ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June 15,
    1995
    DECATUR AUTO AUCTION,
    )
    Complainant,
    V.
    )
    PCB 93—192
    (Enforcement-Air)
    MACON COUNTY FARM BUREAU,
    INC.,
    )
    MACON COUNTY FAIR ASSOCIATION,
    )
    and MACON COUNTY HORSEMEN’S
    )
    ASSOCIATION,
    Respondents.
    DISSENTING OPINION
    (by J. Theodore Meyer and G. Tanner Girard):
    We respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and
    order which found respondents in violation of Sections 9(a)
    of
    the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
    (Act), and Section
    212.301 of the Board’s regulations.
    (35 Ii. Adm.
    Code 212.301..)
    The majority’s opinion and order directed respondents to initiate
    a continual dust suppression program, and required respondents to
    appoint an on—site coordinator for overseeing the treatment and
    maintenance of the racetrack.
    Section 9(a)
    of the Act provides:
    No person shall:
    (a)
    Cause or threaten to allow the discharge or
    emission of any contaminant into the environment
    in any State so as to cause or tend to cause air
    pollution in Illinois,.. .or so as to violate
    regulations or standards adopted by
    the Board
    under this Act.
    (415 ILCS 5/9
    (1992).)
    As the majority correctly
    stated,
    violations of Section 9(a)
    can
    be addressed in two types of actions:
    nuisance violations, and
    violations of the Board’s air regulations standards.
    First and foremost, we
    believe that respondents’ racetrack
    and stable are exempt from
    a nuisance action under the Act
    pursuant to Illinois’ Farm Nuisance Suit Act, which provides in
    pertinent part:
    No farm or any of
    its appurtenances shall be or become
    a private or public nuisance because of any changed
    conditions
    in the surrounding area occurring after the
    farm has been in operation for more than one year,
    .
    provided that the provisions of this Section
    shall not apply whenever a nuisance results from the

    2
    negligent or improper operation of any farm or its
    appurtenances.
    (740 ILCS 70/3
    (1992).)
    In this section,
    “farm”
    is defined as:
    any parcel of land used for the growing and
    harvesting of crops;
    for the feeding, breeding and
    management of livestock for dairying or for any other
    agricultural or horticultural use or combination
    thereof.
    (740 ILCS 70/2
    (emphasis added).).
    The racetrack in question houses,
    feeds and manages between
    50 and 60 horses in its stables on a yearly basis.
    Therefore,
    respondents’ racetrack falls under the definition of “farm” found
    in Illinois’ civil liabilities statutes.
    In addition, the
    racetrack was established in 1955,
    in a clearly rural area.
    The
    businesses currently adjacent to the racetrack and fairgrounds
    are “changed conditions
    .
    .
    .
    occurring after the farm has been
    in operation for more than one year”.
    (Id.)
    Finally, we do not
    find evidence in this record of negligent or improper operation
    of the racetrack.
    Respondents voluntarily apply a dust
    suppressant to the track each year.
    In addition, dust blown from
    one property to another is a common phenomenon in rural areas;
    Decatur Auto Auction cannot be heard to complain when it
    knowingly came to this condition.
    Secondly, even if the racetrack was not considered
    a farm,
    and therefore exempt from a nuisance suit,
    after considering the
    Act’s Section 33(c)
    factors, we are not persuaded that the track
    dust unreasonably interferes with complainant’s pursuit of its
    business.
    (See Wells Manufacturing Co.
    v. Pollution Control
    Board,
    73 Ill.2d 226,
    383 NE.2d 148(1978).)
    No one disputes the
    socio—econonuic value of the racetrack,
    its location suitability
    or the fact that it has priority of location.
    However, the
    majority found that the character and degree of harm suffered by
    complainant due to poor maintenance of the track
    justified
    further financial expense to reduce the emissions.
    We disagree.
    Since 1987,
    respondents have recognized that dust is
    generated from their racetrack and have voluntarily undertaken a
    dust suppressant treatment program.
    This program decreased the
    amount
    of dust blown from the track and kept the track
    in
    compliance with the Act; however,
    it did not eliminate dust
    emissions completely.
    Complainants are asking Horsemen’s
    Association, the party responsible for the track’s maintenance,
    to spend $5,000 for two treatments per year,
    or about one third
    of its annual fee income.
    In addition, the opinion and order
    directs respondents to appoint an on—site coordinator to oversee
    the treatment and maintain the track,
    which may create additional
    expense.
    These added expenses are to be undertaken with no
    guarantee that dust emissions will be reduced to complainant’s
    satisfaction.
    (See Tr.
    at 121-123.)
    What is to stop complainant

    3
    from repeatedly suing respondents, asking for three,
    four,
    or
    five treatments per year?
    Since respondents are voluntarily
    complying with the Act,
    and the added expense does not guarantee
    a solution to the dust emissions, we find that respondents did
    not create a nuisance violation.
    Finally, we consider whether or not respondents violated any
    Board regulations.
    Section 212.301 prohibits fugitive emissions
    from “any process including any material handling or storage
    activity”.
    “Process” is defined
    in the American Heritage
    Dictionary as a system of operations utilized in production.
    From its plain language, Section 212.301 only applies to
    industrial operations.
    A racetrack located on county fairgrounds
    is not an industrial operation.
    Further, the Agency testified at
    hearing that “fugitive dust is really only a problem if it’s
    causing a complaint situation because you have fugitive dust
    going on all the time.”
    (Tr. at 96.) Therefore, Section 212.301
    is inapplicable to the case at bar.
    As a final note, we emphasize that complainant knowingly
    bought property in a rural area next to a track where horses have
    been racing since 1955.
    Surely they were aware that horses and
    sulkies create dust on dirt tracks.
    If complainant was bothered
    by the dust,
    several options could have been implemented to
    alleviate the problem.
    For the reasons set forth above, we dissent.
    Y.
    Theodore Meyer
    Board Member
    G
    Tanner Girar
    Board Member
    I, Dorothy M.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board,
    hereby certify that
    e above dissenting opinion was filed
    on the
    ‘~-
    day of
    ________________,
    1995.
    71
    ~
    ~
    ~‘
    Dorothy M. $~nn,Clerk
    Illinois P~lutionControl Board

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