ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    April
    9,
    1992
    WONDER VIEW IMPROVEMENT
    )
    ASSOCIATION,
    )
    Complainant,
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
    )
    and ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PCB 91-48
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    (Enforcement)
    )
    Intervenors,
    V.
    NORTHERN ILLINOIS
    )
    UTILITIES,
    INC.,
    Respondent.
    MR. DENNIS
    J. PALYS APPEARED ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT;
    MR.
    T.P. MATTHEWS APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by R.
    C.
    Flemal):
    On March 12,
    1992,
    the Illinois Attorney General filed a
    motion to intervene and motion for reconsideration
    in this
    proceeding on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and
    the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (collectively,
    “People”).
    The Board has received no reply to this motion by
    either the complainant or respondent.
    The Board grants the People’s motion to intervene.
    (See
    Pioneer Processing v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (1984),
    102 Ill.2d
    119.)
    The People request that the Board reconsider
    its February
    6,
    1992 Opinion and Order finding that the respondent’s actions did
    not violate35
    Ill.
    Adm.
    Code 602.101.
    For the reasons discussed
    below, the Board grants reconsideration of this matter and
    reverses its prior determination.
    This matter came before the Board upon a complaint filed on
    April 15, 1991 by Mr. Dennis J.
    Palys on behalf of the Wonder
    View Improvement Association
    (Wonder View).
    The complaint
    alleged that respondent installed a “water main” without first
    13 2—39

    —2—
    obtaining a construction permit from the Illinois Environmental
    Protection Agency (Agency), thereby violating the Board’s
    regulations found at
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 602.1011.
    Hearing was
    held October
    7,
    1991,
    in McHenry,
    Illinois.
    In its prior order,
    the Board found that much of what has
    been alleged and counteralleged in this matter
    is either
    irrelevant to the matter or not properly before the Board.
    The
    Board found that the proper issue before it is solely whether
    respondent committed a violation of the Board’s regulations at 35
    Ill.
    Adm. Code 602.101.
    The Board found that the pertinent facts
    in this matter are
    that in December 1990 respondent laid a piece of pipe,
    of
    approximately 240 foot length
    (Tr. 28), along Hickory Drive
    between Balsam and Elmwood Drives in Wonder Lake,
    Illinois.
    At
    the time of placement the pipe was not connected,
    and apparently
    has never been connected,
    to any other piping or to water
    distribution facilities.
    A permit for construction of the piping
    has not been issued by the Agency.
    In pertinent part, Section 602.101 prohibits the
    “construction of any new public water supply installation” or
    “the change or addition to any existing public water supply”
    without a construction permit issued by the Agency.
    The question
    is therefore whether re~spondent’sactions constitute either
    construction of a new public water supply installation or a
    change or addition to any existing public water supply.
    The Board found that “inasmuch as the piping in question has
    never been connected to or used in any public water supply
    context”,
    the Board could not find that “the piping constitutes
    either a new public water supply installation or a change or
    1 The complaint also alleges violation of unspecified
    Illinois Commerce Commission regulations and “guidelines of the
    McHenry Township Road District”
    (April 15,
    1991 response of
    complainant).
    The Board has no jurisdiction in either of these
    arenas,
    and hence all such allegations are improperly brought
    before this Board.
    132—40

    —3—
    addition to an existing public water supply”2.
    (February
    6,
    1992
    opinion at 2.)
    Therefore the Board dismissed the matter.
    The difficulty the Board had was finding that the pipe in
    question was ever intended to be put to any use for which a
    construction permit is required.
    Indeed, there is no need to
    obtain a construction permit for the emplacement of just any
    pipe.
    The pipe must be one covered by Section 602.101.
    Where there is question whether any particular pipe
    (or
    other installation)
    is covered by Section 602.101, there are only
    a limited number of ways in which the matter can be tested.
    The
    most obvious test is that the pipe is actually used in a water
    supply context
    (e.g., to convey water).
    In this circumstance,
    a
    construction permit is clearly required3.
    This test does not apply in the instant case.
    Absent a demonstrated use of the pipe in a water supply
    context, the only method of affirming that a particular pipe is
    covered by Section 602.101 is to ascertain the intent to which
    the emplacement of the pipe took place.
    This is potentially a
    very rocky road.
    If the pipelayer declares that the pipe is not
    intended for use in a water supply context,
    are we to find this
    declaration false on principle?
    Who can get into the mind of
    this pipelayer?
    The Bqard
    is not prepared to declare that we can
    generally find intent,
    or that the Agency or any other person is
    so endowed.
    This is the perspective the Board reached in its February
    6,
    1992 order.
    The “intent or use” concept is embodied in the definition of
    public water supply:
    2
    In its motion, the People object to the alleged
    implication derived from the Board’s finding that “a construction
    permit is not required until the connection or use of the pipes
    takes place.”
    (motion at 3).
    The People express concern over
    whether such a finding indicates a belief that a construction
    permit is not required prior to issuance of an operating permit.
    The Board underscores that it does not now find, nor has
    it
    ever found,
    that construction permits are unnecessary prior to
    issuance of operating permits.
    The requirement for construction
    permits is a Board regulation,
    and there is nothing in the case
    at bar that would lead the Board to repudiate its own regulation.
    ~ This permit is required prior to construction, else
    enforcement may bs brought against the operator.
    132—41

    —4—
    “PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY” means all mains
    * *
    *
    through
    which water is obtained and distributed to the public
    *
    *
    *
    actually used or intended for use for the purpose
    of furnishing water for drinking or general domestic
    use
    *
    *
    *.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par.
    1003.28
    (Act), emphasis added.)
    Intent can be determined in the circumstance when the
    pipelayer himself attests. to the intent.
    The Board finds that
    the respondent in this case admitted its intent to connect the
    pipe foç publi~water supply purposes at a future time after
    permits were obtained
    (Tr.
    7,
    42).
    Since the respondent’s intent
    to use the pipe as a water main at a future time is apparent from
    the record, the Board finds that respondent failed to obtain
    a
    construction permit prior to installing the main in violation of
    Section 602.101 of the Board’s regulations.
    The need to obtain
    a
    construction permit prior to the laying of this water main in
    this case is also apparent when reading Section 602.101
    in
    conjunction with Section 15 of the Act, which requires approval
    of plans and specifications by the Agency before construction
    starts.
    Therefore,
    the Board grants the People’s motion for
    reconsideration,
    changes its determination, and finds the
    Northern Illinois Utilities,
    Inc., violated Section 602.101 of
    the Board’s regulations.
    In making its determination, the Board proceeds to consider
    “all facts and circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of
    the emissions, discharges,
    or deposits involved.”
    (Section 33(c)
    of the Act.)
    Although there are no emissions, discharges,
    or
    deposits involved in this case, the Board will consider the
    factors set forth is Section 33(c)
    of the Act, to the degree that
    the factors are applicable.
    1.
    The character and degree of injury to,
    or interference
    with the protection of the health, general welfare and
    physical property of the people.
    The record does not disclose the degree of any harm to the
    physical property of the people at this time.
    Interference with
    the use of the road along which the water main was laid has been
    alleged by the complainant, but there is no evidence that the
    laying of the main actually interfered with the physical property
    of the people as a result of a violation of the Act or Board
    regulations.
    Had the respondent applied for a construction
    permit, more information pertaining to this factor may have been
    ascertained.
    2.
    The social and economic value of the pollution source.
    132—42

    —5—
    The water main may have social and economic value
    if
    it is
    connected to a water supply system and supplies water to
    customers.
    3.
    The suitability or unsuitability of the pollution source to
    the area in which it is located, including the question of
    priority of location in the area involved.
    The complainant has made allegations that the placement of
    the water main is unsuitable in its present location.
    However,
    these allegations pertain to Illinois Commerce Commission rules
    over which, as noted earlier, the Board has no jurisdiction.
    Had
    the respondent applied for a permit, information on whether the
    main is properly placed under Board regulations would be
    ascertainable.
    Wonder View has priority of location.
    4.
    The technical practicability and economic reasonableness of
    reducing or eliminating the emissions,
    discharges or
    deposits resulting from such pollution source.
    Although the instant matter does not deal with a “pollution
    source”,
    it is clear that the respondent could cease violations
    by applying for and receiving a construction permit.
    5.
    Any subsequent compliance.
    The record discloses that the respondent has never applied
    for nor received a construction permit for the placement of the
    water main.
    The complainant has asked that the Board either declare the
    pipe abandoned (complaint at 3), or that the Board issue a cease
    and desist order that would prohibit the respondent from using
    the pipe or installing new sections of main already in the ground
    (April
    15,
    1991 response of complainant).
    The People do not ask
    for any specific remedy, but solely for a finding that the
    respondent’s actions required a construction permit, and that
    respondent therefore violated Section 602.101.
    After
    consideration of the record and Section 33(c)
    factors, the Board
    believes that a cease and desist order is appropriate in this
    matter, and will so order.
    Accordingly, the respondent must
    obtain a construction permit and otherwise comply with 35 Ill.
    Adin.
    Code 602.101.
    The respondent continues to be prohibited
    under the Act and Board regulations from using the pipe or
    installing new sections of main without first obtaining the
    requisite construction and operating permits.
    This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    132—43

    —6—
    ORDER
    1.
    The respondent, Northern Illinois Utilities,
    Inc., has
    violated
    35
    Ill. Adm. Code 602.101 of the Board’s
    regulations.
    2.
    Northern Illinois Utilities,
    Inc.,
    is hereby ordered to
    cease and desist from all violations of the Board’s
    regulations.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act,
    Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991
    ch.
    111 1/2 par.
    1041,
    provides for appeal of final
    orders of the Board within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certi~ythatthe abov~opi~,nionand order was
    adopted on the
    ~-‘~
    day of
    ~-~A~L
    ,
    1992,
    by
    a vote of
    “7—0
    .
    ~
    )~
    Dorothy M. p~n, Clerk
    Illinois Pd1~4utionControl Board
    132—44

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