ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
15,
1995
DECATUR AUTO AUCTION,
)
Complainant,
)
v.
)
PCB 93—192
(Enforcement
-
Air)
MACON
COUNTY
FARM BUREAU,
)
INC.,
MACON
COUNTY
FAIR
)
ASSOCIATION,
and
MACON
)
COUNTY HORSEMEN’S
)
ASSOCIATION,
)
Respondents.
CHARLES
HUGHES,
KEHART
SHAFTER
HUGHES
&
WEBBER
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF COMPLAINANT;
RICHARD HEAVNER, HEAVNER HANDEGAN & SCOTT APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
THE MACON COUNTY FARM BUREAU INC. AND THE DECATUR MACON COUNTY
FAIR ASSOCIATION;
LEROY MOYER APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ILLINOIS HORSEMEN’S
ASSOCIATION.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by N. McFawn):
On October 14,
1993, the Decatur Auto Auction (Auto Auction)
filed a formal complaint alleging that respondents the Macon
County Farm Bureau,
Inc.
(Farm Bureau), the Macon County Fair
Association
(MCFA), and the Macon County Horseman’s Association
(Horsemen’s
Association)
are
discharging
dust
in
violation
of
Section
9
of
the
Environmental
Protection
Act
(Act)
(415
ILCS
5/9),
and
Section
212.301
of
the
Board’s
regulations
(35
Ill.
Adm.
Code
Section
212.301).
By
order
dated
December
16,
1993
the
Board struck a portion
of the complaint seeking money damages,
and
accepted
the
matter
for
hearing.
Hearing
was
held
on May 26,
1994,
and
was
continued
on
the
record
to
June
6,
1994.
BACKGROUND
The
Decatur
Auto
Auction
is located on a 10—acre site at
1991
West
Mound
Road,
Decatur,
Illinois.
Approximately
75
to
80
percent
of
the
site
is
paved,
although
there
is
a
parking
lot
located
at
the
east
end
of
the
property
which
is
covered with
white
rock.
The
main office is
located in the center of the
property,
and
a
reconditioning
shop
is located at the west end.
The
property
is
bounded
by
farmland to the north and east,
Bachrach’s
corporate
headquarters
to
the
northeast,
a
machine
shop
to
the
west,
and
by
the Macon County Fairgrounds to the
south.
2
The Auto Auction provides a meeting place and reconditioning
service for buyers and sellers of automobiles, and generates most
of its revenues from buyers’ and sellers’
fees.
The Auto Auction
is open 24 hours
a day seven days a week,
although its main
business hours are from
9 a.m.
to
5 p.m. Monday through Friday,
and from 9 a.m. to noon on Saturday.
The Auto Auction employs
approximately 70 to 80 people, half of which are part-time
employees.
The Auto Auction has two sales per week:
the first takes
place at
6 p.m.
on Mondays, and the second takes place at 11 a.m.
on Fridays.
The Auto Auction sells approximately 700 vehicles
per week,
selling approximately 300 at the Monday sale and 400 at
the Friday sale.
Although the vehicles for sale can be brought
to the lot at any time,
approximately 75 to 85 percent come in
the day before the sale.
Approximately 85 percent of the
vehicles are brought to the site in clean condition and ready for
sale.
For the remainder,
the Auto Auction offers a
reconditioning service where
it washes and waxes the vehicles,
shampoos the carpets, details the engine compartment, cleans the
trunk, and dresses the tires.
Respondent MCFA is a not-for-profit organization which
organizes the Macon County Fair,
and which leases the Macon
County Fairgrounds,
including a three—quarter mile dirt racetrack
located on the Fairgrounds site.
MCFA leases the property on
which the fair is held,
including the racetrack,
from respondent
Farm Bureau for $2000 per year.
The fair has been held at this
site each year since 1955.
The MCFA sub-leases the racetrack and buildings with stalls
to the Horsemen’s Association for $4000 per year.
The Horsemen’s
Association is an organization consisting of people that own and
train horses at this location.
The Horsemen’s Association leases
approximately 50 to 60 stalls for $30.00 per month.
(Tr.
at
143.)
Under the terms of the lease agreement with the MCFA,
the
Horsemen’s Association is responsible for maintaining the
racetrack.
The racetrack is a three—quarter mile dirt racetrack which
is used for training horses for harness racing.
The horses that
train at the site pull
small carts called sulkies.
Approximately
50
—
60 horses train at the site seven days a week,
51 weeks per
year.
The track is closed to the horses for one week a year
during which time the MCFA holds an antique auto show at the
track.
The track is periodically maintained by a truck or
tractor which pulls drag equipment, which scrapes and smooths out
the surface of the racetrack.
Complainant alleges that respondents have violated Section
9(a)
of the Environmental Protection Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code
212.301 by discharging dust into the atmosphere and onto
3
complainant’s property.
Complainant alleges that the dust is
discharged from the racetrack when the horses run upon it, and
when the drag equipment is used to smooth the surface of the
track.
Complainant alleges that the discharges of fugitive dust
can be eliminated through administration of a dust suppressant
treatment program which includes two major treatments per year,
with additional maintenance as necessary,
at an incremental cost
to respondents of $2,500 per year.
Complainant seeks an order of the Board requiring
respondents to cease and desist from violations of the Act and
Board regulations, directing respondents to institute a
continuing program for the treatment of the dirt track with
acceptable dust suppressive chemicals,
and requiring respondents
to appoint an on—site coordinator responsible for overseeing
treatment and maintenance of the track.
STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
Section 9(a)
of the Act provides:
No person shall:
(a)
Cause or threaten to allow the discharge or
emission of any contaminant into the environment
in any State so as to cause or tend to cause air
pollution in Illinois,
.
.
.
or so as to violate
regulations or standards adopted by the Board
under this Act;
(415 ILCS 5/9
(1992).)
Section 3.02 of the Act defines “Air Pollution”
as:
the presence in the atmosphere of one or more
contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such
characteristics and duration as to be injurious to
human,
plant, or animal life, to health,
or to property
or to unreasonable interfere with the enjoyment of life
or property.
(415 ILCS 5/3.02
(1992).)
Two types of actions are possible based on violations of
Section
9 of the Act:
“nuisance” violations, where the complained
of emissions unreasonably interfere with the complainant’s life,
health or property,
or unreasonably interfere with the
complainant’s enjoyment of life,
and violations of the standards
set out in the Board’s air regulations.
In this action,
complainant has alleged both types
of violation.
4
NUISANCE VIOLATION
In determining whether respondents have violated Section
9(a)
of the Act so as to cause a nuisance violation, the Board
must determine whether respondents have emitted dust so as to
unreasonably interfere with the complainant’s enjoyment of life
or pursuit of any lawful business or activity.
“The Board must
balance the costs and benefits of abatement in an effort to
distinguish ‘the trifling inconvenience, petty annoyance or minor
discomfort’
from ‘a substantial interference with property.’”
(Wells Manufacturing Co.
v. Pollution Control Board 73 Ill.2d
226, 232,
383 N.E.2d 148,
150,
citing
Processing and Books,
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board
(1976),
64 Ill.2d 68,
77,
351 N.E.2d
865.)
The Illinois Supreme Court has directed the Board to
consider the factors outlined by Section 33(c)
of the Act when
determining the unreasonableness of the alleged air pollution in
a nuisance action.
(Wells Manufacturing Co.
v. Pollution Control
Board 73 Ill.2d 226,
232
—
233,
383 N.E.2d
148,
150
—
151
(1978).)
The Section 33(c)
factors are as follows:
(i)
the character and degree of injury to,
or
interference with the protection of the health,
general welfare and physical property of the
people;
(ii)
the social and economic value of the pollution
source;
(iii)
the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution
source to the area
in which it is located,
including the question of priority of location
in
the area involved;
(iv)
the technical practicability and economic
reasonableness of reducing o eliminating the
emissions
.
.
.
resulting from such pollution
source; and
(v)
any subsequent compliance.
(415 ILCS 5/33(c)
(1992).)
The Board need not find against the respondent on each of the
statutory criteria, and is not precluded from considering
additional relevant factors.
(Wells Manufacturing at 151.)
Character and Degree of Interference
Complainant asserts that the prevailing winds during drier
weather are from a southerly direction,
coming from the south,
5
southeast, or southwest,
at an average wind velocity of
5
—
12
miles per hour.
Complainant asserts that, when the winds are
from a southerly direction,
dust generated from the racetrack is
blown onto the Decatur Auto Auction.
Complainant asserts that the dust discharged by respondents
coats automobiles which have been cleaned for upcoming auctions,
infiltrates electronic equipment causing breakdowns, makes it
difficult for employees to breath, and results in the Auto
Auction making additional expenditures for materials,
labor,
and
wear and tear on its equipment.
Complainant introduced into evidence two video tapes made by
Mr. Harry Polen,
a dealer representative at the Auto Auction, and
the father of Steve Polen, the Auto Auction’s owner.
The first
video
(video #1)
is a compilation of video recordings.
There is
some dispute as to the exact time period covered by the video,
although it apparently covers a period of several years prior to
1994.
(Tr. at 56.)
Video #1 shows horses pulling sulkies
circling the track,
generating dust which can be seen blowing in
clouds, and crossing onto the Auto Auction property.
It also
shows close—up views of cars with words written in the dust
covering the cars.
The second video
(video #2) was taken on one
day in May 1994, and shows similar activities,
as well as a tank
truck watering the track.
Harry Polen testified that the
occurrences on both tapes were not unusual, and represented
accurate depictions of conditions at the site.
Steve Polen also
testified as to the accuracy of the tapes in depicting conditions
at the site.
(Tr. at 56
-
57.)
Complainant also introduced into
evidence photographs showing dust being generated by horses
pulling sulkies and a tractor pulling drag equipment,
as well as
the build-up of dust in its computer equipment.
(Exs.
4,5,
8-11.)
At hearing, complainant presented the testimony of Mr. Bob
Stortzuin,
an inspector with the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency’s
(Agency) Bureau of Air.
Mr.
Stortzum testified that he
has visited the site at least once per year since 1987,
and that
upon inspecting the racetrack, he found between a half—inch and
an inch of loose dirt on top, and that the track surface was in
need of dust suppressant treatment.
(Tr.
at 108.)
Additionally,
he testified that upon inspecting the racetrack on May 20,
1994,
he personally observed fugitive dust being generated and crossing
the property line from the fairgrounds onto the Auto Auction
property, causing air pollution in violation of Section 9(a)
of
the Act and Section 212.301 of the Board’s air regulations.
(Tr.
at 107; 120.)
Mr. Stortzum testified that the dust emissions would be
emitted onto the Auto Auction property approximately fifty
percent of the time.
He further testified that if a suppressant
program with two major treatments per year, with minor
maintenance in between, was undertaken and maintained,
it would
6
effectively deal with the problem.
Mr. Stortzum testified that
the Agency had requested respondents to establish an on—site
coordinator responsible for treating and maintaining the track,
but that no such person has been designated.
During Mr. Stortzum’s testimony, complainant introduced into
evidence a series of letters sent between the Agency and
respondents which document the history of complaints against the
site.
The letters cover a time period from May 13,
1987, to June
29,
1993, and include two pre—enforcement letters issued pursuant
to Section 31(d)
of the Act.
These letters were admitted into
evidence without objection.
(Exh.
14.)
Respondents have not contested Mr. Stortzum’s qualifications
as an expert, nor contested his testimony that the dust emitted
from the racetrack crossed onto the Auto Auction site in
violation of the Board’s regulations.
Furthermore, although
respondents have asserted that segments of video #1 are over four
years old, and that video #1
is not relevant to the current
situation (Respondents Br.
at
3), they have not contested
complainant’s assertion that video #2 accurately portrays
conditions at the site.
Rather, respondents assert that a
comparison of video #1 to video #2 shows that the dust problem
has decreased over the years.
Respondents also point out that
complainant admitted at the June 6,
1994 hearing that the problem
was less severe in 1994.
(Respondents Br. at
3.)
At hearing respondents presented several possible
alternative sources for the dust at complainant’s site.
There
was testimony that dust was generated by customers of the auto
auction when using an asphalt test strip located on the
fairgrounds property to test cars.
Respondents introduced into
evidence several photographs showing cars driving on the test
strip, generating dust.
(Respondent’s Ex.
6
—
12.)
However,
it
was uncontested that complainants have not used the test strip
since August 28,
1992.
(Tr. at 84.)
There was also testimony
that dust was generated by complainants when a sweeping machine
swept the site.
However,
it was also uncontested that the site
was swept on only one such occasion.
Furthermore,
there is a
white rock area on the east end of the Auto Auction, which
complainant admits occasionally generates dust.
However,
it is
uncontested that the white rock area has been treated and that
dust from that area does not blow onto the Auto Auction site.
Respondents further assert that it is uncontested that the
track has been treated on an annual basis since 1987,
and that
this treatment has been performed on a voluntary basis.
They
also point out that they have never been found
in violation of
any laws by the Agency.
Additionally, respondents assert that,
subsequent to the hearing in this matter, the track was treated
in June 1994,
and that the track is not now in violation of the
law.
7
We find that complainant has demonstrated that respondents
have emitted dust onto complainant’s property which interferes
with complainant’s business activities.
The evidence
demonstrates that respondents have emitted such dust over a
period of years, causing added expense for complainant’s
business.
Although several other possible sources of dust have
been alleged, none of these have been shown to cause an on—going
problem.
The evidence demonstrates that the racetrack is the
main source of dust emissions.
Furthermore, Agency inspector
Stortzum testified that the track was not properly maintained,
and that he observed conditions which he believes evidenced
violations of the Act.
While respondents have treated the track
at least once per year since 1987, clearly based upon the
testimony and pictorial evidence provided at hearing,
that
treatment program has not been sufficient to avoid fugitive dust
emissions onto complainant’s property.
The Social and Economic Value of the Pollution Source
The record establishes that the MCFA is a not-for-profit
organization which organizes the Macon County Fair, which has
been held at the fairgrounds location since
1955.
The MCFA
leases the racetrack and stalls to the Horsemen’s Association,
which in turn leases the stalls to horse owners that train the
horses at the site.
We find that the MCFA provides a public
benefit by organizing and holding the county
fair.
We also find
that the Horsemen’s Association’s use of the site provides a
benefit for members of its organization.
Complainant does not
dispute the social value of the racetrack if the track is
maintained so as to avoid nuisance conditions.
Suitability of the Pollution Source to the Area
As previously mentioned,
the fairgrounds has been the site
of the Macon County Fair since 1955.
Surrounding land uses
include farming,
residential housing,
and commercial land uses,
including the Auto Auction, Bachrach’s corporate headquarters,
and a machine shop.
The Auto Auction was not established at
its
present location until
1986.
We therefore find that the Auto
Auction was on notice of the possibility that some annoyances
from the pre—existing racetrack could affect its operations,
although the racetrack’s priority of location does not constitute
an absolute defense.
(Wells Manufacturing Co.
v.
Pollution
Control Board,
383 N.E.2d 148,
152,
73 Iii.
2d 226
(1978).)
However, complainant has not asserted that the fairgrounds
is inappropriately located.
Rather, the complaint is based on
the grounds that the racetrack is inappropriately maintained, and
that it is this inappropriate maintenance which
is causing the
violations.
Accordingly, we conclude that the racetrack,
if
properly maintained, represents an appropriate use for the area
in which it is located.
8
Technical Practicability and Economic Reasonableness of Reducing
or Eliminating Emissions
Respondents do not dispute the technical practicability of
treating the track so as to avoid dust emissions.
In fact,
as
both parties agree, the track has been treated once per year
since 1987.
The parties also agree that when the track is
properly treated it does not cause violations of the Act.
However, the parties disagree over whether
it is necessary to
treat the track one additional time each year,
and who should
bear the cost for additional treatment.
As previously mentioned,
Mr. Stortzum testified that a dust
suppressant treatment program with two major treatments per year
with minor maintenance in between, would effectively control dust
emissions from the racetrack.
Mr. Stortzum also testified that
each dust—suppressant treatment costs approximately $2,500.
Since respondent’s are currently treating the track once per
year,
the incremental cost of achieving compliance would be the
cost of one additional treatment per year.
This estimate
includes the labor cost of application;
if the respondents were
to apply the dust suppressant themselves,
the cost would be
lower.
Respondents presented evidence that the MCFA is currently
$50,000 in debt.
However,
as complainant points out,
it
is
uncontested that it is the Horsemen’s Association that is
ultimately responsible for maintaining the track.
Currently, the
Horsemen’s Association charges its members $30.00 per month.
Complainant presented evidence that the cost of treatment,
assuming that 50 stalls are rented,
breaks down to $50.00 per
horse, which would further break down to $4.16 per month or 13
cents per day per horse.
Respondents have not contested the
validity of these estimates.
Subsequent Comi~1iance
Respondents assert that they began
a treatment program in
1987,
and that they have treated the track at least once per year
since that time.
Respondents assert that they treat the track on
an as—needed basis.
Respondents assert that the dust problem has
decreased each year,
and point out that Steve Polen,
owner of the
auto auction, admitted that the dust problem had been less severe
in 1994 prior to the June 6th hearing than it had been in
previous years.
Furthermore, respondents assert that they
treated the track after the June 4,
1994 hearing, which
subsequently brought the site into compliance.
While respondents have treated the track subsequent to the
June 4,
1994 hearing, we find that they have not instituted
measures which will assure long—term compliance with the Act and
Board regulations.
Respondents have treated the track once per
9
year since
1987,
yet there is evidence that there have been
continuing problems since that time.
We therefore find that
respondent’s subsequent compliance does not obviate complainant’s
need for permanent and continuing relief.
Nuisance Violation
—
Finding
We find that respondents have emitted fugitive dust
emissions so as to cause a nuisance in violation of Section 9(a)
of the Act.
While respondents have implemented a once per year
treatment program since 1987, that program has been insufficient
to avoid dust emissions onto complainant’s property in violation
of the Act.
While the track is an appropriate use for the site
upon which
it is located, the track’s neighbors have a right to
expect that the track will be properly maintained.
As Agency
inspector Stortzum testified, respondents have not maintained the
track
in an appropriate condition.
A properly maintained track
would not have one—half to one
inch of loose dirt on top, but
would instead appear sealed.
We therefore find that
it is necessary to direct respondents
to undertake additional control measures,
so as to avoid future
violations of the Act.
We find that such a program is
technically feasible, and that it is economically reasonable for
respondents, who are causing the emissions,
to bear the economic
burden of undertaking such a program.
While respondents have
indicated that the NCFA is in debt,
it
is uncontested that the
Horsemen’s Association bears responsibility for maintaining the
track.
We further find that the cost of such treatment is not
unreasonable.
Having done so, we note the similarity to the facts and
examination of the Section 33(c)
criteria in Hargrove v.
Tammsco,
Alexander County Commissioners; Donald Jordan Trucking Co.; and
Marquette Gravel
Co., PCB 87-19
(June
16,
1988)
citing
Incinerator Inc. v.
PCB,
Id.
In Hargrove,
the Board found that
the dust from defendant’s gravel road did interfere with the
residents neighboring the gravel road.
However, upon examining
whether such interference was unreasonable, the Board concluded
that it was not.
In so finding, the Board noted that such
finding was “not to say that dust resulting from inappropriate or
improperly applied surface materials cannot result in a
violation”.
Such is case here.
The dust from defendant’s track
has interfered with complainant’s property.
That interference is
unreasonable in light of the Section 33(c)
factors because
defendants have failed to maintain the track when to do so is
economically and technically reasonable.
REGULATORY VIOLATION
Complainant has specifically alleged that respondents have
discharged dust in violation of Section 212.301 of the Board’s
10
air regulations
(35 Ill.
Athu.
Code Section 212.301), which
addresses discharges of fugitive particulate matter.
Section
212.301 provides:
No person shall cause or allow the emission of fugitive
particulate matter from any process, including any
material handling or storage activity, that is visible
by an observer looking generally toward the zenith at a
point beyond the property line of the emission source.
(35 Ill.
Adm. Code 212.301.)
As described above in reference to the nuisance violations,
the two video tapes introduced into evidence by complainant show
horses pulling sulkies circling the track, generating dust which
can be seen blowing in clouds, and crossing onto the Auto Auction
property.
They also show close—up views of cars with words
written in the dust covering the cars.
Complainants also
introduced photographs of dust collected in the office computers,
and testimony about the repeated failure of the office time clock
and the manufacturer’s refusal to replace it after the third
breakdown,
and about the need of employees to often shield their
faces or turn away from blowing dust from the track.
(Tr.
at
71.)
As described above,
Agency inspector Stortzum testified that
upon inspecting the racetrack,
he found a half-inch to an inch of
loose dirt on top, and that the track surface was in need of dust
suppressant treatment.
(Tr. at 108.)
He testified that a
properly maintained track would instead appear sealed.
(Tr. at
113.)
Additionally, he testified that upon inspecting the
racetrack on May 20,
1994,
he personally observed fugitive dust
being generated and crossing the property line from the
fairgrounds onto the Auto Auction property, causing air pollution
in violation of Section 9(a)
of the Act and Section 212.301 of
the Board’s air regulations.
(Tr. at 107;
120.)
Respondents have not contested Mr. Stortzum’s qualifications
as an expert, nor have they contested his testimony that the dust
emitted from the racetrack crossed onto the Auto Auction site in
violation of the Board’s regulations.
Furthermore, although
respondents have asserted that segments of video #1 are over four
years
old,
and that video #1
is not relevant to the current
situation (Respondents Br. at 3), they have not contested
complainant’s assertion that video #2 accurately portrays
conditions at the site.
In fact,
their witness, Don Collins,
testified upon cross—examination that the videos are accurate and
that if the wind is blowing right and the track
is dry, dust goes
on complainant’s property.
(Tr. at 209.)
Respondents do assert
that a comparison of video #1 to video #2 shows that the dust
problem has decreased over the years,
and that complainant
11
admitted the problem was less severe
in 1994.
(Respondent’s Br.
at 3.)
Respondents further assert that it is uncontested that the
track has been treated on an annual basis since
1987,
and that
this treatment has been performed on a voluntary,
as—needed
basis.
They also point out that they have never been found in
violation of any laws by the Agency.
Additionally, respondents
assert that,
subsequent to the hearing in this matter, the track
was treated in June 1994,
and that the track
is not now in
violation of the law.
We find that the uncontested evidence shows that respondents
have emitted dust onto complainant’s property in violation of 35
Ill. Adm. Code 212.301.
While respondents claim to now be in
compliance with the Act, pursuant to Section 33(a)
of the Act,
subsequent compliance does not constitute a defense or bar to
enforcement for
a violation of the Act.
(See Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency v. Barry, PCB 88-71
(May 10,
1990)
at 42—43.)
CONCLUSION
We find that respondents have violated Section 9(a)
of the
Act,
both by emitting dust so as to cause a nuisance, and by
emitting dust in violation of 35
Ill. Adm. Code 212.301.
We
further find that these emissions have unreasonably interfered
with complainant’s business and have caused complainant economic
hardship.
Section 33 of the Act authorizes the Board to issue such
order as
it deems appropriate under the circumstances.
We
therefore direct respondents to undertake a treatment program
which includes two major treatments per year, with additional
maintenance as necessary so as to avoid a violation of the Act.
Furthermore, we direct respondents to designate an on-site
coordinator responsible for overseeing proper maintenance of the
track.
Complainant has not sought the imposition of a penalty,
and we therefore do not consider penalty issues in this matter.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
12
ORDER
Respondents, the Macon County Farm Bureau,
Inc.,
the Macon
County Fair Association and the Macon County Horseman’s
Association shall undertake all measures necessary to cease and
desist from further violations of Section
9 of the Environmental
Protection Act and Section 212.301 of the Board’s regulations
(35
Ill.
Adm. Code Section 212.301).
In addition, the respondents
shall undertake the following measures to reduce dust emissions:
1.
Establish a dust suppressant treatment program with
two major treatments per year, with additional
treatment and maintenance as necessary so as to avoid
violations of the Act and Board regulations.
2.
Designate an on—site coordinator responsible for
overseeing the treatment and maintenance of the track.
The name of such individual shall be provided to the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
and
the Decatur Auto Auction, and shall
be available upon
public inquiry.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Board Members G.
Tanner Girard and J. Theodore Meyer
dissented, and Board Member Emmett Dunham II concurred.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/41
(1992)) provides for the appeal of final Board orders within
35 days of the date of service of this order.
The Rules of the
Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
(See
also 35
Ill. Adm. Code 101.246. “Motions for Reconsideration”.)
I, Dorothy M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above
p nion and order was
adopted on the
/~~-‘
day of
_________________
1995,
by a
vote of
________.
Dorothy N.
5?,1~inn, Clerk
Illinois P~3lutionControl Board
