ILLINOIS
    POLLUTION
    CONTROL
    BOARD
    December 20, 1995
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE
    )
    OF ILLINOIS,
    Complainant,
    v.
    )
    PCB 95-47
    )
    (Enforcement
    -
    Land)
    WO.W. TRUCK LINES,
    INC.,
    )
    Respondent.
    INTERIM OPINION AND ORDER OF THE
    BOARD
    (by H. NcFawn):
    This matter is before the Board on a November 3,
    1995 motion
    for summary judgment, with supporting affidavit,
    filed by
    complainant People of the State of Illinois (People) against
    W.0.W. Truck Lines,
    Inc.
    (W.O.W.).
    The People seek summary
    judgment on a complaint filed against W.O.W.
    on February 7,
    1995.
    W.0.W. has not filed a response to the motion for summary
    I
    udcjment.
    ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
    The complaint in this matter alleges that W.O.W. violated
    Section 21(g)
    of the Environmental Protection Act (Act)
    and 35
    Ill.
    Adm. Code 809.201 by accepting and transporting hazardous
    waste without a permit.
    Section 21(g)
    of the Act provides in
    relevant part:
    No person shall:
    g.
    conduct any hazardous waste transportation
    operation:
    1.
    Without a permit issued by the Agency or in
    violation of any conditions imposed by such
    permit.
    2.
    In violation of any regulations or standards
    adopted by the Board under this Act.
    (Section 21(g)
    of the
    Act.)
    35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 809.201 provides in relevant part:
    No person shall haul or otherwise transport any special
    waste generated within Illinois
    .
    .
    .
    without a
    current, valid waste hauling permit issued by the
    Agency in accordance with the requirements of this
    Subpart.

    2
    (35 Iii. Adm. Code 809.201.)
    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    In support of the motion for summary judgment, the People
    assert that W.o.W. has tailed to respond to
    tile complaint, which
    was filed with the Board on February 7, 1995.
    Furthermore, the
    People assert that,
    on October
    2,
    1995, the People filed a
    request to admit facts in accordance with the requirements of 35
    Ill.
    Adm. Code 103.162(a).
    W.O.W. has also failed to respond to
    this discovery motion.
    The People assert that, pursuant to 35
    Ill.
    Adm. Code 103.162 (c), the facts in the request are deemed
    admitted due to W.0.W.
    ‘S
    failure to respond to the request to
    admit.
    The People assert that the following facts are deemed
    admitted due to W. 0. W. ‘s failure to respond to the request to
    admit:
    W.0.W.
    is an Oklahoma corporation not registered to do
    business in the State of Illinois.
    The Illinois Environmental
    Protection Agency (Agency)
    issued W.O.W. Special Waste Hauling
    Permit No.
    2302 on September 11,
    1990.
    That permit expired on
    September 30,
    1991,
    and W.O.W. did not apply to renew the permit.
    Subsequently, W.O.W. transported D018 hazardous wastes, a special
    w~tste,
    Croin
    the Village of Sauget wastewater Treatment Plant to a
    U.S.
    Pollution Control Company facility in Waynoka, Oklahoma on
    five occasions as follows:
    1)
    on September 24,
    1992,
    24 cubic
    y~rd~
    2)
    on March 31,
    1993,
    two shipments,
    each cori~istingof
    20-26 cubic yards;
    3)
    on April
    6,
    1993, twenty-seven cubic yards;
    4) on April 19,
    1993, two shipments,
    each consisting of 24 cubic
    yards;
    5)
    on April
    21,
    1993,
    two shipments,
    each consisting of
    24
    cubic yards;
    6) on April
    23,
    1993, two shipments,
    each consisting
    of 24 cubic yards.
    Based
    on
    the admission at these allegations due to W.O.W.’s
    failure to respond to the request to admit, and as attested to in
    the affidavit supporting the motion to for summary judgment, the
    People assert that they are entitled to summary judgment.
    Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine
    issues of material fact to be considered by the trier of fact and
    the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    (Waste
    Manacrenient of Illinois,
    Inc.
    V.
    IEPA (July 21,
    1994)
    PCB 94-153;
    ESG Watts
    v.
    IEPA (August 13,
    1992), PCB 92-54; Sherex Chemical
    v. IEPA
    (July 30,
    1992), PCB 91-202; Williams Adhesives1
    Inc.
    v.
    IEPA (August 22, 1991), PCB 91—112.)
    35 Iii. Adm.
    Code 103.162(c)
    provides
    in relevant part:
    Admission in the Absence of Denial.
    Each of the
    matters of fact
    .
    .
    .
    is admitted unless, within 20

    3
    days after service thereof, the party to whom the
    request is directed serves upon the party requesting
    the admission either a sworn statement denying
    specifically the matters of which admission is
    requested or setting forth in detail the reason why he
    cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or
    written objections on the ground that some or all of
    the requested admissions are privileged or irrelevant
    or that the request
    is otherwise improper in whole or
    in part.
    w.o.W
    has not filed a response or objection to the People’s
    October
    2,
    1995 request to admit, or filed any other responsive
    pleading in this matter.
    We therefore find that the facts set
    forth in the request to admit are deemed admitted.
    Furthermore,
    we find that,
    based upon these admissions, no genuine issue of
    material fact remains in this matter, and that summary judgment
    is therefore appropriate.
    We find that the uncontested facts are sufficient to
    demonstrate
    that
    W.0.W has violated Section 21(g) Act and 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 009.201 by accepting and transporting hazardous waste
    without a permit.
    These facts demonstrate that W.O.W. has
    violated these provisions by transporting ten shipments of
    hazardous waste on six different dates without a valid permit
    from
    the
    Agency.
    REMEDY
    Having found that W.o.W. violated the Act and Board
    regulations, we must determine what constitutes a proper remedy.
    This determination is governed by Section 33(b)
    of the Act.
    Under Section 33(b)
    the Board has authority to issue final
    orders, including orders directing a party to cease and desist
    from violations, and orders imposing civil penalties in
    accordance with section 42.
    Under section 33 (c), when issuing
    its orders and determinations, the Board is to consider:
    all the facts and circumstances bearing upon
    the reasonableness of the emissions,
    discharges, or deposits involved, including
    but not limited to the following:
    1.
    the character and degree of injury to, or
    interference with the protection of the health,
    general welfare and physical property of the
    people;
    2.
    the social and
    economic value of the pollution
    source;

    3.
    the
    suitability
    or
    unsuitability
    of
    the
    pollution
    source
    to
    the
    are
    in which
    it
    is
    located
    .
    .
    4.
    the
    technical
    practicability
    and
    economic
    reasonableness
    of
    reducing
    or eliminating the
    emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from
    such pollution source; and
    5.
    any subsequent compliance.
    (415 ILCS 5/33(c).)
    In the complaint, the People seek an order finding W.O.W.
    in
    violation of the Act and Board regulations, directing W.o.W.
    to
    cease and desist from further violations, assessing a civil
    penalty of up to $50,000 per violation and $10,000 for each day
    the violations continued pursuant to Section 42 of the Act, and,
    pursuant to Section 42(f)
    of the Act, an award of attorneys fees
    and costs.
    Additionally,
    in the motion for summary judgment the
    People seek the imposition of a civil penalty of
    $10,000, and,
    pursuant to Section 42(f)
    of the Act, an award of attorneys fees
    and costs.
    Under the circumstances of this case, where W.0.W. has not
    responded to any of the allegations made against it, we find that
    an order imposing a penalty, and directing W.O.W. to cease and
    desist from further violations of the Act,
    is an appropriate
    remedy.
    PENALTY
    Section 42 of the Act gives the Board authority to impose
    civil penalties upon those found in violation of the Act or Board
    regulations,
    or permits or Board orders issued pursuant thereto.
    Section 42(a)
    of the Act provides:
    Except as provided in this Section, any person that
    violates any provision of this Act or any regulation
    adopted by
    the Board, or any permit or term or
    condition thereof,
    .
    .
    .
    shall be liable to a civil
    penalty
    of
    not
    to
    exceed
    $50,000
    for
    the
    violation
    and
    an
    additional
    civil
    penalty
    of
    not
    to
    exceed
    $10,000
    for each day during which the violation
    continues.
    .
    .
    Additionally, Section 42(b) (3) provides:
    Any person that violates Section 21(f),
    (21(g),
    21(h)
    or 21(i)
    of this Act,
    or any RCRA permit or term or
    condition thereof,
    or any filing requirement,
    regulation or order relating to the State RCRA program,

    3
    shall
    be
    liable
    to
    a
    civil
    penalty
    of
    not
    to
    exceed
    $25,000
    per
    day
    of
    violation.
    In
    determining
    the
    appropriate
    penalty
    to
    be
    imposed
    for
    a
    violation,
    Section
    42(h)
    of
    the
    Act
    authorizes
    the
    Board
    to
    consider
    factors
    in
    aggravation
    or
    mitigation
    thereof,
    including
    but
    not
    limited
    to:
    1.
    the
    duration
    and
    gravity
    of
    the
    violation;
    2.
    the
    presence
    or
    absence
    of
    due
    diligence
    on
    the
    part
    of
    the
    violator
    in
    attempting to comply with
    the requirements of this Act and regulations
    thereunder
    .
    .
    3.
    any
    economic
    benefits
    accrued
    by
    the
    violator
    because
    of
    delay
    in
    compliance
    with
    requirements;
    4.
    the amount of monetary penalty which will
    serve to
    deter
    further violations
    by the violator and to
    otherwise aid in enhancing voluntary compliance
    with this Act by the violator and other persons
    similarly subject to the Act; and
    5.
    the number,
    proximity in time, and gravity of
    previously adjudicated violations of this Act by
    the violator.
    Section 42(f)
    of the Act also authorizes the Board to award
    costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the State’s Attorney or
    Attorney General in a case where he has prevailed against a
    person who has committed a wilful, knowinq or repeated violation
    of the Act.
    Any funds collected under this provision in which
    the Attorney General has prevailed must be deposited in the
    Hazardous Waste Fund created pursuant to Section 22.2 of the Act.
    The uncontested facts demonstrate that W.0.W. made a total
    of ten shipments of hazardous waste on seven different dates in
    violation of Section
    21(g)
    of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code
    809.201.
    In their motion for summary judgment, the People
    request a penalty of $10,000.
    W.O.W. has not responded to the
    People’s assertions concerning the appropriate determination of a
    penalty amount.
    We note that W.O.W. failed to respond at all in
    this action to explain its actions or present any defense.
    Under these circumstances, where the People have
    demonstrated that W.O.W. has committed repeated violations of the
    Act, and where W.0.W. has failed to respond to the allegations
    against
    it,
    the Board
    finds that the
    $10,000 penalty
    requested
    by
    the People is warranted.
    Additionally, we find that, pursuant to
    Section 42(f)
    of the Act, these repeated violations warrant the
    award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the People.

    b
    Based
    upon
    the
    preceding
    findings
    of
    fact
    and
    conclusions
    of
    law,
    the
    attached
    order
    finds
    W.O.W.
    in
    violation
    of
    Section
    21(g)
    of
    the
    Act
    and
    35
    Ill.
    Adm.
    Code
    809.201,
    and
    grants
    summary judgment for the People.
    It further directs the People
    to
    submit
    an
    affidavit
    attesting
    to
    the
    fees
    and
    costs
    expended
    on
    this
    action,
    and
    provides
    W.O.W.
    an
    opportunity
    to
    respond
    thereto.
    Upon
    receipt
    of
    the
    requested
    information
    and
    response,
    or expiration of the time allowed therefor, the Board will issue
    an order aesoceing the ten thoucand dollar ($10,000) penalty,
    making the appropriate award of costs, and ordering W.O.W.
    to
    cease and desist from further violations
    of the Act.
    This interim opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of
    fact and conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    1)
    The Board hereby grants summary judgment in favor of the
    People of the State of Illinois
    (People)
    ond against
    respondent WO.W. Truck Lines,
    Inc.
    (W.OW.).
    2)
    The People are hereby directed to file a statement of
    hearing costs and attorneys fees,
    supported by affidavit,
    with the Board and with service upon respondent, on or
    before January 4,
    1996.
    3)
    W.O.WS
    is hereby given leave to file a response to the
    filings ordered in paragraph 2 on or before January
    18,
    1996.
    I, Dorothy H. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify~that the above ~,nterimopinion and order
    was adopted on the ~2j0z~
    day of
    ~-C~t&.~-~
    ,
    1995, by a
    vote of
    7-~
    ~
    Dorothy H. 4unn,
    Clerk
    Illinois ~~1lution Control Board

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