ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
March 25,
1993
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
Complainant,
V.
)
AC 92—41
)
(Docket A
&
B)
LAKEWOOD HOMES
&
)
(IEPA No.
260-92-AC)
DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC.
)
(Administrative Citation)
Respondent.
TODD RETTIG
AND
GREG RICHARDSON APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY;
DOUGLAS
HANCOCK,
CALUWAERT,
PANEGASSER, HANCOCK
& SCHOUSEN
APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT.
OPINION
AND
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by B. Forcade):
This matter comes before the Board on a petition for review
of an administrative citation filed by the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency
(Agency) pursuant to the Environmental
Protection Act
(Act).
(415 ILCS 5/1001
~.
~g.
(1992).)1
The
citation was filed on May 26,
1992 and alleges that respondent,
Lakewood Homes
& Development Co,
Inc.
(Lakewood),
as the owner of
property located in Northlake, has violated Section 21(p) (1)
of
the Act by causing or allowing open dumping of
waste resulting in
litter on the property.
Lakewood filed a petition for review with the Board on June
29,
1992.
A hearing was held on October
1,
1992,
at which no
members of the public attended.
The parties presented closing
arguments at hearing and no briefs were filed in this matter.
BACKGROUND
The property is a vacant lot, consisting of about two acres
of land, situated behind 5223 W. Lake St.
(Tr.
at 10.)
The
property is located in Northlake,
Illinois.
(Tr. at 10.)
The
property is bounded by a quick change oil service and Lake St. on
the south,
another vacant lot on the west,
a residential area on
the east and Hirsch Street to the north.
(Tr. at 13.)
The administrative citation resulted from the inspection of
the property on March 31,
1992,
by Warren Weritz, Environmental
‘
The Act was previously codified at Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1991,
ch.
111 1/2 par.
1001
~.
~
0
L~0-O273
2
Protection Specialist with the Agency.
On the southeast corner
of the property, he observed a pile of landscape waste about 10
feet wide and 60 feet long.
(Tr. at 14.)
He testified that the
pile contained wood chips,
brush weeds and some grass.
(Tr. at
14.)
Northwest of the landscape waste,
Mr. Weritz noticed a pile
of bricks, wood panels and wood debris about 50 feet by 50 feet.
(Tr. at 15.)
In the center of this pile was an old pick up
truck.
(Tr.
at 15,
Comp.
Exh.
3.)
He described the condition of
the bricks as broken, weathered and some had moss growing on
them.
(Tr. at 16.)
He found the wood was also weathered and
other pieces of wood were in advanced stages of decomposition.
(Tr. at 16.)
He testified that the truck was in a state of
disrepair and rusting.
(Tr. at 16.)
He further noted that
graffiti had been painted on the truck and trees were growing out
of the truck.
(Tr. at 16.)
Near the pile of bricks, he
discovered some wire cages that were twisted and rusting.
(Tr. at
17.)
Mr. Weritz also saw a pick up truck with a trailer
containing landscape waste on the property.
(Tr.
at 18.)
Complainant’s exhibit two shows a rusty storage tank on the
property.
(Tr. at 25.)
Mr. Weritz described the material as being indiscriminately
dumped at the site and not protected from the elements.
(Tr.
at
15,
17
&
18.)
Mr. Weritz did not observe anyone dumping waste on
the property and doesn’t know who dumped the materials at the
site.
(Tr. at 18
&
35.)
Mr. Weritz noted that there is no
fencing around the property except some to the east around some
of the neighboring residential properties.
(Tr.
at 19.)
Mr.
Weritz also testified that it
is difficult to determine the exact
boundary of the west end of the property, which is adjacent to
another vacant lot.
(Tr.
at 19.)
From a for sale sign on the
property, Mr. Weritz traced the property to Terrance
Tranchitella.
(Tr. at 21.)
Mr. Tranchitella is president and sole stockholder of
Lakewood.
(Tr. at 41.)
He purchased the property in October of
1988.
(Tr.
at 41.)
Mr. Tranchitella testified that the wire
cages,
shown in complainant’s exhibit 1, are located on the
adjacent property.
(Tr. at 44.)
Mr. Tranchitella stated that the
storage tank, piles of bricks and pick up truck were on the
property when he purchased the property.
(Tr. at 44
&
45.)
As
for the landscape waste dumped on the property and the trailer of
landscape waste, Mr. Tranchitella reports that these resulted
from actions by a neighbor.
(Tr. at 46.)
Mr. Tranchitella
testified that the dumped landscape waste and the trailer have
subsequently been removed from the property.
(Tr.
at 47.)
DISCUSSION
The Act establishes that,
in order to seek enforcement by
way of the administrative citation process for violations of
01 ~O-027k
3
Section 21(p), the Agency must establish that the person caused
or allowed open dumping and must also prove that the open dumping
resulted in litter, open burning or other specified conduct at
the dump site.
If the record demonstrates that such violation
occurred then the Board must adopt an order finding
a violation
and impose the specified penalty unless,
“...the person appealing
the citation has shown that the violation resulted from
uncontrollable circumstances.”
(415 ILCS 5/31.1(d) (2)
(1992).)
The administrative citation issued against Lakewood alleges
violation of subsection
(1)
of Section 21(p)
of the Act.
Section
21(p) provides that no person shall in violation of Section 21(a)
of the Act:
cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in a
manner which results in any of the following
occurrences at the dump site:
1.
litter;
Section 21(a)
of the Act sets forth a general prohibition against
open dumping by providing that “no
person shall cause or allow
the open dumping of any waste.”
Section 3.24 of the Act defines “open dumping” as “the
consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a disposal
site that does not fulfill the requirements of
a sanitary
landfill.”
(415 ILCS 5/3.24
(1992).)
Section 3.31 of the Act
defines “refuse” as “waste.”
(415 ILCS 5/3.31
(1992).)
Section
3.53 defines “waste” as,
inter alia,
“garbage
...
or other
discarded material, resulting from industrial, commercial, mining
and agricultural operations
“
(415 ILCS 5/3.53
(1992).)
In St. Clair County
v. Louis Mund (August 22,
1991), AC 90-
64,
125 PCB 381, the Board adopted the definition of litter
contained in the Litter Control Act
“litter” means any discarded, used or unconsumed
substance or waste.
“Litter” may include, but is not
limited to, any garbage,
trash, refuse, debris
.
abandoned vehicle
.
.
.
or anything else of an
unsightly or unsanitary nature which has been
discarded,
abandoned or otherwise disposed of
improperly.
(Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990 supp.,
ch.
38, par.
86.3.)
Mr. Tranchitella claims that the wire cages are located on
the adjacent property.
From the evidence presented the Board is
unable to determine the exact location of the property boundaries
or the location of the wire cages in respect to the property
line.
Therefore,
the Board makes no finding concerning the wire
cages.
01 L~Q-U275
4
Mr. Tranchitella admits that he is the owner of the property
inspected by Mr. Weritz on March 31,
1992.
He further admits
that the bricks, truck, wood,
storage tank and landscape waste
were on his property at the time of the inspection.
The Board finds that open dumping of waste occurred on the
property that resulted in litter.
The items observed on the
property are discarded materials constituting litter.
Mr. Tranchitella contends that because the landscape waste
has been removed from the property after the administrative
citation was issued there is no violation of the Act.
The Board
has previously held that removal of the litter after the issuance
of an administrative citation does not
negate a violation.
The
Act, by its terms, does not envision a properly issued
administrative citation being dismissed or mitigated because a
person is cooperative or voluntarily cleans up the site.
(IEPA v.
Jack Wright (August
30,
1990), AC 89—227,
114 PCB 863.)
Clean up
of the site is not a mitigating factor under the ‘administrative
citation program.
(IEPA v. Dennis Grubaugh (October 16,
1992), AC
92—3, ____PCB
.)
Mr. Tranchitella argues that there is no violation since the
debris was located on the property when he purchased the property
and he did not place the debris on the property.
Therefore he
contends that he has not caused or allowed litter in violation of
the Act.
The Board has previously held that “allow” includes
present inaction on the part of the landowner to remedy a
previously caused violation.
(EPA v. Robert Wheeler (January 10,
1991)
AC 90—42, EPA v. A.J. Welin (May 13,
1982),
PCB 80—125,
47
PCB 07.)
The Board has held that passive conduct amounts to
acquiescence sufficient to find a violation of Section 21(a)
of
the Act.
(EPA v. Dobbeke et al.
(August 22,
1972), PCB 72-130,
5
PCB 219.)
In Freeman Coal Mining Core.
V.
IPCB
(3rd Dist.
1974),
21 Ill. App. 3d 157, 313 N.E.2d 616, the court stated that the
Act is malum prohibituin and no proof of guilty knowledge or mens
~
is necessary for a finding of guilt.
Present inaction on the
part of the landowner to remedy the disposal of waste that was
previously placed on the site,
constitutes “allowing” litter in
that the owner allows the illegal situation to continue.
The presence of the litter on the site and the failure by
the owner to take action is sufficient to find a violation of the
“allow” language of Section 21 of the Act.
The Board finds that
Lakewood allowed litter on the property in violation of the Act.
Having found a violation, the Board must consider whether
Lakewood has shown that the violation resulted from
uncontrollable circumstances.
This is the only showing of
mitigating circumstances provided in the statute that allows the
Board to excuse any violation.
If the Board so finds, then no
violation would be found and no penalty imposed.
(see 415 ILCS
U
~o-0276
5
5/31.1(d) (2)
(1992).)
The evidence indicates that Mr. Tranchitella failed to take
any action to control the dumping of refuse on his property.
At
the time that Mr. Tranchitella purchased the property the storage
tank,
piles of bricks and pick up truck were already on the
property.
However, Mr. Tranchitella has taken no action to
properly remove these items from the property during the time he
has owned the property.
The property is so situated that it is
easily accessible.
In his defense Mr. Tranchitella admitted that
from time to time without his knowledge or consent, third parties
will dump and litter the premise causing violations.
(Pet.
at 2.)
However, Mr. Tranchitella has not erected a fence around the
property to limit access or taken any other action to discourage
others from open dumping.
(Tr. at 59.)
The Board finds that Mr.
Tranchitella had control over the circumstances that resulted in
the violation and does not find any uncontrollable circumstances.
Therefore, the Board finds Lakewood in violation of Section
21(p) (1)
of the Act for allowing litter.
PENALTIES
Penalties in administrative citation actions of the type
here brought are proscribed by Section 42(b)(4) of the Act, to
wit:
In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1
of this Act,
any person found to have violated any
provision of subsection
(p)
of Section 21 of this Act
shall pay a civil penalty of $500 for each violation of
each such provision, plus any hearing costs incurred by
the Board and the Agency.
Such penalties shall be made
payable to the Environmental Protection Trust Fund to
be used in accordance with the provisions of “An Act
creating the Environmental Protection Trust Fund”,
approved September 22,
1979 as amended;
(415 ILCS 5/42(b)(4)
(1992).)
Respondent will therefore be ordered to pay a civil penalty
of $500 based on the violation as herein found.
For purpose of
review, today’s action
(Docket A) constitutes the Board’s final
action on the matter of the civil penalty.
Respondent is also required to pay hearing costs incurred by
the Board and the Agency.
The Clerk of the Board and the Agency
will therefore be ordered to each file a statement of costs,
supported by affidavit, with the Board and with service upon
Lakewood.
Upon receipt and subsequent to appropriate review, the
Board will issue a separate final order in which the issue of
costs is addressed.
Additionally, Docket B will be opened to
treat all matters pertinent to the issue of costs.
01 L~O-0277
6
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
1.
Respondent is hereby found to have been in violation on
March 31,
1992 of 415 ILCS 5/21(p) (1)
(1992)
2.
Within 45 days of this order respondent shall, by
certified check or money order, pay a civil penalty in
the amount of $500 payable to the Illinois
Environmental Protection Trust Fund.
Such payment
shall be sent to:
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
Fiscal Service Division
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
Illinois
62706
Respondent shall include the remittance form and write
the case name and number and their social security or
federal employer identification number on the certified
check or money order.
Any such penalty not paid within the time prescribed
shall incur interest at the rate set forth in
subsection
(a)
of Section 1003 of the Illinois Income
Tax Act,
(35 ILCS 5/1003
(1992))2, as now or hereafter
amended, from the date of payment is due until the date
payment is received.
Interest shall not accrue during
the pendency of an appeal during which payment of the
penalty has been stayed.
3.
Docket A in this matter is hereby closed.
4.
Within 30 days of this order, the Agency shall file a
statement of its hearing costs,
supported by affidavit,
with the Board and with service upon Lakewood Homes
&
Development Co.,
Inc.
Within the same 30 days, the
Clerk of the Pollution Control Board shall file a
statement of the Board’s costs,
supported by affidavit
and with service upon Lakewood Homes
& Development Co.,
Inc.
Such filings shall be entered in Docket B of this
matter.
5.
Respondent is hereby given leave to file a
reply/objection to the filings as ordered in paragraph
2
Previously codified at Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1991,
ch.
120,
par. 10—1003.
0
~o-0278
7
4 of this order within 45 days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(415 ILCS
5/41
(1992)) provides for appeal of final orders of the Board
within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois
establish filing requirements.
(But see also 35
Ill.
Adm. Code
101.246, Motions for Reconsideration, and Castenada v. Illinois
Human Rights Commission
(1989)
,
132 Ill.
2d 304,
547 N.E.2d 437;
Strube v. Illinois Pollution Control Board
(3d Dist. March
15,
1993),
No.
3—92—0468,
slip op.
at 4—5.)
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above opinion and order was
adopted on the
~
day of__________________________
1993, by a vote of
~
~
I~.~
Dorothy M. G~nn,Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
01 ~~Q-0279