ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
August 22,
199.
ST. CLAIR COUNTY,
)
Complainant,
AC 90—64
(Dockets A
&
B)
v.
)
(Administrative Citation)
)
LOUIS I.
.MUND,
)
)
Respondent.
OPINION
AND
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by B. Forcade):
This
matter
comes
before the Board upon a petition for
review of an administrative citation (“citation”)
filed by Louis
Mund on July 30,
1990.
The citation was issued on July
5,
1990,
by St. Clair County (“County”) pursuant to Section 31.1 of the
Environmental Protection Act
(Ill. Rev. Stat.
1990,
supp.,
ch.
111 1/2, par. 1001 et seq.)
(the Act) and a delegation agreement
with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(the Agency)
under Section 4(r)
of the Act.
The citation, received by the
Board on July 20,
1990,
cited two violations of Section 21 of the
Act.
On May 17,
1991, hearing was held in Belleville,
St. Clair
County,
Illinois.
Mr. Mund did not appear at hearing nor was
counsel present for Mr. Mund.
On May 30, 1991, the Board
received a Motion to Stay Finding filed by Mr. Mund’s counsel.
The Motion requested that the Board stay its finding until the
issues presented in a motion filed in three companion cases ~
Clair County v. Arthur Fields, AC 90-65,
St. Clair County v.
Sandra
L.
Petroff, AC 90—66,
and St. Clair CountY v. Timothy E.
Doctor, AC 90-67 were resolved.
No motion to stay was filed
regarding the open burning citation.
The issues raised in the
Motion filed in the companion cases are the only issues raised in
this appeal.
For the reasons enunciated below the Board denies
the Notion to Stay Finding regarding the litter citation and
finds Mr. Mund in violation of Section 21(q) (1)
and
(3) of the
Act.
BACKGROUND
The citation was issued to Louis Mund as present
owner/operator of a facility located in St. Clair County,
Illinois.
The facility is operated without an Agency permit and
is commonly known to the Agency as Sugar Loaf/Mund and is
designated with the site code No.
1638190005.
125
—3 8 1
2
On the basis of an inspection conducted by Pamela S. Quandt
and David L. Walchshauser on May 9, 1990,
St. Clair County
determined that Louis Mund had operated the facility in violation
of Section 21(q) (1) and
(3).
The County subsequently issued, a
citation on July 5,
1990 for violation of Section 21(q) (1) and
(3) and noted that Louis Mund is subject to a civil penalty of
one thousand dollars
($1000) for the violations.
Louis Nund then
timely filed a petition for review with the Board.
APPLICABLE
LAW
Section 21(q)
of the Act provides,
in part,
that:
No person shall in violation of subdivision
(a) of Section 21, cause or allow the open
dumping of any waste in a manner which
results in any of the following occurrences
at the dump site:
1.
litter;
3.
open burning;
Ill. Rev. Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch. 111 1/2,
par.
1021
*****
Section 31.1 of the Act sets forth the procedural aspects of
an administrative citation.
Section 31.1 provides,
in part,
that:
a)
The prohibitions specified in
subsections
(p) and
(q)
of Section
21 of this Act shall be enforceable
either by administrative citation
under this Section or as otherwise
provided by this Act.
b)
Whenever Agency personnel or
personnel of a
unit
of local
government to which the Agency has
delegated its functions pursuant to
subsection
(r)
of Section 4 of this
Act, on the basis of direct
observation, determine that any
person has violated any provision
of subsection
(p) or
(q)
of Section
21 of this Act, the Agency or such
unit of local government may issue
and serve an administrative
citation upon such person within
th~nm6Uedaysafter the date of the
12
5—382
3
observed violation.
Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch. 111 1/2,
par.
1031.1
*****
Penalties in action of the type here brought are prescribed
by Section 42(b) (4) of the Act which provides:
In an administrative citation action under
Section 31.1 of this Act, any person found to
have violated any provision of subsection
(p)
or
(q) of Section 21 of this Act shall pay a
civil penalty of $500 for each violation of
each such provision, plus any hearing costs
incurred by the Board and the Agency.
Such
penalties shall be made payable to the
Environmental Protection Trust Fund to be
used in accordance with the provisions of “An
Act creating the Environmental Protection
Fund”, approved September 22,
1979 as
amended; except that if a unit of local
government issued the administrative citation
50
of the civil penalty shall be payable to
the unit of local government.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat. 1990 supp.,
ch.
11.
1/2,
par.
1042(b) (4).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Mund’s May 30,
1991 Motion requests that the Board stay
its finding on Mr. Mund’s requested review of the citation for
violation of Section 21(q)(1).
Mr. Nund requests that the Board
stay such finding until the Board determines what cOnstitutes
“litter” in the related cases AC 90—65, AC 90-66 and AC 90—67.
At a consolidated hearing on AC 90-65, AC 90-66 and AC 90—
67 a Motion to Dismiss the citation for violation of Section
21(q) (1) was filed.
The Motion to Dismiss challenges the,
issuance of the citation for litter based on the definition of
litter.
The Notion states that “litter”, is not defined in the
Act. “Litter”
is defined in Black’s
Law
Dictionary Fifth Edition
as:
•
.
.
dumping, throwing, placing, depositing,
or leaving, or causing to be dumped, thrown,
deposited or left any refuse of any kind or
any object or substance which tends to
pollute, mar or deface into, upon or about:
I) Any public street, highway,
alley,
road,
right-of-way, park or other public place, or
125—383
4
any lake,
stream, water course, or other body
of water, except by direction of some public
officer or employee authorized by law to
direct or permit such acts; or
II) Any private property without the consent
of the owner or occupant of such property.
(Motion p.
1—2)
The Motion further argues that the “area of the alleged
violati~nswas privately owned by Louis Nund” and Respondents had
Mr. Mund’s permission to dump and burn.
(Motion p.
2).
Therefore, the Respondent argues, that the open dumping could not
result in “litter”.
The County responds to the arguments set forth in the Motion
by citing to the definition of “litter” contained in The Litter
Control Act, effective January
1,
1974.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990
supp.,
ch.
38, par. 86—1 et seq..
“Litter” means any discarded
used or unconsumed substance or waste and may include:
any garbage, trash, refuse, debris,
rubbish, grass clippings or other lawn or
garden waste,
newspaper, magazines, glass,
metal, plastic or paper containers or other
packaging construction material, abandoned
vehicle
.
.
.
or anything else of an
unsightly or unsanitary nature, which has
been discarded, abandoned or otherwise
disposed of improperly.
Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1990
supp.,
ch.
38, par.
86-3.’
The Litter Control Act was in effect when Public Act 85-
1346,
effective August 31,
1988, added Section 21(q)
as it now
reads to the Act.
Thus, when the General Assembly adopted
Section 21(q) (1)
of the Act the General Assembly already had a
definition of “litter”
in the Illinois Revised Statutes.
“Unless
context of a statute indicates otherwise, words or phrases that
were used in a prior act pertaining to same subject matter will
be construed to be used in same sense.”
Jones v. Illinois
Department of Rehabilitation Services, 504 F.
Supp.
1244.
The
Litter Control Act clearly pertains to “litter”; thus, the
definition of “litter” the Board should look to is the definition
found in Chapter 38.
The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition
(1982), defines “litter” as
“a disorderly accumulation of objects
esp.
(sic)
carelessly discarded waste materials or scraps”.
The
verb “littering”,
“littered”
or “litters” is defined by the same
source as:
“2. To make untidy by discarding rubbish carelessly
3nd
3. To scatter about”.
“Words used in a statute are to be
;iven their ordinary and popularly understood meaning.”
Kozak v.
125—384
5
Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of
Chicago,
69 Ill.
Dec. 177,
95 Ill.
2d 211,
447 N.E.
2d 394 at 396
(1983).
The ordinary and popular meaning of the word “litter”
also supports the finding of violation under Section 21(q) (1).
Section 21(q) (1) of the Act would be virtually meaningless
if the word “litter” was defined to exclude:
refuse of any kind or any object or substance
which tends to pollute, mar or deface into,
upon or about:.
.
.
Any
private property
without the consent of the owner or occupant
of such property.
(Motion p.
1-2)
Open dumping would almost never lead to “litter” on private
property and the prohibition of Section 2l(q)(1) would seldom be
necessary.
Using respondent’s definition,
an owner or occupant
of property could never violate the litter provisions of Section
2l(q)(l).
Such owner or occupant would be liable for violation
of the 5 remaining prohibitions of Section 21(q).
It is well
settled that in interpreting statutes,
“statutes
should be
construed so that the language is not rendered meaningless or
superfluous.”
People v. Singleton,
82 Ill. Dec.
666,
469 N.
E.
2d 200,
103 Il1.2d 336.
Therefore,
“litter” must be defined in a
manner which gives meaning to the statute.
Adopting the
definition put forward by the Respondent would not do so.
The Board has not explicitly adopted the definition of
“litter” used in Chapter 38.
Neither has the definition cited by
the Respondent been adopted or rejected.
However, the Board has
upheld a citation, issued under Section’21(p)(12),
for “litter”
on the site of a landfill.
(In the Matter of:
Dan Heusinkved, AC
87-25, January 21,
1988).
The Board stated in that opinion that:
the interpretation placed upon Section 21(p)
• (12) by the Agency, which is that it is a
violation of that Section of the Act to fail
to daily collect and contain litter within
the site boundaries,
is the correct
interpretation.
(Heusinkved,
p.
5.)
Thus,
the Board has explicitly held that litter can occur on the
site of a landfill.
The Board’s finding in Heusinkved is
contrary to the definition cited by the Respondent.
The definition of “litter” cited by the Respondents in these
four cases does not apply to “litter” as used in Section 21(q)
(1)
of the Act.
If the Board were to hold that the definition
cited by the Respondent is applicable, the effect would be to
render Section 21(q) (1) virtually meaningless.
In addition, the
Board has previously held that “litter” can occur on a landfill
125—3 85
6
site.
The General Assembly has adopted in Chapter 38 a
definition of “litter” which would give Section 21(q)(1) meaning
and the Board hereby adopts that meaning.
Therefore, the Board
h~1dsthat the word “litter” as used in Section 21(q) (1) of the
Act does include refuse or debris dumped on private property with
the consent of the owner of such property.
Because the Board holds that “litter” includes the refuse
placed on Mr. Nund’s land with his knowledge and consent, the
Board denies the motion to Stay Finding and finds Mr. Mund in
violatio~iof Section 21(q) (1) and
(3) of the Act.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
1.
Respondent is hereby found to have been in
violation on May 9,
1990,
of Ill.
Rev. Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2,
par.
1021(q) (1) and
(3).
2.
Within 45 days of this Order Respondent
shall, by certified check or money order, pay
a civil penalty in the amount of one thousand
dollars ($1,000) payable to the Landfill
Citation Fund.
Such payment shall be sent
to:
Paul Haas
County Collector
#10 Public Square
Belleville,
Il 62220
Any such penalty not paid within the time
prescribed shall incur interest at the rate
set forth in subsection
(a) of Section 1003
•of the Illinois Income Tax Act,
(Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch. 120,
par. 10—1003),
from the date payment is due until the date
payment is received.
Interest shall not
accrue during the pendency of an appeal,
during which payment of the penalty is
stayed.
3.
Docket A in this matter is hereby closed.
4.
Within 30 days of this Order, the County
shall file a statement of its hearing costs,
supported by affidavit, with the Board and
with service upon Respondent.
Within the
same 30 days,
the Clerk of the Pollution
125—386
7
Control Board shall file a statement of the
Board’s costs,
supported by affidavit and
with service upon the Respondent.
Such
filings shall be entered in Docket B of this
matter.
5.
Respondent is hereby given leave to file a
reply/objection to the filings as ordered in
paragraph
4 of this Order within 45 days of
this Order.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2, par. 1041)
provides for appeal of
final Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the
Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy N.
Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, do hereby certify that the abo).~eOpinion and Order was
adopted on the
~9”c!~
day of ~h~’
,
1991, by a
vote of
7~’~
-
•
•
Dorothy M.~Munn,Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
125—38
7