tenant
    farmer
    on the land Mr.
    Springman
    owns, testified in Mr. Springman’s behalf.
    He has farmed this site
    for
    14
    years.
    With regard
    to the
    Agency’s
    charge
    concerning
    disease vectors, he testified that it would not be unusual to see
    rats on a farm
    (R.49).
    Concerning the sludge application, Woahl
    stated
    that the sludge was
    not
    put on the
    farm by him and he
    122—149

    4
    suspects
    “Brighton”
    did
    so.
    In his
    opinion,
    knifing
    in of the
    sludge would not be good for the crop
    (R.51).
    Woahi also testified concerning the charge that refuse was
    left in standing or flowing waters.
    He testified that he has never
    observed water
    in the pond
    (R.54)
    or
    in the ravine
    (R.55).
    He
    admitted, however, that he “never got far enough over the edge of
    the ravine
    to see if there was rubbish in
    it
    (R.56).
    Finally
    Woahl
    rebutted the allegation that
    open dumping
    occurred.
    He
    couldn’t
    say
    if more rubbish
    is
    there
    now than when
    he
    began
    farming the property
    (Id.).
    He stated that the refuse in Agency
    photographs had not been there for 14 years, in his opinion (R.57).
    Moreover, he had not seen anyone dispose of refuse on the property
    (R.59—60).
    Al Springman testified that he resides at 300 Murray Street,
    Godfrey,
    Illinois.
    He bought the land
    in question
    in 1960.
    He
    attended
    the University
    of
    Illinois
    in
    1940
    and
    was granted
    a
    degree in 1947.
    He is now retired.
    Mr.
    Springman
    admitted
    that
    the
    sludge
    is
    placed
    on
    his
    property.
    He stated he does not charge for Brighton to place the
    sludge there
    (R.70).
    He stated that when he began accepting it he
    told Al Cruthis of the Brighton Water Department he didn’t want to
    make out reports, be subject to inspections or “nothing like that.”
    He expected Brighton to take care of the details
    (R.70-71).
    When examined by the Agency,
    Mr.
    Springman stated that the
    city had delivered sludge for two years.
    He was not aware that you
    needed to fill out any forms or permits for it and would not have
    taken it if he had known
    (R.77-78).
    He admitted that nothing was
    done with the sludge after it was dumped
    (R.78).
    He stated that,
    “after this”,
    he doesn’t
    intend to allow any more sludge
    to be
    placed on the ground.
    Concerning the charge or open dumping Mr. Springman testified
    that “most” of the rubbish seen in the pictures was site—generated.
    The rubbish, he stated, came from tenants.
    The little rubbish not
    site—generated came from rental houses (R.82—84).
    Whatever needs
    to be disposed of “goes out the door”, he testified (R.72).
    Regarding the
    charge concerning
    refuse
    in
    standing
    water,
    Springman testified that both the pond
    and
    the ravine
    are dry
    (R.71).
    He admitted, however, that the ravine would contain water
    after a rain
    (R.80).
    But,
    Mr. Springman asserted, only an “item
    or two” of material was in the ravine, he stated
    (R.74).
    Mr.
    Springman
    testified
    that
    following
    the
    inspection
    he
    attempted to remedy the alleged violations.
    All
    of the refuse
    material seen in the pictures was placed under two and a half feet
    of ground (R.73).
    Moreover, the sludge has been allowed to dry out
    and “kicked up over four acres” to remove it (R.75).
    122—150

    5
    Mr.
    Colantino testified
    in rebuttal
    of
    Mr.
    Springman.
    He
    reiterated
    his
    opinion
    that
    the
    dumping
    of
    sludge
    without
    incorporation constitutes open dumping.
    He also testified that he
    revisited the site November 8, 1990 and December 14, 1990 and found
    exposed refuse on the southwest face of the open dump.
    The cover
    dirt appeared to be less than two feet deep and the refuse had been
    mixed with the dirt to cover the dumping (R.93-94).
    Dirt had been
    pushed over the debris.
    It thinned out until at the far edge no
    dirt
    at all covered the refuse
    (R.98).
    A
    tire pile which
    was
    present at the original inspection was also not affected by the
    cover—up.
    At hearing upon a
    Petition for Review of an administrative
    citation two statutory defenses are available to a Respondent:
    (a)
    to prove that the violation did not occur or
    (b) that it occurred
    but was due to uncontrollable circumstances.
    Ill. Rev. Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111
    1/2,
    par.
    1031
    (d)(2).
    Neither has
    been
    successfully
    asserted by Mr.
    Springman.
    A subsequent “cleanup” of the site is
    not a statutory defense.
    The evidence adduced at hearing and the photographs submitted
    as exhibits show that dumping occurred on Mr. Springman’s property.
    Some of this was household trash and rubbish, including white goods
    and treated sewage or sludge.
    The record is clear that the sludge
    was placed on the site at Mr.
    Springman’s request.
    It was not
    being used at agronomic rates.
    While Mr. Springman asserts that
    he would not have allowed
    it to be placed there had he known it
    required a permit, his lack of knowledge does not provide a defense
    to the administrative citation.
    Nor is his hope that the City of
    Brighton sewer plant manager would do so enough to relieve him from
    a finding that a violation occurred.
    We find that Mr. Springman
    caused or allowed open dumping on his property in a manner which
    resulted in litter,
    in violation of Section 21(q)(1).
    We
    also
    find that
    the Agency
    has
    proven
    that refuse
    was
    allowed to accumulate in standing water.
    The inspector’s testimony
    was that he observed refuse in water in the ravine.
    Mr. Springman
    allowed that water
    may flow through the ravine
    at
    times.
    Mr.
    Springman’s testimony also did not rebut the presence of refuse in
    the~ravine
    but
    merely
    contended
    that
    the
    amount
    was
    small.
    Therefore,
    the
    Agency
    has
    also
    proven
    a
    violation
    of
    Section
    21(q) (4).
    Finally, we believe that the Agency has proven that the open
    dumping Observed has led to the proliferation of disease vectors.
    A rat was observed at the site.
    While we understand that many
    farms contain rats, the conditions exhibited here are not part of
    a normal farming operation.
    Our examination of the documentary
    evidence and testimony shows that
    a habitat for reproduction of
    rats was provided by the dumping
    of
    clothing,
    rags,
    refuse and
    white goods.
    A food supply was supplied by the household trash and
    122—15
    1

    6
    garbage evi&ent in pictures and testimony.
    Therefore, we find the
    Agency has p:roven a violation of Section 21(q) (5)
    of the Act.
    ORDER
    1.
    R~spondentis hereby found to have been in violation on
    July 7,
    199(1 of Ill. Rev. Stat.
    1989, ch. 111 1/2, pars. 1021(q) (1)
    and (q)(4) and
    (q)(5).
    2.
    Within
    45
    days
    of
    this
    Order
    Respondent
    shall,
    by
    certified cb~eckor money order, pay a civil penalty in the amount
    of $1,500 p~yab1eto the Illinois Environmental Protection Trust
    Fund.
    Such ~paymentshall be sent to:
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    Fiscal Service Division
    2200 Churchill Road
    Springfield,
    Illinois 62706
    Respondent ~ha1l
    also place his Federal Employee Identification
    Number or So~cialSecurity Number upon the certified check or money
    order.
    Any such penalty not paid within the time prescribed shall
    incur intere~stat the rate set forth in subsection
    (a)
    of Section
    1003 of Illinois Income Tax Act,
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    120,
    par. 10-1003), from the date payment is due until the date payment
    is received..
    Interest shall not accrue during the pendency of an
    appeal, during which payment of the penalty is stayed.
    3.
    Dc~cketA in this matter is hereby closed.
    4.
    Within
    30 days
    of this
    Order,
    the Agency shall
    file
    a
    statement
    of.
    its hearing
    costs,
    supported by an affidavit,
    with
    the Board amd with service upon Al Springman.
    Within the same 30
    days,
    the
    Clerk
    of
    the
    Pollution
    Control
    Board
    shall
    file
    a
    statement of the Board’s costs,
    supported by affidavit and with
    service upon Al Springman.
    Such filings shall be entered in Docket
    B in this matter.
    5.
    Respondent
    is
    hereby
    given
    leave
    to
    file
    a
    reply/objection to the filings as ordered in paragraph
    4 of this
    Order withim 45 days of this Order.
    Section
    41
    of
    the Environmental Protection Act,
    Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1989,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1041,
    provides for appeal of final
    Orders of
    the
    Board within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme Court
    of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    122—152

    7
    I, Dorothy M.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that the above Opinion and Order was adopted
    on the
    ___________
    day of ______________________,
    1991 by
    a vote of
    7—o
    Dorothy N. G4~1n, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
    122—153

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