ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
February
1,
1996
IBP,NC.,
)
Petitioner,
)
)
PCB93-179
v.
)
(Permit Appeal
-
NPDES)
)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTION AGENCY,
)
)
Respondent.
)
DISSENTiNG OPINION (by C.A.
Manning and M. McFawn):
We respectfully
dissent.
We do not believe that petitioners havejustified the use ofthe
1,808
mg/I value as the permit level for their sulfate discharge.
The Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency’s (Agency)
permitting decision is supported by its technical
analysis ofthe data
submitted
in IBP’s permit application,
and that decision should not be disturbed.
The majority
opinion discounts technical
analysis in favor ofcommon sense inference, and
reaches a conclusion
which is not technically supportable.
Furthermore, IBP has not demonstrated that the permit,
issued without the contested condition,
would not cause a violation ofthe Environmental
Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/1
et seq.)
(Act) or applicable Board
regulations.
We believe that this is a very straightforward case, which turns on the validity of certain
monitoring data points
submitted by IIBP and determined by the Agency to be “outliers.”
Neither the majority opinion nor IBP provides any technical support for overturning the Agency’s
conclusion.
In making
its permitting decisions, the Agency applied its standard
methodology in
accordance with its applicable guidance document to
determine the appropriate sulfate discharge
level for IBP’s permit.
In determining which data to use when applying this methodology,
the
Agency applied Nalimov’s test (an
accepted methodology for examining the validity ofvalues
in a
data set) to the data set
submitted by IBP.
This analysis demonstrated that there were three
definite outliers2
in the data set,
including the
1,808
mg/I value upon which the majority relies in
establishing the permit level.
While an Agency guidance document does not have the force and effect of a rule, IBP has
not challenged the Agency’s methodology for calculating its maximum
daily sulfate effluent level.
Nor has IBP challenged the validity ofNalimov’s test.
IIBP has not even challenged the assertion
The term outlier is
a mathematical term that
is defined as an observation that
is unusually large or small relative
to the other values
in a data set.
2
Definite outlier status indicates that
there is a
very high degree ofcertainty that there is a gross error associated
with the value.
2
that the
1,808 mg/l data point is valid,
sincethere were no
operational upsets at its facility, and
since its analytical laboratory has standard operating procedures which were followed.
They have
provided no explanation as to why the sulfate level was approximately four times higher than the
levels measured immediately preceding
and following the 1,808 mg/I value.3
IBP’s assertions do
not constitute sufficient grounds for overturning the Agency’s decision, and the truth ofthese
assertions does not affect the validity ofthe Agency’s determination that these points are outliers.
The fact that the disputed data points are definite outliers for the data set submitted by
IBP means that these points are not bona fide values,
and should not be considered when
establishing a sulfate permit limit.
Ifwe assume that the data set submitted by IBP is sufficient for
establishing a permit
limit, as the Agency was required to do, we cannot use these data points, but
must instead rely on other data points which havebeen determined to be valid.
Alternatively, if
the data points properly characterize IBP’s effluent,
as IBP would have us believe, then the data
set itself must be insufficient, since the disputed data points are uncharacteristic ofthe data set.
Faced with this situation,
it was appropriate for the Agency to set the permit limit at
1,529
mg/I;
even the 1,390
mg/I
value underlying that limit was characterized by Nalimov’s test as a probable
outlier.
By relying on an invalid data point, the Board has allowed IBP to avoid compliance with
the Board’s regulations.
As the majority properly points out, 35 Ill.
Adm.
Code Section
302.102(a) provides an exception to
the prohibition in
35
Ill. Adm.
Code Section
304.105
against
dischargers causing or contributing to a violation ofany water quality standard.
The exception
in
Section 302.102(a) allows certain dischargers, who are already providing the best degree of
treatment, to use small portions ofreceiving waters to effect mixing with their effluent,
subject to
certain limitations set forth in Section 302.102(b).
Section 301.1 02(b)(12) requires that the area
ofallowed mixing be as small as practicable.
As the majority points out, the limitations in Section
302.102(b) are intended to insure that “the volume ofwaters used for allowed mixing are
as
small as is practical,
such as to limit impact on aquatic life, human health,
and recreation.”
(See
majority opinion at 7,
quoting
In The Matter ofAmendments to Title 35,
Subtitle C (Toxic
Control) R88-2 1, Docket A, January 25,
1990,
107
PCB 281.)
However, by relying on an invalid
data point to set the effluent level in IBP’s permit at an insupportably high level, the majority will
allow the area ofallowed mixing to exceed the size that would be the smallest practicable.
This
will permit IBP to cause an exceedence ofthe water quality
standard for sulfate in an area larger
than that supported by the valid data submitted by IBP,
in violation ofthe prohibition
in Section
302. 102(b)(12).
Additionally, by determining that the absolute highest effluent limit for sulfate is
1,808
mg/I, the majority has also
actually increased IBP’s exposure to potential
enforcement for effluent
limit violations.
It may very well be that 1BP’s next recorded “high” value will exceed
1,808 mg/I.
IBP cannot now claim as a defense that values in this range are outliers.
Furthermore, we believe that the majority’s decision reverses the burden ofproof in this
permit appeal and
conflicts with the accepted division ofenvironmental regulatory functions in
~The sulfate levels immediately preceding and following the
1,808
mg/i value were
569
mg/I and
538
mg/i,
respectively.
(Agency Brief
at
15.)
3
Illinois.
The burden is on a petitioner challenging the Agency’s permitting decision to
demonstrate that the permit, if issued without the contested
condition, would not violate the Act
or Board
regulations.
While the Agency has the opportunity to contest evidence offered by a
petitioner, it is not required to meet a burden ofproofin supporting its
permitting decision; the
Agency can rely on the permitting record.
In this case,
IBP has failed to sustain its burden ofproof
Again, we point out that it is
not IBP who has challenged the Agency’s methodology, the validity ofNalimov’s test, or the
application ofthat test.
Rather, it is the majority which has implicitly raised these challenges, and
then ruled in its own favor on each.
Having done so, the majority has disregarded a critical
element ofthe Agency’s permitting methodology, ignored the Agency’s technical support
for its
position, and shifted the burden ofproofto
the Agency.
In sum, the petitioner has provided no
valid grounds for challenging the Agency’s
technical analysis in this matter, other than its
unsupported assertions that the “definite outlier”
data point (1,808 mg/I) is valid.
The majority,
by second-guessing the Agency’s methodology,
has attempted to usurp the Agency’s permitting function and replace it with a “common sense,”
ad hoc
decision-making process unsupported by technical analysis.
4,
~
~
~
Claire A. Manning,
Chairman
Marili McFawn, Boar~i
Member
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn, Clerk ofthe Illinois~PollutionControl Board, hereby certify that the
above dissenting opinion was submitted on the
‘~‘~
day of___________
1996.
j~
/
Dorothy M.
~unn,
Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board