ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
August
22,
1991
ST. CLAIR COUNTY,
Complainant,
AC 90—66
(Dockets A
&
B)
V.
)
(Administrative Citation)
SANDRA
L. PETROFF d/b/a
PETROFF ‘TRUCKING COMPANY,
)
Respondent.
DENNIS HATCH APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE COUNTY.
ANN
FOHNE KEELEY APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
THE
RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by B.
Forcade):
This
matter comes before the Board upon a petition for review
of an administrative citation (“citation”)
filed by Sandra Petroff
on July 31,
1990.
The citation was issued on July 5,
1990, by St.
Clair
County
pursuant
to
Section
31.1
of
the
Environmental
Protection Act
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2, par. 1001
et
seq.)
(the Act)
and
a delegation agreement with the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency
(the Agency) under Section 4(r)
of
the Act.
The citation, received by the Board on July 20,
1990,
cited two violations of Section 21 of the Act.
On Nay 17,
1991,
hearing was held in Belleville,
St. Clair County, Illinois on this
case and three companion cases
(St. Clair County v. Louis Nund, AC
90-64,
St.
Clair County v. Arthur Fields, AC 90—65, and St. Clair
County v. Timothy E. Doctor, AC 90-67).
At hearing,. Ms. Petroff’s
attorney filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Citation and
a Motion to
Dismiss Violation A(i)
(the
littering
violation).
The
issues
presented in the Motions are the only issues raised in the appeal.
For
the reasons enunciated below the Board
finds Ms.
Petroff
in
violation of Section 21(q)(1)
and
(3).
BACKGROUND
The
citation
was
issued
to
Sandra
Petroff
as
present
owner/operator of Petroff Trucking Company.
The company deposited
waste in
a
facility located in
St.
Clair County,
Illinois.
The
facility is operated without an Agency permit and is commonly known
to the Agency as Sugar Loaf/Mund and
is designated with the site
code
No.
1638190005.
Mr.
Louis Mund
is
owner/operator
of
the
facility
(see St. Clair County v.
Louis Mund,
AC 90-64).
On the basis
of an inspection conducted by Pamela
S.
Quandt
and
David
L.
Walchshauser
on
May
9,
1990,
St.
Clair
County
12 5—39 7
2
determined that Sandra Petroff had deposited waste in the facility
in a manner which resulted in violation of Section 21(q)
(1)
and
(3).
The county subsequently issued a citation on July 5, 1990 for
violation
of
Section
21(q)
(1)
and
(3)
and noted
that
Sandra
Petroff is subject to a civil penalty of $1000 for the violation.
Sandra Petroff then timely
filed a petition for review with the
P~ard.
APPLICABLE
LAW
Section 21(q)
of the Act provides,
in part,
that:
No person
shall
in violation
of
subdivision
(a)
of Section
21,
cause
or
allow
the open
dumping of any waste in a manner which results
in any of the following occurrences at the dump
site:
1.
litter;
* **
* *
3.
open burning;
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2,
par. 1021
Section 31.1 of the Act sets forth the procedural aspects of
an administrative citation.
Section 31.1 provides,
in part, that:
a)
The prohibitions specified in subsections
(p)
and
(q)
of
Section
21
of
this Act
shall
be
enforceable
either
by
administrative
citation
under
this
Section or as otherwise provided by this
Act.
b)
Whenever Agency personnel or personnel of
a unit of local government to which the
Agency
has
delegated
its
functions
pursuant to subsection
(r)
of Section
4
of
this
Act,
on
the
basis
of
direct
observation,
determine
that
any
person
has violated any provision of subsection
(p) or
(q) of Section 21 of this Act, the
Agency or such unit of
local government
may
issue
and
serve
an
administrative
citation upon such person within not more
than
60
days
after
the
date
of
the
observed violation.
Ill. Rev. Stat.
1990
supp.,
ch.
111 1/2, par. 1031.1
*****
125—398
3
Penalties in action of the type here brought are prescribed
by Section 42
(b) (4)
of the Act which provides:
In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1
of
this
Act,
any
person
found
to
have
violated
any
provision of subsection
(p) or
(q)
of Section 21 of this
Act shall pay a civil penalty of $500 for each violation
of each such provision, plus any hearing costs incurred
by ‘the Board and the Agency.
Such penalties
shall be
made payable to the Environmental Protection Trust Fund
to be used in accordance with the provisions of “An Act
creating the
Environmental Protection
Fund”,
approved
September 22,
1979 as amended;
except that if a unit of
local government issued the administrative citation 50
of the civil penalty
shall
be payable to the unit
of
local government.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
ill
1/2, par.
1042(b)(4).
DISCUSSION
There were two Motions filed at a consolidated hearing on AC
90-65,
AC 90—66 and AC 90-67.
The first was a Motion to Dismiss
the violation
of
Section
21(q) (1)
was
filed
at
a
consolidated
hearing on AC 90-65,
AC 90-66 and AC 90-67.
The County objected
to the filing of the Motion on the grounds that the Notion was not
timely.
The
County
cited
to
the
Board’s procedural
rules
to
support
its position.
The County also argued that there has been
no showing that material prejudice would result if a deviation from
the timeliness rule was not allowed.
The County is correct that the Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss,
as
a motion preliminary to hearing under the Board’s procedural
rules,
was untimely filed.
However, the Motion articulates the
Respondents
sole
defense
at
hearing.
Therefore,
despite
any
untimeliness in the filing,
the Board must address the arguments
set forth
in the Motion.
In addition, we note that,
the Board’s
Hearing Officer allowed the County time to respond to the Notions
filed
at
hearing,
thus
allowing
the
County
an
opportunity
to
present its arguments on the issues.
It should first be noted that the following exchange occurred
at hearing between
Ms.
Petroff’s counsel and the Board’s Hearing
Officer:
Professor Schoenberger:
With respect to the other violation,
what’s your client’s position?
Ms.
Keeley:
We will plead out to the charges of
open burning.
Professor Schoenberger:
Okay.
Now it’s my understanding that
the attorneys have agreed to submit
125—399
4
the matter of whether littering is
a valid count,
under state
law,
to
the IllinoisPollution Control Board.
Should the Pollution Control Board
decide adverse to you on the plead
that you just placed, legal arguments
you
just
made,
what
would
your
complaints be with
respect to the
count on litter?
Ms.
Keeley:
Will
(sic)
plead out to the charge.
Thus,
Ms.
Petroff’s
attorney
consented
to
judgement
on
the
violation of Section 21(q) (3)
(open burning) and agreed to consent
to judgement
on the violation of Section
21(q) (1)
if the Board
found against the Respondent
on the Motion to Dismiss Violation
A(l). filed
at
hearing.
These
statements
appear
to
negate the
arguments
set
forth
in
the
Motion
to
Dismiss
the
Citation.
Therefore, the Board denies the Motion to Dismiss the Citation.
The Motion to Dismiss Violation challenges the issuance
of
the citation for litter based on the definition of litter.
The
Motion states that “litter” is not defined in the Act. Respondent
points to the definition
of
“litter”
in Black’s Law Dictionary
Fifth Edition which states:
dumping,
throwing, placing,
depositing,
or
leaving, or causing to be dumped,
thrown,
deposited
or
left any refuse
of any kind
or
any
object
or
substance
which
tends
to
pollute, mar or deface
into, upon or about:
I)
Any public
street,
highway,
alley,
road,
right-of-way,
park or other public place,
or.
any lake, stream, water course, or other body
of water,
except by direction of some public
officer
or
employee
authorized
by
law
to
direct or permit such acts; or
II)
Any private property without the consent
of
the
owner
or
occupant
of
such property.
(Motion p.
1—2)
The Motion further argues that the “area of the alleged violations
was privately owned by Louis Mund” and Respondents had Mr. Mund’s
permission
to dump
and
burn.
(Motion
p.
2).
Therefore,
the
Respondent
argues,
that
the
open
dumping
could
not
result
in
“litter”.
The County responds to the arguments set forth
in the Motion
by citing to the definition
o~f “litter” contained in the Litter
Control Act effective January
1,
1974.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1990 supp.,
ch.
38, par. 86—1 et seq..
“Litter” means any discarded used or
125—400
5
unconsumed substance or waste and may include:
•
.
.
any
garbage,
trash,
refuse,
debris,
rubbish,
grass
clippings
or
other
lawn
or
garden
waste,
newspaper,
magazines,
glass,
metal,
plastic or
paper
containers
or
other
packaging
construction
material,
abandoned
vehicle
.
.
•
or anything else of an unsightly
or
unsanitary
nature,
which
has
been
discarded,
abandoned or otherwise disposed of
improperly.
(Ill.
Rev. Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
38,
par.
86—3).
The Litter Control Act, predates Section
(q). ~
Thus,
when
the General Assembly adopted Section 21(q) (1) of the Act it already
had defined
“litter”.
“Unless
context
of
a
statute
indicates
otherwise,
words
or
phrases
that
were
used
in
a
prior
act
pertaining to same subject matter will be construed to be used in
same
sense.”
Jones
v.
Illinois
Department
of
Rehabilitation
Services,
504
F.
Supp.
1244.
The
Litter
Control
Act
clearly
pertains to “litter”;
thus,
the definition of “litter” the Board
should look to is the definition found in Chapter 38.
The
American
Heritage
Dictionary,
Second
College
Edition
(1982), defines “litter” as
“a disorderly accumulation of objects
esp.
(sic)
carelessly discarded waste materials or scraps”.
The
verb “littering”, “littered”
or “litters”
is defined by the same
source as:
“2. To make untidy by discarding rubbish carelessly and
3. To scatter about”.
“Words used in
a statute are to be given
their
ordinary
and
popularly
understood
meaning.”
Kozak
v.
Retirement
Board
of
the Firemen’s
Annuity
and Benefit
Fund
of
Chicago,
69
Ill.
Dec.
177,
95
Iii.
2d 211,
447 N.E.
2d 394 at 396
(1983).
The ordinary and popular meaning of the word “litter”
also supports the finding of violation under Section 21
(q)
(1).
Section 21(q) (1) of the Act would be virtually meaningless if
the word “litter” was defined to exclude:
refuse of any kind or any object or substance
which
tends
to
pollute, mar
or deface
into,
upon
or
about:.
.
.
Any
private
property
without the consent of the owner or occupant
of such property.
(Motion p.
1-2)
Open
dumping
would
almost
never
lead
to
“litter”
on
private
property and the prohibition of Section 21(q)(1) would seldom be
necessary.
Using respondent’s definition, an owner or occupant of
property
could
never
violate
the
litter provisions
of
Section
1
The Litter
Control
Act was effective
January
1,
1974;
Section 21(q)
was effective August 31,
1988.
125—40 1
6
21(q)(1).
Such owner or occupant would be liable for violation of
the
5 remaining prohibitions of Section 21(q).
It is well settled
that in interpreting statutes, “statutes
should be construed so
that the
language
is
not rendered meaningless
or superfluous.”
People v. Singleton,
82 Ill. Dec. 666, 469 N.
E. 2d 200,
103 Ill.2d
336.
Therefore,
“litter” must be defined in a manner which gives
meaning to the statute.
Adopting the definition put forward by the
Respondent would not do so.
The
Board
has
not
explicitly
adopted
the
definition
of
“litter” used in Chapter 38.
Neither has the definition cited by
the Respondent been adopted or rejected.
However, the Board has
upheld a citation, issued under Section 21(p) (12),
for “litter” on
the site of a landfill.
(In the Matter of:
Dan Heusinkved, AC 87-
25, January 21,
1988).
The Board stated in that opinion that:
the interpretation placed upon Section 21(p)
(12)
by the
Agency,
which
is that
it
is
a
violation of that Section of the Act to fail
to daily collect and contain litter within the
site
boundaries,
is
the
correct
interpretation.
(Heusinkved,
p.
5.)
Thus, the Board has explicitly held that litter can occur
on the
site of a landfill.
The Board’s finding in Heusinkved is contrary
to the definition cited by the Respondent.
The definition of “litter” cited by the Respondents in these
four cases does not apply to “litter” as used in Section 21(q)
(1)
of the Act.
If the Board were to hold that the definition cited
by the Respondent
is
applicable,
the effect would be to render
Section 21(q) (1) virtually meaningless.
In addition, the Board has
previously held that “litter” can occur on
a landfill
site.
The
General Assembly has adopted in Chapter 38 a definition of “litter”
which would give Section
21(q) (1)
meaning and the Board hereby
adopts that meaning.
Therefore,
the Board
holds that the word
“litter” as used in Section 21(q) (1) of the Act does include refuse
or debris dumped on private property with the consent of the owner
of such property.
Because the Board
holds
that
“litter”
includes the refuse
placed on Mr. Mund’s land with his knowledge and consent, the Board
denies the Motion to Dismiss Violation A(1)
and finds Ms. Petroff
in violation of Section 21(q) (1)
of the Act.
In addition, due to
statements made on behalf of Ms. Petroff at hearing the Board finds
Ms. Petroff in violation of Section 21(q) (3)
of the Act.
This
Opinion constitutes
the Board’s
findings
of
fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
125—402
7
ORDER
1.
Respondent
is
hereby
found
to have been
in
violation on May
9,
1990,
of Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2,
par.
1021(q)(l)
and
(3)
2.
Within 45 days of this Order Respondent shall,
by certified check or money order, pay a civil
penalty in the amount of one thousand dollars
($1,000) payable to the Landfill Citation Fund.
Such payment shall be sent to:
Paul Haas
County Collector
#10 Public Square
Belleville,
Il 62220
Any
such
penalty
not
paid
within
the
time
prescribed
shall
incur
interest
at the rate
set forth in subsection
(a) of Section 1003 of
the Illinois Income Tax Act,
(Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1990
supp.,
ch.
120,
par.
10—1003),
from the
date payment is due until the date payment
is
received.
Interest shall not accrue during the
pendency of an appeal, during which payment of
the penalty is stayed.
3.
Docket A in this matter is hereby closed.
4.
Within 30 days of this Order, the County shall
file
a
statement
of
its
hearing
costs,
supported by affidavit, with the Board and with
service upon Respondent.
Within the same 30
days, the Clerk of the Pollution Control Board
shall file
a statement
of the Board’s costs,
supported by affidavit and with service upon
the Respondent.
Such filings shall be entered
in Docket B of this matter.
5.
Respondent
is
hereby
given
leave
to
file
a
reply/objection to the filings as ordered
in
paragraph
4
of this Order within
45 days
of
this Order.
Section
41
of the Environmental
Protection Act
(Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
111 1/2, par.
1041) provides for appeal of
final Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
125—403
8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
do hereby
certify that the ~,boveOpinion and Order
was
adopted on the
“—f--
day of ~
~7
,
1991, by a vote
of
~
Dorothy M.
unn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
125—404