ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
4,
1992
LAND
AND
LAKES
COMPANY,
JNC
)
OPERATIONS,
INC.,
and
NBD
TRUST
)
COMPANY OF ILLINOIS
AS
TRUSTEE
)
UNDER TRUST NO. 2624EG,
)
)
Petitioners,
)
v.
)
PCB 92—25
(Landfill Siting Review)
VILLAGE OF ROMEOVILLE,
)
)
Respondent,
)
COUNTY
OF
WILL,
)
)
Intervenor.
STEPHEN F. HEDINGER APPEARED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS.
LYMAN
C.
TIENAN
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OP
RESPONDENT.
GLENN
C.
SECHEN,
MATTHEW
KLEIN
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF THE
COUNTY
OF WILL, INTERVENOR.
NANCY
A. MCKEATING APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE JURCA OBJECTORS.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by M. Nardulli):
This matter
is before the Board on the February 13,
1992
petition for review filed by petitioners Land and Lakes Company,
JMC
Operations,
Inc. and NBD Trust Company of Illinois as Trustee
Under Trust No.
2624EG
(Land and Lakes collectively).
Land and
Lakes
challenges
the
January
8,
1992
decision
of
the
Village
of
Romeoville
(Village) denying site location approval of an
expansion of its regional pollution control facility pursuant to
Section 40.1(a)
of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act)
(Ill.
Rev. Stat.
1991,
ch.
111 1/2,
par. 1040.1(a)).
Hearings attended
by members of the public were held on April
21, 1992 and May
1,
1992
in Romeoville,
Illinois.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 15,
1991, Land and Lakes filed a petition for
review
challenging
the
Village’s
December
21,
1989
siting
decision.
On
August
26,
1991,
the
Board
entered
its
decision
finding
that
the
Village
failed
to
comply
with
Section
39.2(d)
of
the
Act
rendering
its
decision
void.
(PCB
91-7
(August
26,
1991)
at
17.)
Upon
reconsideration,
the
Board
found
that
the
Village
had given proper notice pursuant to Section
39.2(d)
of
the
Act
and vacated its prior decision.
(PCB 91-7
(December 6,
1991) at
4-5.)
However, the Board also found that the Village failed to
134—53
2
issue a definitive approval or denial and that the case needed to
be remanded to the Village for a definitive vote on criterion 1.
(~.
at 5-11.)
The Board stated that the sole issue before the
Village on remand was whether Land and Lakes had met its burden
of proving there is a need for the proposed facility pursuant to
criterion
1 of section 39.2 and applicable case law.
(~.
at 10-
11.)
On January
8,
1992, the Village issued its decision finding
that the facility is not necessary to accommodate the waste needs
of the intended service area and that no conditions are attached
to the denial of criterion
1
(sometimes referred to as the “need
criterion”).
As instructed by the Board
(PCB 91-7 (January 23,
1991)), Land and Lakes filed a new petition for review
challenging the Village’s decision upon remand.
The Board will
not reiterate all the facts of this case as they are fully set
out in the Board’s August 26,
1991 and December
6,
1991 opinions
and orders in PCB 91-7.
Rather, the facts will be discussed
where necessary in the following analysis of the issues presently
before the Board.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
At the local
level, the siting process is governed by
Section 39.2
of the Act.
Section 39.2(a)
provides that local
authorities are to consider as many as nine criteria when
reviewing an application for siting approval.
•These statutory
criteria are the only issues which can be considered when ruling
on an application for siting approval.
Only if the local body
finds that all applicable criteria have been met by the applicant
can siting approval be granted.
The Village found that Land and
Lakes did not meet its burden on the criterion relating to need
(Ill.
Rev. Stat.
1991,
ch.
111 1/2, par. 1039.2(a) (1)).
When reviewing
a local decision on the criteria, this Board
must determine whether the local decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
(McLean County Disposal,
Inc.
v. County
of McLean (4th Dist. 1991), 207 Ill.App.3d 352,
566 N.E.2d 26,
29;
Waste Management of Illinois.
Inc.
v. Pollution Control
Board
(2d Dist.
1987),
160 Ill.App.3d 434,
513 N.E.2d 592; E
&
E
Haulinci. Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board (2d Dist.
1983),
116
Ill.App.3d 586, 451 N.E.2d 555, aff’d
in part (1985)
107 Ill.2d
33,
481 N.E.2d 664.)
A decision is against the manifest weight
of the evidence if the opposite result is clearly evident, plain,
or indisputable from a review of the evidence.
(Harris v. Day
(4th Dist.
1983),
115 Ill.App.3d 762,
451 N.E.2d 262,
265.)
The
Board, on review,
is not to reweigh the evidence.
Where there is
conflicting evidence, the Board
is not free to reverse merely
because the lower tribunal credits one group of witnesses and
does not credit the other.
(Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce v.
Pollution Control Board
(3d Dist.
1990),
198 Ill.App.3d 541,
555
134—54
3
N.E.2d 1178,
1184; Tate v. Pollution Control Board
(4th Dist.
1989),
188 Ill.App.3d 994, 544 N.E.2d 1176,
1195; Waste
Manaciement of Illinois.
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1989),
187 Ill.App.3d 79,
543 N.E.2d 505,
507.)
Merely because
the local government could have drawn different inferences and
conclusions from conflicting testimony is not a basis for this
Board to reverse the local government’s findings.
File v.
D
& L
Landfill.
Inc., PCB 90—94
(August 30,
1990), aff’d File v.
D
& L
Landfill. Inc.
(5th Dist.
1991), 219~Ill.App.3d 897,
579 N.E.2d
1228.
Additionally, the Board must review the areas of
jurisdiction and fundamental fairness.
Section 40.1 of the Act
requires the Board to review the procedures used at the local
level to determine whether those procedures were fundamentally
fair.
(E &
E Haulinci, 451 N.E.2d at 562.)
Land and Lakes has
not raised any jurisdictional issues, but has raised a question
of fundamental fairness.
However, before the Board considers the
threshold issue of fundamental fairness, the Board will address
Land and Lakes’ contention that this Board should review the need
criterion in light of both the Village’s December 12,
1990
(i.e.,
the first vote)
decision and the January 8,
1992 decision
(j.~.,
the second vote).
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Clarification of First Vote
Land and Lakes devoted much of the hearing and their brief
to arguing how the Village voted on the need criterion on
December 12,
1990.
Land and Lakes argues that the record after
remand coupled with the record in PCB 91—7 establishes the
Village’s intent in attaching Condition
6 to the first vote on
criterion
1.1
According to Land and Lakes,
a review of the first
vote,
in light of testimony given after remand, establishes that
the Village improperly attempted to redefine the service area
(see, Metropolitan Waste Systems.
Inc.
v. PCB, 558 N.E.2d 785,
787 (3d Dist.
1990))
and that the appropriate relief is to strike
Condition 6 and declare the siting application approved.
1
Pursuant to this Board’s order of January 23,
1992
(PCB
91-7),
Land
and
Lakes
requested
that
portions
of the record in PCB 91-7 be incorporated
into PCB 92-25.
The Board also notes that
because it was required to review the
fundamental fairness of the first proceeding
and address the issue of criterion
1 for the
first time,
other portions of the record in
PCB 91-7 have been relied on in reaching the
instant decision.
134—55
4
Land and Lakes’ arguments regarding the first Village vote
are misdirected.
In its prior opinions in PCB 91-7, the Board
thoroughly discussed the confusion and inconsistencies
surrounding the Village’s first vote.
The Board stated that the
Village’s, decision on Criterion 1 was subject to so many
differing interpretations that neither the parties nor the Board
could decipher whether the Village found that Land and Lakes met
its burden of establishing need.
Consequently, the Board found
that the Village failed to issue a valid decision and remanded
the case to the Village for a “definitive determination on
Criterion I”.
(PCB 91—7
(December 6,
1991) at 11.)
After
remand, the Village issued a determination on Criterion 1
consistent with the Board’s directive.
The Village clearly
determined that the facility is not necessary to accommodate the
waste needs of the intended service area and noted that no
conditions are attached to the denial of Criterion 1.
The Board will not revisit the Village’s first vote in an
attempt to interpret what that vote meant.
The purpose of the
remand was to make certain the Village’s determination on need.
The Village has done so.
Any
attempt to now argue what Condition
6 and the first vote meant is totally irrelevant in this
proceeding.
Therefore, contrary to Land and Lake’s request, the
Board will not review the propriety of Condition 6 in relation to
the need criterion.
In response to Land and Lakes’ argument regarding the first
vote and Condition 6,
respondents contend that Land and Lakes’
attempt to utilize post—decision testimony of current and former
trustees to impeach the written decision on the second vote is
improper.
Respondents argue that the Board should sustain their
continuing objection to such testimony.
The Board has previously noted the wealth of case law
establishing that before an inquiry can be made into the
decisionmaker’s mental processes when a contemporaneous formal
finding exists,
there must be a strong showing of bad faith or
improper behavior.
(Dimaggio
V.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Illinois
(January 11,
1990), PCB 89—138 at 5; City of Rockford v.
Winebacio County (November 19, 1987),
PCB 87-92 at 9
citations
omitted).)
In their adjudicative role, the decisionmakers are
entitled to protection of their internal thought processes.
(DimacTciio at 5.)
Consequently, without adequate facts warranting
an inference that fundamental unfairness may have occurred in the
hearing process, the Board will not unnecessarily invade the
proper realm of the Village trustees.
(Dimaggio v.
Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County (October 24,
1989), PCB 89-138 at
7—8.)
Here, Land and Lakes attempted to elicit testimony from
former and current trustees to explain whether the first vote was
an approval with conditions or a denial.
This line of inquiry is
134—56
5
distinct from Land and Lakes’ inquiry into alleged bias and ~
~arte contacts, which are discussed below, and is simply an
attempt to reopen the first vote even though the Board has
already ruled that the first vote is void.
(PCB 91-7
(December
6,
1991)
at 5.)
Therefore,
in addition to a lack of. relevancy,
the Board also declines to review the Village’s first vote
because the testimony elicited by Land and Lakes’ in an attempt
to establish what the first vote meant constitutes an improper
invasion into the mind of the decisionmaker.
All such testimony,
which the Board notes is replete throughout the transcripts of
the Board’s April and May 1992 hearings, will not be considered
by the Board in rendering its decision in this case.
Evidentiary Issues
Land and Lakes raises a number of objections to the hearing
officer’s rulings at the April and May 1992 hearings.
First,
Land and Lakes contends that the hearing officer erred in
admitting the deposition of Trustee Martin only under an offer of
proof.
(Pet.
Exh.
6.)
The deposition of Trustee Martin relates
solely to why Martin voted in December of 1990 and is an improper
invasion of the decisionmaker’s mental processes.
Therefore, the
Board upholds the hearing officer’s ruling on Pet.
Exh.
6.
Second, Land and Lakes reiterates its objections made during
hearing to the “hearing officer’s limitations upon petitioner’s
examination of certain Village trustees).”
(Pet.
Brief at 20.)
The Board notes that Land and Lakes simply cites to the
transcripts in support of this broad contention without
identifying with a great deal of specificity the particular
rulings at issue.
Regarding the testimony of Trustee Valderrama, the hearing
officer sustained the County of Will’s hearsay objection based
upon Valderrama’s purported attempt to speak for the village as a
whole as evinced by use of the terms
“us” and “we”.
(Tr. at
110.)
The Board finds this ruling proper.
The hearing officer
also sustained the Village’s objection to testimony of
Valderrama’s thought process regarding the first vote.
(Tr. at
109-13.)
For reasons stated above,
this ruling is affirmed.
For
the same reasons, the hearing officer’s ruling on the objection
to Trustee Martin’s testimony regarding the first vote is
affirmed.
(Tr. at 205—7.)
As to Trustee Peterek, on the basis
of relevancy the hearing officer did not allow Land and
Lakes
to
question Peterek as to his participation in Brent Hassert’s
campaign for .state legislature.
(Tr. at 69—71.)
The Board
agrees that such testimony is irrelevant.
For the same reason,
the Board also affirms the hearing officer’s ruling regarding
similar questioning of Trustee Dewald.
(Tr. at 272—74.)
As to
Trustee Dewald, the hearing officer sustained the County of
Will’s objection to Land and Lakes’ question as to the trustee’s
purpose in moving that the expansion be denied.
(Tr. at 265-66.)
134—5 7
6
Again, the ruling is affirmed’ as an improper attempt to invade
the decisionmuaker’s thought process.
Land and Lakes argues that many of the hearing officer’s
rulings are erroneous because they extend the “privilege” beyond
its intended scope.
By the term “privilege”, Land and Lakes
apparently means the principle discussed above that,
in their
adjudicative capacity, the trustees are entitled the protection
from scrutiny into the though process afforded members of the
judiciary discussed above.
(See also,
DiMaciciio (October 24,
1989), PCB 89—138 at 7-8.)
Land and Lakes argues that any
entitlement to this “privilege” was waived by the following
statements made by Trustee Dewald at the January 8,
1992 meeting:
Em
response to a point of clarification
That in so
doing, we are denying the expansion of the landfill.
I watched
a lot of these Board Members work real hard
and listen to a lot of testimony and put a lot of work
into it, and me and dan being newcomers, doing a lot of
reading and being involved even back then.
I don’t
know that any discussion any further could change
anyone’s mind,
so I would like to call the question,
if
I could, please.
(Tr. at 266—68,
269—70.)
The Board does not believe that the decisionmaker can “waive” the
principle that the thought process of one in an adjudicative
capacity is not to be invaded.
Even if Dewald had offered such
information, the Board would not consider
it in rendering its
decision where a formal finding exists.
The Board agrees with
Land and Lakes’ contention that an applicant can probe facts
relevant to fundamental fairness.
However, an applicant cannot
elicit testimony from the decisionmaker which probes the mental
processes behind a decision where, as here,
a formal written
decision exists.
Assuming, arguendo, that a decisionmaker can
waive the principle that the thought process of one in an
adjudicative capacity is not to be invaded, these statements
cannot be construed as a voluntary explanation by Trustee Dewald
as to why or how he voted on the siting application.
Lastly, Land and Lakes reiterates its objection to all of
the exhibits introduced by Will County at the Board’s April and
Nay 1992 hearings.2
Land and Lakes asserts that the exhibits
should have been excluded by the hearing officer on the basis of
lack of relevancy.
Exhibit
1 is a letter from Land and Lakes’
attorney to the Village’s attorney concerning PCB 91-7,
exhibit 2
2
Land and Lakes again contends that Will County is not a
proper party and should not have been allowed to
intervene.
The Board will not reconsider its prior
order granting Will County’s motion to intervene.
13
4—58
7
is a letter from the Mayor of Romeoville to the Village board and
exhibit
3 is a letter from one of the owners of Land and lakes to
the Village administrator, exhibit 4
is a campaign disclosure
statement for Citizens for John Strobbe, exhibit 6
is a similar
disclosure statement for the People’s Choice Part? and exhibit 6
is a group of phone logs maintained by the Village showing calls
received from Land and Lakes.
The hearing officer overruled Land
and Lake’s relevancy objection (Tr. 164,
344-47) and the Board
finds no reason to overturn the hearing officer’s ruling.
The
weight to be accorded these exhibits is a matter for the Board to
decide in assessing fundamental fairness and whether the
Village’s decision on criterion
1 is against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
Disaualification for Bias
Land and Lakes raises several issues relating to its
contention that the procedures at the Village were fundamentally
unfair.
First, Land and lakes contends that two trustees, Dewald
and Peterek, were biased against the landfill siting.
In support
of this contention,
Land and Lakes points to the fact that Dewald
and Peterek “are long-time political ‘allies of the staunchest
opponents to (Land and Lakes’) landfill siting application.”
(Pet. Brief at 13.)
Both Dewald and Peterek were elected as
Village trustees in April of 1991 and therefore, voted on the
second vote after remand, but not the first vote in PCB 91-7.
(Tr. at 45,
219,
287.)
According to Land and Lakes, the staunch
opponents are Brent Hassert and Ann Dralle, who have contributed
money to Dewald and Peterek’s campaigns for Village trustee
positions (Tr. at 279).
Land and Lakes also contends that
Dewald’s and Peterek’s campaigns establish that they were
predisposed to voting to deny site approval.
The Board must first consider whether Land and Lakes has
waived its right to object to the participation of Dewald and
Peterek given that such an objection was not raised at the
January
8, 1992 Village meeting.
(See
E
& E Hauling. Inc. v.
~
(1985),
107 Ill. 2d 33,
481 N.E.2d 664.)
“A claim of
disqualifying bias or partiality on the part of a member of the
judiciary or an administrative agency must be asserted promptly
after knowledge of the alleged disqualification.”
(~
at 666.)
A failure to object at the original proceeding constitutes a
‘waiver of the issue on appeal.
(~~)
The Board received certified copies of exhibits 4 and 5
on May 8,
1992 as directed by the hearing officer.
(Tr.
at 326.)
13
4—59
8
Land and Lakes attempts to distinguish E
& E Hauling by
asserting that it did not become aware of Dewald’s and Peterek’s
bias until the Board’s hearings in April and May of 1992.
The
information relied upon by Land and Lakes in asserting bias
relates to Dewald’s and Peterek’s February and March 1991
campaign for April 1991 trustee positions.
Land and Lakes
asserts that the campaign literature distributed by these
trustees during their campaign and their receipt of contributions
from people opposed to the landfill show bias against siting.
However, Land and Lakes fails to explain why it was unable to
ascertain information relating to the alleged bias which appears
to have been available in April of 1991, prior to the Village’s
meeting in January of 1992.
Therefore, the Board finds that Land
and Lakes has waived its claim that Dewald and Peterek should be
disqualified by not raising this objection at the January
8,
1992
Village meeting.
Although the Board has found that Land and Lakes has waived
its claim of disqualification of Dewald and Peterek, the Board
will nevertheless consider the issue on the merits.
Peterek,
elected to the Village in April of 1991, testified. that Brent
Hassert and Ann Dralle assisted his campaign.
(Tr. at 62-63.)
Dewald, also elected in 1991, testified that he talked to Hassert
about the campaign and that Hassert gave advice on an informal
basis.
(Tr.
at 222-23.)
Dewald had known Hassert since second
grade.
(Tr. at 294-45.)
Dewald testified that Dralle did not
assist his campaign.
(Tr. at 227.)
Dewald testified that the
committee to elect Dewald and Peterek received -a $500
contribution from the committee to re-elect Hassert to the state
legislature
(Tr. at 279),
$500 from Ann Dralle
(Tr. at 279)
and
$1,000 from a White Fence
Farm4
fundraiser
(Tr. at 279).
Both
Dewald and Peterek testified that these contributions had no
influence on their January 1992 vote finding that Land and Lakes
did not establish need.
(Tr. at 74—75, 293.)
Dewald stated that
he “knew people on both sides of the issue.”
(Tr. at 297-98.)
Campaign literature circulated by Dewald and Peterek
contained statements such as “o)ne
can only remember the chaos
the landfill brought to our community.
even after a major outcry
against the landfill at the polls, the village board proceeded
with the landfill”
(Pet. Exh.
3) and “c)oncerned
about the
landfill”
(Pet.
Exh. 4).
Peterek testified that he viewed the
referendum passed by the voters of Romeoville opposing the
annexing of Village property for the landfill as a mandate by the
people against the landfill.
(Tr. at 57.)
In explaining his
campaign literature, Peterek testified that one of the things he
and Dewald were trying to convey was that the existing village
Board was unresponsive to the people.
(Tr. at 61.)
Peterek also
Brent Hassert,
Jr.
is an owner of White Fence Farm.
(Tr.
280).
134—60
9
explained that at the time of the campaign, the Village had
already voted on Land and’ Lakes’ application, such that there was
no siting issue pending.
(Tr. at 61.)
Dewald also testified
that the campaign literature was geared toward the
unresponsiveness of the Village.
(Tr. at 232.)
Dewald was
questioned regarding the following statement made at the January
8,
1992 Village meeting:
“I watched a lot of these Board Members
work real hard ... and me and Dan (Peterek) being newcomers,
doing an awful lot of reading and being involved even back then.”
(Tr. at 270.)
Dewald stated that by referring to “back then” he
simply meant that was interested in the first vote as a citizen
of Romeoville and that he read the newspaper to keep himself
aware of what was going on in the city.
(Tr. at 272.)
Lastly,
Land and Lakes relies on a newspaper article dated January
8,
1992 which states that Dewald said that prior to becoming a
trustee, he did not believe a landfill was needed and quoting
Dewald as stating that “I still do believe at this moment right
now that we don’t need a landfill” and that there were several
reasons it was not needed, including traffic and proximity to
residents.
(Pet. Exh. 5; Tr. at 251.)
Dewald testified that he
did not remember if these statements were made before or after
the January 8th vote.
(Tr. at 248,
284.)
Dewald also testified
that he could not remember if the quotations were accurate and
that they may have been taken out of context.
(Tr. at 284-88.)
Dewald also testified that,
prior to becoming a trustee, he was
not fully aware of the statutory criteria governing siting
applications.
(Tr. at 287.)
Lastly, Dewald testified that he
refrained from making a decision on Land and Lakes’ application
until the vote was called on January 8th and that he put aside
any prejudgment or prejudice for or against the landfill.
(Tr.
at 288—92.)
Public officials are presumed to act without bias.
(E &
E
Hauling.
481 N.E.2d at 668.)
.
A decisionmaker may be disqualified
for bias or prejudice if a “disinterested observer might conclude
that he had in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law
of the case in advance of hearing it.”
(E
& E Hauling
(2d Dist.
1983)451 N.E.2d at 565—66, aff’d, 481 N.E.2d 668
(1985), citing
Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools,
Inc.
v.
F.T.C.
(D.C.
Cir.
1970), 425 F.2d 583,
591.)
Upon review of the record, the Board concludes that Land and
Lakes’ has made no showing that P.eterek or Dewald had decided to
deny Land and Lakes’ application for siting approval prior to the
Village’s January 8,
1992 meeting.
When Peterek and Dewald were
campaigning for trustee positions, no siting application was
pending before the Village.
In campaigning for trustee
positions, Dewald and Peterek were certainly free to state their
opinions of the first vote as those opinions relate to the
functioning of the then existing Village Board.
There is nothing
in the record to indicate that these two trustees did not
exercise their adjudicatory functions in voting on the siting
134—6 1
10
application.
Trustees are elected officials and Land and Lakes
points to nothing unlawful about the receipt of campaign
contributions.
Moreover, both Dewald and Peterek testified that
their receipt of campaign ;ontributions in no way influenced
their vote on siting.
The Board rejects Land and Lakes’
contention that Peterek and Dewald should be disqualified.
Land and Lakes also alleges fundamental unfairness resulting
from trustee Pakula’s “changed vote.”
According to Land and
Lakes, Pakula’s “change was to be expected, given that she
received over 50 telephone calls from landfill opponents in the
week preceding” the second vote.
(Pet. Brief at 16; Tr. at 144.)
Pursuant to the Board’s ruling above regarding impermissible
invasion into the mind of the decisionmaker and lack of
relevancy,
the Board rejects Land and Lakes’ contention that
Pakula’s vote establishes that the second proceeding was
fundamentally unfair.. Land and Lakes’ contention that Pakula
“changed her vote”
is based upon testimony,
objected to by
respondents, concerning the first vote.
(Tr. at 133—41.)
However, the principle that one cannot invade the decisionmaker’s
mental processes as well,
as the Board’s determination that any
inquiry into the Village’s first vote is irrelevant, prevents any
inquiry into allegations of a “changed vote.”
Ex Parte
Although not clearly argued by Land and Lakes,
it appears
that they also assert that Pakula’s telephone conversations from
constituents opposed to the landfill were improper
~
parte
contacts rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair.
A court
will not reverse an agency’s decision because of ~
Parte
contacts with members of that agency absent,a showing of
prejudice.
(Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce v. IPCB (3d Dist.
1990),
198 Ill.
Ap.
3d 541,
555 N.E.2d 1178,
1183,
citing, Waste
Management of Illinois v. PCB (1988),
175 Ill. App.
3d 1023,
530
N.E.2d 682, 697-80.)
“Moreover,
existence of strong public
opposition does not render a hearing fundamentally unfair where
the hearing committee provides a full and complete
opportunity for the applicant to offer evidence and support its
application.”
(~~)
Thus,
while ~
parte communications to
Village members in their adjudicative capacity are improper,
there must be a showing of prejudice.
(~~)
The Board finds that Land and Lakes was given every
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of
their application at the hearings.
Additionally, Pakula
testified that all but one of the phone calls she received were
againstsiting the landfill.
.(Tr. at 144.)
She also testified
that these phone calls in no way prejudiced her decision.
(Tr.
at 146.)
The record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting
from the phone calls received by Pakula and, therefore, Land and
134—62
11
Lakes’ attempt to have the Village’s decision reversed on this
basis fails.
De Novo Review on Second Vote
Finally, Land and Lakes argues that the Village erred by
conducting a gg novo review on remand rather than merely
clarifying its first vote.
(Pet. Brief at 7-11.)
Again, Land
and Lakes’ contention is based upon its position that the Board’s
hearings in the instant case establish that the first vote was
actually a vote to grant approval subject to Condition 6.
Given
that the second vote is clearly a vote denying site approval,
Land and Lakes asserts that the Village improperly voted ~
novo
as evinced by the changed vote.
In support of its contention
that an improper ~,gnovo vote was taken, Land and Lakes points to
the fact that Peterek and Dewald, who were not on the Village
Board for the first vote, were allowed to participate on the
second vote.
The Board remanded this case because the Village failed to
issue a definitive approval
(with or without conditions)
or a
definitive denial of the siting application.
(PCB 92-25
(December 6,
1991)
at 7.)
Because of this confusion,
the Board
concluded that the Village “did not issue a valid decision
with the result that the case must be remanded for a clarifying
vote.”
~
at 5.)
In its order, the Board directed the Village
to.issue a definitive determination on Criterion 1.
~
at 11.)
If Land and Lakes is contending that ~
novo means that the
Village reviewed the record before casting its second vote, such
a procedure is not inconsistent with the remand directive.
The
Board would view any attempt to supplement the Village record on
remand to be an improper ~
novo review, but the Village was
certainly free to review, the existing record.
To the extent that
Land and Lakes contends that an improper de novo review occurred
on remand as evinced by a “change” in the Village’s vote,
as
noted above the Board will not consider any testimony relating to
the first vote because such testimony is both irrelevant and an
improper probe into the mind of the decisionmaker.
The Board is
not concerned with whether the second vote is “changed” from the
first vote because the Board has already determined that it could
not decipher the meaning of the first vote.
In light of the
confusion surrounding the first vote,
any attempt to assess
whether any change occurred is irrelevant.
As to Land and Lakes’ claim that Peterek and Dewald should
not have participated in the second vote, no such objection was
made at the Village proceeding.
Generally,
a failure to object
at the original proceeding constitutes a waiver of the issue on
appeal.
(E &
E Hauling (1985), 481 N.E.2d at 666.)
Land and
Lakes did not object to Dewald’s or Peterek’s participation in
the second vote.
Any claim that such participation constituted
an impermnissible ~
novo vote on remand should have been raised
134—63
12
at the January
8, 1992 Village meeting.
Land and Lakes’
failure
to raise this objection constitutes a waiver of the issue.
Additionally,
if no waiver exists, the Board notes that the
Village Board is a continuing body, the existence of which never
ceases by reason of a change in membership.
(Roti v. Washington
(1st Dist.
1983),
114 Ill. App.
3d 958,
450 N.E.2d 465,
473.)
Given that the make-up of the Village Board changed after the
first vote,
the fact that the record was available for Peterek’s
and Dewald’s review renders their participation in the second
vote valid.
(Waste Management of Illinois
V.
PCB (1984),
123
Ill.
App. 3d 1075,
463 N.E.2d 969.)
In summary, the Board finds no fundamental unfairness in the
Village’s January 8,
1992 proceeding.
The Board must also address whether the proceedings leading
to the first vote in December 1990 were fundamentally fair as
this issue was not reached in either of the Board’s opinions in
PCB 91-7.
Land and Lakes contends that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair for the following reasons:
(1) the Village
is constitutionally disqualified from acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity,
and, therefore, the Section 39.2 siting proceedings are
fundamentally unfair by definition;
(2) Land and Lakes was not
given the opportunity to introduce testimony on the
reasonableness or necessity of Condition 6; and
(3)
improper
evidence was considered by the Village.5
Regarding Land and Lakes’ constitutional challenge, the
Board ruled in its August 26,
1991 opinion and order that it
would construe Section 39.2 of the Act as constitutional until
the courts hold otherwise.
(PCB 91-7 at 7.)
The Board adheres
to this ruling and rejects Land and Lakes’ challenge to the
constitutionality of Section
39.2.6
Land and Lakes contends that the proceeding was
fundamentally unfair because it was not given the opportunity to
present testimony on the reasonableness or necessity of Condition
6.
As the Board noted in its prior decisions in PCB 91-7,
the
record contained many inconsistencies as to the Village’s first
In assessing the fairness of the first proceeding, the
Board relies upon those arguments presented by the
parties in post-hearing briefs submitted in PCB 91-7.
6
The Board grants Land and Lakes’ May 14,
1992 motion
for leave to amend its post—hearing brief to include
its constitutional challenge to the siting procedures
which had been raised previously in PCB 91-7.
No
response objecting to this motion was filed by
respondent or the intervenor.
134—64
13
vote and the attachment of conditions.
Because no such condition
is attached to the Village’s second finding on criterion
1, this
issue is moot.
Land and Lakes asserts that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair because the Village was allowed to consider
material which was never introduced into evidence.
Land and
Lakes admits that,
pursuant to the Village’s ordinance governing
siting proceedings, all documentary evidence is to be submitted
the first day of hearing.
The record establishes that the
Village Clerk distributed these documents to the trustees by the
third day of hearing.
(Nay 3,
1991 Tr.
at 17—18; C-2497—3433.)
Land and Lakes argues that these documents should not have been
available to the trustees because they were never formally
introduced into the record.
In particular, Land and Lakes’
relies on a public petition against siting the landfill expansion
which was submitted the first day of hearing and documents which
it asserts suggest that the facility would not protect. the public
health safety and welfare and suggesting that the Village lacked
jurisdiction over the application.
(C-3246—3431.)
Initially, the Board finds that the distribution of
documents the Village Clerk is apparently consistent with the
Village ordinance.
Moreover, given that the Village did not find
against Land and Lakes on criterion
2, the “public health,
safety
and welfare criterion”,
the Board finds the availability of
documents suggesting that the proposed facility would not meet
this criterion does not establish that the proceeding was
fundamentally unfair.
Similarly, any documents relating to the
Village’s jurisdiction cannot be found to have prejudiced Land
and Lakes because the Village concluded that it did have
jurisdiction to decide the matter.
Lastly, as noted above, the Village trustees are presumed to
act without bias and,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Additionally, the existence of strong public opposition to the
expansion does not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair
where the applicant is provided a full opportunity to support its
application.
Therefore, the Board finds that the availabilty of
the petition does not render the proceedings fundamentally
unfair.
Land and Lakes also relies on the inclusion of an advisory
referendum placed on the Village ballot for a primary election
held March
20,
1990.
(C-2874—75) and subsequent knowledge that
the outcome of this referendum was that many voters disapproved
of siting in support of its claim of fundamental unfairness.
However,
the Board finds this information to fall within the
purview of the law discussed above regarding the petition.
The
Board concludes that Land and Lakes fails to establish any
prejudice resulting from inclusion of the referendum ballot in
the Village record.
134—65
14
Land and Lakes also contends that Will County, as an
objector,
“took part in an active campaign to deprive petitioners
of fundamentally fair proceedings.”
(Pet. Brief PCB 91—7 at 42.)
In particular, Land and Lakes contends that Will County’s public
comment should have been stricken from the record and points to
“Will County’s inability to play fair” as evinced by its
attachment of a copy of a complaint to its “Proposed Findings of
Fact” which was never introduced at hearing.
(~~)
However,
both of these documents relate to the issue of whether the
Village had jurisdiction.
Again, given that the Village found
that it did indeed have jurisdiction, Land and Lakes incurred no
prejudice from the submittal of these documents.
Land and Lakes asserts that the Village hearing officer
should have refused to accept Will County’s “Proposed Findings of
Fact”
(in essence, this is Will County’s brief filed after the
conclusion of the Village hearings)
(C-3643-3671) because the
brief was filed late “thus hampering Land
and Lakes) effort to
respond”.
(~~)
The record establishes that Land and Lakes did
file a response to Will County’s brief.
(C-3722—62.)
Land and
Lakes correctly notes that Will County’s brief does not contain a
proof of service so that it is impossible to determine what date
Land and Lakes received the County’s brief.
(C-3643-7l.)
The
record does indicate that the Village received Will County’s
brief on November
1,
1990.
(C—3644.)
Land and Lakes makes no
assertion as to when it received the County’s brief.
The Board
cannot find the proceeding fundamentally unfair simply because a
post-hearing brief was received late,
particularly where the
complaining party does not state how late the brief was and where
that party was able to file
a response.
Land and Lakes’ final argument regarding Will County is that
its counsel failed to inform the Village that the County was
prosecuting a suit to close the Wheatland Prairie Landfill in
violation Rule 3.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.
Initially, the Board notes that it does not have the authority to
enforce the rules of professional conduct.
Additionally, the
record establishes that such information was included in the
record as a result of Land and Lakes’ motion to supplement the
record.
(C—4110-24.)
Consequently, Land and Lakes suffered no
prejudice as a result of Will County’s alleged failure to
disclose this information.
Land and Lakes also challenges the fairness of the Village’s
proceedings on the basis of alleged ~
parte contacts.
Land and
Lakes notes that the record establishes that trustees received
threats
(Strobbe Dep.
at 8, Stoppenbach Dep. at 6-7,
21) and
numerous telephone calls in opposition to the expansion.
Additionally, Land and Lakes points to trustees who engaged in
personal conversations with landfill opponents,’ contacts which
exposed trustees to Will County’s position on need and trustees
awareness of the media coverage of the siting proceeding.
134—66
15
As noted above,
a local siting body’s decision will not be
reversed for ~
parte contacts absent a showing of prejudice.
(~
& E Hauling
(1985),
451 N.E.2d at 571, aff’d 481 N.E.2d 664.)
While ~
parte contacts are discouraged, courts have recognized
that
“~
parte communications are inevitable given a
Board)
member’s perceived legislative position, albeit in these
circumstances, they act in an adjudicative role as well.”
(Waste
Nanaciement
(2d Dist.
1988, 530 N.E.2d at 698.)
Consequently,
as
long as the party was given a fair opportunity to be heard and
present evidence during the proceedings, the decision will not be
overturned.
(Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce (3d Dist.
1990),
555 N.E.2d at 1183.)
The voluminous Village record establishes that Land and
Lakes was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence in support of its siting application.
The Board finds
that Land and Lakes has failed to establish prejudice resulting
from the ~
carte contacts.
In summary, the Board finds no fundamental unfairness in the
Village’s proceedings leading to the first vote.
CHALLENGED CRITERIA
Land and Lakes challenges the Village’s finding that it
failed to meet its burden of establishing that the facility is
necessary to accommodate the waste needs of the area it is
intended to serve.
(Ill. Rev. Stat.
1989,
ch.
111 1/2, par.
1039.2 (a) (1)
.)~
As noted above, the Board must review the
Village’s decision on criterion
1 to determine if it is against
the manifest weight of the evidence.8
The area intended to be served by the landfill expansion is
northern Will County, the extreme southeastern portions of DuPage
County and the far western communities of Cook County.
(C-014,
Land and Lakes does not address this issue in its brief
filed in PCB 92-25,
but incorporates its argument on
criterion 1 made in its brief
in PCB 91-7.
8
Tn reaching its defermination, the Board will not
consider any written findings of fact adopted by the
Village on the first vote because that vote is not
relevant to the instant proceeding.
(C-4354—72.)
As
the Board noted in its December 6,
1991 opinion and
order, the record in PCB 91—7 reveals many
contradictions between the actions taken by the Village
at its December 12,
1990 meeting and its written
account of those actions.
(PCB 91—7 (December 6,
1991)
at 6.)
134—67
16
C-070,
C—7556—57.)9
Charles Haas, an environmental consultant,
prepared a study for Land and Lakes on the need for the facility.
(C-060—066, C—7552.)
Haas’ study concludes that the facility is
needed.
(~~)
Haas reac~dthis determination by calculating
the 1990 base population for the service area and waste
generation rates as reported by the IEPA to arrive at an estimate
of waste generation within that service area.
(C—7552-53.)
Also
using IEPA data,
Haas examined the individual disposal facilities
within the service area, the lifetime of these facilities and the
yardage of the facilities currently accepting waste.
(C-7553.)
Haas’
study considered the existing Land and Lakes Willow Ranch
facility, the CDT Landfill in Joliet, ESL and the Greene Valley
facility as active landfills in calculating need.
(C—7600.)
Haas stated that Greene Valley receives 3.7 million cubic yards
of waste per year and that 1.2 million cubic yards could be
attributed to waste generated by Land and Lakes’ proposed service
area.
(C—7561—63.)
Haas compared the waste generation figure of
1.8 million (C-75620 to the disposal capacity of the existing
facilities and concluded that the service region would be a net
exporter of waste by the end of 1992.
(C-7553—54,
7560.)
The
proposed facility would have a capacity of 7-8 million cubic
yards.
(C—7560.)
On cross—examination, Haas states that he did not compute
the geographic size of the service area, nor did he compute the
most distant point from the facility to the outward boundary of
the service area.
(C—7557.)
Haas testified that he did not know
where counties within the service area are currently sending
their waste.
(C-7580,
7591—95.)
He also stated that while the
Wheatland Prairie facility located in Will County, the Robbins
incinerator and the Gallatin National Balefill in Fulton County
are licensed, he did not rely on these facilities in calculating
need.
(C—7583,
7588, 7589—90,
7601, 7605.)
Haas testified that
Wheatland was not considered because it had voluntarily shut—down
and did not expect that it would reopen, although he admitted it
had available space and could be reopened at any time.
(C-7583,
7609, 7619.)
Haas did not rely on the Robbins incinerator
because it is small and its impact on need is, therefore,
minimal
(C-7588) and because of the moratorium on incinerators in
Illinois
(C—7609).
Haas also did not consider any Kane County
landfills in calculating need because they were “too far away”.
(C-7596.)
Although Haas admitted that Greene Valley had’ ten
years capacity remaining,
he did not believe that Greene Valley
would receive the excess waste needs of the service area jj.e.,
1.8 million
—
1.2 million
=
600,000 cubic yards)
because
excessive use of the facility would not be financially
advantageous.
(C-7564—66.)
“C—
“
refers to the Village Board record.
133—68
17
Roif C.
Campbell,
a planning and zoning consultant, also
testified as to need on behalf of Land and Lakes.
(C—7994.)
Campbell opined that the facility is needed based upon his
“general knowledge of the area”, the “growth trend happening” in
DuPage, Will and Cook Counties and his opinion that existing
facilities cannot deal with the growth.
(C-8001-02.)
On cross—examination, Campbell testified that he did not do
a need study for the Land and Lakes’ facility and that his
testimony was based upon a study he had prepared the previous
year for the CDT facility located in Joliet which had a different
service area.
(C—8029-31.)
Campbell did not know how much waste
was generated in the proposed service area, nor was he aware of
the garbage haulers or landfills providing service to the area.
(C—8083—84.)
Jim Ambroso, vice president of environmental affairs for
Land and Lakes, also testified as to need.
(C-8249.)
He
testified that the service area was defined by looking at the
communities that used the existing Land and Lakes’ Willow Ranch
facility for the past nine years, other available facilities and
the customers and scavengers who have expressed a desire to come
to the facility in the future.
(C-8264—65,
8276-77.)
Ambroso
stated that the proposed facility was designed to accept 1.3
million cubic yards per year.
(C-8277.)
Ambroso testified that
the Wheatland facility is closed, that the Robbins incinerator
was not yet operational and the Gallatin facility cannot
guarantee capacity to contract haulers.
(C-8265-69.)
Will County presented the testimony of Kevin Standbridge,
solid waste director for the County.
(C-9035.)
Standbridge
testified that he was involved in the preparation of Will
County’s “Interim Solid Waste Management Plan” and the “Solid
Waste Mangemuent Plan Public Hearing Draft of September 1990”.
(C—4497—4819, C—9044,
C—9056—58.)
Standbridge testified that
Will County’s September 1990 proposed solid waste management
plan, which contains a needs analysis, was in the 90—day public
comment period.
(C—6596—6678, C—9056.)
In preparing the
proposed plan,
haulers were surveyed to calculate waste
generation rates and those rates were compared to the
Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission’s estimates of
population growth in the county to arrive at an estimate of the
waste to be generated in Will County in the next 20 years.
(C-
451732, C-660304, C—9058.)
The County looked at the remaining
capacity of solid waste disposal facilities in the County as
reported by IEPA.
(C—6608,
C-9058.)
The County calculated
approximately 17.5 million cubic yards of remaining capacity as
of March 31,
1990.
(C—6608.)
Lastly, the County looked at the
amount of solid waste being imported into Will County to assess
need.
(C6608, C-9059.)
The proposed solid waste management
plan concludes that “after volume reduction and recycling,
capacity for the disposal of 616,000 cubic gateyards of solid
134—69
18
waste will be necessary sometime around 1998.”
(C-6611.)
Standbridge testified that the plan considered the expansion of
the CDT landfill in the needs analysis.
(C-9059.)
Standbridge
also stated that the proposed service area of both plans is Will
County.
(C-9059-60.)
Standbridge testified that, based upon
information received from IEPA by virtue of a delegation
agreement, Waste Management stated in its application to amend
its closure/post-closure care plan that Wheatland Prairie’s
operations were only temporarily suspended.
(C—9083.)
Stanbridge also testified that the Gallatin Balefill includes
Cook, will and DuPage Counties in its service area.
(C—9087.)
Based upon the above,
Standbridge opined that Land and Lakes’
proposed facility is not needed.
(C—9087—90.)
On cross-examination,
Standbridge stated that the projected
need date in the plan considers the CDT expansion as being
completed before the need will exist in the county.
(C-9151-52.)
The record indicates that CDT received site approval from the
City of Joliet for the expansion and that an application for
a
development permit was submitted on January 23,
1990 and denied.
(C—3765,
C-6607.)
Standbridge also stated that the Robbins
incinerator had obtained
a development permit from IEPA and that
it was his belief that the moratorium on incinerator construction
exempted such permitted facilities.
(C-9l46.)
Land and Lakes contends that the Will County’s assessment of
need is flawed because it considers Greene Valley, Wheatland
Prairie, the CDT expansion and the Robbins incinerator in
assessing need.
Regarding CDT, Land and Lakes contends that the
expansion does not have an operating permit and should not be
considered pursuant to Tate v. Pollution Control Board
(4th Dist.
1989),
188 111. App. 3d 994, 544 N.E.2d 1176).
Tate,
relying on
Waste Management of Illinois v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1988),
175 Ill. App.
3d 1023, 530 N.E.2d 682,
690, recognizes
that it is appropriate for
a county board to consider proposed
facilities, whether in or out of the county,
if such facilities
will be capable of handling a portion of the waste disposal needs
of the county and will be capable of doing so prior to the
projected expiration of current disposal capabilities within the
county in assessing need.
(544 N.E.2d at 1193.)
The court
upheld the Board’s determination that it was improper,
in
assessing need,
to consider an offer of proof that a landfill
located within 15 miles of the county where the facility is
located had obtained siting approval but no IEPA permits with a
50-year capacity.
(544 N.E.2d at 1193.)
Under Tate,
it appears that Will County’s analysis of need
is flawed.
However, Will County is not the decisionmaker.
Therefore, the fact that Will County’s assessment of need may be
somewhat flawed does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the Village’s decision on criterion
1
is against the manifest
134—
70
19
weight of the evidence as the record contains other evidence of
need.
Regarding Will County’s consideration of the Wheatland
Prairie facility in assessing need, the record establishes that
the facility has been voluntarily closed, but has a remaining
capacity and may be reopened at any time.
There is conflicting
testimony as to the likelihood of the facility reopening.
It does not appear that Will County’s assessment of need is
fatally flawed because it considered the Robbins incinerator in
assessing need.
The record establishes that there are differing
opinions at to whether the incinerator’s disposal capacity is too
minimal to impact need and as to the effect of the construction
moratorium.
Additionally, the record indicates that the
incinerator has been permitted.
Land and Lakes also contends that Will County.should not
have used the Greene Valley landfill in assessing need in its
proposed solid waste management plan because this facility will
be available exclusively for waste generated from DuPage County.
Land and Lakes admits that this exclusive arrangement has not
been finalized.
The record does indicate that no formal executed
agreement exists establishing that Greene Valley would accept
only DuPage County waste and that Haas considered Greene Valley
as an active facility within the proposed service area.
(C-4194-
96, C—9896—97, C—9917—l8,
C—9931.)
Therefore,
it does not appear
to be erroneous for Will County to have utilized Greene Valley’s
remaining capacity in assessing need.
The appellate court has held that an applicant for siting
approval need not show absolute necessity in order to satisfy
criterion
1.
(Clutts v. Beasley, 541 N.E.2d 844,
846
(5th Dist.
1989); A.R.F. Landfill v.
PCB,
528 N.E.2d 390,
396
(2d Dist.
1988);
WNI
v. PCB, 461 N.E.2d 542,
546
(3d Dist.
1984).)’
The
Third District has construed “necessary” as connoting a “degree
of requirement or essentiality.”
(WNI v. PCB, 461 N.E.2d at
546.)
The Second District has adopted this construction of
“necessary”, with the additional requirement that the applicant
demonstrate both an urgent need for, and the reasonable
convenience of, the new facility.
(Waste Manaciement
V.
PCB, 530
N.E.2d 682,
689
(2d Dist.
1988; A.R.F. Landfill v. PCB, 528
N.E.2d at 396;
WMI
v. PCB, 463 N.E.2d 969, 976
(2d Dist.
1984.).)
The First District recently stated that these differing terms
merely evince the use of different phraseology rather than
advancing substantively different definitions of need.
(Industrial Fuels
& Resources/Illinois. Inc.
v. IPCB (1st Dist.
March 19,1992),
No.
1—91—0144 slip op. at 19.)
After reviewing the record, the Board finds that the Village
could have reasonably reached its conclusion that Land.and Lakes
failed to meet its burden of establishing that the facility is
134—7
1
20
necessary to accommodate the waste needs of the service area.
The Board finds that Will County’s assessment of need is not
indicative of whether Land and Lakes’ facility is needed because
it utilized Will County alone as the proposed service area.
An
assessment of need based on a totally different service area than
that proposed by the applicant is not a useful indicator of need.
As previously noted, the Board also finds that Will County’s
assessment of need is flawed because it improperly relies upon
‘the speculative CDT expansion in assessing need.
However, the
record does contain testimony elicited on cross—examination of
Land and Lakes’ witnesses on need which casts doubt
on
the
validity of the conclusions of those witnesses as well as on
Haas’ study.
In particular,
the Village could have reasonably
concluded that the Haas’ study did not adequately consider the
Robbins Incinerator Wheatland Prairie and Gallatin National
Balefill in assessing need.
Unlike Industrial Fuels
&
Resources/Illinois,
Inc.
v. PCB (1st Dist. March 19, 1992),
No.
1—91—0144 slip op. at 22,
26, here the Village could have
concluded, based upon cross—examination, that the applicant’s
assessment of need was “materially flawed”.
Therefore, based
upon the manifest weight standard of review, the Village’s
decision denying siting approval must be affirmed.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that the
decision of the Village of Romeoville finding that Land and Lakes
did not meet its burden of establishing need is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
Therefore,
the Village’s denial
of siting is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. Theodore Meyer concurs.
J. Anderson dissents.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1991,
ch.
111 1/2, par.
1041) provides for the appeal of
final Board orders within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby certif
that the above opinion and order was
adopted on the
_________
day
‘of
_________________,
1992 by
a vote
of
~,—/
.
“
/2
~4Z~
ttorothy M.
G/inn,
Clerk
Illinois P~lutionControl Board
134—72
