ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    December 7,
    1995
    THOSE OPPOSED TO AREA
    )
    LANDFILLS (T.O.T.A.L.),
    )
    a Concerned Citizen’s Group,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    PCB 96-79
    )
    (Third-Party Landfill Siting
    v.
    )
    Review)
    CITY OF SALEM,
    )
    Respondent.
    CONCERNED ADJOINING OWNERS,
    )
    a Concerned Citizen’s Group,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    V.
    )
    PCB 96—82
    )
    (Third-Party Landfill Siting
    CITY OF SALEM,
    )
    Review)
    )
    (Consolidated)
    Respondent.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by J.
    Yi):
    On October 13,
    1995, Those Opposed to Area Landfills
    (TO.T.A.L) and on October 16,
    1995, the Concerned Adjoining
    Owners (Adjoining Owners) filed petitions for review of the City
    of Salem’s (City) siting approval for its landfill made on
    September 11,
    1995.
    On October 19,
    1995 the Board consolidated
    these matters and accepted them for hearing.
    This matter is
    before the Board on a “Motion for Pleadings to be made more
    Specific or in the Alternative Motion for Bill of Particulars”
    filed by the City on November 13, 1995.
    In addition, the City
    filed a motion for discovery which the Board directed to the
    assigned hearing officer for a ruling and issuance of an
    appropriate order.
    The Board therefore will not address that
    motion for discovery.
    The motion requests the Board to order the petitioners to
    make their petition for review more specific to “...specify each
    and every deficiency that they claim took place in the site
    application proceedings; to particularly specify each and every
    criterion that they claim was not satisfied; to specifically
    identify each and every objection that they have to the
    fundamental fairness of proceedings at the local level; to
    specifically set forth any and all basis for their claim that The
    City of Salem did not have jurisdiction to hear the site
    2
    application...”.
    (Motion at 3.)
    The petitions filed by
    T.OT.A.L and Adjoining Owners contain identical reasoning and
    therefore will be discussed together.
    On November 27,
    1995, T.O.T.A.L filed a response to the
    City’s motion.
    As of the date of this order no response has been
    filed by the Adjoining Owners.
    T.O.T.A.L states
    in response that
    the petition puts the City on notice that it is claiming that the
    City,
    as applicant,
    did not meet its burden of proof on the
    criteria, the hearing was fundamentally unfair and that the City,
    as decision—maker,
    had no jurisdiction to hear the site
    application because the City,
    as applicant, did not purchase part
    of the property pursuant to Illinois law.
    T.O.T.A.L concludes
    that the petition is sufficient and requests the Board to deny
    the motion.
    The Board’s procedural rules do not contain a provision
    allowing for a motion for a bill of particulars.
    The Board
    procedural rule at 35 Iii.
    Adin.
    Code 101.100 states that in the
    absence of a specific provision in the Board’s procedural rules
    the parties may argue that a particular provision of the Code of
    Civil Procedure and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules should
    apply.
    In this instance, the City is arguing that the Board
    should require the petitioners to state specifically their
    claims.
    Section 5/2-607 of the Code of Civil Procedure discusses
    the purposes of a bill of particulars.
    (735 ILCS 5/2—607
    (1994).)
    A bill of particulars
    is designed to appraise an
    opposing party of claims made in order to guide the opposing
    party in trial preparation, and ordinarily a party is limited to
    proof of matters particularized.
    (Ko1ber~v. Cities Service Oil
    Co.,
    1951,
    343 Ill.
    App.
    355,
    99 N.E.2d 152.)
    The petitions are explicit as to what issues will be raised
    by petitioners concerning fundamental fairness.
    On pages 2—3 of
    T.O.T.A..L’s petition and pages 2-3 of the Adjoining Owners’
    petition the issues are listed.
    As far as the issue of
    jurisdiction, both petitioners are challenging the City’s
    jurisdiction on the basis that the annexation of a portion of the
    property (Site
    3) to be used for the landfill was allegedly not
    done according to the statutory requirements as discussed on page
    3 of both petitions.
    The petitions are sufficiently specific
    concerning the issues of fundamental fairness and jurisdiction.
    As to the issue of the criteria of Section 39.2 of the Act
    petitioners state that “...the applicant did not produce
    sufficient evidence during the public hearing to satisfy the
    criteria as required by 415 ILCS 5/39.2
    ...“
    on page
    2 of their
    petitions.
    The petitioners are challenging the City’s decision
    concerning all the criteria of Section 39.2 of the Act.
    The
    burden of demonstrating the insufficiency of the evidence
    submitted at the hearing before the City is on the petitioners.
    When reviewing a local decision on the criteria,
    this Board must
    3
    determine whether the local decision is against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    (McLean County Disposal v. County of
    McLean, 207 Ill. App.3d 352,
    566 N.E.2d 26,
    29,
    (4th Dist.
    1987);
    E
    & E Hauling v. Pollution Control Board,
    160 Ill.App.3d 434,
    451
    N.E.2d 555,
    (2d Dist.
    (1983).)
    A decision is against the
    manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite result is clearly
    evident, plain,
    or indisputable from a review of the evidence.
    (Harris v.
    Day, 115 Ill.App.3d 762, 451 N.E.2d 262,
    265, (4th
    Dist.
    1983).)
    The Board,
    on review,
    is not to reweigh the
    evidence.
    Where there is conflicting evidence, the Board is not
    free to reverse merely because the lower tribunal credits one
    group of witnesses and does not credit the other.
    (Fairview Area
    Citizens Taskforce v. Pollution Control Board,
    198 Ill.App.3d
    541, 555 N.E.2d 1178,
    1184
    (3d Dist.); Tate v. Pollution Control
    Board,
    188 I11.App.3d 994,
    544 N.E.2d 1176,
    1195; Waste
    Management of Illinois,
    Inc.
    v. Pollution Control Board,
    187
    Ill.App.3d 79,
    543 N.E.2d 505,
    507,
    (2d Dist.
    1989).)
    No new
    evidence may be presented at hearing concerning the Board’s
    review of the criteria.
    The Board’s decision will be based
    solely on the record before the City when it made its decision.
    Therefore, no new evidence may be presented concerning the
    criteria and the petition does not need to be further clarified
    to prepare the City.
    Since the criteria in question are set
    forth in Section 39.2 of the Act and no new evidence or witnesses
    may be offered concerning the criteria the petition does not need
    to be clarified.
    However,
    in the interests of efficiency of
    briefing, petitioners are directed to state on the record before
    the close of hearing whether there are any criteria which, after
    additional review, they no longer wish to challenge in this
    appeal.
    For the reasons stated above the Board denies the City’s
    motion.
    This matter is to proceed to hearing.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Dorothy N.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that the above order was adopted on the
    j~.day of
    ~
    ~-~.~-t-ti
    ,
    1995,
    by a vote of
    ‘~‘
    ~O
    Dorothy i.j4 Gunn,
    Clerk
    Illinois(’follution Control Board

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