ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    April 8, 1993
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE
    )
    OF ILLINOIS,
    Complainant,
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 92—164
    (Enforcement)
    BERNIECE KERSHAW, DARWIN DALE
    )
    KERSHAW
    AND
    DARRELL KERSHAW
    )
    d/b/a KERSHAW MOBILE HOME PARK,
    )
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by G. T. Girard):
    On October 29, 1992, the Attorney General of Illinois filed
    a complaint on behalf of the People of Illinois against Berniece
    Kershaw, Darwin Dale Kershaw, Darrell Kershaw and Kershaw Mobile
    Home Park, pursuant to Section 31 of the Environmental Protection
    Act (Act). (415 ILCS 5/31 (1992).)1 The complaint alleges
    violations of Sections 12 and 18 of the Act on four counts. The
    allegations relate to operations at Kershaw Mobile Home Park,
    located in Henry County, Illinois. The Board did not receive any
    filing in response to the complaint.
    On February 17, 1993, the complainant filed a motion for
    summary judgment asking the Board to enter judgment in favor of
    complainant and against Berniece Kershaw, Darwin Dale Kershaw and
    Kershaw Mobile Home Park. The Board notes that the request for
    summary judgment did not include respondent Darrell Kershaw.
    Further, the record indicates that Darrell Kershaw was not served
    with the October 29, 1992, complaint, the motion for summary
    judgment or other filings in this proceeding. Therefore, the
    Board dismisses Darrell Kershaw from this proceeding and the
    respondents referred to herein are only Berniece and Darwin Dale
    Kershaw and Kershaw Mobile Home Park.
    The motion asks for summary judgment “for the reason that
    the pleadings, admissions on file and affidavits show that there
    is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the complainant
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. (Mot. at 1.) The
    Board has not received a response to the motion for summary
    judgment from Berniece Kershaw, Darwin Dale Kershaw and Kershaw
    Mobile Home Park.
    ‘The Act was previously codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 111
    1/2 par. 1001 et seq.
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    KERSHAW MOBILE HOME PARK
    Kershaw Mobile Home Park (KMHP) is owned by Berniece Kershaw
    and her two sons, Darwin and Darrell Kershaw. The KMHP has a
    mailing address of Route 3, Box 3, Colona, Henry County,
    Illinois. Berniece and Darwin Kershaw reside in Colona,
    Illinois, and Darrell Kershaw resides in Florida. (Comp. at 2.)
    KMHP serves an estimated population of 265. (Comp. at 3.)
    KMHP has its own sewage treatment plant. There are approximately
    30 septic tanks, each serving 3 trailers. The effluent from
    these tanks is delivered by individual sewers to the sewage
    treatment plant’s 3—cell lagoon system. The lagoon system
    discharges into a backwater slough of the Rock River. (Comp. at
    2.)
    KMHP has two groundwater wells with associated pressure
    tanks, mains and piping. One well serves approximately 94 lots
    and the other approximately 12 lots. The wells also serve 3
    houses and a large building, containing stores and a laundry.
    (Comp. at 2 and 3.)
    ALLEGATIONS
    Count I
    Count I of the complaint alleges violations of Section 12(a)
    of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 304.106, 304.120(c) and
    304.121(a). These regulations deal with water quality parameters
    for discharges. Section 304.106 states:
    “In addition to the other requirements of this Part, no
    effluent shall contain settleable solids, floating debris,
    visible oil, grease, scum or sludge solids. Color, odor and
    turbidity must be reduce to below obvious levels.”
    The complaint alleges that from “at least November 13, 1985, and
    continuing until at least June 18, 1990” the Kershaws caused or
    allowed discharges containing settleable solids with obvious odor
    and turbidity from respondent’s sewage treatment plant. “This
    condition continued until at least March 23, 1992, on which date
    the Agency inspected the (KNHP and found that the effluent from
    the tsewage treatment plant was green and turbid.” (Comp. at
    4.)
    The Board’s water pollution regulations at Section
    304.121(a) provides:
    Section 304.121 Bacteria
    a) Effluents discharged to all general use waters shall
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    3
    not exceed 400 fecal coliforms per 100 ml unless the
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency determines
    that an alternative effluent standard is applicable
    pursuant to subsection (b).
    The fecal coliform limit of 400 per 100 milliliters (ml) was
    violated at least 5 months between March 1986 and May 1987. The
    “greatest excessive concentration occurred in March 1986, when
    the concentration was 87,000 per 100 ml. The Kershaws failed to
    provide effluent disinfection in order to assure that the
    effluent did not exceed 400 fecal coliform per 100 ml.” (Comp.
    at 6.)
    Section 304.120(c) states:
    Except as provided in Section 306.103, all effluents
    containing deoxygenating wastes shall meet the following
    standards:
    c) No effluent whose dilution ratio is less than five to
    one shall exceed 10 mg/l of BOD5 or 12 mg/l of
    suspended solids, except that sources employing third-
    stage treatment lagoons shall be exempt from this
    subsection (c) provided all of the following conditions
    are met...
    The record shows that “the BOD5 effluent of 10 mg/l on a monthly
    average was in fact violated at least 18 months between November
    1985 and March 1990”. (Mot. at 7.)
    Count II
    Count II of the complaint alleges violations of Sections
    12(a) and (f) of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 305.102(b) and
    305.103. The complaint alleges that the respondents had no
    National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
    from May 1, 1983, through March 6, 1991. Further, the complaint
    alleges that respondents failed to perform tests and monitoring
    as required by their previous NPDES permit. (Comp. at 9-10.)
    Count III
    Count III alleges violations of Section 12(f) of the Act and
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 309.102(a) and 309.104(a). Specifically, the
    allegation is that respondents operated their facility without a
    NPDES permit. (Comp. at 12-13.)
    Count IV
    Count IV alleges violations of Section 18(a) of the Act and
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 601.101, 653.109, and 653.118 as well as Part
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    4
    7.2.4 of the Recommended Standards for Water Works (l982).2 The
    complaint alleges that the respondents are a public water supply.
    (Comp. at 15.) As a public water supply the complaint alleges
    that respondents failed to keep proper air pressure in the tanks.
    (Comp. at 18.) In addition, the complaint alleges that one of
    respondent’s water wells was located within 5 feet of the
    restroom stool and cast iron sewer line. (Comp. at 19.)
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    The motion for summary judgment includes full affidavits and
    supporting documents from the Illinois Environmental Protection
    Agency files. (See attachments B—F.) These affidavits and
    documents support the allegations set forth in the complaint. In
    addition, the motion includes a request for admission of facts
    which was served upon respondents Berniece Kershaw and Darwin
    Dale Kershaw on December 3, 1992. (Mot. Attch. A.) The
    admission of facts was not answered by respondent. Therefore,
    pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code 103.162(c) the facts are deemed
    admitted.
    The facts which are admitted by respondents include that
    respondents operated the sewage treatment plant without a NPDES
    permit. (Not. Attch. A at 3.) In addition, respondents admit
    ownership of the facility as well as ownership of the wells and
    water supply. (Mot. Attch. B at 2.)
    The complainant has presented substantial evidence in
    support of its allegations. Further, the respondents’ failure to
    respond to the request for admission of facts has resulted in
    material facts being deemed admitted. Therefore, the Board finds
    that there are no genuine issues of fact to be determined.
    Further, the Board finds that the complainant has presented
    sufficient evidence to warrant granting of summary judgment in
    complainant’s favor and that as a matter of law complainants are
    entitled to judgment. Thus, the Board finds respondents in
    violation as alleged in each of the four counts of the complaint.
    PENALTY
    Having found violation, the Board must now determine the
    penalty to be assessed. The complainant points out that the
    total maximum penalty which could be assessed is seven hundred
    sixteen million one hundred thousand dollars ($716,100,000.00).
    (Not. at 25.) Complainant is however only asking for two hundred
    fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00). The motion states that
    2 This standard is incorporated in the Agency’s regualtions
    at 35 Ill. Adm. Code 652.111.
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    complainant has determined that such penalty “will serve to deter
    further violations and aid in future voluntary enforcement of the
    Act and Board regulations”. (Mot. at 25.) In determining the
    unreasonableness of the alleged pollution, the Board must take
    into account factors outlined in Section 33(c) of the Act.
    (Wells Manufacturing Company v. Pollution Control Board, 73
    Ill.2d 226, 383 N.E.2d 148 (1978).) In addition, the Board is
    authorized by statute to consider the factors in Section 42(h) of
    the Act in determining an appropriate penalty.
    Section 33(c) Factors
    Section 33(c) sets forth five factors which the Board must
    consider in making its determinations:
    1. the character and degree of injury to, or interference
    with the protection of the health, general welfare and
    physical property of the people;
    2. the social and economic value of the pollution source;
    3. the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution
    source to the area in which it is located, including
    the question of priority of location in the area
    involved;
    4. the technical practicability and economic
    reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the
    emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from such
    pollution source; and
    5. any subsequent compliance.
    Section 33(c)(1)-(4) The complainant states that the
    Kershaws have created a “nuisance and caused actual or potential
    harm to human health”. (Mot. at 22.) In addition, the
    complainant indicates that the mobile home park does have
    “moderate social and economic value” and is suitable to the rural
    area in which it is located. (Not. at 22.) Further, complying
    with the requirements of the Act and regulations is technically
    feasible and economically reasonable according to complainant.
    (Not. at 22.)
    Section 33(c)(5) The complainant also discusses whether or
    not there has been subsequent compliance. On December 17, 1985,
    an enforcement letter was mailed to the Kershaws and a subsequent
    meeting resulted in a tentative settlement agreement. However,
    the Kershaws failed to perform their obligations under the
    settlement. (Mot. at 22.) In 1987, 1990 and 1991 further
    meetings took place with the Kershaws. On May 23, 1992, “the
    IEPA inspected the facility and found that conditions there were
    essentially unchanged from those noted in a Nay 1990 inspection”.
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    6
    (Not. at 23.) In July 1992, the Kershaws retained an engineering
    consultant to recommend changes to bring the facility into
    compliance. (Mot. at 23.)
    Section 42(h) Factors
    Section 42(h) sets forth factors to be considered in
    determining the appropriate amount of the civil penalty. Those
    factors are:
    1. the duration and gravity of the violation;
    2. the presence or absence of due diligence on the part of
    the violator in attempting to comply with the
    requirements of this Act and regulations thereunder or
    to secure relief therefrom as provided by this Act;
    3. any economic benefits accrued by the violator because
    of delay in compliance with requirements;
    4. the amount of monetary penalty which will serve to
    deter further violations by the violator and to
    otherwise aid in enhancing voluntary compliance with
    this Act by the violator and other persons similarly
    subject to the Act; and
    5. the number, proximity in time, and gravity of
    previously adjudicated violations of this Act by the
    violator.
    Section 42(h)(1) The Board finds that the Complainants
    requested penalty of two hundred fifty thousand dollars
    ($250,000) is appropriate given the number of years of violation,
    the serious nature of the violations, the number of people at
    risk, the varied violations, and the many meetings with Agency
    officials attempting to bring the facility into compliance. The
    respondents have been in violation of the Act since October 1978
    through at least October 1992. (Not. at 24.) When records were
    available, they showed serious violation of water discharge
    standards, including standards for suspended solids, BOD5, and
    fecal coliform. (Comp. at 4—6.) Respondents also failed to
    perform required tests so determining the full magnitude of their
    non—compliance is frustrated by respondent’s noncompliance with
    Board regulations. From October 14, 1978, through October 29,
    1992, respondents “failed to perform flow measurement and monitor
    effluent discharge as required by their NPDES permit”. (Comp. at
    9.) Respondent’s also violated public water supply regulations,
    including siting a restroom stool a distance of five feet from a
    well serving over 200 people. (Comp. at 19.) The Board notes
    that KMHP serves a community population estimated at 265. (Comp.
    at 3.) The unhealthy discharges from the sewage treatment plant,
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    7
    and the violation of public water supply regulations (Comp. at
    14-19), put that large community at risk.
    Section 42(h)(2)-(4) The Agency and the Attorney General’s
    Office have stated in the record that there have been several
    meetings over the years with respondents. At those meetings “the
    state has made numerous attempts to bring the Kershaws into
    compliance with the Act”. (Mot. at 24.) Further, the Kershaws
    “accrued a substantial economic benefit by not making the
    improvements necessary to bring the KMHP wastewater treatment
    plant into compliance”. (Mot. at 25.) Complainant believes
    “that a total penalty of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
    ($250,000) will serve to deter further violations and aid in
    future voluntary enforcement of the Act and Board regulations.
    (Mot. at 25.)
    Section 42(h) (5) The complainant notes that in 1990, the
    Illinois Department of Public Health suspended the respondents’
    license to run the mobile home park because a licensing
    inspection “revealed numerous problems with the sewage treatment
    plant”. (Not. at 26.) The complainant notes that the following
    year the license was reinstated. (Not. at 26.) However, despite
    the long term nature of the violations, there are no “previously
    adjudicated violations of this Act by the violator”.
    Conclusion
    After considering the record in this case and the factors
    outlined in Section 33(c) and 42(h) of the Act, the Board finds
    that the penalty requested by the complainant is reasonable. The
    Board will order respondents to pay a penalty of two hundred
    fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
    COSTS AND FEES
    The complaint asked that the respondents be ordered to pay
    all costs including attorney, expert witness and consultant fees,
    expended by the State in pursuit of this action. (Comp. at
    9,13,15,21.) The Attorney General’s motion (Comp. at 26) states
    that documentation of costs and fees will be provided if the
    Board so requests. Under Section 42(f) of the Act, the Board may
    award “costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including the
    reasonable costs of expert witnesses and consultants” in a case
    where the Attorney General has prevailed “against a person who
    has committed a willful, knowing or repeated violation of the
    Act”. Such monies are to be deposited in the Hazardous Waste
    Fund created in Section 22.2 of the Act. Implementation of
    Section 42(’f) requires certain findings which must be based on
    the record. In cases where the Attorney General asks to recover
    costs and fees it would be most helpful if the complaint would
    request them pursuant to Section 42(f). Additionally, a
    0114 -0075

    8
    discussion of which evidence specifically supports a finding of
    willful, knowing or repeated violations should be presented.
    The record indicates that respondents committed additional
    violations of the Act even after being notified that the
    operation of respondents’ facility was in violation of the Act.
    (~
    Mot. at 22-24.)~ Thus, the Board finds that the respondent
    committed repeated and knowing violations of the Act. Therefore
    the Board will open a Docket B in this proceeding to assess
    reasonable costs and fees to the respondents as provided in
    Section 42(f) of the Act. Complainants are directed to file an
    affidavit of costs and fees with the clerk of the Board within 30
    days of this date.
    ORDER
    The respondents shall pay Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
    ($250,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order.
    Such payment shall be made by certified check or money order
    payable to the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, designated to
    the Environmental Protection Trust Fund, and shall be sent by
    First Class mail to:
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    Fiscal Services Division
    2200 Churchill Road
    P.O. Box 19276
    Springfield, IL 62794—9276
    Respondents shall also write its Federal Employer
    Identification Number or Social Security Number on the certified
    check or money order. Any such penalty not paid within the time
    prescribed shall incur interest at the rate set forth in
    subsection (a) of Section 1003 of the Illinois Income Tax Act,
    (35 ILCS 5/1003), as now or hereafter amended, from the date
    payment is due until the date payment is received. Interest
    shall not accrue during the pendency of an appeal during which
    payment of the penalty has been stayed.
    Respondent shall cease and desist from the alleged
    violations.
    3me Board notes that this case is distinguishable from
    Chicago Heights Refuse Depot (cite) wherein the Board determined
    that there is a distinction between “continuing” violations and
    “repeated” ‘violations. In the instant matter the respondents
    were first notified of violations in 1985 and yet as late as
    1992, the respondents were in violation for failure to perform
    required test procedures. (Comp. at 9.)
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    The Board hereby opens Docket B in this proceeding.
    Complainants are directed to file an affidavit of costs and fees
    with the Clerk of the Board within 30 days of the date of this
    Order.
    IT IS SO ORDERED
    Board Member Joan Anderson concurs
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
    5/41) provides for the appeal of final Board orders within 35
    days. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish
    filing requirements. (But see also, 35 Ill. Adin. Code 101.246,
    Motions for Reconsideration, and Casteneda v. Illinois Human
    Rights Commission (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 304, 547 N.E.2d 437; Strube
    v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, No. 3—92—0468, slip op. at
    4—5 (3d Dist. March 15, 1993).)
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify~that the above order was adopted on the
    ~
    day of
    (-~u~~ ,
    1993, by a vote of
    ORI-0077
    Dorothy M.
    Illinois
    Control Board

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