ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
January 20, 2000
CASS COUNTY SERVICE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
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PCB 99-31
(Tax Certification - Appeal)
GREG ROOSEVELT, OF THE ROOSEVELT LAW OFFICE, APPEARED ON BEHALF
OF PETITIONER; and
LISA MORENO, OF THE ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by C.A. Manning):
Petitioner Cass County Service Company (Cass) is an agricultural service cooperative
that owns and operates a bulk petroleum storage and transfer facility in Virginia, Cass County,
Illinois. The facility contains eight steel tanks, a concrete dike, and a concrete spill pad, all of
which are covered by a steel building. Petroleum product is shipped to the facility in bulk to
store in the steel tanks. Cass transfers the petroleum from the tanks to trucks for delivery to
customers.
In 1998, Cass applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) to
receive property tax certification of the dike, spill pad, and steel building as pollution control
facilities. While the Agency granted tax certification status for the dike and spill pad, the
Agency denied that status for the steel building. Cass now asks the Board to review the
Agency’s decision to deny tax certification status for the steel building.
Based on the record before it, the Board disagrees with the Agency’s decision to deny
the tax certification. The Board finds that Cass has proved that the steel building is a “pollution
control facility” as defined in the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-10 (1998)). The Board
therefore certifies that the steel building is a pollution control facility. The Board directs the
Agency to timely provide any additional documentation of this tax certification that the
Department of Revenue may require.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
On August 17, 1998, Cass filed an appeal of the Agency’s July 16, 1998 partial denial
of Cass’ tax certification application. On August 20, 1998, the Board accepted this matter for
2
hearing. The Agency filed the administrative record of the tax certification application on
March 8, 1999.
1
Hearing Officer Amy Muran Felton held a hearing in this matter on July 21, 1999.
Two witnesses appeared for Cass and two witnesses appeared for the Agency. Cass offered 13
exhibits, all of which were admitted. The Agency offered one exhibit, which was admitted.
2
Cass filed a posthearing brief on August 18, 1999. On November 16, 1999, the
Agency filed a response brief, accompanied by a motion for leave to file the brief
instanter
. On
December 30, 1999, Cass moved the Board to strike the Agency’s brief because the Agency
filed it late. The Board denies Cass’ motion to strike and accepts the Agency’s brief. Cass
filed a reply brief on January 7, 2000.
3
Finally, on August 30, 1999, Hancock Service Company (Hancock) filed an
amicus
curiae
brief, accompanied by a motion for leave to file the brief. Hancock is the petitioner in a
similar tax certification proceeding currently pending before the Board. See Hancock Service
Company v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, PCB 99-138. The Board grants
Hancock’s motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Board’s authority in this matter arises from the Property Tax Code, under which
the Board has sole authority to certify pollution control facilities for property tax purposes. The
Board’s review here therefore is
de novo
. Accordingly, the Board will consider the Agency’s
record of Cass’ tax certification application as well as the evidence presented at the July 21,
1999 hearing. See Reed-Custer Community Unit School District No. 255-U v. Commonwealth
Edison Co. and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (August 30, 1990), PCB 87-209
(Board considered tax certification application and evidence introduced at hearing in arriving at
its determination), aff’d
sub nom.
Reed-Custer Community Unit School District No. 255-U v.
Pollution Control Board, Commonwealth Edison Co., and the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency, 232 Ill. App.3d 571, 597 N.E.2d 802 (1st Dist. 1992).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Persons who obtain a tax certification receive preferential property tax treatment for
certain facilities. Specifically, under the Property Tax Code, “pollution control facilities” are
valued at 33 1/3% of the fair cash value of their economic productivity to their owners. See 35
ILCS 200/11-5 (1998).
1
The administrative record is cited as “R. at _.”
2
The transcript of the hearing is cited as “Tr. at _.” Cass’ hearing exhibits are cited as “Pet.
Exh. _;” the Agency’s hearing exhibits are cited as “Resp. Exh. _.”
3
Cass’ first brief is cited as “Pet. Br. at _;” the Agency's response brief is cited as “Resp. Br.
at _;” Cass’ reply brief is cited as “Reply Br. at _.
3
The Property Tax Code provides that “the Pollution Control Board, acting through its
Chairman or his or her specifically authorized delegate” may certify that a facility is a
“pollution control facility.” 35 ILCS 200/11-25 (1998). On January 11, 1982, the Chairman
of the Board delegated to the Agency the authority to issue or deny tax certifications. Resp.
Br., Exh. A. The Agency’s final decision may be appealed to the Board. See CGE Ford
Heights, L.L.C. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (February 1, 1996), PCB 96-164,
slip op. at 1.
The Property Tax Code defines “pollution control facilities” in pertinent part as follows:
[A]ny system, method, construction, device or appliance appurtenant thereto, or
any portion of any building or equipment, that is designed, constructed, installed
or operated for the primary purpose of:
a)
eliminating, preventing, or reducing air or water pollution, as the terms
“air” and “water pollution” are defined in the Environmental Protection
Act . . . . 35 ILCS 200/11-10 (1998).
The Environmental Protection Act (Act), 415 ILCS 5/1
et seq.
, defines “water
pollution” as follows:
[S]uch alteration of the physical, thermal, chemical, biological or radioactive
properties of any waters of the State, or such discharge of any contaminant into
any waters of the State, as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such
waters harmful or detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or
to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate
uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish, or other aquatic life. 415 ILCS
5/3.55 (1998).
As used in the definition of “water pollution,” the Act also defines “contaminant” and
“waters” as follows:
“Contaminant” is any solid, liquid, or gaseous matter, any odor, or any form of
energy, from whatever source.
“Waters” means all accumulations of water, surface and underground, natural,
and artificial, public and private, or parts thereof, which are wholly or partially
within, flow through, or border upon this State. 415 ILCS 5/3.06, 3.56 (1998).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Cass owns and operates a bulk petroleum storage and transfer facility in Virginia, Cass
County, Illinois. Tr. at 13. Petroleum product is shipped to the facility in bulk to store in
tanks. Tr. at 13. Cass transfers the petroleum from the tanks to trucks for delivery to
customers. Tr. at 13.
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The facility contains eight steel tanks (four 19,000 gallon tanks and four 50,000 gallon
tanks) to store the petroleum product. Tr. at 15. All eight tanks are located inside a concrete
dike. A 40 feet by 40 feet steel building covers the steel tanks, the concrete dike, and the
facility’s 36 feet by 36 feet concrete spill pad. The steel building has a roof, sidewalls, and an
entrance door. Tr. at 15, 34; Pet. Exh. 1-5, 8, 9.
The concrete dike and spill pad are secondary containment structures. The dike is
located around and underneath the petroleum storage tanks. Cass installed the spill pad to
contain spillage incident to transferring petroleum product to and from the tanks. Tr. at 14.
The steel building was part of the overall design to control pollution at the facility. Specifically,
Cass designed the steel building to reduce the amount of rainwater coming into contact with
spilled petroleum in the area of the tanks, dike, and spill pad. Tr. at 14-15, 19, 38.
Spilled petroleum product and rainwater in this area accumulate in a concrete trench.
The trench contains a sump pump that Cass uses to pump the material from the trench. If
petroleum and rainwater commingle, Cass cannot return the material to the tanks. Cass has
incurred additional expense to dispose of such material at an offsite facility. Tr. at 19-20, 28-
29; Pet. Exh. 12.
In the past, Cass’ engineers designed bulk petroleum facilities without steel buildings to
cover loading and unloading operations. Tr. at 24. These bulk petroleum facilities were
capable of operating in an open environment. Tr. at 24-25. Before 1992, when Cass built the
steel building at issue, the facility did not have any structure to cover its petroleum loading and
unloading activities. Tr. at 38. Before Cass constructed the steel building, it paid 90 cents per
gallon to dispose of an estimated 400 to 500 gallons of commingled petroleum and rainwater
during periods of heavy rain. Tr. at 34-35; Pet. Exh. 12.
Cass constructed the steel building to reduce the amount of this commingled material that
it disposed of offsite and in an effort to comply with federal requirements for a Spill Prevention
Control and Countermeasures (SPCC) plan.
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The steel building is part of the facility’s SPCC
plan. By covering Cass’ loading and unloading operations, the steel building reduces the
amount of rainwater entering the area, thereby reducing the amount of commingled petroleum
and rainwater. Tr. at 37.
On April 16, 1998, the Agency received Cass’ application for property tax certification
of the dike, spill pad, and steel building as pollution control facilities. R. at 1. On July 16,
1998, the Agency granted tax certification status for the dike and spill pad, but denied that
status for the steel building. R. at 10.
4
Under Section 311(j)(1)(c) of the federal Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.§ 1251(j)(1)(c)), the
United States Environmental Protection Agency established the SPCC program to protect
surface water from petroleum contamination. Facilities subject to the regulations must prepare
and maintain an SPCC plan, which includes provisions for appropriate containment or
diversionary structures to prevent discharged petroleum from contacting surface waters. See 40
C.F.R. 112.
5
The Agency acknowledged that the steel building helps to keep rainwater away from
spilled petroleum. Tr. at 53. The Agency denied tax certification status for the steel building,
however, because it determined that its primary purpose appeared to be to allow Cass to
continue operating the facility during adverse weather. Tr. at 50; R. at 10. Agency
representatives did not inspect Cass’ facility, interview Cass’ employees, or review design plans
for the steel building. Tr. at 56. In other tax certification matters, the Agency has approved
structures that cover fertilizer and pesticide operations. Tr. at 51-52.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented to the Board is whether the steel building that covers Cass’
petroleum loading and unloading area was designed and constructed for the primary purpose of
eliminating, preventing, or reducing water pollution.
Initially, the Board finds that petroleum-impacted rainwater accumulated at Cass’ facility
constitutes “water pollution” as defined in the Act. See
Supra
3. The parties do not dispute
this. Nor do the parties dispute that the steel building reduces the commingling of rainwater
and spilled petroleum. Nevertheless, before the Board can decide whether it agrees with the
Agency’s decision to not certify the steel building as a “pollution control facility” for
preferential tax treatment under the Property Tax Code, the Board must decide whether the
record demonstrates that the steel building’s “primary purpose” is to eliminate, prevent, or
reduce such water pollution. See Reed-Custer, PCB 87-209, slip op. at 7-10. For the reasons
set forth below, the Board finds that the steel building was designed and constructed for the
primary purpose of preventing or reducing water pollution.
The Agency denied tax certification status for the steel building because it found that the
primary purpose of the structure appeared to be to allow Cass to continue operating the facility
during adverse weather, rather than to control pollution. Cass argues that the steel building was
designed and constructed primarily to control water pollution. Larry Sands (Sands), Cass’
design engineer, testified as follows:
The building over the spill pad is designed to keep – as much as possible to keep
water off the structure . . . . If things are not picked up right away, with water
on it then you have a real problem, and you have a mixture of oil and water, and
so you try to keep water off the pad.
* * *
The structure over the spill pad, the steel building, was there to try to cut down
on the amount of rainwater coming in. That’s the primary purpose. Tr. at 15,
23-24.
Additionally, Sands testified that if rainwater comes into contact with petroleum on the concrete
pad, Cass pumps out the mixture and disposes it offsite at cost. Tr. at 19.
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The Board finds Sands’ testimony persuasive and uncontradicted by any evidence in the
record. No evidence in the record supports the Agency’s assertion that the steel building’s
primary purpose is to allow Cass to continue operating in inclement weather. In fact, the
evidence shows that such facilities can operate in an open environment. It is undisputed that
rainwater can enter the petroleum handling area at Cass’ facility and commingle with spilled
petroleum. If this happens, Cass pays to dispose of the accumulation of petroleum-impacted
water at an offsite facility. The record shows that Cass designed and built the steel building to
prevent or reduce this water pollution.
Cass also contends that the steel building’s design takes into account the federal SPCC
requirements at 40 C.F.R. 112. These regulations require certain petroleum storage facilities to
prepare SPCC plans and install drainage and containment systems for tank car and truck
loading and unloading areas. See 40 C.F.R. § 112.7(c).
The Agency argues that these federal regulations are not determinative of whether the
steel building meets the definition of “pollution control facility” under the Property Tax Code.
The Board agrees. Merely because Cass built the steel building in an effort to comply with
federal SPCC requirements does not, in itself, mean that the structure is entitled to tax
certification status. It does, however, provide additional evidence in support of Cass’ position.
The Agency further suggests that finding the steel building to be a pollution control
facility “makes every commercial and private garage in the State of Illinois a pollution control
facility.” Resp. Br. at 10. The Board disagrees. Like Cass, each individual taxpayer must
carry the burden of proving that its particular facility meets the “primary purpose” test. See
XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d 202, 709 N.E.2d 293 (4th Dist. 1999)
(taxpayer failed to satisfy primary purpose test when the evidence showed that pollution control
benefits are ancillary to the facility’s primary purpose). The Board’s decision in this case is not
determinative of the issue in every situation without regard to the facts.
The Board’s reasoning here is consistent with appellate court case law. For example, in
Beelman Truck Co. v. Cosentino, 253 Ill. App. 3d 420, 624 N.E.2d 454 (5th Dist. 1993), a
hazardous waste transporter sought tax certification status for its dump truck liners and certain
“escort trucks.” Beelman lined its dump truck beds with a plastic liner to prevent contaminated
soil from leaking during transport. Additionally, the dump trucks were accompanied by pickup
trucks referred to as “escort trucks,” which carried emergency response equipment.
Id.
at 421.
When Beelman sought and was denied tax certification status, it sued the State Treasurer and
the Director of Revenue in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that the plastic liners
and escort trucks were tax-exempt pollution control facilities under the Use Tax Act.
5
The
5
The “primary purpose” language in the definition of “pollution control facilities” in the Use
Tax Act, 35 ILCS 105/2a (1998), is nearly identical to the language at issue here from the
Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/11-10 (1998). Thus, a construction of either definition
operates as an interpretation of both. See Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131
Ill. 2d 196, 200-01, 545 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (1989) (court’s analysis of Use Tax Act
7
circuit court found that the plastic liners and escort trucks were tax-exempt pollution control
facilities.
Id.
at 422, 424. In affirming the circuit court’s decision, the appellate court stated:
Beelman submitted and the trial court considered uncontradicted evidence that the
primary purpose of the plastic liner was to prevent hazardous waste from
escaping from the dump trucks. Under section 2a [definition of “pollution
control facilities”], a business is entitled to an exemption for
any
system, method,
or device or appliance whose primary purpose is to eliminate, prevent, or reduce
pollution.
Id.
at 424 (emphasis in original).
The appellate court in Beelman also stated that the broad terms of the definition of
“pollution control facilities” must not be construed as “limiting its application based on the type
or nature of the component part.”
Id.
at 424 (quoting Wesko Plating, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 222 Ill. App. 3d 422, 426, 584 N.E.2d 162, 164 (1st Dist. 1991)). The Beelman
court determined that the pollution control facility encompasses the entire “system” or “method”
of eliminating, reducing, or preventing pollution. Beelman, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 424, 624
N.E.2d at 458.
Similarly, the appellate court in Wesko affirmed the circuit court’s determination that the
use of chemicals in a system for eliminating pollutants in an electroplating process was tax
exempt. See Wesko, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 426, 584 N.E.2d at 163. In its review of the
definition of “pollution control facilities” in Section 2a of the Use Tax Act, the appellate court
found:
[P]recluding application of the exemption to systems, such as Wesko’s, where
chemicals are the integral components for eliminating pollutants, . . . imposes an
improper limitation on the terms method and system. That constraint is contrary
to the purpose of section 2a to encourage efforts to control pollution by
providing a tax exemption for the employment of pollution control facilities.
Id.
at 426.
The facts of the instant case are analogous to those of Beelman and Wesko. Cass uses
the building, dike area, and spill pad as its system for controlling water pollution. Like the
plastic liners in Beelman and the chemicals in Wesko, the steel building is a component of Cass’
system to control water pollution.
CONCLUSION
The Board disagrees with the Agency’s decision to deny tax certification status for Cass’
steel building. The record in this case demonstrates that the steel building was designed and
constructed for the primary purpose of preventing or reducing water pollution. Accordingly,
applicable to Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act because of noted similarities between the definitions
of “pollution control facilities” in the respective statutes).
8
the Board certifies that the steel building is a “pollution control facility” under the Property Tax
Code.
Under Section 11-25 of the Property Tax Code, the effective date of this certification is
“the date of application for the certificate or the date of the construction of the facility, which
ever is later.” 35 ILCS 200/11-25 (1998). Cass built the steel building in 1992 and the
Agency received Cass’ tax certification application on April 16, 1998. The effective date of the
Board’s certification therefore is April 16, 1998. The Agency must timely provide any
additional documentation of this tax certification that the Department of Revenue may require.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in this
matter.
ORDER
1.
The Board certifies that Cass’ steel building is a pollution control facility under
the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/11-10 (1998). The effective date of this
certification is April 16, 1998.
2.
The Board directs the Agency to timely provide any additional documentation of
the tax certification set forth in paragraph one of this order that the Department
of Revenue may require.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (1998)) provides for the
appeal of final Board orders to the Illinois Appellate Court within 35 days of service of this
order. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 establishes such filing requirements. See 172 Ill. 2d
R. 335; see also 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
the above opinion and order was adopted on the 20th day of January 2000 by a vote of 6-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board