ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

May 9, 1991

FRANKLIN DR. & RUTH JEAN VICKERS

Complainants,

v.

)

PCB 91—42

(Enforcement)

VILLAGE OF MILLSTADT,

Respondent.

ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J.C. Marlin):

The complaint in this matter was filed March 11, 1991 by

Franklin and Ruth Vickers (“Vickers”) against the Village of

Millstadt (“Village”) alleging violation of the Illinois

Environmental Protection Act (“Act”) and Board noise regulations

caused by the use of an electronic siren. On March 19, 1991 the

Village filed a motion to extend the time to file a response to the

complaint. The Board issued an Order dated March 28, 1991 granting

the Village the additional time requested. The Board received the

Village’s filing on April 19, 1991. The Board construes the filing

as a motion to dismiss the action on the grounds that it is

frivolous. The Vickers filed a reply on April 25, 1991.

In the Village’s motion for extension of time the Village

questioned whether legal limits on noise levels existed for

emergency uses, informed the Board that sound readings had been

taken, outlined the purpose of the siren as to alert the volunteer

fire department and public to emergencies but admitted that “the

additional ringing as a noon whistle is open to question as to it’s

importance.” The motion added two points: 1) the common good

outweighed the right of someone to object to the whistle’s use, and

2) the use of a siren for noon and curfew whistle is something

which should be determined at the local level. The Village went

on to question whether the Vickers requested relief, i.e. its

relocation of the whistle to a non-offensive location, was

possible. The filing also attached a petition from a group

denominated “Save Our Siren” which contained signatures.

The Vicker’s reply gives background information regarding the

history of their complaint, encloses decibel readings taken of the

siren and a map of Millstadt, questions the foundation for the

petition and the signatures filed by Millstadt and concludes that

the Vickers would like to see the new siren moved to a more

suitable location.

The Board may dismiss a case filed with it if it finds that

the suit is frivolous. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 111 1/2, par. 1031(b).

122—12 7

---

The Boar~~as determined the term “frivolous” to mean those cases

which

~faL~L

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

(RES 89—2; June 8, 1989) The Village has raised two grounds for

dismissal In this regards: the emergency nature of the siren and

the inahiL~ityto remove the siren to a location that doesn’t offend

someone~. ~e find neither of these grounds satisfies the legal test

and we, tinerefore, deny the Village’s motion to dismiss.

The V’illage claims the electronic siren is for emergency use

and ther~ore falls within a statutory exception concerning

permissibLe noise levels. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 901.107. The

Village athmits however that its use as a horn whistle is “open to

question..’~ Our review of the complaint shows that the Vickers have

complained of the whistle’s use to signal time as well as possible

fires. Th~eVillage does not assert that the whistle’s use in this

manner fa1..ls under the exception for sound emitted from emergency

warning i~e~vicesgiven by the legislature. If it did, the most

invasive wses for non—emergency situations would be given blanket

protection~. Such a reading would lead to an absurd result, a

constructi~on we do not believe the legislature intended.

Therefore,. we find the motion deficient on this ground.

LastLy, the Village contends that the Board cannot grant the

relief req~uestedby the Vickers, namely, moving the siren to a

suitable LDcation.. Our reading of the complaint shows that the

Vickers re~uestthe siren be moved or that the noise pollution be

stopped. ~2omplaint, p. 4) We find that some type of relief which

does not Impact upon the emergency functions maybe within the

Board’s pcx~werto order. We do not believe the speculation as to

the diffic~ultyin formulating a remedy deprives the Board of its

ability t~ fashion relief should it find that noise pollution has

been prove~n. We therefore find the Village’s motion deficient on

this groumr.d also.

The VT~illage of Millstadt’s motion to dismiss is denied. This

matter is ~accepted for hearing.

IT

IS~

SO ORDERED.

J. Anderson concurred.

I, Dc~rothyN. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control

Board, her~ebycertif that the above Order was adopted on the

9~

da~ of

______________________,

1991, by a vote of

~

~.

Dorothy M. 4(inn, Clerk

Illinois POllution Control Board

122—128