ILLINOIS
    POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    March 7,
    1996
    KEAN
    om
    COMPANY,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    )
    )
    PCB 96-88
    v.
    )
    (UST Fund
    -
    90 Day Extension)
    )
    ILTINOTS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    )
    ORDER OF THE BOARD (by J.
    Yi):
    This matter is before the Board pursuant to
    a motion for reconsideration filed by
    Kean Oil Company
    (Kean) on January
    19,
    1996 requesting the Board to reconsider our
    order of December 20,
    1995,
    which dismissed this matter and closed the docket.
    The
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency)
    filed a response to the motion for
    reconsideration on February 15,
    1996 requesting the Board to deny Kean’s motion
    for
    reconsideration.
    On October 23,
    1995,
    the Agency and Kean filed a notice of extension of the
    35-day appeal period pursuant to Section 40(c) ofthe Act,
    relating to a September Ii,
    1995,
    Agency final reimbursement decision.
    The Agency requested the extension “to
    December 10,
    1995, or any other date not more than a total of90 days from the thte of
    the Agency’s final determination”.
    As the Board explained in our November 2,
    1995
    order, P.A.
    88-690 (SB1724) effective January 24,
    1995,
    amends Section
    40(c), which
    governs the underground storage tank appeal process, to provide:
    the 35-day period for petitioning for a hearing may be extended for a
    period of time not to exceed 90 days by written notice provided to
    the
    Board from the applicant and the Agency within the initial appeal period.
    The Board granted the extension of time and reserved this docket and stated “~in
    the
    event that Kean
    fails to
    file an appeal on or before December
    11,
    1995
    (the 90th day
    after September
    10,
    1995),
    the Board will dismiss the docket as unnecessary”.
    On
    December 20,
    1995
    the Board having received
    no appeal dismissed the docket.
    Kean in its
    motion for reconsideration acknowledged that it received the Board’s
    order of November 2,
    1995
    which granted the extension of time but failed
    to read such
    2
    order due to employee illness.
    Kean argues that it misunderstood that the length of the
    extension pursuant to
    Section 40(c) of the Act was for only a total of 90 days.
    Kean
    states that it was operating with the understanding that the extension was for 35 days
    plus 90 days which would have expired on January
    14,
    1996.
    Additionally Kean
    argues that the Agency requested a waiver of the statutory decision deadline in this
    matter which added to the confusion as to
    the length ofthe extension.
    Kean requests
    the Board to vacate the December 20,
    1995 order.
    The Agency in its response,
    citing to Citizens Against Regional Landfill v.
    County Board of Whiteside County,
    (March
    11,
    1993), PCB 93-156, argues that Kean
    has not raised newly discovered evidence,
    changes
    in
    law or errors in
    the application of
    law which would allow the Board to reconsider or vacate the order of December 20,
    1995.
    Additionally, the Agency argues that the Board is a creature of statute and must
    find its
    authority within the statute by which it was created for any claimed authority.
    The Agency argues that the Board has no
    statutory authority to extend the appeal period
    beyond any extension given pursuant to
    Section 40(c) of the Act.
    Therefore the
    Agency concludes that the Board cannot grantthe request of Kean as stated in the
    motion for reconsideration because it would be extending the appeal period for Kean
    beyond
    the statutorily-constructed appeal period which the Board has no authority to
    do.
    In ruling
    on a motion
    for reconsideration the Board is
    to consider, but is not
    limited to,
    error in the decision and facts in the record which may have been
    overlooked.
    (35 Ill.
    Adm.
    Code 101.246(d).)
    In Citizens Against Regional, Landfill v~
    County ofBoard of Whiteside. (March
    11,
    1993), PCB 93-156, we stated that “~the
    intended purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to bring to the court’s attention
    newly discovered evjdence which was not available at the time of hearing, changes in
    the law
    or errors in the court’s previous application of the existing law.
    (Korogluyaq,
    v.
    Chicago Title & Trust Co.,(lst Dist.
    1992), 213 ffl.App.3d 622,
    572 N.E.2d 1154,
    1158.)”
    We find that Kean presents the Board with no new evidence,
    change in the law,
    or any other reason to conclude that the Board’s December 20,
    1995 decision was in
    error.
    Therefore we deny Kean’s motion for reconsideration.
    IT IS
    SO ORDERED.
    Section
    41
    of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
    5/41)
    provides for
    the appeal of final Board
    orders within 35 days of the dateof service of this order.
    (See also 35
    Ill. Adm.
    Code 101.246,
    Motion for Reconsideration.)
    3
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
    hereby
    certify that the above order was adopted on the~~~day
    of
    lIT?
    Weli
    ,
    1996, by a
    vote of
    1-0,
    Dorothy M.fiuinn,
    Clerk
    Illinois Pollbtion Control Board

    Back to top