ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June
    15,
    1992
    GALLATIN NATIONAL COMPANY,
    )
    Petitioner,
    PCB 91—256
    v.
    )
    (Landfill Siting Review)
    THE FULTON COUNTY
    BOARD
    and
    )
    THE COUNTY OF FULTON,
    )
    Respondents.
    THOMAS
    R. MULROY, REBECCA
    L. RAFTERY, and GARY W. BALLESTEROS,
    of
    JENNER
    & BLOCK, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER, AND
    JAMES
    E.
    LLOYD and JOAN C.
    SCOTT APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
    RESPONDENTS.
    OPINION
    AND
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by J. Theodore Meyer):
    This matter is before the Board upon the December 23,
    1991
    petition for hearing filed by Gallatin National Company
    (Gallatin).
    Gallatin, as a third-party petitioner,’ contests the
    decision of the Fulton County Board (County Board)
    to grant
    siting approval to the County of Fulton
    (Fulton County)
    for a
    regional pollution control facility.
    This appeal is brought
    pursuant to.Section 40.1(b) of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Act).
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par.
    1041.1(b).)
    Throughout this proceeding the applicant has been referred
    to as the County of Fulton,
    or Fulton County.
    The decisionmaker
    has been referred to as the Fulton County Board.
    In
    fact,
    all
    relevant actions in this proceeding were taken by the County of
    Fulton,
    acting through its duly authorized representatives,
    the
    County Board.
    Thus, the entity authorizing the issuance of
    bonds, the entity filing the landfill siting application,
    and the
    entity rendering the landfill siting decision now under appeal
    were all the same entity.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On July
    8,
    1991,
    Fulton County filed an application with
    the County Board requesting that the County Board approve the
    siting of a regional pollution control facility.
    The application
    requested a vertical expansion of the county’s Landfill No.
    2,
    and the development of Landfill Np.
    3 as a vertical and
    Gallatin owns a permitted landfill in the area, although the
    landfill
    is apparently not yet accepting waste.
    I
    34—245
    2
    horizontal expansion of Landfill No.
    2.
    (C0035.)2
    On August
    6,
    1991, Gallatin entered its appearance as an objector to the
    application,
    and thereafter participated
    in the siting review
    process.
    Public hearings were held pursuant to Section 39.2 of
    the Act on October 21 and 22,
    1991.
    At its December 10,
    1991
    meeting, the County Board voted to adopt
    a resolution granting
    Fulton County local siting approval to its Landfill No.
    3.
    Gallatin filed its petition for hearing with this Board on
    December 23,
    1991.
    The Board’s hearings on this matter were held
    on April
    2 and 9,
    1992,
    in Lewistown,
    Fulton County,
    Illinois.
    Several members of the public attended the hearings.
    In its petition, Gallatin claims that the exhibits and
    testimony provided by Fulton County at the local hearing failed
    to show,
    as required by Sections 39.2(a)(1),
    (2), and
    (5)
    of the
    Act,
    that:
    a.
    the facility is necessary to accommodate the
    waste needs of the area
    it is intended to
    serve;
    b.
    the facility is designed to protect the
    public health,
    safety, and welfare; and
    c.
    the plan of operations for the facility is
    designed to minimize the danger to the
    surrounding area.
    In addition, Gallatin argues that the County Board conducted
    the application process in
    a fundamentally unfair manner.
    BACKGROUND
    The history of Fulton County’s prior and present landfilling
    operations are at issue
    in this case.
    On February 16,
    1972,
    the
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency)
    issued Permit
    No.
    1972-12-OP to Fulton County for the operation of a solid
    waste landfill, known as Landfill No.
    1,
    at an abandoned strip
    mine site located near the City of Cuba in Putman Township,
    Fulton County,
    Illinois.
    (C0036,
    C0072, C0819.)
    Fulton County
    operated Landfill No.
    1 from 1972 to 1984.
    (C0036—0037,
    C08l9,
    2
    References to the county record will be cited
    as
    (C____
    (The transcripts of the
    local
    he~aringsare contained within the
    county record.)
    References to the transcripts of the Board’s April
    2,
    1992,
    and April
    9,
    1992 hearings will be cited as
    (Tr.
    I
    )
    and
    (Tr.
    II
    ),
    respectively.
    The exhibits
    introduced
    at the
    Board’s hearings will be
    cited as
    (Pet.
    Ex.
    )
    and
    (Resp.
    Ex.
    I
    34—246
    3
    C0828.)
    Although the initial operating permit was for trench
    fill operations on 10.83 acres of the strip-mined spoil areas,
    the permitted boundaries were exceeded during the operating years
    from 1972 to approximately 1980 so that approximately 80 acres
    were used.
    (C0037,
    C0072, C0819,
    C0824—0833.)
    The landfill
    accepted general municipal wastes except on those occasions when
    a supplemental permit was granted to accept special
    (i.e.,
    hazardous,
    industrial,
    toxic) wastes.
    (C0073—0080,
    C08l9,
    C0822,
    C1334.)
    During the time of its operation,
    the Agency notified
    Fulton County that the landfill was in violation of the Board’s
    regulations for failing to comply with its operational
    requirements, including failing to apply daily and final cover,
    operating without a permit, and failing to submit groundwater
    monitoring reports.
    (C0794, C0797—0798,
    C0799—0801.)
    Moreover,
    the landfill did not have a leachate treatment system even though
    the landfill’s permit required one.
    (C0794,
    C0796,
    C0815—08l8.)
    On January
    4,
    1984,
    the Agency issued Supplemental Permit No.
    1984—1-SP to allow for the modification of the groundwater
    monitoring program at the site.
    (C0037,
    C0082-0083.)
    On
    November 12,
    1986, the United States Environmental Protection
    Agency
    (USEPA)
    issued a hazardous waste site assessment of
    Landfill No.
    1.
    (C0794,
    C0815-0823.)
    On May 3,
    1988,
    the Agency
    conducted an on-site inspection of the landfill which indicated
    that the landfill had never been properly closed.3
    (C0794,
    C0824—0833.)
    On July 31,
    1989,
    Daily
    & Associates,
    on behalf of
    the County Board, sent a letter to the Agency that set forth a
    proposed schedule for closure of the landfill.
    (C0794,
    C0834-
    0835.)
    On May 8,
    1981, the Agency issued Permit No. 1981—l9-DE to
    the Fulton County for the development of a second landfill known
    as Landfill No.
    2.
    (C0037,
    C0093-0101.)
    The developmental
    permit did not require a leachate or gas collection system, gas
    monitoring system,
    or a liner.
    (C0093-0101, C1258—1259.)
    The
    Agency issued an operating permit,
    Permit No. l981—19—OP,
    for
    this landfill on January 5,
    1984.
    (C0037,
    C0103—0104,
    C0819.)
    Although the development area of the landfill was 61.6 acres,
    this landfill has exceeded the vertical limitations in Area
    1 of
    the fill.
    (C0037, C0093—OlOl,
    C08l9, C0842—0849,
    C0850—0858,
    Co861-0869,
    C0866.)
    In addition, the Agency has notified Fulton
    County that the landfill is
    in violation of the Act and the
    Board’s regulations.
    (C0795, C0850—0858,
    C0859—0860, C0861—
    0869.)
    The Board also has found the landfill in violation of the
    Act and regulations.
    (In the Matter of: Fulton County,
    (August
    4,
    1988), AC 88—63,
    91 PCB 223.)
    (C0795,
    C0836—084l.)
    Fulton County
    3Fulton County,
    in
    its response brief,
    cites to the County
    hearing transcript
    in support of its assertion that Landfill No.
    1
    is not required to have
    a written closure plan.
    (Resp.
    Br.
    p.
    2;
    C1347—1348.)
    134—247
    4
    is currently preparing another area of the landfill, known
    as
    Waste Area
    4,
    to receive waste.
    (C0037.)
    Landfill No.
    2 is
    expected to close in June,
    1994.
    (C0037.)
    On November 22,
    1989,
    Fulton County attempted to secure a
    supplemental permit from the Agency for the overfilling of Area
    1,
    the elimination of Areas 6,7,
    and 8,
    and for a change in
    grade for the final grading plan.
    However, Fulton County was
    advised by the Agency that
    it would need to go through a siting
    process pursuant to Section 39.2
    of the Act.
    (C0037, C0842-0849,
    C1454.)
    Finally,
    on August 22,
    1991,
    the Agency directed Fulton
    County to submit an application for significant modification for
    the landfill so that the landfill’s permits would be compatible
    with the Board’s new landfill regulations.
    (C0788—0789,
    C0790,
    C0795, unmarked page between C0869 and C0870.)
    In early 1990, the County Board commissioned Daily
    &
    Associates to present Fulton County with options to correct the
    deficiencies
    in Landfills No.
    1 and 2.
    (Tr.
    II 63—64.)
    In
    April,
    1990,
    Daily & Associates completed its report entitled
    “Analysis of Options for the County Landfill Facility.”
    (C0938—
    0951.)
    The report presented the following three options:
    1)
    close Landfill No.
    2 immediately;
    2)
    close Landfill No.
    2 at the end of its permitted life
    (approximately early 1993), or
    3)
    vertically expand Landfill No.
    2.
    (C0938—0951).
    On June 12,
    1990,
    the County Board formally voted,
    18 to
    8, to
    proceed with Option
    3, subject to obtaining both financing and
    siting approval for the expansion.
    (Tr.
    II
    65,
    97,
    108.)
    On November 13,
    1990, the County Board acted upon the
    financing component.
    It voted by ordinance to finance the
    expansion by borrowing $500,000 through a bond issuance from the
    Illinois Rural Bond Bank.
    (C0870—0913, C0914—0918, Co9l9~ C0920—
    0921, C0922—0926,
    C0927, C0928—0929,
    C0930—0932,
    C0933, C12l8;
    Tr.
    I
    116,
    121; Tr.
    II
    68.)
    The bonds were to be repaid by the
    revenue generated by the expansion; the debt was required to be
    further secured by sales tax intercept revenues.
    (C0883,
    C0922-
    0926,
    C0927,
    C0928—0929,
    C12l8,
    C1220—1221;
    Tr.
    II 66—68.)
    The
    County Board then addressed the siting component.
    It retained
    Richard Spencer of Daily
    & Associates to act as its expert
    engineer and to prepare the siting application.
    (C1224.)
    In January or February,
    1991,
    Fulton County received the
    revenues from the bond issue.
    (Tr.
    II
    68—69.)
    On May
    14,
    1991,
    the chairman of the County Board, Melba Ripper,
    appointed three
    County Board members
    (Wanda Williams,
    Ray Moore,
    and William
    Danner)
    to
    a subcommittee known
    as the Regional Pollution Control
    134—248
    5
    Hearing Committee
    (Committee)
    .~
    Three other County Board members
    (Kenny Brooks,
    Louise Ruff, and Randy Brennan) were appointed as
    alternate members of the Committee.
    (Cll66;
    Tr.
    I 59-60,
    62—63,
    97; Tr.
    II
    32,
    73.)
    The Committee eventually presided at the
    siting hearing and made
    a written recommendation to the County
    Board to approve the landfill siting.
    (C1166; Tr.
    73-74; Pet.
    Ex.
    3.)
    On July 8,
    1991,
    eight months after the County Board issued
    the bonds,
    Fulton County applied to the County Board for siting
    approval.
    (C0011—0590,
    0644; Tr.
    II 74.)
    On August
    6,
    1991,
    Gallatin entered its appearance in the case and specifically
    requested that “all notices or any filings of any type made to
    the Committee concerning the siting be sent to (Gal1atin’s~
    attorneys....”
    (C0645.)
    On August 30,
    1991, Gallatin filed a
    notice requesting notification from the Committee of any tours of
    the Fulton County Landfill,
    and a notiOe requesting a 30-day
    advance notification of the siting hearing.
    (C0646-0652.)
    Notice of the hearing was mailed to Gallatin’s attorneys on
    September 27,
    1991.
    (C0653—0656,
    C0658,
    C0664,
    C0665.)
    On
    October 21 and 22,
    1991, the Committee conducted the siting
    hearing.
    (C1l61—1381,
    Cl382—1578.)
    On November 20,
    1991,
    Gallatin submitted a document entitled “Gallatin National
    Company’s Proposed Findings of Fact” to the County Board.
    (C1060-1090.)
    The proposed findings directed the County Board to
    specific citations in the record that Gallatin believed detailed
    the failure of Fulton County to satisfy the applicable statutory
    criteria.
    (C1060—l090.)
    On that same date,
    Gallatin also
    submitted the opinions of three technical experts who had
    reviewed the Fulton County’s application.
    (Cl091-l123.)
    In November,
    1991,
    the Committee met to determine its
    findings and recommendations to the County Board.
    (Cl126-1l32;
    Tr.
    I 65—68,
    107—110,
    l39—142.)~ On December 10,
    1991,
    the
    County Board received the Committee’s recommendations, dated
    December
    10,
    1991, voted
    19 to 7 to approve the Fulton County’s
    application for site expansion,
    and requested that a written
    decision be prepared by the Fulton County State’s Attorney.
    ~ In May, 1990, Ms. Ripper appointed a special ad hoc committee
    to address issues associated with the Fulton County Landfill.
    (Tr.
    II
    61-63.)
    That
    committee,
    known
    as
    the
    “landfill
    siting
    committee”
    and
    different
    than
    the
    Regional
    Pollution
    Control
    Hearing Committee, met on May
    3,
    6 and 31,
    1991.
    (Tr.
    II 69-73.)
    Fulton County’s attorney, special~assistantstate’s attorney James
    Lloyd, and Mr. Spencer of Daily and Associates were members of that
    committee.
    (Tr.
    II
    72.)
    5There
    is some discrepancy
    in the record as to whether this
    meeting occurred on November 10,
    1991,
    or on November 25,
    1991.
    134—249
    6
    (C1124—l125,
    1126—1131;
    Pet.
    Ex.
    3,
    Resp.
    Ex.
    2.)
    Finally, on
    January
    8,
    1992, the County Board filed its
    written decision
    pursuant to Section 39.2(e)
    of the Act with the Fulton County
    Clerk.
    (C1147—ll54.)
    PRELIMINARY MATTERS
    Respondents’ Motion to quash
    On February 28,
    1992, Gallatin served Fulton County’s
    attorney, Mr.
    James Lloyd,6
    with a subpoena to appear as a
    witness at this Board’s hearing.7 Fulton County and the County
    Board filed a motion to quash the subpoena on March
    4,
    1992.
    Gallatin filed its response to the motion on March 4,
    1992.
    The
    Board’s hearing officer issued an oral ruling quashing the
    subpoena on March 4,
    1992.
    Gallatin,
    at hearing and
    in its post—
    hearing brief,
    objects to the hearing officer’s order and,
    in its
    post-hearing brief, requests that this Board’s hearings be
    reopened so that it can examine Mr. Lloyd about his contacts with
    the County Board.
    (Tr.
    I 6-7,50-53.)
    Gallatin argues that Mr.
    Lloyd is the person most competent to testify about the contacts
    revealed by his legal bills and the county records, and that no
    prejudice will result to Fulton County if Mr. Lloyd testified
    because the County Board was represented at this Board’s April
    2
    and 9,
    1992 hearings by Joan Scott.
    In response, Fulton County and the County Board note that
    the hearing officer quashed Gallatin’s subpoena because the
    subpoena was late, the existing case law was against Gallatin,
    and because the information that Gallatin sought was available
    from other sources.
    In a March
    6,
    1992 letter to the Board, the hearing officer
    indicated that he quashed the subpoena against Mr. Lloyd during
    an emergency telephone pre—hearing conference held on March
    4,
    1992,
    and that he would place his rulings on the record at
    hearing.
    On March 17,
    1992,
    the Board notified the parties that
    although the hearing officer would rule on current pending
    motions,
    a new hearing officer was assigned to the case.
    The
    result of these circumstances was that the original hearing
    officer never provided the specific reasoning for his ruling.
    After reviewing the arguments and the record, we decline to
    6James Lloyd represented Fulton County,
    as applicant,
    during
    the siting proceeding.
    State’s Attorney Joan Scott represented the
    County Board.
    ~The subpoena was for attendance at a scheduled March
    6,
    1992
    hearing.
    That hearing was cancelled because of poor weather, and
    the hearing was held on April
    2
    and
    9,
    1992.
    I
    34—250
    7
    overturn the hearing officer’s ruling.
    Much of the information
    that Gallatin sought to adduce via its subpoena was made
    available during the Board’s hearings
    in this case when several
    persons testified regarding their contacts with Mr. Lloyd.
    The
    Board is extremely reluctant to allow an attorney of record to be
    subpoenaed, thus endangering his or her representation of his
    client
    (in this case,
    Mr. Lloyd’s representation of Fulton County
    as the applicant), without a showing that only that attorney can
    provide necessary information.
    Respondents’ Motion in Limine
    On March
    6,
    1992,
    Fulton County and County Board filed a
    motion in limine •asking the Board to enter an order prohibiting
    Gallatin from calling witnesses or adducing evidence at the
    Board’s hearing with respect to the issue of fundamental
    fairness.
    Gallatin filed its response to the motion on March
    17,
    1992.
    The hearing officer denied the motion in limine on March
    26,
    1992.
    In their brief,
    Fulton County and the County Board
    state that they continue to object to the hearing officer’s
    ruling because:
    1.
    although Gallatin alleged bias, prejudgment,
    and improper ex parte contacts on October 21,
    1991,
    immediately prior to the siting
    hearing,
    it failed to call any witnesses or
    adduce any evidence in support of its
    allegations;
    2.
    any circumstances constituting evidence of
    prejudgment or bias of the County Board would
    have occurred prior to the siting hearing
    beginning on October 21,
    1991;
    3.
    the County Board ruled upon Gallatin’s objections
    to fundamental fairness in its January 8,
    1992
    decision; and
    4.
    Section
    40.1(b)
    of the Act provides that the
    hearing before the Board be based exclusively on
    the record before the County Board.
    In addition to his ruling on the motion to quash, the
    hearing officer,
    in his March
    6,
    1992 letter to the Board,
    indicated that he was “likely to deny a (motion
    Jjj
    limine..
    .“,
    and that he would place his ruling on the record at hearing.
    Because another hearing officer conducted the hearing,
    the
    original hearing officer never provided the reasoning for his
    rulings on the record.
    We will not overrule the hearing officer in this instance.
    134—251
    8
    The Illinois supreme court has affirmed that the Board may look
    beyond the record on the issue of fundamental fairness to avoid
    an unjust or absurd result.
    (E&E Hauling,
    Inc.
    v.
    PCB
    (2d Dist.
    1983),
    116 Ill.App.3d 586,
    451 N.E.2d 555, aff’d
    (1985),
    107
    Ill.2d 33,
    481 N.E.2d 664.)
    The statute requires the Board to
    examine the fundamental fairness of the procedures used at the
    local level.
    (Section 40.1 of the Act.)
    It would be absurd to
    find that although the Board must examine fundamental fairness
    issues,
    a
    petitioner
    is excluded from presenting evidence on
    those questions.
    Moreover, the Board cannot find any case that
    stands for the proposition that we are precluded from considering
    evidence of prejudgment or bias that may have occurred prior to
    the local siting hearing or from examining the issue of
    fundamental fairness simply because the County Board ruled upon
    objections to fundamental fairness at the siting hearing below.
    Again, the statute specifically requires the Board to consider
    fundamental fairness issues on appeal from a local decision.
    Finally, Gallatin is not required to prove predisposition at
    the County Board level
    in order to preserve its allegations.
    Fulton County and the County Board’s assertion to the contrary
    ignores the fact that Gallatin may have discovered evidence of
    predispo.sition,
    bias,
    or ex parte contacts after the siting
    hearing and that Gallatin may have been unable to make a record
    of the objectionable conduct until
    it could take discovery and
    question the decision makers at the Board
    level.
    In addition,
    the courts have recognized that
    in order for the question of bias
    to be reviewed on appeal,
    a person need only raise or assert an
    objection prior to or during the~siting hearing.
    (See Fairview
    Area Citizens Taskforce v.
    IPCB (3rd Dist.
    1990),
    198 Ill.App.3d,
    555 N.E.2d 1178,
    1180; A.R.F Landfill,
    Inc.
    v.
    PCB
    (1988)
    ,
    174
    Ill.App.3d 82,
    528 N.E.2d 390; E
    & E Hauling,
    Inc.
    v. PCB
    (1985),
    107 Ill.2d 33,
    38—39,
    481 N.E.2d 664,
    666; People
    v. Carlson
    (1980),
    79 Ill.2d 564, 576—577, 404 N.E.2d 233,
    238—239.)
    This
    is precisely what happened in this case.
    Gallatin initially
    raised its objections to the hearing officer at the onset of the
    siting hearing on October 21,
    1991.
    (Cll72-l173.)
    At that time,
    Gallatin also provided its objections in written form in a
    document entitled “Objections of Gallatin National Company to the
    Fundamental Fairness of Fulton County’s Application Process and
    Motion to Disqualify”, dated October 21,
    1991.
    (C1172—1173,
    C0971-0976.)
    Although the hearing officer overruled Gallatin’s
    objections without comment, Gallatin renewed its objections later
    in the siting hearing.
    (Cll73—1174,
    Cl564.)
    In fact, the
    hearing officer clarified that Gallatin’s objections were made
    part of the record and that no further action was necessary to
    preserve Gallatin’s objections.
    ~(C1564—1565.)
    STATUTORY BACKGROUND
    Public Act 82-682,
    commonly known as SB-172,
    is codified in
    Sections 3.32,
    39(c),
    39.2,
    and 40.1 of the Act.
    It vests
    134-2 52
    9
    authority in a county board or municipality to approve or
    disapprove the siting request for each new regional pollution
    control facility.
    These decisions may be appealed to the Board
    in accordance with Section 40.1 of the Act.
    The Board’s scope of
    review encompasses three principal areas:
    (1) jurisdiction;
    (2)
    fundamental fairness of the county board’s site approval
    procedures;
    and
    (3)
    statutory criteria for site location
    suitability.
    Pursuant to Section 40.1(a)
    of the Act, the Board
    is to rely “exclusively on the record before the county board or
    the .governing body of the municipality” in reviewing the decision
    below.8
    Section 39.2
    of the Act presently outlines nine criteria for
    site suitability, each of which must be satisfied
    (if applicable)
    if site approval is to be granted.
    In establishing each of the
    nine criteria, the applicant’s burden of proof before the local
    authority is the preponderance of the evidence standard.
    (Industrial Salvage
    v.
    County of Marion(August 2,
    1984),
    PCB 83-
    173,
    59 PCB 233,
    235,
    236.)
    On appeal, the Board must review
    each of the challenged criteria based upon the manifest weight of
    the evidence standard.
    (See McLean County Disposal,
    Inc.
    v.
    County of McLean(4th Dist.
    1991),
    207 Ill.App.3d 352,
    566 N.E.2d
    26; Waste Management of Illinois, Inc.
    v. Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1987),
    160 Ill.App.3d 434,
    513 N.E.2d 592; E&E Hauling
    v.
    IPCB,
    116 Ill.
    App.
    3d 586,
    451 N.E.2d 555
    (2d Dist.
    1983),
    aff’d in part 107 Il1.2d 33,
    481 N.E.2d 664.)
    A decision is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite
    result is clearly evident, plain or indisputable from a review of
    the evidence.
    (Harris v. Day (4th Dist.
    1983),
    115 Ill.App.3d
    762,
    451 N.E.2d 262,
    2.65.)
    The Board,
    on review,
    is not to
    reweigh the evidence.
    Where there
    is conflicting evidence, the
    Board is not free to reverse merely because the lower tribunal
    credits one group of witnesses and does not credit the other.
    (Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce v. Pollution Control Board
    (3d
    Dist.
    1990),
    198 Ill.App.3d 541,
    555 N.E.2d 1178,
    1184; Tate v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (4th Dist.
    1989),
    188 Ill.App.3d 994,
    544
    N.E.2d 1176,
    1195; Waste Management of Illinois,
    Inc.
    v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1989),
    187 Il1.App.3d 79,
    543
    N.E.2d 505,
    507.)
    Merely because the local government could have
    drawn different inferences and conclusions from conflicting
    testimony is not a basis for this Board to reverse the local
    government’s findings.
    (File v.
    D
    & L Landfill,
    Inc.
    (August 30,
    1990),
    PCB 90—94, aff’d File v.
    D
    & L Landfill,
    Inc.
    (5th Dist.
    1991),
    219 I1l.App.3d 897,
    579 N.E.2d 1228.)
    However, where an
    applicant made a prima facie showing as to each criterion and no
    contradicting or impeaching evidence was offered to rebut that
    8As previously stated,
    the
    Board
    may
    look beyond the
    local
    authority’s
    record
    when
    reviewing
    the
    issue
    of
    fundamental
    fairness.
    I 34—2 5
    10
    showing,
    a local government’s finding that several criteria had
    not been satisfied was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    (Industrial Fuels
    & Resources/Illinois,
    Inc.
    v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (1st Dist. March
    19,
    1992),
    No.
    1—91—
    0144,
    slip op.
    at 26.)
    JURISDICTION
    Jurisdiction
    is not at issue in this case.
    FUNDAMENTAL
    FAIRNESS
    Section 40.1 of the Act requires that this Board review the
    proceedings before the local siting authority to assure
    fundamental fairness.
    In E&E Hauling,
    Inc.
    v.
    PCB
    (2d Dist.
    1983),
    116
    Ill.App.3d 586,
    594,
    451 N.E.2d 555,
    564, aff’d in
    p.~rt
    (1985),
    107 Ill.2d
    33,
    481 N.E.2d
    664,
    the appellate court
    found that although citizens before a local decisiOnmaker are not
    entitled to a fair hearing by constitutional guarantees of due
    process, procedures at the local level must comport with due
    process standards of fundamental fairness.
    The court held that
    standards of adjudicative due process must be applied.
    (See also
    Industrial Fuels
    & Resources/Illinois,
    slip op.
    at
    17; Tate v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (4th Dist. 1989),
    188 Ill.App.3d 994, 544
    N.E.2d 1176,
    1193.)
    In an analysis of bias or prejudgment,
    elected and administrative officials are presumed to be objective
    and to act without bias.
    In its post-hearing brief,
    Gallatin cites to the following
    four arguments in support of its contention that the County
    Board’s decision making process was fundamentally unfair:
    1.
    Gallatin argues that the County’s attorney, Mr.
    Lloyd,
    and engineer, Mr.
    Spencer, engaged in a series of ex
    parte contacts with the County Board,
    Committee, and
    hearing officer after Fulton County filed its
    application for siting approval and after Gallatin
    filed its appearance.
    Gallatin adds that fundamental
    and procedural issues were discussed at such times and
    that Gallatin was given no notice of such meetings and
    had no opportunity to respond even though
    it had
    specifically requested notice.
    2.
    Gallatin argues that Fulton County failed to
    distinguish between its roles as applicant and decision
    maker.
    More specifically, Gallatin asserts that the
    evidence shows that Mr., Spencer acted
    in an advisory
    capacity to the Committee and that County Board
    chairman,
    Ms. Ripper,
    acted on behalf of Fulton County
    when she negotiated for the bonds that funded the
    siting application and signed the siting application.
    134—254
    11
    3.
    Gallatin argues that the County Board demonstrated bias
    in favor of the application when it failed to apply its
    own siting rules.
    Specifically, Gallatin argues that
    the County Board violated its rules when it did not
    publish notice of Fulton County’s application or hold
    the hearing within the time frames specified in the
    rules,
    and when it allowed Fulton County to file its
    siting application without paying the required filing
    fee.
    4.
    Gallatin argues that, when passing the ordinance
    authorizing the issuance of bonds, the County Board
    already had determined that Landfill No.
    3 would be
    built.
    Ex Parte Contacts
    With regard to the allegation of ex parte contacts, Gallatin
    cites to several examples of such contacts in its post—hearing
    brief.
    First, Gallatin points out that Mr. Keith Kost,
    Gallatin’s local attorney, testified that,
    at the conclusion of
    the October 22,
    1991 siting hearing, he observed Mr.
    Lloyd
    discussing with the six members of the Committee “the burden of
    proof that Fulton County had to put on and how much evidence the
    county had to put on to meet the burden”.
    (Tr.
    I
    17.)
    In
    addition, Gallatin notes that,
    in a July 10,
    1991 memo,
    Ms.
    Ripper directed the Committee to meet with Mr. Lloyd “concerning
    the siting application and hearing procedures for”Landf ill No.
    3.
    (Pet.
    Ex.
    6.)
    Gallatin alleges that the meeting between the
    Committee and Mr.
    Lloyd occurred on July 25,
    1991.
    (Tr.
    I
    81,
    94-95;
    Pet.
    Exs.
    1,
    5.)
    Finally, Gallatin notes that Mr. Lloyd’s
    bills to Fulton County indicate,
    in part,
    that he attended the
    July 25,
    1991 Committee meeting at the courthouse; an August 14,
    1991 Committee meeting in Lewistown to “revise rules and
    regulations for the Committee”;
    had an October
    2,
    1991
    telephone conference with Mr. Danner regarding “copy of siting
    committee rules and regulations”; had an October 16,
    1991
    conference with the hearing officer, Ronald Weber, on “the
    procedure to be used at
    the
    siting hearing”; and had a December
    9,
    1991 telephone conference with Ms. Scott,
    on “the
    landfill
    resolution and review of committee findings and recommendations”
    (Pet.
    Ex.
    1.)
    In addition, Gallatin argues that the Committee
    members met with Fulton County’s engineer,
    Mr.
    Spencer, to “go
    over the rules and regulations for siting a landfill”.
    (Tr.
    I
    80;
    Tr.
    II 45—46, Pet. Ex.
    4.)
    Finally, Gallatin points to
    several places
    in the record where the Committee members
    themselves confirmed that the ex parte contacts occurred.9
    (Tr.
    9Gallatin specifically alleges that it received no notice of
    the above contacts
    even though
    it
    entered
    an
    appearance
    in the
    134—255
    12
    I 17, 80—82, 94—95,
    134; Tr.
    II
    4,
    26—28,
    36,
    45—46,
    58,
    78.)
    A review of the record reveals that there were indeed
    several contacts during the course of the siting process.
    We are
    particularly disturbed by Mr. Lloyd’s contacts with the Committee
    and the hearing officer.
    We cannot,
    however, hold the Committee
    or the hearing officer responsible for such contacts.
    Rather,
    Mr. Lloyd, as an attorney,
    should have been aware of the danger
    of ex parte contacts once the siting application was filed and
    once he was appointed as special assistant state’s attorney to
    represent Fulton County.
    We are also disturbed by the fact that
    there may have been a violation of the Open Meetings Act
    if,
    in
    fact, no notice of the Committee meetings was given.’0
    Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Board does not
    believe that the contacts or lack of notice fundamentally
    prejudiced Gallatin.
    A decision must be reversed, or vacated and
    remanded, where “as a result of improper ex parte communications,
    the agency’s decision making process was irrevocably tainted so
    as to make the ultimate judgment of the agency unfair,
    either to
    an innocent party or to the public interest that the agency was
    obliged to protect”.
    (E&E Hauling, 451 N.E.2d at 603.)
    In
    determining if improper ex parte communications irrevocably taint
    the decision making process,
    a number of considerations may be
    relevant, including:
    the gravity of the ex parte communications,
    whether the contacts may have influenced the ultimate decision;
    whether the party making the improper contacts benefitted from
    the ultimate decision; and whether the contents of the
    communications were unknown to opposing parties, who therefore
    had no opportunity to respond.
    E&E Hauling,
    451 N.E.2d
    603.
    There are several reasons why we do not believe that Mr.
    Lloyd’s and Mr. Spencer’s contacts with the Committee and the
    hearing officer irrevocably tainted the decision making process.
    First, we again remind Gallatin that neither the Committee nor
    matter and requested notice.
    (C0646, Tr.
    I 24—25,
    73—74,
    95.)
    ‘°Mr.
    Kost testified that he did not receive notice of the July
    25, 1991, August 14, 1991, or August 21, 1991 meetings.
    (Tr.
    I 24—
    25,
    41.)
    Ms. Williams testified that she did not give notice of
    the November
    25,
    1991 Committee meeting and did not know who was
    responsible for giving notice.
    (Tr.
    I 73-74.)
    She also testified
    that she did not know if notice was given of the August
    14,
    1991
    meeting or
    if
    any notice was given
    for
    any
    of
    the
    Committee’s
    meetings.
    (Tr.
    I
    73,
    82,
    95.)
    Mr.
    Danner
    testified
    that he
    believed
    notice
    was
    given
    of
    the
    November
    25,
    1991
    Committee
    meeting.
    (Tr.
    I 132.)
    Mr. Weber testified that he did not notify
    Gallatin of his October 16,
    1991 contact with Mr.
    Lloyd.
    (Tr.
    II
    28.)
    134—256
    13
    the hearing officer was, the decision maker in this instance.
    The
    Committee’s only duty was to preside at the hearing and make a
    recommendation to the County Board.
    (C1l66; Tr. 73-74; Pet.
    Ex.
    3.)
    The hearing officer’s only duty was to preside over the
    siting hearing.
    (Tr.
    II
    8,
    15.)
    In fact,
    there
    is no evidence
    of any ex parte contacts between Mr. Lloyd or Mr. Spencer and the
    decision maker itself (i.e.,
    the County Board).
    Second, the testimony of the Committee members and the
    hearing offiöer make it clear that,
    in many instances,
    they could
    not recall
    if or when the alleged contacts occurred.
    (Tr.
    I
    79,
    80,
    81—82,
    86,
    89,
    92,
    94—95,
    100—101,
    102—104, 134—135; Tr.
    II
    20,
    44,
    47—50,
    53—54.)
    For example, with regard to discussion
    between Mr. Lloyd and the Committee members after the October 22,
    1991 siting hearing, the Committee members, the hearing officer,
    and Ms. Ripper testified that they could not recall any
    discussion with Mr. Lloyd regarding burden of proof after the
    siting hearing.
    (Tr.
    I 104—106, 136—137; Tr.
    II
    13, 37—38,
    53,
    84, 85.)
    In’ fact,
    Mr. Kost himself could not remember the
    substance of Mr. Lloyd’s remarks
    (i.e., the type of burden of
    proof or the type of evidence needed)
    to the Committee members
    that night.
    (Tr.
    I 32—34,
    37.)
    Even when the Committee members and hearing officer did
    recall such contacts, they testified that the contacts were about
    non—substantive matters or occurred during other committee
    meetings.
    For example, Ms. Williams testified that another
    committee,
    the landfill siting committee
    (as opposed to the
    Regional Pollution Control Hearing Committee),
    may have met with
    Mr.
    Spencer,
    on or about August 14,
    1991, to review “the rules
    and regulations for siting a landfill” and that the group was.
    “asking him questions about
    the
    application, and how he put it
    together” and “correcting some of the.
    .
    .page number mistakes and
    such so that it would be clearer”.
    (Tr.
    I 78-84,
    100.)
    She also
    testified that she and Mr.
    Lloyd attended some meetings of other
    committees during the summer.
    (Tr.
    I 100-101,
    see also Tr.
    I
    80—
    81,
    86—87.)
    Mr. Danner testified that Mr.
    Lloyd attended the
    organizational meetings of the Committee and “assisted the
    committee in the timetable and the timeframes that the hearings
    had to be taken place”.
    (Tr.
    I
    134-135.)
    Mr. Danner also
    testified that the group “went over some rules and regulations
    for the meeting”, but that he did not believe that Mr. Lloyd
    attended any other Committee meetings thereafter.
    (Tr.
    I 135.)
    Later in the transcript,
    Mr. Danner testified that the Committee
    members also had some meetings with Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Spencer
    during the summer to discuss the rules and procedures.
    (Tr.
    II
    44-46,
    47-50.)
    Mr. Moore confirmed that the Committee members
    met with Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Spencer during the summer to discuss
    rules.
    (Tr.~ II
    54,
    58.)
    Mr. Danner also testified that Mr.
    Lloyd telephoned him on October
    2,
    1991,
    to request that “I send
    him a copy or get him a copy of the rules that had been adopted
    for the hearing committee”.
    (Tr.
    II
    36,
    40—41,
    46—47.)
    Mr.
    134—257
    14
    Weber testified that he had an October 16, 1991 telephone
    conversation with Mr. Lloyd to obtain “a copy of the set of rules
    with regard to how the hearing was going to be conducted” and
    discuss “how the hearing would be opened”.
    (Tr.
    II 4-5,
    18,
    21-
    23.)
    In addition, Gallatin’s own exhibits indicate that the
    contacts were of a non—substantive nature.
    (Pet.
    Exs.
    1,
    6.)
    In any event, the Committee members and hearing officer
    affirmatively stated that they did not discuss the merits of the
    case with anyone
    (e.g.,
    Mr.
    Lloyd,
    Mr.
    Spencer, Mr. Kost,
    or the
    County Board members) and were not influenced in any way when
    making their recommendation for the December 10,
    1991 County
    Board meeting.
    (Tr.
    I
    107,
    109—111,
    137—138;
    Tr.
    II
    6—7,
    10,
    14,
    24—25,
    38,
    54—55.)
    Finally, Gallatin has failed to demonstrate
    how it has been prejudiced or how the alleged contacts or lack of
    notice compromised the County Board’s decision.
    A court will not
    reverse an agency’s decision because of improper ex parte
    contacts without a showing that the complaining party suffered
    prejudice from these contacts.
    (E&E Hauling,
    451
    N.E.2d 603.)
    The Board is disturbed, however, by the possibility that the
    membership of Mr.
    Lloyd and Mr. Spencer
    (who were not County
    Board members) on the landfill siting committee while the
    application was before the Committee, may have given rise to an
    appearance of impropriety,
    even though we have found no prejudice
    arising from any of the contacts.
    The Board cautions local
    decisionmakers that any appearance of impropriety should be
    avoided.
    Commingling of Duties
    Gallatin cites to several instances to support its
    contention that Fulton County failed to distinguish between its
    roles as applicant and decision maker.
    First, Gallatin contends
    that Mr. Lloyd assisted in choosing the hearing officer and was
    retained to represent Fulton County as a special assistant
    state’s’ attorney even though the state’s attorney was
    representing the decision maker.
    (Pet.
    Ex.
    1.)
    Gallatin also
    points to Mr. Lloyd’s claim of attorney-client privilege when he
    was subpoenaed to testify about his communications with the
    County Board and the fact that many of the Committee members
    testified that they were unsure of who was their attorney.
    (Tr.
    I 48-49.)
    Gallatin also questions the fact that Ms. Ripper
    negotiated the bonds that funded the siting application, signed
    the siting application, sat at the applicant’s table at the
    siting hearing and this Board’s hearings, allowed the Committee
    to meet in her offices, attended some of the Committee’s
    meetings, and met with Mr. Lloyd on several occasions.
    (C00l2;
    Tr.
    I
    71;
    Tr.
    II
    66,
    77;
    App.
    Ex.
    1,
    Resp.
    Ex.
    2.)
    Although Gallatin points to Mr. Lloyd’s billing sheets in
    support of its contention that Mr.
    Lloyd chose the hearing
    134—2 58
    15
    officer, the logs do not support the contention.
    The entry for
    June 17,
    1991 simply states “Telephone conf.
    with Joan Scott on
    hearing officer”, and the entry for June
    18,
    1991 states
    “Telephone Conf. with Bill Randolph on hearing officer at siting
    hearing.”
    (Pet.
    Ex.
    1.)
    In fact,
    the hearing officer testified
    that the County Board’s attorney,
    Ms.
    Scott,
    asked him if he
    would accept the appointment as hearing officer.
    (Tr.
    II
    15.)
    In any event, we conclude that since the hearing officer was not
    involved in making the decision on the siting application, Mr.
    Lloyd’s involvement did not prejudice Gallatin.
    (See ~
    Hauling,
    451 N.E.2d 603.)
    We also see nothing wrong with the
    fact that Mr. Lloyd was appointed Special Assistant State’s
    Attorney.
    Section 3-9008 of the Civil Code permits that
    appointment of an attorney to “prosecute or defend
    a
    cause or
    proceeding” whenever the State’s Attorney is “interested in any
    cause or proceeding,
    civil or criminal, which it is or may be his
    duty to prosecute or defend”.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    34,
    par.
    3—9008.)
    As to the issue of attorney—client privilege,~Mr.Lloyd
    never claimed the privilege during the course of the case before
    the Board.
    Rather,
    the March 4,
    1992 motion to quash the
    subpoena was filed by Ms.
    Scott on behalf of Fulton County
    (which
    Mr. Lloyd represented)
    ~
    the County Board,
    as co—respondents.
    Finally, no Committee members testified that Mr. Lloyd was their
    attorney.
    In fact,
    Ms. Williams and Mr.
    Danner, testified that
    Ms.
    Scott rather than Mr.
    Lloyd was the Committee’s attorney.
    (Tr.
    I
    61,
    66,
    74—75,
    106,
    136.)
    We also do not find that Ms. Ripper’s actions prejudiced
    Gallatin.
    As County Board chairman, Ms. Ripper may well have
    been the only official authorized to negotiate or sign documents
    and may have routinely done so during her tenure as County Board
    chairman.
    We also see no harm from the fact that she sat at the
    applicant’s table during the local siting hearing.
    That action
    alone
    is not dispositive of any bias.
    Moreover,
    it is logical
    that Ms. Ripper,
    as a co—respondent, would have sat with her
    other co—respondent at this Board’s hearing.
    With regard to the allegation that Ms. Ripper attended the
    Committee’s meetings, Ms. Ripper testified that she did not
    attend any of the Committee’s meetings after the Committee
    drafted the hearing rules and regulations.
    (Tr.
    II 77—78.)
    More
    specifically, Ms. Ripper testified that she did not attend the
    Committee’s August 14,
    1991 or August 21,
    1991 meetings, but was
    in the outer office.”
    (Tr. II 79-80.)
    Ms. Ripper later
    testified that she may have attended the “landfill siting
    committee’s” August 14,
    1991 meeting, but that the meeting was
    ~The transcript is not clear as to whether this was a meeting
    of
    the
    Committee
    or
    the
    landfill
    siting
    committee.
    (see
    Ms.
    William’s testimony at Tr.
    I 78—84,
    100 and p.
    12 of this opinion).
    I
    34—259
    16
    “for the revised rules and regulations and procedural matters,
    location, dates,
    notices
    ...“
    (Tr.
    II
    111; Pet.
    Ex.
    4.)
    With
    regard to the November 25,
    1991 Committee meeting,
    Ms. Williams
    testified that she was unsure of whether the Committee met in Ms.
    Ripper’s office or in a room adjoining Ms. Ripper’s office, but
    stated that,
    although Ms.
    Ripper may have been in her office that
    day,
    she was not present at the meeting.
    (Tr.
    I 68—71,
    72—73,
    107,
    132.)
    Ms. Ripper testified,
    and Ms. Williams specifically
    confirmed,
    that she did not direct the Committee’s discussions or
    deliberations about what to recommend to the County Board.
    (Tr.
    I
    107,
    110; Tr.
    II 77—79,
    85—87.)
    In addition, we remind
    Gallatin that Ms. Ripper’s vote did not determine the decision of
    the County Board nor did Ms. Ripper control the decision maker.
    We therefore conclude that Gallatin has not been prejudiced and
    that the alleged contacts did not compromise the County Board’s
    decision.
    Failure to Apply Siting Rules
    Gallatin cites to the Notice of Public Hearing and a
    Response to Request to Admit
    in support of its contention that
    Fulton County did not publish timely notice of the siting
    application pursuant to the local siting ordinance.’2
    (C0653,
    Response to Request to Admit-No.
    1,
    filed February 4,
    1992.)
    Gallatin also points to the transcript of the local siting
    hearing to support its contention that Fulton County failed to
    conduct a timely hearing.
    (C116l.)
    Finally, Gallatin points to
    the siting application and a response to request to admit to
    support the contention that Fulton County waived the siting
    application filing fee.
    (C0012, Response to Request to Admit-No.
    5.)
    An examination of the above evidence fails to indicate that
    Fulton County did not provide notice of the siting application or
    conduct the siting hearing in a timely manner.
    Specifically, the
    Notice of Public Hearing,
    the Response to Request to Admit,
    and
    the siting hearing transcript do not mention when notice was to
    be published or when the hearing was to be held.
    The documents
    provide only the date that notice was actually published and the
    dates on which the siting hearing were actually held.
    In addition, we cannot ascertain the terms of the siting
    ordinance because the ordinance
    is not in the record.
    We wish to
    state,
    however, that we disagree with Fulton County’s and the
    County Board’s argument that Gallatin failed to preserve its
    objection on this issue because Gallatin failed to place the
    local ordinance into the record for review.
    We again note that a
    12
    Gallatin
    does
    not
    allege
    any
    violation
    of
    the
    notice
    requirements of the Act.
    I
    34—26()
    17
    person need only raise or assert an objection prior to or during
    the siting hearing in order for the question of bias to be
    reviewed on appeal.
    Gallatin raised its objections below and the
    hearing officer clarified that Gallatin’s objections were made
    part of the record and that no further action was necessary to
    preserve Gallatin’s objections.
    (C097l—0976, C1l72—l173,
    C1173—
    1174,
    C1564,
    C1564—l565.)
    Although Gallatin should have seen to it that the ordinance
    was placed
    in the record,
    Fulton County and the County Board had
    the primary duty to see that the ordinance was included in the
    record.
    In our January 9,
    1992 order in this matter,
    Fulton
    County and the County Board were charged with the duty of
    preparing and filing the local record with this Board.
    The
    record was to contain “all documents,
    transcripts,
    and exhibits
    deemed to pertain to this proceeding from initial filing through
    and including final action by the local government body.”
    (Gallatin National ComPanY v.
    Fulton County Board
    (January
    9,
    1992), PCB 91—256.)
    The local siting ordinance,
    therefore,
    should have been included in the record.
    We also disagree with
    Fulton County and the County Board’s argument that there
    is no
    basis for Gallatin’s objection because the hearing officer denied
    the objections and because the County Board,
    in its January
    8,
    1992 decision, determined that
    it substantially complied with the
    ordinance.
    Such a position is fundamentally at odds with this
    Board’s mandate to review local siting decisions.
    However,
    given
    that no violation of the Act is asserted (which would be a
    jurisdictional matter), and we do not see where Gallatin was
    prejudiced by the County Board’s actions in this matter, we do
    not find fundamental unfairness here.
    With regard to the filing fee, Fulton County and County
    Board,
    in their Response to Gallatin’s Request to Admit,
    stated
    “co-RespondentS
    admit Fulton County did not pay any application
    filing fee pursuant to Sec.
    1039.29(k)
    as the purpose for the
    filing fee is to cover the reasonable, necessary costs incurred
    by Fulton County in the siting review process and since Fulton
    County was the applicant that
    it
    would
    be
    charged
    with
    all
    costs.”
    (Response to Request to Admit
    p.
    2 #6).
    Although Fulton
    County and County Board admit that they waived the filing fee, we
    do not see how Gallatin was prejudiced by the fact that no filing
    fee was paid particularly in light of the fact that Fulton County
    would be charged with all costs.
    Bond Ordinance
    Gallatin argues that the
    County
    Board
    already
    had
    determined
    that
    Landfill
    No.
    3 would be built when it passed the bond
    ordinance.
    In response, Fulton County and the County Board
    contend
    that
    the
    statutory
    criteria
    of
    Section
    39.2
    were
    not
    before
    the
    County
    Board
    when
    it
    voted
    on
    the
    bond
    issue.
    I35~-2~I
    18
    On June
    12,
    1990,
    the County Board voted 18 to
    It~~~~:,txeed
    with the expansion of Landfill No.
    2.
    (Tr.
    II
    65,
    ~
    1~)
    the
    County Board’s vote was subject to the following tw..~nä..’t~cns:
    1)
    obtaining financing for the expansion and
    2) obta~.~n~i~iting
    approval for the expansion.
    (Tr.
    I
    111; Tr.
    Ii.
    65, 3~
    The financial contingency was satisfied on November
    it...
    before any siting proceeding had commenced.
    On tha~ta.~t~.
    the
    County Board passed an ordinance authorizing the
    is~
    ~f
    $500,000 in revenue bonds from the Illinois Rural Bat E~’J~.:.
    tc~
    finance the landfill expansion.
    (C0870—0913,
    C09i4-l~..:~,
    C~19,
    C0920—0921, C0922—0926,
    C0927,
    C0928—0929, C0930—093~, ‘c.-33,.
    C1218; Tr.
    I 116—117,
    121; Tr.
    II 68.)
    The bonds ~
    ~
    repaid by the revenue generated by the expansion.
    ~
    c~922-
    0926,
    C0927,
    C0928—0929, C1218,
    C1220—l22l; Tr. II ~6~184
    Additionally,
    a sales tax intercept
    is collateral1 t~b’ea~1ied
    upon any payment default.
    (Tr.II 65-67.)
    Fulton C~:~r~eived
    the revenues from the bond issue in January or Febr~y:,
    ~,
    11~1.
    (Tr.
    II
    68-69.)
    The siting application was filed ~
    L~1.
    After reviewing the record, the Board does not &..:~d~thatthe
    County Board’s issuance of the bonds indicates pred
    s±iczi~
    on
    the question of siting approval.
    As Fulton County
    .~.
    t~
    &unty
    Board maintain,
    issuing the bonds was merely a pre~a~y
    step
    in applying for site location approval.
    The County~.a~
    wa~s
    not
    faced with the same issues
    in issuing bonds as are
    ~
    zbjr an
    application for site approval.
    There is no indicat~.:~.,i~~t~Le
    record that the County Board’s vote to grant siting’
    ~r&~L
    was
    based upon the bonds rather than the six applicable
    ~‘rt~ri~a
    of
    Section 39.2.
    The facts in this case are very similar to the:~~tf’
    scrutinized by the supreme court in E
    & E Hauling. I~4~t case,
    the objectors alleged that the local decisionmaker
    t~. ~raj~ged
    the siting application because the decisionmaker had
    rL. etr
    approved the proposed landfill by ordinance.
    The s~r~ecourt
    rejected that claim,
    finding that the earlier ordin~’~a~s
    simply a preliminary step,
    and that there was no evL~:.’.n~ttiat
    the decisionmaker had prejudged the adjudicative faa;,
    ~L..
    e.. the
    applicable criteria under Section 39.2.
    The suprem~ct.oi~rt
    further noted that there is no inherent bias when ar
    administrative body is charged with both investigatq~‘.~t
    adjudicatory functions.
    (E
    & E Hauling,
    481 N.E.2d~
    ~,
    citing Withrow v.
    Larkin (1975),
    421 U.S.
    35, 95
    s..ct
    .1:~55~,
    43
    L.Ed.2d 712.)
    Applying the facts and reasoning of ~
    to the instant case, the Board finds that the Count~~rcf’~
    issuance of the bonds was a permissible preliminaryt:e~,. a~d‘did
    not indicate predisposition or bias on the six critt~...ab~~he
    considered under Section 39.2 of the Act.
    Additionally, the Board believes that our findi~h~r~is
    supported by the appellate court decisions in Fairvi~
    ~
    Citizens Task Force
    v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (3d’;1~E’t..l~3O),
    I. 3/4—262
    19
    198 Ill.App.3d 541, 555 N.E.2d
    1178,
    and Woodsmoke Resorts,
    Inc.
    v. City of Marseilles
    (3d Dist.
    1988),
    174 Ill.App.3d 906,
    529
    N.E.2d 274.
    Although, as Gallatin points out,
    the facts
    of those
    two cases are not directly on point, we believe that the cases
    are analogous to this case.
    Both Fairview Area Citizens
    Taskforce and Woodsmoke Resorts involved municipalities which
    entered into preannexation agreements with future applicants for
    siting approval.
    In both cases,
    the court held that
    a possible
    economic benéfit to the local decisionmaker if siting approval
    was granted did not show predisposition on the specific criteria
    to be addressed in a siting application.
    The Board is not
    persuaded by Gallatin’s attempt to distinguish these cases on the
    grounds that those cases involved possible economic benefit,
    while the
    instant case involves a possible economic detriment.
    Gallatin maintains that if the County Board did not approve
    siting,
    it would be unable to repay the $500,000 in bonds.
    There
    is some dispute over whether all of the money was spent on the
    application, or if the county could simply repay the bonds with
    the remaining proceeds of the bonds.
    (Tr.
    I
    121, Resp.
    Br.
    24.)
    Regardless of whether the county could immediately repay the
    bonds if the siting was not approved, the Board finds that
    Gallatin’s attempt to distinguish these cases disregards the
    reasoning of the court in both cases.
    Those decisions focused on
    the distinctions between entering into a preannexation agreement
    and reviewing an application for siting approval.
    Quite simply,
    those two actions are separate,
    and a local government’s decision
    on one cannot be construed as a determination on the other.
    Finally, the Board notes that a finding that it is
    fundamentally unfair for a county to issue bonds before filing an
    application for siting approval would make it very difficult,
    if
    not impossible,
    for a county or a municipality to ever site its
    own landfill.
    As the supreme court noted
    in
    E
    & E Hauling,
    “it
    does not seem unusual that
    a landfill would be proposed for
    location on publicly owned property.
    .
    .We do not consider that the
    legislature intended this unremarkable factual situation to make
    ‘fundamental fairness of the procedures’
    impossible.”
    (E
    &
    E
    Hauling,
    481 N.E.2d at 668.)
    In sum1
    we find no evidence of
    predisposition on the siting application simply because the
    County Board previously issued bonds on the subject.
    CHALLENGED CRITERIA
    Gallatin has raised challenges to three of the six criteria
    which the County Board found were met by the application.
    The
    criteria
    in dispute are:
    whether the facility is necessary to
    accomodate the waste needs of th~area it
    is intended to serve
    (Section 39.2(a) (1)); whether the facility
    is so designed,
    located,
    and proposed to be operated that the public health,
    safety,
    and welfare will be protected (Section 39.2(A) (2)); and
    whether the plan of operations
    for the facility
    is designed to
    minimize the danger to the surrounding area from fire,
    spills,
    or
    I
    34-263
    20
    other operational accidents
    (Section 39.2(a) (5)).
    As noted
    above, this Board must review the County Board’s
    decisions on the challenged criteria on a manifest weight of the
    evidence standard.
    Need
    The first criterion which the local decisiorimaker must
    consider in ruling upon an application for local site approval is
    whether “the facility is necessary to accomodate the waste needs
    of the area it is intended to serve”.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    lii
    ½,
    par.
    l039.2(a)(l).)
    In its January
    8,
    1992 written
    decision, based upon its December
    10,
    1991 vote,
    the County Board
    found that the facility met this criterion.
    The County Board
    noted that G. Richard Spencer, Fulton County’s consulting
    engineer, testified that the proposed expansion “is necessary to
    accommodate the waste needs of the area bounded by Illinois Route
    9 to the southern limits of Fulton County and extending into
    Mason County,
    Illinois where there are no other operating
    landfills”.
    (Cl152.)
    The County Board stated that it had
    reviewed Gallatin’s cross—examination of Mr.
    Spencer, and
    specifically rejected paragraphs
    15 through 26 of the findings of
    fact proposed by Gallatin.’3
    (Cl152.)
    Gallatin argues that the County Board’s decision that
    Landfill No.
    3
    is necessary to accomodate the waste needs of the
    intended service area is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    Gallatin notes that the intended service area is
    approximately the southern two-thirds of Fulton County and a
    portion of neighboring Mason County, with a total current
    population of 26,500 decreasing to 24,000 by the year 2010.
    (C0045-0046.)
    Gallatin argues that although Fulton County
    initially contended that waste generation rates in the service
    area will increase, the data actually showed that the estimated
    waste produced
    in the service area will decrease by 26
    in the
    next 18 years.
    (C0046,
    Table 4—B.)
    Gallatin maintains that Mr.
    Spencer conceded that the projected waste generation rates did
    not accurately account for the mandatory recycling requirements
    imposed under the Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.l991,
    ch.
    85, pars.
    5951 et seq.),
    so that when
    Fulton County achieves the mandatory recycling rates
    in 1998 and
    2000, waste generation rates will decrease even further.
    (C1266.)
    Gallatin further argues that Fulton County also failed to
    ‘~
    This statement refers
    to Gallatin’s
    proposed findings of
    fact, submitted to the County Board on November 20,
    1991.
    (C1061-
    1090.)
    134—264
    21
    consider that the intended service area
    is already served by a
    large local landfill.
    Gallatin contends that although Fulton
    County “gerrymandered” the service area to exclude the Gallatin
    facility,
    Gallatin’s 80 acre,
    five million ton capacity landfill
    is located in Fulton County,
    ten miles from Landfill No.
    3.
    (C1469—1471.)
    Gallatin states that the intended service area for
    its facility includes all of Fulton County and Mason County.
    Gallatin maintains that Mr.
    Spencer did not give the Gallatin
    facility much credit in his analysis of need,
    because
    construction of the Gallatin facility has not been completed.
    (C1310-1313; Cl433—l435.)
    Gallatin cites the appellate court
    decisions in Tate v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (4th Dist.
    1989),
    188 Ill.App.3d 994,
    554 N.E.2d 1176,
    and A.R.F. Landfill,
    Inc.
    v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1988)
    174 Ill.App.3d 82,
    528
    N.E.2d 390 for the proposition that future development of other
    disposal sites must be considered in determining need.
    Finally, Gallatin contends that Mr. Spencer could not
    articulate why Landfill No.
    3
    is necessary.
    Gallatin states that
    Mr. Spencer initially stated that the waste disposal needs of the
    population in the service area was the only factor supporting a
    conclusion of need.
    (Cl226-1227.)
    However, Gallatin maintains
    that Mr. Spencer later changed his opinion and stated that the
    real reason he believed Landfill No.
    3 was necessary was to
    provide a revenue stream to take care of potential problems of
    Landfill No.
    2.
    (C1267—1268; Cl305—l306.)
    Gallatin argues that
    Fulton County’s desire for a source of revenue
    is not a
    legitimate basis for satisfying the need criterion.
    In response, Fulton County and the County Board argue that
    the County Board’s decision was not against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.
    Fulton County and the County Board contend that
    there are no other operating landfills in the intended service
    area currently accepting waste
    (Cl227), and that all projections
    point to a stable stream of waste
    in the intended service area,
    despite a declining population and considering recycling rates.
    (C0046, Table 4-B.)
    Fulton County and the County Board state
    that Gallatin did not present any studies or evidence to rebut
    Mr. Spencer’s conclusion of declining population and
    a rise
    in
    per capita waste disposal rates.
    Fulton County and the County
    Board maintain that Fulton County acknowledged Gallatin’s
    facility and took that facility into consideration in assessing
    need.
    (C131l-13l3.)
    However,
    Fulton County and the County Board
    contend that the record shows that Gallatin was not accepting
    waste at the time of hearing, and had never accepted waste
    (Cl455), that the principal service area for Gallatin’s facility
    and the maximum waste load to the~facility
    is outside Fulton
    County’s service area (Cl3l2—13l3), and that Fulton County’s
    service area
    is not the same as Gallatin’s intended service area
    (C13l3).
    Fulton County and the County Board argue that the
    manifest weight of the evidence supports the County Board’s
    decision that there
    is a need for the facility and a reasonable
    1
    34—265
    22
    convenience to the intended service area.
    (Waste Management of
    Illinois v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1988),
    175
    Ill.App.3d 1023,
    530 N.E.
    2d 682.)
    After a review of the record and the arguments, the Board
    finds that the County Board’s decision that the application
    demonstrated compliance with criterion one
    is not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    Gallatin did not present any
    testimony or evidence on this criterion, but relied on cross—
    examination of Mr.
    Spencer.
    The County Board stated in its
    January 8,
    1992 written decision that
    it had considered Mr.
    Spencer’s testimony upon cross—examination, and then specifically
    rejected the findings of fact proposed by Gallatin
    in paragraphs
    15—26.
    (C1152.)
    Paragraphs
    15-26 of Gallatin’s proposed
    findings of fact include all of the arguments raised by Gallatin
    before this Board.
    (Cl065-1066.)
    Thus,
    the County Board
    specifically considered and rejected Gallatin’s contentions that
    Fulton County had not demonstrated need.
    The Board finds that
    the record shows that the County Board could have reasonably
    reached its conclusion that need had been demonstrated.
    Additionally, Gallatin did not submit its own evidence on this
    criterion, and the County Board,
    as the trier of fact,
    is well
    within its authority to reject Gallatin’s “impeachment” of Mr.
    Spencer.
    Although Gallatin asserts that Fulton County failed to
    consider Gallatin’s facility,
    in violation of Tate,
    the Board
    finds evidence that Fulton County did indeed consider Gallatin’s
    facility.
    Mr. Spencer testified that he considered the Galatin
    facility.
    (C1312—13l3; C1434—l435.)
    Although Mr. Spencer also
    stated that he gave little weight to the Gallatin facility
    because of questions on when that facility would be operational
    (C1435),
    that statement cannot translate to a finding that Fulton
    County failed to consider Gallatin’s facility.
    It
    is the
    province of the County Board to determine whether Mr. Spencer’s
    analysis of need was sufficient to demonstrate compliance with
    criterion one.
    Based upon this record, we cannot say that it was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence for the County Board
    to conclude that criterion one was satisfied.
    The Board notes that Gallatin’s claim that Fulton County did
    not consider the Gallatin facility seems to imply that simply
    because a large landfill has been sited and permitted,
    and
    intends to serve the same area,
    no need for another facility can
    ever be demonstrated.
    For this Board to find that no need can
    exist if another landfill, with much capacity,
    is serving or will
    serve the proposed service area, ~rou1dresult in the creation of
    landfill monopolies, at least within specific service areas.
    We
    do not believe that the legislature,
    in requiring local
    decisionmakers to consider the waste needs of the intended
    service area,
    meant to establish de facto monopolies.
    In this
    case,
    Fulton County presented an analysis of need,
    and the County
    I 34—266
    23
    Board found that the facility is necessary.
    The proper inquiry
    before the Board is whether the County Board’s decision is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, not whether there
    is
    another landfill which could serve the intended service area. We
    do not find the County Board decision to be against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    The Board does agree with Gallatin that a desire for a
    source of revenue alone is not a legitimate basis for satisfying
    the need criterion.
    However, Gallatin has pointed only to Mr.
    Spencer’s testimony on the issue of revenue.
    Mr. Spencer was the
    applicant’s witness,
    not a decisionmaker.
    Simply because Mr.
    Spencer testified that revenue was a consideration does not mean
    that the County Board’s decision on criterion one was based upon
    improper reasons.
    The record contains direct testimony and
    evidence on issues properly considered under criterion one, such
    as waste disposal projections.
    The Board finds no evidence that
    the County Board’s decision was based upon a desire for a source
    of revenue.
    Public Health,
    Safety, and Welfare
    The second criterion which the local decisionmaker must
    consider when ruling upon an application for local site approval
    is whether “the facility is so designed,
    located,
    and proposed to
    be operated that the public health,
    safety, and welfare will be
    protected.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par. 1039.2(a) (2).)
    In its January 8,
    1992, written decision, the County Board found
    that the facility met this criterion.
    The County Board stated
    that Mr. Spencer testified that Landfill No.
    3 will be designed
    in accordance with applicable regulations
    (C1228), and will
    conform with any regulations which may be adopted prior to permit
    application.’4
    The County Board found that Mr. Spencer’s design,
    with a transfer station at the head end of the landfill, would
    control the placement of waste, maintain daily cover,
    and address
    the violations that the county’s landfills have experienced in
    the past.
    The County Board further found that Landfill No.
    3
    will improve public health,
    safety, and welfare by adding
    leachate collection and groundwater monitoring systems and
    groundwater intercept,
    and that these systems would improve upon
    the current situation
    in Landfill No.
    2.
    Finally, the County
    Board stated that it had reviewed Gallatin’s proposed findings of
    fact on criterion two,
    and specifically rejected those proposed
    findings.
    (C1l52—1153.)
    “
    The Board
    notes that the County Board’s decision refers to
    “Environmental
    Protection
    Agency”
    regulations.
    In
    fact,
    environmental
    regulations
    in
    Illinois,
    including
    the
    landfill
    regulations,
    are Pollution Control Board regulations.
    134—267
    24
    Gallatin argues that because Fulton County failed to prove
    that Landfill No.
    3
    is designed to protect public health,
    the
    County Board’s finding that criterion two was satisfied is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Gallatin contends
    that leachate
    is migrating from Landfill No.
    2,
    and that although
    Landfill No.
    3 will be “perched” on top of Landfill No.
    2, Fulton
    County’s expansion plan provides for no improvements to Landfill
    No.
    2.
    Gallatin states that public comment from “outside
    experts” demonstrated that the underground mines
    in the area of
    the landfills make the hydrogeology in the area very complex,
    and
    that groundwater will be extremely difficult to control.15
    Gallatin maintains that Mr.
    Spencer, Fulton County’s consulting
    engineer, admitted that the application only mentioned the need
    to stop leachate from migrating into the underground mines,
    without actually designing a system to do so.
    (Cl363.)
    Gallatin also argues that building Landfill No.
    3 on top of
    Landfill No.
    2 poses additional health and safety questions,
    because the existing landfill is not a suitable foundation to
    support a landfill.
    Gallatin maintains that Fulton County
    provided no analysis of the settlement of Landfill No.
    2 and the
    effect on Landfill No.
    3.
    Gallatin points to the comment of its
    expert,
    Dr. Tuncer Edil, who stated that significant settlement
    will occur at Landfill No.
    3, causing cracks in the liner of
    Landfill No.
    3,
    structural damage to the leachate collection
    system,
    and rupture of the geoinembrane.
    (C1105-l107.)
    Gallatin
    contends that the County Board’s finding that criterion two had
    been satisfied, despite the evidence of uncontrolled leachate
    migration from the existing landfill and the likelihood of
    foundation failure, was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    In response, Fulton County and the County Board argue that
    the County Board’s decision is not against the manifest weight of
    the evidence.
    Fulton County and the County Board contend that
    the application contains sufficient details showing that the
    design of Landfill No.
    3 will comply with the applicable
    regulations, including regulations on groundwater, contaminant
    transport issues, and engineering analysis for the foundation.
    Fulton County and the County Board note that these regulations
    require all existing units, such as Landfill No.
    2,
    which will
    remain open past September 18,
    1992,
    to be modified to conform
    with the rules.
    Fulton County and the County Board point out
    that Dr.
    Edil was not called to testify at the hearing, and
    therefore was not subject to cross—examination.
    Nevertheless,
    Fulton County and the County Board state that
    Dr. Edil’s opinion
    ~
    The
    “outside
    experts”
    were
    retained
    by
    Gallatin,
    and
    Gallatin submitted the experts’ comments during the public comment
    period following the public hearing.
    (Cl091-ll23.)
    1 34—268
    25
    does not appear to contradict Fulton County’s presentation of
    facts concerning proper design.
    Fulton County and the County
    Board point out that Dr.
    Edil found that the settlement issue “is
    tractable provided that adequate engineering inverstigation is
    committed to it.”
    (Cl106.)
    Fulton County and the County Board
    argue that the proposed plans in a siting document are considered
    preliminary,
    and that the Illinois Environmental Protection
    Agency will review the complete permit application, further
    ensuring the ‘public health,
    safety, and welfare.
    Based upon a review of the record, the Board cannot say that
    the County Board’s decision that criterion two was satisfied is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Fulton County’s
    application contains discussion of design considerations,
    including foundations,
    liner systems, leachate drainage and
    treatment,
    gas monitoring,
    and final cover.
    (C0039-004l.)
    The
    application also addresses site characteristics,
    such as
    geological and groundwater considerations,
    and landfill
    development.
    (C0047-0064;
    C0592-06l1.)
    Additionally, Mr.
    Spencer presented testimony
    in support of the application.
    (C1227-1239.)
    This Board
    is not free to reverse simply because
    the local decisionmaker credits one group of witnesses and not
    another group.
    (Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce,
    555 N.E.2d at
    1184.)
    The Board notes that Fulton County and the County Board
    argue that the proposed plans in a siting document are considerd
    preliminary, and that the Illinois Environmental Protection
    Agency’s, review of the complete permit application will further
    ensure the public health,
    safety,
    and welfare.
    Assuming,
    as is
    the case here,
    that the applicant presents a prima fade case
    that the application meets criterion two, the Board believes that
    a local decisionmaker is free to place some reliance on the
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency’s permit review process.
    The appellate court has held that a local decisionmaker is
    empowered to consider any and all highly technical details of
    landfill design and construction in ruling upon criterion two.
    (Waste Management of Illinois,
    Inc.,
    v. Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1987),
    160 Ill.App.Jd 434,
    513 N.E.2d 592,
    594—596; see
    also McHenry County Landfill,
    Inc.,
    v. Illinois Environmental
    Protection Agency (2d Dist.
    1987),
    154 Ill.App.3d 89,
    506 N.E.2d
    372,
    380-381; County of Lake v. Pollution Control Board
    (2d Dist.
    1983),
    120 Ill.App.3d 89,
    457 N.E.2d 1309.)
    We do not believe,
    however, that these cases mean that local decisionmakers must
    examine each request for siting approval so as to ensure
    compliance with every applicable regulation.
    (Qj~.
    Tate v.
    Pollution Control Board
    (4th Dist~. 1989),
    188 Ill.App.3d 994,
    544
    N.E.2d 1176,
    1195.)
    Building
    a new regional pollution control
    facility in Illinois is
    a two-step process:
    siting approval from
    the local decisionmaker, and an approved permit from the Illinois
    Environmental Protection Agency.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.l99l,
    ch.
    111½,
    pars.
    1039,
    1039.2.)
    The local decisionmaker is not required to
    1:34—269
    26
    perform both functions.
    In
    sum,
    the Board finds that the County
    Board’s decision that criterion two was satisfied
    is not against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Plan
    of’ Operations
    The fifth criterion which is to be considered by a local
    decisionmaker
    is whether “the plan of operations for the facility
    is designed to minimize the danger to the surrounding area from
    fire,
    spills, or other operational accidents.”
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½, par. l039.2(a)(5).)
    In its January 8,
    1992
    written decision, the County Board found that this criterion was
    met, based upon Mr. Spencer’s testimony.
    (C1232-l233..)
    The
    County Board stated that by limiting access to Landfill No.
    3,
    the potential for a garbage truck to overturn, causing a fire,
    would be limited.
    The County Board further found that “the
    ‘potential for an explosion would be reduced in that the potential
    for a fire near methane gas would be reduced.”
    (C1154.)
    Gallatin argues that the County Board’s finding on this
    criterion was against the manifest weight of the evidence,
    because Fulton County failed to offer evidence of any plan of
    operation.
    Gallatin contends that in contrast to this failure,
    Gallatin introduced “ample” evidence of Fulton County’s inability
    to safely operate landfills.
    (C0794—0869.)
    Gallatin states that
    the applicant’s operating experience and past record of
    convictions in the field of solid waste management are relevant
    considerations in evaluating criterion five.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par. 1039.2(a).)
    Gallatin maintains that other
    than Mr.
    Spencer’s brief and vague testimony on limiting public
    access to the landfill, there is no other evidence of Landfill
    no.
    3’s plan of operations.
    Gallatin argues that the failure to
    provide a plan of operations is particularly flagrant in light of
    the evidence of Fulton County’s past operational history.
    In response, Fulton County and the County Board contend that
    the manifest weight of the evidence indicates that the plan of
    operations for the landfill
    is designed to minimize the danger to
    the surrounding area from fire,
    spills,
    or other operational
    accidents.
    Fulton County and the County Board state that the
    application addresses aspects of the operational plan for gas
    management and monitoring,
    leachate treatment,
    groundwater
    monitoring,
    construction quality assurance,
    operations
    procedures,
    and closing operations.
    (C006l-0064.)
    Fulton County
    and the County Board maintain that the application and the
    uncontradicted testimony of Mr.
    Spencer presented sufficient
    details of the plan of operations.
    Mr. Spencer testified that
    the transfer station at the head bf the landfill would limit
    public access to the operating fill area,
    enabling the county to
    control the placement of waste and maintain daily cover.
    (C1229-1230.)
    Fulton County and the County Board state that this
    action will avoid past violations for blowing litter,
    inadequate
    1:34—270
    27
    daily cover,
    and other operational problems.
    The Board cannot find,
    based upon its review of the record,
    that the County Board’s decision on criterion five
    is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    It is true, as Gallatin
    alleges, that the application does not contain any distinct plan
    of operations addressing emergency situations such as fire and
    spills.
    However, Mr. Spencer did present testimony on the issue,
    and the application does address aspects of an operational plan.
    (C0061—0064; Cl229—1232.)
    Gallatin’s evidence on this criterion
    consists of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency documents on
    Landfills Nos.
    1 and 2.
    It
    is clear that there have been
    operational problems at Landfills Nos.
    1 and 2.
    However, that
    fact does not rebut Fulton County’s evidence regarding proposed
    operations at Landfill No.
    3,
    which is the facility at issue
    here.
    The statute does allow
    a local decisionmaker to consider
    the applicant’s past operating history in the field of solid
    waste management,
    but does not require any type of finding that
    past operational problems will be solved.
    Indeed, the statute
    does not even require that the decisionmaker consider past
    operating history, but simply states that operating history and
    violations may be considered.
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par. 1039.2(a).)
    Merely because the local decisionmaker could
    have drawn different inferences and conclusions from the evidence
    is not
    a basis for this Board to reverse the local government’s
    findings.
    (File v.
    D
    & L Landfill,
    Inc.
    (August 30,
    1990), PCB
    90—94, aff’d File v.
    D
    & L Landfill,
    Inc.
    (5th Dist.
    1991),
    219
    I11.App.3d 897,
    579 N.E.2d 1228; ~
    Steinberg v. Petta
    (1st
    Dist.
    1985),
    139 Il1.App.3d 503,
    487 N.E.2d 1064,
    1069.)
    We do
    not find the County Board’s decision on criterion five to be
    against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    CONCLUSION
    The Board finds that the proceedings of the County Board
    were fundamentally fair.
    Additionally, the Board finds that the
    County Board’s decisions on criteria one, two,
    and five are not
    against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Therefore,
    the
    County Board’s decision granting siting approval
    is affirmed.
    This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    The Board hereby affirms the Fulton County Board’s December
    10,
    1991 decision,
    set forth
    in a~January8,
    1992 written
    decision, granting site approval
    for Fulton County’s Landfill No.
    3.
    IT
    IS SO ORDERED.
    I
    ‘3/4—27
    I
    28
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Ill.Rev.Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111½,
    par.
    1041) provides for the appeal
    of final Board orders.
    The Rules of the Supreme Court of
    Illinois establish filing requirements.
    J. Anderson and M. Nardulli dissented.
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board,
    hereby certify that the abov
    opinion and order was
    adopted on the
    /1Y~
    day of
    _______________,
    1992,
    by a vote
    of
    -~/-~2
    .
    L
    Dorothy M.
    Illinois
    Control Board
    134—2
    72

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