ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September 16, 1971
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
and JULIUS L. BOGNAR
v.
)
##
PCB 71—137, 71—139
STEELCO CHEMICAL CORP. et al.
Opinion of the Board (by Mr. Currie)
On June 9, 1971, we received from the
Attorney General, on
behalf of the Agency, a complaint alleging air pollution violations
at the respondents~ plant in Lemont, with respect to the discharge
of chlorine gas. A complaint was also filed in the Circuit Court
by the Attorney General with respect to the same matter, seeking
both temporary and permanent relief.
After extensive proceedings in the Circuit Court, including
appearances relating to the respondents~ motion to enjoin the
proceedings before this Board, the Attorney General on behalf of the
Agency filed with us a motion to dismiss the complaint before the
Board. Oral argument was heard by the full Board at its regular
meeting September 7. The respondent had no objection to the motion.
The Attorney General~s spokesman related that the Village of Lemont,
which had intervened, had no objection, and that Mr. Bognar, complainant
in a related case against the same respondents
(#
71-139) ,could not
immediately be contacted, The Attorney General asked for speedy
resolution of the motion as conducive to an early termination of
jurisdictional litigation in the Circuit Court.
The Attorney General~argued that it was his intention to
press the pending Circuit Court proceeding seeking permanent relief;
that
our
dismissal would avoid a duplication of effort in trying
the merits of the case; and that it would put an end to litigation
over preliminary questions, thus facilitating resolution of the alleged
pollution problem. We found these arguments convincing. The
Environmental Protection Act clearly gives the Agency and the Attorney
General a
choice of forums with respect to the merits of pollution
cases. Obviously the same case should not be tried in both
of them, and it
is
up to the complainants whether to litigate here
or there. When temporary injunctive relief is sought to prevent
irreparable harm while the case is being tried, as we have held
(Hernmerich v. Lloyd Fry Roofing Co.,
#
71-33, May 12, 1971), it
is necessary that such relief be obtained from the court, since the
2
-~
453
statute does not provide for the Board to give it. We do not think
that this statutory gap means the Board cannot try on the merits
cases in which preliminary court relief has been sought, but that
issue is not now before us. The parties are agreed that this case
should be tried in the Circuit Court, and we consequently dismissed
the Board case on September 7. This opinion gives the reasons for
that action, which was without prejudice, of course, to the rights
of the complainant in
#
71-139, who was not represented at the
September 7 argument.
On September 8, however, we received from Mr. Bognar a motion
to dismiss his own action without prejudice. We grant that motion
for similar reasons, in order to avoid multiple litigation in two
forums at the same time.
I, Regina E. Ryan, Clerk of the Pollution Control Board, certify
that the Board adopted the above opinion this
16
day
of September
,
1971.
2 — 454