ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
July 22,
 1971
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
v.
 )
 ~
71—24
HYMAN-MICHAELS Co.
Opinion of the Board
 (by Mr. Currie):
The Agency charged that Hyman-Michaels had engaged in the
open burning of railroad cars on eight occasions
 in late 1970
at
 its
 salvage yards
 in Venice and in Alton.
 Two of the eight
counts were dropped before the hearing, and another at the close
of
 the
 ~evidence(R~ 3
 ,
 226).
 The company has consented to
the entry of a cease-and-desist order against future burning
(R,
 4,
 223), but we hold the evidence too meager to justify
the imposition of
 money penalties as requested by the Agency.
Complicating the Agency~scase was the fact that some time
ago the
 old Air Pollution Control Eoard had approved an Air
Contaminant Emission Reduction Program
 (Acerp)
 that allowed
the company to continue burning, at a declining rate,
 until
May 1971,
 Although we have held that such
 a program expired in
fact after one year
 (EPA v.
 Commonwealth Edison Co., ~ 70—4,
Feb.17,
 1971), we have also refused to impose money penalties
 on those who followed
 a program in good faith for more than
 a
year, since that Board itself believed
 it
 had authority to approve
a longer program
 (EPA v, M.S,
 Kaplan Co., ~ 71—50, July
 8,
1971).
 Consequently
 it
 is
 not enough to show that open burning
occurred; to justify penalties
it
must also he shown that such
burning was in violation of the terms of the Acerp.
Of the five incidents remaining for consideration after
the hearing, two appear quite trivial from the evidence.
 On
December 11 and
 15,
 EPA witnesses testified, they saw “smoldering
metal” and a “smoldering”
 railroad car bed on the company~s
premises at Alton
 (R,
 53—55)
 The company denied knowledge of
any open burning on those dates
 (R~ 154-55),
 The use of torches
to cut silvageable metal
 is common at both sites; whether it
constitutes open burning every time this practice results
 in
“smoldering metal”
 is doubtful.
 But
 even
 if there was open burning
on these two dates, there was no
 proof
 that
 it
 was
 done
 in
 violation
2
 14~
of the ~Acerp. The company was allowed
 to burn only during
“ideal”
weather conditions for smoke dissipation, hut there was no
evidence as
 to weather on December
11,
 and December
 15
was
clear with
 a wind blowing away from the nearest homes
 (P.
 5~),
The Agency did not suggest that any other condition was broken,
except that
 a report required by the Pcerp had not been
 filed
(P.
 215,
 225); we do not think the failure
 to file
 the renort
makes every burning incident cause
 for
 money
penalties, es~eciallv
since
 the complaint did not allege the failure to
 file,
The company conceded ‘that
 on Sentembor
 9
 at Venice anr~en
December
 1
 at Aiton
 a railtoad c~raccidentally
 caunht
 fire
in the cutting process
 (P.
 11,
 180),
 There
 is
 a duty
to r~re~~ent
and to extinguish
fires
 that
 is
not always satis~iod
by
proof
that
 the
 fire
 was
 not
 deliberately
 set
 (EPA
 v.
 Cooling,
 ~
 7~—7,
Dec.
 9,
 1970).
 But
 in
 the
 December
 incident
 there
 was
 no
 nroo~
that
 the
 burning
 occurred
 in
 violation
 of
 the
 Acerp;
 we
 know
nothing
 of
 the
 weather
 save
 that
 the
 wind
 was
 blowing
 toward
East
 Alton
 to
 the
 northeast
 (P.
 ~
 en
 Sentember
 ‘~
 there
 was
a
 south
 wind
 of
 only
 4
 m.p.h.
 blowing
 toward
 a
 nearby
 ro~idential
area,
 so
 conditions
 were
 not
 “ideal”
 (P.
 16—19);
 there
 was
 a
suggestion,
 though
 not
 sufficient proof,
 that this
fire
 was
 the
cause
 of
 a
 spoiled
 wash
 (P.
 71),
 We
 find
 a
 violation
 on
 ~enten’her
9,
 hut,
 since
 it
 was
 accidental
 and
 not
 repeated,
 we
 think
 no
 penalty
 is
 called
 for
 under
 these
 narro~~icircumstances.
The
 final
 allegation
 is
 the
 most
 serious.
 Ar,
 EPA
 witness
testified
 that
 on
September
 16
he
 had
 observed
 the
 hurnina
 o~
six
 boxcars
 at
 the
 Venice
 site
 when
 there
 was
 a
 light
 north
 wind
and
 an
 overcast
 sky
 (P.
 32—34).
 Overcast
 conditions and low
winds
 are
 far
 from
 “ideal”;
 the
 Acero
 did
 not
 allow
 such
 burning.
But
 the
 question
 is
 whether
 Hyman~”ic1iaeis
 actually
 burned
 that
day.
 The
 company
 has
 no
 record
 of
 this
 incident
 (P.
 l~1),
 a~
it
 has
 of
 days
 of
 apparently
 lawful
 hurnincx
 (P.
 IOR,
 7~1)
.
would
 not
 be conclusive alone.
 Put
 the
 company
 points
(~t
 tha~I
its
 property
 abuts
 that
 of
 another
 company
that
 ~as
 eneacino
in
 open
 burning
 during
 the
 period
 in
 question
 (P,
 ~i4,
 l~2),
 suq~ests
the
 witness
 may
 have
 seen
 burning
 by
 that
 comnany
 rather
 than
Flyman—Michaels
 (P.
 194),
 The
 witness marked
 a~i~ on
 the
 ~nap
to
 show
 the
 burning
 site,
 at
 a
 point,
 the
 company
 ac~nowledoed
as
 its
 property
 (P.
 200),
 Put
 we
 think
 there
 is
 sutantia.i
doubt,
 given
 his
 distant
 vantage
 point,
 whether
 the
 !-~.trnino
cars
 he
 saw
 were
 actually
 at
 the
 point
 describe~or
 a
 ~ew
to one side on
 someone
 else’s
 property.
 Civ~n
 this
 doubt
 and
the company’s general record of complying with
 the conditions
of
 its
 Acerp,
 we
 think
 there
 is
 to~
 little
 proof
 to
 justi~
a
 money
 penalty
 in
 this
 case.
Finally,
 there
 was
 an
 effort,
 by
 E~A
 to s~o~
violat’ioac
 or
dates
 not
 alleged
 in
 the complaint
 (P. 2~)
 T~js doe
 process
does
 not allow;
 a respondent- is
 entitled
 to
 notice
 o~ the
 charo~
it must meet.
2—
142
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and-
conclusions of
 law,
ORDER
Hyman—Michaels Co.
 shall cease and desist from the open burn-
ing of railroad cars or related equipment at its Alton and
Venice premises.
I, Regina E, Ryan, Clerk of the PollutiOn Control Board, certify
the Board adopted the above Opinion this
 22
 day of
July
 ,
 l~7l.
2—
143