ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
April
22,
1993
SMITH OIL COMPANY OF KANKAKEE,
)
Petitioner,
v.
)
PCB 91—243
)
(UST Fund)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Respondent.
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by G.
T. Girard):
On March 30,
1993,
the Board received a motion for judgement
by default filed by petitioner,
Smith Oil Company of Kankakee
(Smith Oil).
On April
12,
1993,
the Board received a response
from the Agency.
Smith Oil asks that the Board enter judgement in its favor
on the pleadings filed in this cause.
Smith states that on July
30,
1992,
the Board reversed an Agency determination that Smith
Oil was not eligible to receive reimbursement from the fund.
Smith Oil further points out that on November
19,
1992,
the Board
granted a motion to compel filed by Smith Oil and directed the
Agency to make the determination of deductible and the
reasonableness of costs no later than January
15,
1993.
As of
the date of the filing of the motion for judgement by default,
the Agency has failed to make the determination of deductible and
the reasonableness of costs,
acccording to petitioner.
The Agency’s response indicates that following the Board’s
final order of July 30,
1992, the Agency placed Smith Oil
in the
“queue for eligibility and deductible review”.
(Ag.Resp. at 1.)
Further, the Agency indicates that it did not receive
confirmation from the Office of State Fire Marshall that the
tanks at issue in this appeal were properly registered until
February 9,
1993.
(Ag.Resp. at 2.)
Therefore, according to the
Agency it was unable to make a determination by January
15,
1993,
as directed by the Board.
However, upon receiving the
notification that the tanks were properly registered, the Agency
proceeded with its reimbursement review.
On February 19,
1993,
the petitioner was mailed
a letter indicating that the deductible
to be applied to Smith Oil was $10,000.
(Ag.Resp. at
2.)
The Agency also questions the appropriateness of the filing
of a motion for default judgement in a proceeding in which the
docket has been closed.
Before ruling on this specific motion the Board notes that a
motion for default in this instance is appropriate.
The
petitioner has already been granted a motion to compel, which the
Of L~J-OI95
2
Agency did not respond to.
Thus,
this motion would appear to be
a logical next step.
Further, had the Agency responded to the
motion to compel with some of the information included in this
response, the Board might have extended the timeframes in its
order granting the motion to compel.
The Board finds that the Agency is proceeding and denies the
motion for judgement by default.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy
M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
do hereby certi~yth~tthe above order was adopted on the
~
day of
~
,
1993,
by a vote of
~
~-‘Dorothy M.
9lnn,
Clerk
Illinois I~yLlutionControl Board
01 ~ 1-0196