ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October
21,
1993
THE
ROBERTSON-CECO CORPORATION,
)
Petitioner,
v.
)
PCB 92—90
(Variance)
ILLINOIS
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
CLIFTON
LAKE
AND NANETTE EVERSON APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE
PETITIONER;
PAUL JAGIELLO APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT.
OPINION
AND
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by G.
T.
Girard):
On June 15,
1992, Robertson—Ceco Corporation
(Robertson—
Ceco)
filed
a petition for variance from the Board’s December 20,
1990,
order.
(Ceco Corporation v.
Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency, PCB 86-180,
117 PCB 25, hereinafter to be
cited as PCB 86—180.)
On March
5,
1993, the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
filed a recommendation
that the variance not be granted.
Hearing was held on July
9,
1993,
in Bolingbrook,
Illinois.
Petitioner filed its brief
on
August
30,
1993,
and a reply brief on September 20,
1993.
The
Agency filed its brief on September
9,
1993.
BACKGROUND
The June 15,
1992, petition for variance seeks relief from
the Board’s December 20,
1990,
order in PCB 86—180.
In PCB 86-
180, Robertson-Ceco sought Board review of conditions imposed by
the Agency on Robertson-Ceco’s closure plan for its facility.
Therefore, the following is a comprehensive discussion of the
factors which were also relevant at that time.
Robertson—Ceco
is the corporate successor to the Ceco
Corporation
(Ceco) which owned and operated a steel production
facility in Lemont,
Illinois, prior to February
3,
1983.
On that
date,
Ceco sold the steel mill facility to Thomas Steel Company;
however, the sales agreement provided that Ceco would retain
title to the parcel of real estate on which electric arc furnace
dust was stored.
(Pet.
Br.
Attch.
I at
2.)’
Production
The petition will be cited as
“Pet.
at
_“;
the
petitioner’s brief will be cited as
“Pet.
Br.
at
_“;
the reply
brief will be cited as
“Rep.
at
_“;
the Agency’s brief will be
cited
as “Ag.
Br.
at
“;
the Agency’s recommendation
will
be
2
operations at the facility involved the melting of scrap steel
in
electric arc furnaces and the fabrication of billet and other
steel forms and shapes including concrete reinforcing bar.
(Pet.
Br. Attch.
I at 1.)
As a consequence of its operation of
electric arc furnaces,
Ceco was required to install and operate
air pollution control equipment.
The air pollution control
equipment consisted of
a baghouse collector system which removed
entrained dust from the furnace exhaust.
The collected dust was
wetted to facilitate handling and deposited in waste piles on a
25—acre parcel of real estate owned by Ceco adjacent to the steel
mill.
(Pet.
Br. Attch.
I at 2.)
The greatest portion of the
wetted dust was deposited for storage
in a single bermed pit;
however,
some was deposited on other areas of the site and was
subsequently covered by other materials, principally slag.
(Pet.
Br.
at
3.)
Electric arc furnace dust
(K06l)
is a listed hazardous waste
pursuant to 40 CFR 261.32.
In 1980,
Ceco applied for and
received interim status for a hazardous waste storage site under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)
(40 U.S.C.
3001
et seq.) and the rules implementing
RCRA.
Ceco did not dispose
of K06l at the site after November 19,
1980.
(Pet.
Br. Attch.
I
at 2.)
Because Ceco did not wish to maintain a RCRA—regulated
hazardous waste storage facility it began removing K061 from the
site for disposal at a licensed hazardous waste disposal site.
During 1981 and 1982,
Ceco removed 10,000 cubic yards of electric
arc furnace dust.
(Pet.
Br. Attch.
I at 3.)
Ceco also retained
NUS Corporation
(NUS)
as an environmental consultant to develop a
closure plan for the site.
Based on records and information
available,
NUS estimated that fifteen percent of the dust stored
at the site remained in 1983.
(Pet.
Br.
at 3.)
On January 31,
1985,
Ceco submitted to the Agency its
closure plan for the site.
The closure plan described the
methodology by which the remaining deposits of electric arc
furnace dust would be identified, excavated and disposed of at a
licensed hazardous waste facility.
(Pet.
Br.
Attch.
I at 3.)
The plan included sub—surface investigation to determine the
location or existence of the dust as well as a plan for removal.
Because of the manner in which the dust was deposited,
excavation
with eart~h-movingmachinery caused a significant volume of non-
hazardous~wasteto be admixed with the dust.
(PCB 86-180 at 117
PCB 26.)
Ceco set forth in its plan a system to separate non-
hazardous waste from the hazardous waste.
On March 29,
1985,
the
Agency se~-ta letter to Ceco disapproving the closure plan for
certain deficiencies and listing several questions concerning
cited as
“Ag.
Rec.
at
_“;
and the transcript will be cited as
“Tr.
at
_“;
3
those deficiencies.
Ceco responded to those comments on April
30,
1985.
On June
13,
1985,
the Agency approved the closure plan
submitted by Ceco on January
31,
1985,
as clarified by the
responses to the March 29,
1985,
Agency letter.
On September
18,
1985,
Agency representatives visited the site and observed the
excavation and separation processes being carried out.
Following
the visit,
the Agency sent Ceco a Compliance Inquiry Letter on
September 27,
1985.
(PCB 86—180 at 117 PCB 26.)
The Compliance
Inquiry Letter expressed concerns over the use of color as an
identifier of the electric arc furnace dust at the site, the
actual excavation procedures and the separation process.
(PCB
86-180 at 117 PCB 27.)
A meeting between Ceco and the Agency
followed in November 1985; the principal subject discussed was
the application of the hazardous waste mixture rule
(35 Ill. Adm.
Code 721.103) to the material excavated.
The Agency stated that
its interpretation of the hazardous waste mixture rule requires
the inclusion of all material from the separation process unless
Ceco could demonstrate that “absolutely no trace”
of dust would
be contained in admixed material.
(PCB 86—180 at
117 PCB 27.)
Due to the increased cost of disposal of all the 32,000
cubic yards of admixed material and the physical impossibility of
obtaining the degree of separation which the Agency required,
Ceco notified the Agency that it would amend its closure plan.
On March 19,
1986, Ceco submitted an amendment to its closure
plan to provide for site disposal of the admixed material.
The March
19,
1986, amendment to the closure plan provided
for a consolidation of the then excavated admixed waste within
a
two-acre portion of the former regulated unit which would then be
closed pursuant to 35
Ill. Adm.
Code 725.358(b).
On June
12,
1986,. the Agency disapproved the amended.closure plan of March
19,
1986.
The Agency’s disapproval stated that the amended
closure plan contained over
18 deficiencies
including:
1)
“it
has not yet been demonstrated to this Agency that all of the
waste residues and contaminated soils have been removed”;
2)
drawings fail to indicate the outline of the quarry;
3)
a
description of how the stockpile areas will be cleaned up must be
included and 4)
a method to identify areas contaminated by wind
blown and drifting dust must be included.
(PCB 86-180 at 117 PCB
27.)
On July 15,
1986,
Ceco submitted a modified closure plan.
On September 11,
1986, the Agency notified Ceco that the modified
closure p~banwould not be approved without conditions imposed by
the Agency.
The letter set forth conditions numbered 1-20.
Ceco appealed the September
11,
1986,
modified closure plan
and that appeal was the subject of PCB 86—180.
Ceco specifically
accepted the conditions
in the September
11,
1986,
letter which
4
are numbered 2(a)—(c),
(f)—(j),
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10,
12,
14,
17,
and 19.
Ceco also accepted condition number
11
as
it relates to
the requirement of a final cover of four feet over the closed
regulated unit.
The specific conditions
in the September
11,
1986,
closure
plan which Ceco objected to were:
1,
2(d)-(e),
3,
11,
13,
l5(i)—(iii),
16,
18, and 20.
The Board
on December 20,
1990,
upheld,
in part, the
Agency’s imposition of conditions.
The Board only reversed the
Agency with regard to condition 2(d) which the Board struck.
(PCB 86—180 at 117 PCB 43.)
Robertson-Ceco then appealed the
Board’s decision to the appellate court.
The court upheld the
Board’s decision and affirmed the Agency’s conditions.
(cite)
The Illinois Supreme Court denied
cert
in the subsequent appeal
by Robertson-Ceco.
PETITION
The petition for variance states that Robertson—Ceco seeks
a
variance from those provisions of the Board’s December 20,
1990,
order “which affirm the Agency-prescribed supplemental
investigation,
specifically Conditions
1,
3,
11,
14,
15 and 16”.
(Pet. at 5.)
Robertson-Ceco contends that compliance with those
conditions will impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship
in
that the supplemental investigation would cost approximately
$286,000.
(Pet.
at 5.)
Robertson—Ceco maintains that the
supplemental investigation would “prove’
a fact that Robertson-
Ceco believes has already been demonstrated,
i.e.,
that all
furnace dust deposits have been located and removed from the
‘clean-closed’ portion of the site”.
(Pet.
at
5..)
Robertson-Ceco states in the petition:
As a.realistic and reasonabLe alternative to compliance
with the technically infeasible and economically
unreasonable Agency—imposed investigation requirements,
Robertson-Ceco proposes,
as its ‘compliance plan’
within the meaning of
35 Ill. Adm. Code 104.121(f), to
conduct a different form of supplemental investigation
to demonstrate that all furnace dust has been accounted
for.
Such investigation will substantiate Robertson-
Ceco’s contention that all electric arc furnace dust
has keen located and removed from the area of the 25—
acre ~site‘outside of the new two—acre closure unit.
Under the direction of its environmental consultant,
NUS Corporation, Robertson-Ceco proposes to excavate,
at 3O~—footgrid—intersect points,
across the entire
site 25—acre
(except where such grid—intersect points
fall upon the new closure unit)
to the depth of
bedrock.
;(Pet.
at
5.)
5
Robertson—Ceco also would install
a post—closure groundwater
monitoring well system
in conjunction with the subsurface
excavation.
This alternative plan will “require an expenditure
of
$38,200”.
(Pet.
at
6.)
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION
The Agency recommends that
a RCRA variance from the Board’s
order
in PCB 86-180 regarding conditions
1,
3,
11,
14,
15 and 16
of the Agency’s September
11,
1986, closure plan be denied.
The
Agency,
in sum,
states that “the granting of the variance would
allow Robertson-Ceco to conduct activities at the site
inconsistent with the federal RCRA standards and regulations”.
(Rec.
at 5.)
Further, the Agency maintains that the site still
poses a threat to human health and the environment
(Rec.
at
7)
and that the economic hardship Robertson-Ceco “complains of
is
not so unique as to constitute the type of hardship that would
support the grant of a
RCRA
variance”.
(Rec. at
11.)
The Agency argues that the variance petition is one more
attempt to convince the Board to strike conditions from the 1986
modified closure plan.
(Rec.
at 8.)
The Agency finds the
proposed compliance plan unacceptable for a number of reasons
including the fact that the plan would use only visual inspection
criteria to confirm the presence or absence of electric arc
furnace dust.
(Rec.
at 9.)
The Agency also objects to the fact
that the proposal does not mention surface investigation and
would in fact limit the investigation of the site to
identification of subsurface deposits of K06l.
(Rec.
at 9.)
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
The Agency presented two objections at hearing which are
renewed
in. the brief.
Those objections are
to the admittance by
the hearing officer of Exhibits 2-A and 2-B and to the seeking of
a variance to condition
14 of the closure plan.
(Ag. Br.
at
2
and 4.)
First, with regards to the condition
14, the hearing
officer
did not rule on that objection as Robertson-Ceco wished
to address the issue
in its brief.
The Board will sustain the
Agency objection and finds that condition 14
is not properly a
part of this variance petition.
Robertson-Ceco points out that condition 14 deals with
submission,
by’December
11,
1986,
of a revised schedule of
closure and revised closure and post—closure cost relating to the
conditions imposed by the Agency.
(Pet.
Br.
at 7.)
Robertson-
Ceco argue-s that as the underlying conditions were challenged
in
PCB 86-180 compliance with condition 14 was not possible.
(Pet.
Br.
at 7.)
Thus,
Robertson-Ceco maintains the Agency objection
is moot.
(Pet.
Br.
at 7.)
6
The Board
is not persuaded by the Robertson-Ceco argument.
Robertson-Ceco specifically accepted condition
14
in the prior
proceeding.
(See,
PCB 86—180 at 117 PCB 27.)
Further, this
petition is seeking
a variance from the Board’s order
in PCB 86-
180.
The Board’s order did not include condition 14.
(See,
PCB
86-180 at 117 PCB 43-44.)
Therefore, condition 14
is not
properly a part of this variance.
The second objection by the Agency involves the inclusion in
this record of two exhibits which deal with groundwater
monitoring data for the two-acre RCRA closure site as identified
by Robertson-Ceco.
The Agency maintains that the two-acre
RCRA
cell is within the 25-acre site that the Agency believes is the
regulated site.
(Ag.
Br.
at 5.)
Thus, the Agency argues that
the data is not relevant to this proceeding.
(Ag. Br.
at 4.)
The Board disagrees that the information is not relevant.
Therefore,
the Board affirms the hearing officer’s admittance of
the information.
The Board does agree that the information has
limited value in this proceeding as the monitoring wells are only
for the two—acre site.
DISCUSSION
The Agency sets forth several arguments
in opposition to the
granting of the requested variance.
The specific arguments are:
1.
That Robertsori-Ceco’s petition for variance seeks
permanent rather than temporary relief;
2.
That Robertson—Ceco has not met its burden of showing
that claimed hardship outweighs the public interest
in
attaining compliance with regulations designed to
protect the public;
3.
That Robertson-Ceco has not met its burden of showing
that the cost of compliance constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable hardship; and
4.
That the compliance plan is inadequate.
Robertson-Ceco petition for variance seeks permanent rather
than
temporary relief
The Agency claims that the petition and the testimony at
hearing make it clear that Robertson—Ceco does not intend to
comply
with the conditions of the closure plan
for the facility
which were upheld by the Board in PCB 86-180.
(Ag.
Br.
at
10.)
The Agency points out that
in the petition Robertson-Ceco state
that its compliance plan
is “to conduct a different form of
supplemental investigation to demonstrate that all furnace ~
has been accounted
for”.
(Ag.
Br.
at
10;
Pet.
at
5.)
Furt
7
the Agency states that “Mr.
Lake, Robertson-Ceco’s counsel,
and
Mr.
Gardner, Robertson—Ceco’s witness, agreed that Robertson—Ceco
does not intend to follow the subsurface investigation which
is
a
part of the approved closure plan for the Robertson—Ceco site”.
(Ag.
Br.
at 10;
Tr. at 67-68.)
The Agency argues that the “concept of a variance which
permanently liberates a polluter from the dictates of a board
sic)
regulation is wholly inconsistent with the purposes of the
Environmental Protection Act”.
(Ag.
Br.
at 11, citing Monsanto
Company v.
Pollution Control Board,
67 Ill.
2d 276,
10 Ill.
Dec.
231,
367 N.E.2d 684
(1977).)
Robertson—Ceco maintains that it
is not seeking permanent
relief.
Rather,
Robertson-Ceco
is asking the Board for a
variance to perform its own supplemental investigation.
(Rep.
at
5.)
Robertson-Ceco argues that:
Because Robertson—Ceco does not seek a variance from any
substantive control requirement, the substitution of
Robertson-Ceco’s proposed supplemental investigation for
that of the Agency would not result in a “permanent”
variance under the case law, nor would it in any manner be
inconsistent with the purposes of the Environmental
Protection Act.
(Rep. at 5.)
Robertson—Ceco also •argues that its investigation is “superior”
to that developed by the Agency and that Robertson-Ceco is not
seeking any less stringent substantive control requirement or
standard.
(Rep. at 5.)
The Board may grant relief from its Board orders in the form
of variance.
(415 ILCS 5/35(a).)
However,
in this case,
Robertson—Ceco is asking to be allowed to perform a site
investigation which Robertson—Ceco’s consultants have argued
is
“superior” to the investigation recommended by the Agency.
This
investigation is very similar to the investigation Robertson-Ceco
argued for in PCB 86-180.
Further, Robertson-Ceco will never
comply with the requirements of the Board’s order
in PCB 86-180.
Robertson—Ceco argues that it is not seeking a less substantive
control requirement; however,
the effect of granting permanent
relief
in this case would be a lessening of requirements.
The
Board found,
in PCB 86-180, that the conditions imposed by the
Agency wei~e“necessary to insure that the Act and the Board’s
rules will not be violated”.
(PCB 86—180 at 117 PCB 43.)
Therefore,
granting permanent relief from those “necessary”
conditions.- could result in lessening the standard imposed under
the Act and the Board’s regulations.
Robertson-Ceco has not met its burden of showing that claimed
hardship outweighs the public interest in attaining compliance
with’
regulations designed to protect the public.
8
The Agency states that “Robertson-Ceco’s alternative
investigation proposes to identify K061 dust by a method which
has already been held to be inadequate by the Board in PCB 86-
180”.
(Ag.
Br.
at 12.)
The Agency maintains that Robertson-Ceco
intends to use visual characteristics to identify K061, the same
method which was subject of litigation in PCB 86-180.
(Ag. Br.
at
13.)
The Agency points to testimony by Mr. Gardner
in support
of this argument.
(Tr.
at 62-63.)
The Agency further bolsters
its argument by pointing to the Board’s opinion in PCB 86-180.
(Ag. Br.
at 15.)
The Agency also states:
All of the arguments raised by Robertson-Ceco in its
Petition For Variance, including hardship resulting
from what Robertson-Ceco considers
to be “technically
infeasible and economically unreasonable Agency—imposed
investigation requirements” were raised,
argued,
litigated, considered by and decided upon by the
Illinois Pollution Control Board and the Appellate
Court.
(Ag.
Br. at
16.)
Thus, the Agency argues that Robertson-Ceco has
failed to prove that the claimed hardship outweighs the public
interest in attaining compliance.
(Ag. Br. at 16.)
Robertson-Ceco argues that the opinion and order in PCB 86-
180 did not decide the issues raised in this proceeding.
(Pet.
Br. at 8.)
Robertson-Ceco maintains that in this proceeding the
Board must determine whether compliance with the PCB 86-180 order
would cause an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship for Robertson-
Ceco.
(Pet.
Br. at 8.)
In the PCB 86-180 case, the standard of
review was whether the conditions were necessary to demonstrate
compliance with the Act and Board regulations.
(Pet.
Br.
at 8.)
Thus,
Robertson—Ceco argues,
the Board has not decided the issue
before it
in this proceeding.
Robertson—Ceco agrees that the investigation it seeks to use
by the granting of this variance would include the identification
test utilized by NUS in 1985, except that it will not be using
color to identify potential K06l dust with its proposed
investigation.
Rather, Robertson—Ceco maintains that it will
“identify, any material, regardless of color, which appears
in the
subsurface in a fine—grained, densely—packed layer,
as electric
arc furnace dust”.
(Pet.
Br.
at 9; Rep.
at
6.)
Robe~tson—Cecoalso argues that the chemical analysis
required in the P03 86—180 order
is inadequate and futile.
(Pet.
Br.
at 9.)
Robertson—Ceco also maintains that the use of
groundwater monitoring will substantiate that the site poses no
threat to human health or the environment.
(Pet.
Br.
at
10.)
Robettson-Ceco contends that “together,
these two approaches are
9
more than adequate to satisfy a reasonable and rational inquiry
as to whether all furnace dust has been removed”.
(Pet.
Br.
at
10.)
The Board stated in PCB 86-180 that
“the record does
indicate that color was not the sole criterion used by Robertson-
Ceco in identifying K061”.
(PCB 86-180 at 117 PCB 33.)
The
Board went on to identify other areas of concern regarding the
methodology used by NUS and Robertson-Ceco in the site
investigation.
(PCB 86-180 at 117 PCB
33,
35 and 37.)
The Board
finds that this variance petition contains no additional
information which alleviates the concerns the Board expressed in
PCB 86—180.
Therefore,
the Board finds that Robertson-Ceco has
not demonstrated that the claimed hardship outweighs the public
interest in attaining compliance.
Robertson—Ceco has not met its burden of showing that the cost of
compliance constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
The Agency also argues that Robertson—Ceco has placed the
cost of compliance with the Agency-imposed investigation
requirements of
the September 11,
1986,
closure
plan in issue by
claiming that the cost of compliance constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable hardship.
(Ag. Br. at
16.)
The Agency maintains
that Robertson—Ceco did not present any evidence regarding its
financial status to prove that the cost of the Agency—required
investigation would constitute a hardship.
(Ag.
Br. at 17.)
In
fact Mr. Gardner testified that he did not have any financial
information regarding Robertson-Ceco.
(Ag. Br. at 17; Tr.
at
79.)
Thus, the Agency asserts Robertson—Ceco failed to prove
hardship and cites to Allaert Rendering,
Inc.
v. Pollution
Control Board, 91 Ill. App.
3d 160,
46
Ill.
Dec.
613,
414 N.E.2d
497
(Third Dist.
1980).
In that case, the court stated:
For reasons previously stated, there was no evidence
admitted as to Allaert’s financial condition.
Therefore,
Allaert could not show the alternatives were economically
infeasible and, therefore,
failed to prove hardship.
Robertson—Ceco maintains that the cost of compliance with
the order
in PCB 86—180 is $286,000, which could be higher
if
groundwater sampling indicates elevated concentrations of heavy
metals.
(Pet.
Br.
at 12.)
Robertson—Ceco also maintains that
its finangial position
is irrelevant to this proceeding.
(Rep.
at 8.)
Robertson—Ceco states:
In the
present case,
Robertson—Ceco does
flgj
claim that
compliance with the Agency-mandated supplemental
investigation should not be required because Robertson-Ceco
cannot afford to pay $286,000 to perform such investigation.
It contends that because there
is a better and substantially
~less expensive alternative which will achieve the intended
10
goal of the Agency’s supplemental investigation, for
Robertson—Ceco to be required to perform the Agency’s
investigation would be both an “arbitrary” and
“unreasonable” hardship.
(Rep.
at 7—8.)
The
Board disagrees that the financial status of a
petitioner seeking a variance is irrelevant.
The law is well
settled that the financial resources of a petitioner are relevant
to a determination of arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
(Citizens Utilities ComPanY of Illinois v.
PCB,
(Third Dist.,
1985)
134 Ill. App.3d ill, 479 N.E.2d 1213,
89 Il1.Dec.
207;
Allaert.)
Although, the Board does agree that an equivalent
manner of compliance which is less expensive could be the proper
subject
of a variance.
However, the Board has stated that it
does not believe the requested variance is equivalent.
Therefore,
the lack of financial information makes it impossible
for the Board to find an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
The compliance
plan is inadequate.
The Agency finally argues that the compliance plan
is
inadequate because it proposes to identify electric arc furnace
dust by a method held to be inadequate by the Board in PCB 86—
180.
(Ag. Br.
at 18.)
Further the Agency maintains that
Robertson—Ceco’s proposed plan fails to address the surface
investigation required by condition
3 of the Board’s order
in PCB
86—180.
(Ag. Br. at 19.)
Robertson—Ceco
argues that the surface areas of concern to
the Agency were excavated and deposited in the
RCRA
closure unit
and that the surface of the site has since 1988 been covered over
with the constant gradual accumulation of steel mill by-product
material.
(Rep.
at 8.)
Further, Robertson-Ceco maintains that
the surface investigation required in PCB 86-180 would be
“unavailing” and that the “geochemical conditions which exist at
the site would prevent groundwater contamination by heavy metals
from any former surface dust deposits”.
(Rep.
at 8.)
The Board agrees that the compliance plan is inadequate.
The Board has previously ruled that the conditions imposed on
Robertson-Ceco’s closure permit were necessary to insure
compliance with the Act and
the Board’s regulations.
This
proceedin~ghas presented no additional information which would
lead the Board to conclude that the alternative investigation
first suggested by Robertson-Ceco
in 1985
is adequate to insure
compliance with the Act and the Board’s regulations.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the information provided by the
petitioner,
the Board finds that
a variance from the Board’s
order
in PCB 86-180
is inappropriate for three major reasons.
11
First, the petitioner has sought permanent relief from the
Board’s order through
a variance proceeding,
which by the very
nature of
a variance is inappropriate relief
in this case.
Second, the petitioner failed to show that the order in PCB 86-
180 imposes an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
Third, the
compliance plan is inadequate to insure compliance with the Act
and Board regulations.
The Board must look to compliance with
the Act and Board’s regulations,
since the relief being sought is
a substitution of the proposed compliance plan for the conditions
affirmed in PCB 86-180.
Therefore, the Board denies Robertson-
Ceco request for variance from the Board’s order in PCB 86—180.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
The Board denies the variance requested by Robertson—Ceco
from the Board’s order in Ceco Corporation
v.
Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, PCB 86-180,
117 PCB 25
(December
20,
1990)
for the site located in Lemont,
Illinois.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1991,
ch.
111
1/2, par.
1041)
provides for the appeal of
final Board orders within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
(See also
35
Ill. Adm.
Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration.)
I, Dorothy
M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above opinion and order was
adopted on the
~
day of
__________________
1993,
by a vote of
-7—c’
I
Control Board
