ILLINOIS. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 7, 1992
RICHARD J. PECKA,
)
JANICE M. PECKA,
)
)
Complainants,
PCB 92—27
v.
)
(Enforcement)
)
SKYLARKS REMOTE CONTROL
)
AIRPLANE
,
)
)
and
)
JOHN
CROWN
)
GOLDEN OAKS FARM,
)
)
Respondents.
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by
a.
C. Marlin):
This matter comes before the Board on a February 28, 1992
motion to strike and dismiss filed on behalf of respondent John
Crown, Golden Oaks Farm, and an April 20, 1992 motion to dismiss
filed on behalf of respondent Skylarks Remote Control Airplane Club
(Skylarks). In an order dated March 26, 1992, the Board noted the
threshold issue that Section 25 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1025) places certain
restrictions on the Board’s ability to hear noise complaints
involving certain sporting activities. The Board quoted the
pertinent language as follows:
No Board standards for monitoring noise or regulations
prescribing limitations on noise emissions shall apply to
any organized amateur or professional sporting activity
except as otherwise provided in this Section. Baseball,
football or soccer sporting events played during
nighttime hours, by professional athletes, in a city with
more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium at which
such nighttime events were not played prior to July 1,
1982, shall be subject to nighttime noise emission
regulations promulgated by the Illinois Pollution Control
Board.
The Board also directed the parties’ attention to the
Appellate Court ruling in Hinsdale Golf Club v. Kochanski (2d Dist.
1990), 197 I11.App.3d 634, 555 N.E.2d 31. The Board then required
the parties to file written ddcumnents discussing whether the
complained of activity is an “organized amateur or professional
sporting activity” with the Board by April 16, 1992. On April 16,
1992, respondents filed a motion to extend until April 20, 1992,
the time in which to file the respondents’ written documents
133—273
discussing whether the complained of activity falls within the
“organized amateur or professional sporting activity” exception.
The motion for the extension in which to file the written documents
is hereby granted.
On April 9, 1992, complainants filed their response to the
Board’s order of March 26, 1992, alleging that Skylarks is not an
“organized amateur or professional sporting activity” within the
meaning of the statute. The statutory definition of “organized
amateur or professional sporting activity” is contained in Section
3.25 of the Act:
“ORGANIZED AMATEUR OR PROFESSIONAL SPORTING ACTIVITY”
means an activity or event carried out at a facility by
persons who engaged in that activity as a business or for
education, charity or entertainment for the general
public, including all necessary actions and activities
associated with such an activity. This definition
includes, but is not limited to, skeet, trap or shooting
sports clubs in existence prior to January 1, 1975,
organized motor sports, and sporting events organized or
controlled by school districts, units of local
government, state agencies, colleges, universities or
professional sports clubs offering exhibitions to the
public.
Complainants assert that Golden Oaks Farm is private property
that is being rented to a private club, that the access road
leading to the flying area is private farm property, and that no
signs mark the access roads indicating that the flying area exists.
Additionally, complainants argue that because the flying club is a
private club located on private land, and is not open to or for the
benefit of the general public, it falls within the jurisdiction of
the Illinois Pollution Control Board.
On April 20, 1992, respondent Skylarks filed a motion to
dismiss and an affidavit in support thereof, alleging that the club
is an “organized amateur or professional sporting activity” within
the meaning of the statute. Respondent asserts that Skylarks has
been in existence for over twenty years and has been located at the
Golden Oaks Farm since 1986. Respondent also asserts that Skylarks
obtained a permit from Lake County in 1987 granting it a right to
operate at the Golden Oaks Farm. Respondent explains that Skylarks
has designated hours of operation, and members are drawn from the
general public who choose to apply and pay the initiation fee.
Respondents also state that skylarks serves to provide
entertainment for the general public and serves in an educational
capacity for the general public. Finally, respondent asserts that
the general public is invited to attend skylarks’ monthly meetings
and has the ability to join once having attended these meetings.
Respondent submitted the affidavit of Clement Germanier, former
president and treasurer of Skylarks and current member of the club,
113—274
3
to support its factual assertions.
On April 22, 1992, respondent John Crown (Golden Oaks Farm)
filed a memorandum in response to the order of the Board from March
26, 1992. Respondent asserts that Skylarks conducts activities
which are “organized motor sports” per Section 3.25 of the Act
because the club draws members from the general public who choose
to applyThe
Board•and
paynotesthe
that,initiationtechnically,fee.1 the time for respondent to
reply to Skylarks’ April 20, 1992 motion to dismiss has not run.
However, Skylarks’ motion is premised on the same statutory issue
which complainant has addressed in response to the Board’s March
26, 1992 order. The Board sees no reason to delay decision under
these circumstances.
The Board finds that Skylarks falls within the statutory
definition of an “organized amateur or professional sporting
activity.” The activity is “carried out at a facility by persons
who engaged in that activity as a business or for education,
charity or entertainment for the general public,” and the general
public has the ability to apply for membership.
Because the Board finds that the complained of activity falls
within the statutory definition of an “organized amateur or
professional sporting activity”, the Skylarks Remote Control
Airplane Club is exempted from Board regulation under Section 25 of
the Act. The Board accordingly grants the motions to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. Theodore Meyer concurred.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1989, ch. 111 1/2, par. 1041) provides for the appeal of
final Board orders. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois
establish filing requirements.
I
Respondent requested that the Board allow its filing to be
on non-recycled paper because of the flooding of the Loop and the
consequential relocation of respondent’s office. The motion to
allow filing •on non-recycled paper is hereby granted.
I
33—275
4
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, do hereby certify that the above order was adopted on the
____________
day of
______________,
1992, by a vote of
7 ~
Control Board
133—276