ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July 13, 2000
STEPHEN G. BRILL,
)
)
Complainant,
)
)
v.
)
PCB 00-219
)
(Enforcement - Noise, Citizens)
HENRY LATORIA, individually and
)
d/b/a TL TRUCKING FOODLINER, )
)
Respondent.
)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by S. T. Lawton, Jr.):
On June 12, 2000, Stephen G. Brill filed a complaint on behalf of himself and 20 other parties
who live near respondent’s facility in Franklin Park,Cook County, Illinois, alleging respondent violated
the Environmental Protection Act (Act) and several Board regulations regarding air and noise pollution.
This matter is before the Board pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.124. Under this Section,
enforcement cases filed by citizens are placed on the Board’s agenda to determine whether the case is
frivolous or duplicitous.
COMPLAINT IS NOT DUPLICITIOUS OR FRIVOLOUS
A complaint is frivolous if the Board cannot grant the requested relief, or fails to state a cause
of action for which the Board can grant relief. Colony of Longmeadow HOA v. Dominick’s (January
6, 2000), PCB 00-92, slip op. at 1; People v. State Oil (August 19,
1999), PCB 97-103, slip op. at 3. The complaint alleges air pollution and noise pollution in violation of
sections 9(a) and 24 of the Act and the following Board regulations: 35 Ill. Adm. Code 900.102,
901.102(a), 901.102(b), and 901.104.
The complaint is not frivolous in alleging respondent caused air pollution in violation of Section
9(a) of the Act, which states:
No person shall . . . cause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of any
contaminant into the environment in any State so as to cause or tend to cause air
pollution in Illinois . . . . 415 ILCS 5/9(a) (1998).
The Act defines air pollution as “the presence in the atmosphere of one or more contaminants in
sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as to . . . unreasonably interfere with the
enjoyment of life or property.” 415 ILCS 5/3.02 (1998). The complaint alleges truck traffic from
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respondent’s business generates constant dust in the air, which unreasonably interferes with the use and
enjoyment of nearby properties. Comp. at par. 6 and 7.
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Allegations of continual dust from
respondent’s business, which interferes with neighbors’ use and enjoyment of their property, could
possibly cause or tend to cause air pollution as defined by the Act. The complaint clearly states a cause
of action for which the Board can grant relief.
The complaint is also not frivolous in alleging noise pollution in violation of Section 24 of the Act
and several Board regulations. Section 24 provides:
No person shall emit beyond the boundaries of his property any noise that unreasonably
interferes with the enjoyment of life or with any lawful business or activity, so as to
violate any regulation or standard adopted by the Board under this Act. 415 ILCS
5/24 (1998).
Section 900.102 of the Board’s regulations prohibits someone from causing or allowing noise
pollution, such as noise that unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of another’s life or property. 35
Ill. Adm. Code 900.102; see also 415 ILCS 5/3.02 (1998).
Sections 901.102(a) and (b) of the Board’s regulations prohibit emitting sound above regulatory
limits during daytime or nighttime hours from a source on Class A, B or C land to any receiving Class A
land. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 901.102(a) and (b). Section 901.104 similarly prohibits emitting impulsive
sound, which is a single pressure peak or burst of noise, exceeding maximum allowable limits of sound
for the type of land and time of day involved in each matter. The alleged violations are not frivolous in
that the complaint stated noise from air horns, air breaks, metallic crashing and other sound, occurs
during the day and nighttime. In fact, the complaint alleges TL Trucking Foodliner operates 24 hours a
day, seven days per week. The noise from respondent’s site could possibly exceed the maximum levels
of sound permitted by 35 Ill. Adm. Code 901.102(a) and (b) of the Board’s regulations. Comp. at par.
6 and 7. The Board can grant relief for such alleged violations.
An action before the Board is duplicitous if the matter is identical or substantially similar to one
brought in this or another forum. Colony of Longmeadow HOA v. Dominick’s (January 6, 2000), PCB
00-92, slip op. at 1. In paragraph 10 of the certified complaint, Stephen G. Brill states he did not know
of any other action against respondent for the same alleged pollution discharge or emission. Comp. at
par. 10. Respondent did not alert us to any other action. Based on this information and our own
independent search of our database, we cannot find this action is duplicitous.
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The complaint will be cited as “Comp. at __”.
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NON-ATTORNEY CANNOT REPRESENT OTHER COMPLAINANTS
ADDITIONAL PARTIES MUST FILE PROPER COMPLAINTS.
The Board must address another issue before accepting this case for hearing. Brill was the only
individual named as a complainant in the complaint filed with the Board. Brill separately lists 20
additional names on a letter attached to the complaint, namely:
Oleta Brill; Drema, Manuel and Calvin Harrah; Sharon and Crystal Cook; Bernice
Raple; Nancy Gibas; Richard Eckert; Teresa Farlow; Silvia Lackajs; Randall and
Daniel Hester; Gertrude Miklase; Kathy and Joe Koval; Robert and Joann
Rasmmussan; and Agnienle and Konraot Kance.
Although Brill properly provided his name, address and signature, the other residents were merely listed
with abbreviated street addresses on the letter submitted by Brill to the Board. The Board’s procedural
rules require the party to sign the original of each document filed with the Board. 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.104(g). None of the additional residents on the list signed the complaint.
An attorney can also sign a complaint on behalf of a complainant.
Id.
However, the complaint
does not identify Brill as an attorney. The Board rules do not allow a non-attorney to represent a
natural person as a complainant. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.107(a)(1); see also Graf,
et al.
v. Emerald
Landscaping and CPK Landscaping (herinafter “Graf”) (April 15, 1999), PCB 99-125, slip op. at 3.
Section 1 of the Attorney Act prohibits persons from acting as an attorney without first obtaining a
license to do so. 705 ILCS 205/1(1996); Graf (April 15, 1999), PCB 99-125, slip op. at 3. Since
Brill, a non-attorney, was the only individual to file and sign a complaint that complies with the Board’s
procedural rules, the Board recognizes him as the sole complainant in this matter.
Accordingly, the caption reflects that Brill is the sole complainant. Other interested individuals
may still become involved in the case by exercising one of several options. People may represent
themselves and refile an individual or joint complaint. Each person must provide his or her signature and
business address, and properly serve a complaint in accordance with the Board’s procedural rules.
Individuals may also retain an attorney to represent them in a suit against respondents. Anyone
who is not identified as a complainant may petition to intervene in accordance with 35 Ill. Adm. Code
103.142. Graf (April 15, 1999), PCB 99-125, slip op. at 3. Interested individuals may also participate
in this case by submitting written statements, by giving comment at hearing, or by testifying as witnesses
if called at hearing. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.203(a); Giertych,
et al
v. 4T’s Management, L.L.C.
(April 20, 2000), PCB 00-133, slip op.
at 4.
In summary, since this complaint is neither frivolous nor duplicitous, the Board accepts this case
for hearing, with Stephen C. Brill as sole complainant. The additional 20 people listed by Brill can either
refile individual or joint complaints, petition to intervene, or participate as witnesses in this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that the above
order was adopted on the 13th of July 2000 by a vote of 7-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
