ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June 4,
1992
WARREN’S
SERVICE,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
PCB 92—22
v.
)
(Underground Storage Tank
)
Fund Reimbursement)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
)
Respondent.
ROBERT
C.
SHEARER
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF THE PETITIONER.
JEANE
HEATON
AND
DANIEL
MERRIMEN
APPERED
ON
BEHALF
OF
THE
RESPONDENT.
OPINION
AND
ORDER
OF
THE
BOARD
(by
G.
T.
Girard):
On
February
7,
1992, the petitioner, Warren’s Service,
filed
a petition for review of a January 23,
1992, determination by the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) that certain
costs were not reimbursable from the Underground Storage Tank
Reimbursement Fund (Fund).
The costs at issue were incurred
during the remediation of a site where underground storage tanks
were removed.
On March 2,
1992, the Agency filed the record in
this case.
Hearing was held on April 21,
1992,
in Aledo, Mercer
County,
Illinois.
No members of the public were present.
The
parties did not present briefs on this matter choosing to rest on
the closing arguments at hearing.
FACTS
Warren’s Service, which
is
owned
by Mr. Ron Ayers,
is
located at 502 Fifth Street in Sherrard, Illinois.
Warren’s
Service is operated as a gas station and light mechanical work is
done on the site.
Petitioner discovered that at least three
tanks under the property were leaking in
August
1989.
(R. at
56)..1
The property held four tanks, all of which were registered
with Office of the State Fire Marshal.
Three tanks were
registered in 1986 and fourth tank was registered after
installation in 1990.
(R. at 57—61.)
The Emergency Service and
Disaster Agency was notified of the leak on July 27,
1990.
(R.
at 56.)
The tanks were removed from service on July 23,
1990 and
the process of removing the tanks began on August 10,
1990.
1
The Agency record will be cited as “R. at
“;
the transcript
will be cited as “Tr.
at
“;
the Petition will be cited as
“Pet.
at”.
134—47
Mr. Ayers hired a consulting
firm,
Beling Consultants, to
direct the removal of the tanks and remediation of the site.
At
the instruction of the consulting firm,
concrete was broken and
removed to allow for access to contaminated soil.
(Tr.
at 12.)
The concrete was hauled away to another site for disposal.
After
reaching the excavation limit, new tanks were installed and
washed rock for compaction was placed over the new tanks.
(Tr.
at 14-15.)
Finally, concrete was poured on top of the washed
rock.
(Tr. at 15.)
In February of 1991,
Mr. Ayers submitted an application for
reimbursement from the fund, requesting $45,956.46.
(R. at 64;
Pet. at 2.)
On January 23,
1992, the Agency notified Mr.
Ayers
that a $10,000 deductible was applied and reimbursement would be
forthcoming for $28,092.12.
The difference of $5,595.94 was
disallowed because the Agency declined to reimburse for the
replacement of the concrete.
(Pet. at 3.)
DISCUSSION
The sole issue raised by this petition is whether or not the
costs incurred in the replacement of concrete are reimbursable.
(Tr. at 6.)
This issue has been squarely before the Board on two
previous occasions in the cases Platolene 500. Inc.
V.
IEPA (May
7,
1992), PCB 92—9, _____PCB
______
and Strube v.
IEPA
•(May 21,
1992), PCB 91—205,
___
PCB
____.)
In both Platolene and Strube
the Board held that the replacement of concrete is not corrective
action and the Agency properly denied reimbursement.
The facts
in this case present no new material which would convince the
Board that replacement of concrete is
a reimbursable costs.
Therefore,
for the following reasons the Board upholds the
Agency’s denial of reimbursement.
The petitioner maintains that the guidance manual allows for
reimbursement of concrete.
(Tr. at 28,
37.)
When asked why the
concrete was replaced the petitioner stated:
A
Because we had to have a concrete driveway back in
there again.
Q
Did some Agency or body tell you you had to do that?
A
No, you just don’t run a gas station on gravel.
Q
Why
is that?
A
For one thing
I don’t think the tanks would hold up.
Q
The
A
I was under the assumption that we could replace it
just right back the way it was.
134—48
3
Thus, the petitioner is arguing that replacement of concrete was
necessary for safety.
When asked specifically if the guidance manual stated that
pouring new concrete to replace the removed concrete was
reimbursable, the petitioner replied:
A
The way I read it, read the manual,
is when they say
the concrete was covered as a structure, they said
structures are covered for dismantling and mantling.
Concrete is a structure.
But
I suppose I could have
re-mantled the old concrete but it would have taken
twice as much money.
Q
But,
in fact,
you destroyed the old concrete?
A
Right.
Q
It wouldn’t have been possible for you to reassemble
it?
A
I suppose if you could have cut it in big squares,
knowing the technicality,
it would have cost a bundle.
But
I suppose it could have been done.
Q
It didn’t say repaving or pouring down new concrete was
a reimbursable expense?
A
No.,
it didn’t.
The Agency maintains that the replacement of concrete is not
corrective action and is therefore not reimbursable.
The Agency
through cross-examination distinguishes between replacement and
reassembly.
(Tr. at 28—29.)
The Agency also points out that
reimbursement was given for removal of the concrete.
The guidance manual clearly allows for reimbursement for the
dismantling and “reassembling of structures” and includes paving
(concrete or asphalt) as a structure.
There
is no provision in
the statute that deals with the replacement or reassembly of
structures.
InPiatolene and in Strube, .the Board found that the
guidance manual was a rule which was not promulgated according to
the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and therefore the manual
has no legal or regulatory effect in proceedings before the
Board.
Therefore,
the Board cannot enforce the provisions of the
guidance manual and determinations on reimbursement must be
consistent with any applicable statutory or regulatory
requirements.
134—49
4
The statute limits reimbursement to costs of corrective
action.
(Section 22.18b(a).)
The definition of corrective action
consists of two inquiries:
whether the costs are incurred as a
result of an action to “stop minimize, eliminate,
or clean up a
release of petroleum”,
and whether those costs are the result of
such activities as tank removal, soil remediation and free
product removal.
(Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1989,
ch.
111 1/2,
par.
1022.18(e) (1) (C), see Enterprise Leasina Company v. IEPA (April
9,
1992),. PCB 91—174, ____PCB
.)
In applying this
definition
of
corrective action to the replacement of concrete
the Board has determined that the replacement of concrete under
most circumstances does not constitute corrective action, because
it is not an act to stop or minimize a release.
(Platolene
500,
Inc.
V.
IEPA
(May. 7,
1992),
PCB 92—9, _____PCB
.)
However,
the Board does believe that under certain circumstances the
replacement of concrete may be proven to be a corrective action.
(Ibid. at
6.)
The particular facts surrounding the action and
the purpose of the action will ultimately determine whether that
action is a corrective action.
(Ibid.
at
6..)
The facts in this case do not support a finding that the
replacement of concrete was a corrective action.
In fact,
Mr.
Ayers testified that placing concrete over the new tanks was
necessary for safety reasons, not to further remediate the
leaking tanks.
Thus,
the replacement of the concrete was done as
a part of improvements made after corrective action was complete.
CONCLUSION
The guidance manual has no legal force or effect because it
was not promulgated according to the requirements of the APA.
Corrective action is an action to stop, minimize, eliminate or
clean up a release of petroleum.
The petitioner has not shown
that the replacement of concrete at the station was a corrective
action.
Therefore,
the Board finds that the petitioner is not
eligible for reimbursement of the cost of replacement of concrete
pursuant to the statute.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s finding of facts and
conclusions of law in this matter..
ORDER
The Board affirms the Agency’s January 23,
1992,
determination that the petitioner,
Warren’s Service, cost of
replacement of concrete is not a reimbursable expense because the
repaving did not constitute
a corrective action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
134—50
5
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Ill.Rev.Stat.
1991,
ch.
111 1/2, par.
1041)
provides for the
appeal of final orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of
the Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements..
I, Dorothy Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certif
that the above opinion and order was
adopted on the
_______
day of
_______________,
1992, by a vote
of
7c~
.
(I
~
~Dorothy M. G)~hn, Clerk
Illinois Pol4ution Control Board
13 4—5
1