ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September
21,
1995
PEOPLE OF THE STATE
)
OF ILLINOIS,
Complainant,
v.
)
PCB 94—202
)
(Enforcement
-
Land)
SUMMIT ENVIRONMENTAL
)
SERVICES,
INC.,
)
Respondent.
JAMES
L. MORGAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, APPEARED ON BEHALF
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS;
DAVID R. WEINSTEIN AND HOWARD
S. LEVINE, WEINSTEIN
& EISEN, P.C.,
APPEARED ON BEHALF OF DUKE
C.
SALISBURY,
CHAPTER
11 TRUSTEE AND
PROPOSED CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE FOR SUMMIT ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES,
INC.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by N. NcFawn):
This matter
is before the Board on
a July
27,
1994 complaint
filed by the People of the State of Illinois
(People),
against
respondent Summit Environmental
Services,
Inc.
(Summit),
a
foreign corporation not registered to do business
in Illinois,
with offices at 3033 West Mission Road, Alhambra,
California.
The complaint alleges that Summit improperly transported
hazardous waste by railcar in violation of Sections
21(e),
21(g) (2)
of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act),
and Board
regulations at
35
Ill. Adm.
Code 722.120(b),
722.120(d),
722.130, 722.131,
722.132(a),
722.132(b),
and 722.133.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September
9,
1994,
the Board received
a Notice
of
Automatic Stay,
indicating that on February
11,
1994,
respondent
had filed
a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of
Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code,
docketed as case
no. LA 94-16300-CA.
A hearing was held
in this matter on
December
19,
1994,
at which respondent did not appear or
participate.
The People filed their post—hearing brief on
January 9,
1995.
Summit has not filed any response
in this
action.
However, the bankruptcy trustee filed a response on
January 23,
1995, which did not respond to the allegations of
violation, but merely emphasized Summit’s bankruptcy
status.
The
People submitted
a waiver of their reply brief on February
14,
1995.
2
BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
As an initial matter, we will deal with Summit’s bankruptcy
status.
The bankruptcy trustee for Summit asserts that
it takes
no position on any of
the acts alleged
in
the complaint,
since
they occurred prior to the bankruptcy and his appointment as
trustee.
However, the trustee does make the following statement:
The only point that the trustee seeks to raise
is that
the State of Illinois understands and acknowledges that
all
fines and/or penalties that might be imposed in
this proceeding are unsecured pre—petition
dame
against the Summit estate and to the extent any fines
and or penalties are imposed, the State of Illinois
will take no action to collect any such fines and/or
penalties since such actions would be in violation of
the United States Bankruptcy Code.
(Emphasis in original.)
Pursuant to Section 362(a)
of the United States Bankruptcy
Code
(11 U.s.c.
362(a)),
filing a petition in bankruptcy invokes
an automatic stay which prevents the commencement or continuation
of judicial and other proceeding against the debtor or property
of the estate.
However,
several exceptions to the automatic stay
have been created
in Section 362(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code.
These exceptions include the police powers exception created in
Section 362(b) (4), which allows the states to protect the public
health and the environment and sue a debtor to prevent or stop a
violation of the environmental protection laws,
or affix damages
for violation of such laws.
(People v.
Fosnock, PCB 94-1
(September
15,
1994),
citing
Midatlantic
v.
New Jersey
474 U.S;
494,
106 S.Ct. 755,
761 (1986),
In re Lenz,
65 BR.
292,
293
(N.D.
Ill.
1986).)
The policy behind this police or regulatory
exception to the automatic stay is to prevent the bankruptcy
court from becoming a haven for wrongdoers.”
(Fosnock at 10,
quoting
In re Lenz at
293.)
However,
Section
362 (b) (5)
of
the Bankruptcy Code creates an
“exception to the exception” which prohibits enforcement of money
judgments against the debtor even if such action is brought
pursuant to the police or regulatory power of the state.
(In re
Lenz at 294.)
Thus,
the automatic stay does not prohibit
regulatory actions seeking injunctions and fixing fines and
penalties for violations of regulatory statutes, but it is
operative where the state attempts to enforce a money judgment.
Clearly,
in this action before the
Board the People are
seeking to establish the remedy and penalty for an alleged
violation of the Board’s regulatory provisions, not to enforce a
3
money judgment.
It is therefore appropriate for this action to
go forward.
BACKGROUND
Summit operates a hazardous waste fuel blending facility in
California.
On October
10,
1991,
Summit shipped a railcar
containing 221 drums of FOOl,
F002,
F003,
and FOO5
listed
hazardous waste from Colton, California to Clayton Chemical
Company
(Clayton Chemical)
in Sauget,
Illinois.
The alleged
violations
in this action arose out of this shipment of hazardous
wastes.
TESTIMONY
AT
HEARING
At hearing, three Environmental Protection Specialists
testified on behalf of the Agency:
1) Thomas E. Powell,
from the
Agency’s Office of Chemical Safety, Emergency Response Unit;
2)
Mark Johnson, from the Agency’s Office of Chemical Safety,
Emergency Response Unit;
and 3)
and Michael D. Grant, a hazardous
waste inspector with the Agency.
Their uncontested testimony
established the following sequence of events.
The railcar arrived in Illinois on November 22,
1991.
However, Clayton Chemical was not permitted to receive shipments
by rail, and the railcar was shunted by the Terminal Railroad
Association
(TRRA)
to a railroad siding leased by Clayton
Chemical at
TRRA’s
railyard in Madison, Madison County,
Illinois.
On January 29,
1992, John Spitz,
a hazardous materials
inspector for the United States Department of Transportation
F~dera1Railroad Administration
(FRA),
observed that the railcar
was exuding solvent odors, and that its undercarriage was stained
with materials leaking from within the railcar, which appeared to
be paint—related solvents.
Mr. Spitz reported his findings to
the TRRA, who reported them to the Illinois Emergency Services
Disaster Agency (ESDA), now known as the Illinois Emergency
Management Agency
(EMA).
That same day, Thomas E. Powell,
an inspector with the
Agency’s Office of Chemical Safety,
Emergency Response Unit,
conducted a site visit and inspected the railcar.
Inspector
Powell, together with Larry Hurt of the
TRRA
and
FRA
Inspector
Spitz, opened the railcar.
They found that the railcar was
filled with 55-gallon drums of hazardous waste, stacked two and
three drums high.
Some of the drums were made of plastic or polyethylene, and
some
of
them
were
made
of steel.
The drums were in poor
condition,
and many were leaking.
(Tr.
at 8.)
Wastes were
observed on the floor of the boxcar and dripping from the drums.
Spillage was also visible on the undercarriage of the railcar,
4
leaking through the floor from inside the car.
The staining and
odors emanating from the boxcar led Inspector Powell to believe
the drums contained paint—related solvents.
The railcar was
moved to a more remote portion of the railyard, and efforts were
undertaken to collect dripping wastes.
Inspector Powell notified Mark Johnson,
an inspector with
the Agency’s Office of Chemical Safety,
Emergency Response Unit,
and Michael
D.
Grant, a hazardous waste inspector with the
Agency’s Division of Land, of the conditions at the site.
All
three inspectors investigated the site on January
30.
Inspectors
Johnson and Crant subsequently provided oversight for the
remediation efforts.
The inspection reports of each inspector,
including photographs of conditions at the site, were admitted
into evidence.
David Scott Walker, Summit’s Director of Environmental
Affairs, met with Inspector Powell and inspected the site on
January 30.
He confirmed that the materials in the railcar were
from Summit.
(Tr.
at 18.)
On February 3, the three Agency
inspectors met at the site, and obtained the keys to the railcar
from Ed Reedy,
Jr., vice—president of Clayton.
Condition of the Drums.
While metal banding used to secure drums was present in the
railcar,
it was not properly affixed but merely thrown in the
railcar, and did not prevent the drums from shifting.
(Testimony
of Inspector Grant,
Pr.
at 50.)
In fact the testimony at hearing
and the photographs accompanying the inspection reports reveal
that the drums did in fact shift, and that many were dented and
crushed.
some
of the drums had their lids knocked off, thereby
exposing the material inside.
Several of the drums were in a
deteriorated condition,
and
were visibly leaking material onto
other drums, and onto the floor and walls of the boxcar.
Some
were upside down,
and others were on their sides.
The floor of
the railcar was coated with a black, viscous substance that had
leaked from the barrels.
The Agency directed that the drums be secured for shipment
off-site to a proper treatment facility.
This entailed repacking
leaking, damaged, or insecure drums in
85
gallon repack
containers.
Of the approximately 250 drums within the boxcar,
Inspectors Grant and Johnson testified that only 35-36 did not
require repacking in 85 gallon drums.
(Testimony of Inspector
Grant, Tr.
at 43; Testimony of Inspector Johnson, Tr.
at 27.)
Inspector Powell testified that the drums he observed all
appeared to be used drums that were not reconditioned.
He
testified that they had old labels or stencils that were painted
over.
Inspector Grant also testified that all of the drums
appeared to be used.
5
Remediation Activities.
A staging area was established outside the railcar,
at which
the repacking took place.
Summit personnel removed the drums
from the railcar and recontainerized them in 85 gallon drums.
The Summit personnel were initially assisted by personnel from
Hazardous Waste Recovery
(HWR), the facility where the wastes
were being taken for disposal.
The drums were removed from the
railcar using a forklift and “drum grappler,” a metal hook used
to move drums.
Some of the drums were so badly crushed and out
of round that they could not be lifted with the drum grappler,
and required the use of straps to remove them from the railcar.
The Summit personnel also removed the wastes which had leaked
from the inside of the railcar.
All the wastes were loaded into
rubberS-tired trailer trucks and shipped to
a disposal site.
This
work was completed by February 10,
1992.
(Post-Hearing. Br. at
6.)
Labelling of the Drums.
Inspector Grant testified that during the course of his
visits he was able to observe all
or
a majority
of the drums that
had been in the railcar.
He testified that not all of the drums
were labelled with Summit’s name and address, and the manifest
document number. He testified that numerous labels were found on
the floor of the boxcar.
Additionally, he testified that not all
of the drums had a label stating “Hazardous Waste federal law
prohibits improper disposal;
if found contact the nearest police
or public safety authority or the United States Environmental
Protection Agency.”
Inspector Grant also testified that not all
of the drums had the DOT required label for flammable liquids.
Finally,
he testified that none of the drums containinq 1-1-1
trichioroethane he observed were labelled with a warning stating
“keep away from food.”
Inspector Johnson testified that while the majority of drums
did have hazardous waste labels on them identifying Summit, not
all of them were so labelled.
(Tr.
at 26.)
He also testified
that not all of the drums
had the hazardous waste warning label,
or the DOT label for flammable liquids.
Manifests.
Six manifests were attached to Inspector Powell’s inspection
report.
These were copies of the manifests for the wastes Summit
faxed to Mr. Hurt at the TRRA on January
29.
Additionally,
copies of the manifests were found inside the railcar,
copies of
which were included
in Inspector Grant’s inspection report.
The
manifests show that the drums in the railcar contained hazardous
wastes.
The wastes listed in the manifests included
RCRA
listed
wastes DOO1,
FOOl, FOO2, FOO3,
and F005,
a flammable mixture of
ketone, alcohol, toluene, and xylene, and 1,1,1-trichloroethane.
6
Manifests were also prepared in order to ship the recontainerized
wastes from the railyard to HWR for ultimate disposal, and the
waste characterizations on those manifests match the
characterization of the original manifests found in the railcar.
On the manifests,
Summit listed Clayton Chemical as the
designated receiving facility, despite the fact that Clayton
Chemical is not permitted to accept rail shipments of waste at
its Sauget facility.
(Tr. at 37-38.)
No alternate facility was
designated on the original manifests.
A subsequent bill of
lading directed that the railcar be shipped to Cahokia Marine
Services, despite the fact that this
facility
was also not
permitted to receive such shipments.
(Tr. at 19,
38.)
Placards.
Inspectors Powell, Grant, and Johnson each testified that
the railcar did not have the DOT required placards on all 4
sides.
Inspector Grant also testified that only one side of the
railcar
had
a
placard
indicating
that
it
contained
flammable
materials.
VIOLATIONS
The People allege that Summit committed the following
violations:
Shipping Hazardous Wastes to an Imprqper Facility.
The People allege that
Summit violated Section 21(e)
of the
Act by shipping hazardous wastes by rail to Clayton Chemical,
which was not permitted or equipped to accept such shipments.
The People also allege that Summit violated Section 21(g) (2)
of
the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 722.120(b)
by designating Clayton
Chemical as the receiving facility on the shipping manifest
accompanying the wastes.
Furthermore, the People allege that
Summit violated Section 2l(g)(2)
of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code
722.120(d)
by failing
to
designate another facility permitted to
accept
hazardous
waste
when
the
transporter
could
not
deliver
the
wastes
to
Clayton
Chemical.
The record clearly demonstrates that Summit attempteti to
ship the railcar of hazardous wastes to Clayton Chemical,
a
facility which
is not permitted for or capable of receiving
shipments by rail.
We therefore find that Summit violated
Section 21(e)
of the Act.
The copies of the manifests included
in the record also clearly show that Clayton was designated on
the manifests as the receiving facility for the waste shipment.
We therefore find that Summit violated Section 21(g) (2)
of the
Act and 35 Ill.
Adm. Code 722.120(b).
Summit also failed to
designate an alternative receiving facility which could accept
the wastes when Clayton Chemical was unable to accept them.
We
7
therefore find that Summit violated Section 21(g) (2)
of the Act
and 35 Ill. Ad~i.Code 722.120(d).
Labelling Drums.
The People allege that Summit violated Section 21(g) (2)
of
the Act and 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 722
•
132 (a) by failing to mark the
drums of hazardous waste with:
(1) the proper shipping name and
identification number;
(2) the technical names tor the wastes;
and
(3) either the waste name, waste stream number,
or EPA
characteristic.
The People further allege that
Sumiuit violated
Section
(g)
(2)
of
the
Act
and
35
Ill.
Adm.
Code
722.132(b)
by
failing to mark the drums of hazardous waste with Summit’s name
and
address,
the
manifest
document
number,
and
the
following
statement:
HAZARDOUS WASTE
--
Federal Law Prohibits Improper
Disposal.
If found, contact the nearest police or
public safety authority or the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.
The People further allege that Summit violated Section
21(g) (2)
of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 722.131 by failing to
label the drums of hazardous waste with the United States
Department
of
Transportation
(U.S.
DOT)
required
label
for
flammable
liquids
and
by
failing
to
label
the
drums
containing
1,1,1—trichioroethane with the warning “Keep Away From Food.”
The testimony of Inspector Grant and Inspector Johnson
establish that many of the drums were not properly labelled in
accordance with the requirements of Section 21(g) (2)
of the Act,
35
Iii. Adm.
Code 722.132(a),
35
Ill.
Adm. Code 722.132(b), and
35
Ill. Adm.
131.
We therefore find that Summit violated this
section of the Act and these Board regulations.
Allowing_Releases of Hazardous Waste.
The People further allege that Summit violated Section
21(g)
(2)
or the Act and
35
Ill.
Adm.
Code
722.130
by
utilizing
drums which leaked, thereby allowing identifiable releases of
hazardous wastes.
The record clearly establishes that many of the drums
leaked,
causing releases of hazardous materials.
The Agency
inspectors testified that the drums were not new or reclaimed
drums,
but
were
old
drums with painted—over labels.
The
photographs demonstrate that some drums leaked from seams, while
other releases occurred from drums which had their lids knocked
ott.
Hazardous
waste
leaked
trom
upper
barrels
onto
the
barrels
below,
arid
was
splattered
on
the
inside
walls
of
the
railcar.
The
leaks
were
of
a
sufficient quantity that the floor of the
boxcar
was
covered
with
the
waste,
and
a
quantity of waste leaked
8
through the floor of the railcar onto
its
undercarriage and the
tracks below.
We therefore find that Summit violated Section
21(g)(2)
of the Act and 35 Iii. Adm. Code 722.130.
Improper Placarding.
Finally, the People allege that Summit violated Section
21(g) (2)
of the Act and 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 722.133
by failing to
placard
the
railcar
in
accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR
Part
172,
Subpart
F.
All three Agency inopectoro te$tifled that the railcar wa~
not properly placarded on all four sides.
Inspector Grant
testified that the car was only placarded on one side.
We•
therefore find that Summit violated Section 21(q) (2)
of the Act
and 35 Ill. Adm. Code 722.133.
REMEDY
Having found that Summit violated the Act and Board
regulations, we must determine what constitutes a proper remedy.
This determination ie governed by Section 33(b)
of
the Act.
Under Section 33(b)
the Board has authority to issue final
orders,
including orders directing a party to cease and desist
from violations, and orders imposing civil penalties in
accordance with Section 42.
Under Section 33(c), when issuing
its orders and determinations,
the Board is to consider:
all the facts and
circumstances
bearing upon
the reasonableness of the emissions,
discharges,
or deposits involved,
including
but not limited
to
the fo1lowing~
1.
the character and degree of injury to,
or
interference with the protection of the health,
general welfare and physical property of the
people;
2.
the
social
and
economic
value
of
the
pollution
source;
3.
th~
suitability
or
unsuitability of the pollution
source to the are in which it is located
.
.
.;
4.
the technical practicability and economic
reasonableness of reducing or eliminating the
emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from
such pollution source; and
5.
any subsequent compliance.
(415 ILCS 5/33(c).)
9
In the complaint,
the People seek an order finding Summit in
violation of the Act and Board regulations,
and directing Summit
to cease and desist from further violations.
Additionally, the
People see the imposition of a civil penalty of up to $25,000 per
violation per day for each day of violation.
Under the circumstances of this case, where Summit has not
responded to any of the allegations made against it, we find that
an order imposing a penalty,
and directing Summit to cease and
desist from further violations of the Act,
is an appropriate
remedy.
PENALTY
Section 42 of the Act gives the Board authority to impose
civil penalties upon those found in violation of the Act or Board
regulations,
or permits or Board orders issued pursuant thereto.
Section 42(a)
of the Act provides:
Except as provided in this Section,
any person that
violates any provision of this Act or any regulation
adopted by the Board,
or any permit or term or
condition thereof,
•
.
.
shall
be
liable
to
a
civil
penalty of not to exceed $50,000 for the violation and
an additional civil penalty of not to exceed $10,000
for each day during which the violation
continues.
.
Additionally,
Section 42(b)
(3)
provides;
Any
person
that
violates
Section
21(f),
(21(g),
21(h)
or
21(i)
of
this
Act,
or
any
RCRA
permit
or
term
or
condition
thereof,
or
any
filing
requirement,
regulation
or
order
relating
to
the
State
RCRA
program,
shall be liable to a civil penalty of not to exceed
$25,000 per day of violation.
In
determining
the
appropriate
penalty
to
be imposed for a
violation,
Section 42(h)
of the Act authorizes the Board to
consider
factors
in
aggravation
or
mitigation thereof,
including
but not limited to:
1.
the
duration
and
gravity
of the violation;
2.
the
presence
or
absence
of
due
diligence
on
the
part
of
the
violator
in
attempting
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
this
Act
and
regulations
thereunder
.
.
3.
any economic benefits accrued by the violator
because
of
delay
in
compliance
with
requirements;
10
4.
the
amount
of monetary penalty which will serve to
deter further
violations
by the violator and to
otherwise
aid
in
enhancing
voluntary
compliance
with this Act by the violator and other persons
similarly
subject
to
the
Act;
and
5.
the
number,
proximity
in
time,
and
gravity
of
previously
adjudicated
violations
of
this
Act
by
the violator.
Section 42(f)
of the Act also authorizes the Board to award
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the
State’s
Attorney or
Attorney General in
a
case
where
he
has
prevailed against a
person
who
has
committed
a
wilful,
knowing
or
repeated
violation
of
the
Act.
Any
funds
collected
under
this
provision
in
which
the Attorney General has prevailed must be deposited in the
Hazardous Waste Fund created pursuant to Section 22.2 of the Act.
In their post-hearing
brief,
the People
assert that a
significant penalty is warranted,
and suggest the imposition of a
$200,000 penalty.
(Post-Hearing Br.
at 7.)
In support, the
People assert that there are several factors which the Board
should consider in aggravation of the penalty.
First, the People note that the violations extended for four
months.
(Post—Hearing Br.
at 6.)
The wastes were shipped on
October 19,
1991, and arrived in Illinois on November 22,
1991.
Summit did not take any action until January 27,
1992.
The
People
assert
that Summit only removed the waste, recontainerized
it, and shipped it off-site at the insistence of state and
federal inspectors.
(fl~.)
Second, the People emphasize the gravity of the violations.
(Post-Hearing Br. at 6.)
The People assert that leaking and
deteriorated drums of ignitable hazardous waste sitting in an
improperly placarded railcar in the middle of a busy railyard
threatened the safety of all persons and other railcars in the
vicinity.
Third, the People emphasize Summit’s lack of due diligence.
(Post—Hearing Br.
at 7.)
The People assert that this is
demonstrated by the unsuitability of the drums for the
waste
they
contained, the lack of labels,
the failure to block and brace the
drums, the failure to placard the railcar, Summit’s inaction
until the arrival of state and federal inspector’s at the site,
and Summit’s second attempt to ship wastes to a site not
permitted to accept
it.
Fourth, the People assert that Summit gained an economic
benefit by avoiding the costs of storing the waste between the
time of its initial shipment and its ultimate disposal.
(Post-
Hearing
Br.
at
7.)
Finally,
the
People
assert
that a
$2fl0,000
11~
penalty will deter further violations by Summit and will aid in
enhancing voluntary compliance by other persons subject to the
Act.
(Post-Hearing Br. at 7.)
Additionally,
the People seek the
imposition of $1,900 in attorneys fees and $63.00 in costs.
(Post-Hearing Br. at
5,
8.)
The People’s post-hearing brief was accompanied by an
affidavit attesting to the time,
effort, and costs spent in
preparing this case,
and the experience of the assigned Senior
Assistant Attorney General.
The People seek to recover
attorney’s fees at a rate of $100.00 per hour.
Summit has not responded to the People’s assertions
concerning the appropriate determination of a penalty amount.
We find that the factors recited by the People justify the
imposition of the requested penalty amount.
Summit showed a
blatant disregard for the safety procedures mandated for the
shipment of hazardous waste.
The
wastes
were stored in improper
containers,
and no precautions were taken to prevent their
leaking.
The contaminated, leaking railcar sat in an active
Illinois railyard for over two months, leaking its hazardous,
flammable contents onto the rails and into the environment,
posing a threat to the environment, and threatening the safety of
railyard workers.
The improper placarding of the railcar and
improper labelling of the drums increased the risk posed by
failing to warn of the dangers presented.
Additionally, we find that Summit’s lack of due diligence
warrants the imposition of a significant penalty.
Summit’s
shipment of improperly braced or blocked drums,
improper
labelling of drums, improper placarding of the railcar,
improper
manifesting of the wastes,
and shipment of waste in inappropriate
drums show a blatant disregard for the Board’s regulations.
This
disregard for applicable regulations becomes even more apparent
when it is remembered that Summit is in the business of blending
hazardous waste fuels,
and therefore should have been well aware
of the applicable requirements.
Despite this, Summit shipped its
wastes to
a facility that was not permitted to accept them.
Summit then attempted to ship the wastes to Cahokia Marine
Terminals, another facility which was also not permitted to
accept them.
Furthermore, Summit’s lack of concern for the risks
presented by its improper shipment of waste is evident in its
failure to take any remedial action until such action was
insisted upon by state and federal regulators.
We also find that
Summit gained an economic benefit by not having to. store the
wastes for the approximately four—month period of the violations.
Finally, we note that Summit failed to appear at all in this
action to explain its actions or present any defense.
12
Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the
significant threat posed to human health and the environment,
combined with Summit’s lack of due diligence, warrants the
imposition of a significant penalty.
The Board further finds
that a significant penalty will deter future violations by Summit
and aid voluntary compliance by others with the terms of the Act
and Board regulations.
We find that the $200,000 penalty
requested by the People is warranted.
Additionally, we find
that, pursuant to Section 42(f)
of the Act, Summit has willfully
and knowingly violated the Act,
and that it is appropriate to
direct Summit to pay the People’s attorneys fees and costs.
We
further find that the fees and costs sought by the People,
as
attested to by affidavit,
are reasonable.
ORDER
1)
The Board hereby finds that respondent Summit Environmental
Services,
Inc.
(Summit), improperly transported hazardous
waste by railcar in violation of Sections
21(e),
2l(g)(2)
of
the Environmental Protection Act
(Act), and Board
regulations at 35 Ill. Adm. Code 722.120(b), 722.120(d),
722.130,
722.131, 722.132(a), 722.132(b), and 722.133.
2)
Summit shall immediately cease and desist from further
violations of the Act or Board regulations.
3)
Summit shall pay a penalty of two hundred thousand dollars
($200,000)
within 30 days of the date of this order.
Such
payment shall be
made
by
certified check or money order
payable to the Treasurer of the State of Illinois,
designated to the Environmental Protection Trust
Fund,
and
shall be sent by First Class mail to:
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
Fiscal Services Division
2200 Churchill Road
P.O. Box 19276
Springfield,
IL 62794—9276
The certified check or money order shall clearly indicate on
its face, the respondent’s Federal Employer Identification
Number or Social Security Number and that payment
is
directed to the Illinois Environmental Protection Trust
Fund.
Any such penalty not paid within the time prescribed shall
incur interest at the rate set forth in subsection
(a) of
Section 1003 of the Illinois Income Tax Act
(35 ILCS 5/1003)
as
now
or hereafter
amended,
from
the date payment is due
until the date payment
Ls received.
Interest shall not
accrue during the pendency of an appeal during which payment
of the penalty has been stayed.
13
4)
Summit shall pay the attorneys fees of one thousand nine
hundred dollars
($1,900.00),
incurred at a rate of
$100/hour,
and costs of sixty-three dollars
($63.00),
incurred by the Office of the Illinois Attorney General in
its representation of the State of Illinois and the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency.
Such payment shall be made
by certified check or money order payable to the Treasurer
of the State of Illinois, designated to the Hazardous Waste
Fund,
and shall be sent by First Class mail to:
Illinois Environmental. Protection Agency
Fiscal Services Division
2200
Churchill Road
P.O.
Box 19276
Springfield,
IL 62794—9276
The certified check or money order shall clearly indicate on
its face,
the respondent’s Federal Employer Identification
Number or Social Security Number and that payment
is
directed to the Hazardous Waste Fund.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
(415 ILCS
5/41
(1994))
provides tor the appeal or final Board oraers within
35 days of the date of service of this order.
The Rules of the
Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
(See
also 35 Ill. Adm.
Code
101.246,
“Notions for Reconsideration”.)
I, Dorothy N. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby
certify
that
the
above
order
was
adopted
on
the
~07/A2~~’
day of
_________________,
1995,
by
a
vote
of
7—o
Dorothy N/fGunn, Clerk
Illinois~ollution
Control Board
