STATE OP ILLINOIS

POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

League of Women Voters

)

v.

)

P0—7

North Shore Sanitary District

October

8,

1970

OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Opinion of the Board

(by Mr. Currie):

The League of Women Voters has filed

a complaint charging the

North Shore Sanitary District with polluting Lake Michigan.

The

District moves to dismiss the complaint,

and we deny the motion.

Under section 31

(b)

of the Environmental Protection Act uany

person” may file

a complaint alleging a violation of the Act or

of the regulations,

and the Board is required to hold

a hearing

unless it determines

that such complaint

is

“duplicitous or fri-

volous.”

The District argues that the Board lacks jurisdiction

of the complaint;

that the League lacks standing to sue;

that the

i~eague has not been authorized by its members to sue; and that the

complaint

is duplicitous.

The first objection, that of lack of jurisdiction,

appears to be

based upon

the other three objections,

as no independent reasons

are suggested for this position and as none are apparent to us.

The second and third objections

are not worthy of serious con-

sideration.

The League is

a corporation,

and

its Board of Direc-

tors specifically authorized the filing of this complaint under

clear bylaws giving if the power to do

so.

A corporation,

like

any other legal entity,

is

a

“person’ under section 3(i)

of the

Act.

We reject the half—hearted attempt

to inject the defense

of

ultra vires;

that archaic principle

is not written

into the Environ-

mental Protection Act.

The words

and the purpose of the statute are

clear:

Anybody may file

a complaint.

The Attorney General joins the District in arguing that the com-

plaint is “duplicitous” because the Attorney General has filed

a

suit against the District in the Circuit Court of Lake County.

This position,

if accepted, would turn established principles of

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administrative

law squarely on their heads and subvert the

purpose of the Environmental Protection Act.

The reports are

replete with decisions invoking the familiar doctrines

of

primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, instructing

litigants

to seek relief from administrative tribunals before

proceeding in court.

The present statute plainly attempted

to centralize initial decision—making in pollution cases in

a single specialized

Board, specifically

combining authority

over air and water pollution,

solid waste disposal, and other

environmental problems in

a single tribunal in recognition of

the advantages of experience and continuity

in administering

the

law in

a field often requiring considerable

technical know-

ledge.

This policy of centralization is especially evident

in the case of private complaints,

for

the private litigant

is actually forbidden by statute to go to court until he has

sought and been denied relief by the Board

(section 45

(b)).

The

fact that the provision for dismissal of rrduplicitous~

cases does

not apply to complaints filed by the Environmental

Protection Agency is further proof that provision was not meant

to impair the primary jurisdiction of the Board.

The reason for

the ban on

~lduplicitous~!complaints was

the

fear that allowing private complaints might flood

the Doard

with

too many cases raising

the same issue and unduly harass

a respondent.

The fear was not of one complaint before

the

Board but of many.

The very purpose of permitting private

complaints was to allow

an alleged polluter

to he brought be-

fore

the Board.

In this case there is no other pending complaint against this

respondent before the Board.

Moreover,

the Attorney Peneral’s

court

suit does not allege

a violation of the same statute or

regulations;

it is based upon his independent statutory authority

to abate water pollution,

and it was institutec before the Act

under which the presont complaint was filed

even was adopted.

It

is no answer that in

a

sense both complaints

seek the same

relief,

namely,

an order forbidding water pollution by the Dis-

trict.

The

State has several

laws against pollution

,

and

a

complaint alleging violation of one of

ththn does not preclude

a complaint by another party alleging violation

of another law.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

Mr. Lawton

took no part

in

the

consideration

or decision of this motion.

//I

Con,~Ürf

~

~

______

I

Dissent

~/~1~b/

~L&,;~

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I,

Recrina

E.

Ryan,

Clerk of the Pollution Control Board,

hereby certify that

the Board adonted the above Oninion this

8th. day of October,

1970.

3~ecrmna P.

RVan

Clerk of the Board

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