1. Section 306.305 Treatment of Overflows and Bypasses

ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
August 23, 2001
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
 
Complainant,
 
v.
 
CITY OF WAUKEGAN, a municipal
corporation,
 
Respondent.
 
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PCB 01-104
(Enforcement – Water)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by N.J. Melas):
 
On January 5, 2001, the Attorney General’s Office, on behalf of the people of the State of
Illinois (complainant) initiated this action by filing a four-count complaint (comp.). Complainant
alleged that respondent City of Waukegan (Waukegan) violated various sections of the
Environmental Protection Act (Act) and the Board’s regulations when it discharged untreated
sewage into a drainage ditch. Waukegan filed an answer (ans.) to the complaint on February
9, 2001.
 
This matter is before the Board on a motion for summary judgement (mot.) filed by
complainant on April 18, 2001. On May 14, 2001, Waukegan filed a motion for leave to file
instanter
response to the motion for summary judgment and a response (resp.). In the response,
Waukegan denied that it violated Section 306.305(c) of the Board’s regulations. On May 22,
2001, complainant filed a motion for leave to file a reply to the response. Former Board Hearing
Officer John Knittle granted both the motion for leave to file instanter and the motion for leave
to file a reply on June 11, 2001. On June 18, 2001, complainant filed its reply to the response
(reply). On June 28, 2001, Waukegan filed a motion for leave to file instanter surreply to the
reply and a surreply (surreply). Complainant did not oppose the motion to file
instanter
surreply
and, as complainant will not be prejudiced, the Board grants it.
 
For the reasons outlined below, the Board denies complainant’s motion for summary
judgment in Count III only with respect to Section 306.305(c) of the Board’s regulations. The
Board grants complainant’s motion for summary judgment regarding all other alleged violations
in the complaint.
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and depositions, together with any
affidavits and other items in the record, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason,
181 Ill. 2d 460, 693 N.E.2d 358 (1998). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Board

 
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“must consider the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits strictly against the movant and in favor
of the opposing party.” Dowd, 181 Ill. 2d at 483, 693 N.E.2d at 370.
 
Summary judgment “is a drastic means of disposing of litigation,” and therefore it should
be granted only when the movant’s right to the relief “is clear and free from doubt.” Dowd, 181
Ill. 2d at 483, 693 N.E.2d at 370, citing Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871
(1986). However, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not rest on its
pleadings, but must “present a factual basis which would arguably entitle [it] to a judgment.”
Gauthier v. Westfall, 266 Ill. App. 3d 213, 219, 639 N.E.2d 994, 999 (2nd Dist. 1994).
 
UNCONTESTED FACTS
 
Summary judgment is appropriate here in that the Board has found no issues of material
fact in this matter. The relevant facts are as follows:
 
Waukegan owns and operates a sanitary sewer lift station known as the McGaw Road
Lift Station (lift station), also known as the Lakehurst Lift Station, located at 4200 West McGaw
Road in Waukegan. Two electric pumps at the lift station send untreated sewage from a wet well
to an elevated discharge pipe. The discharge pipe leads to a sewage treatment plant. Mot. at 3;
resp. at 2.
 
During April 1999, one of the pumps failed. Waukegan officials made efforts to replace
the failed pump, but they were unable to do so before the second pump failed at about 10:30 am
on July 23, 1999. With both pumps failed, untreated sewage began to back up at the lift station.
In order to avoid untreated sewage from backing up into nearby residences, Waukegan officials
employed mobile pumps to direct the sewage from the lift station to a nearby unnamed drainage
ditch. Mot. at 3-4; resp. at 2-3.
 
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) personnel then advised Waukegan
officials against pumping the untreated sewage into the drainage ditch. From 1:00 p.m. on July
23, 1999, until noon on July 27, 1999, Waukegan pumped approximately 31,600 gallons of
untreated sewage into the drainage ditch. At around noon on July 27, Waukegan officials began
pumping sewage to a tanker truck. The truck then took the sewage to a gravity flow sewer line.
Waukegan officials obtained two new pumps on July 27 and, once the pumps were installed, the
lift station resumed normal operation on July 28, 1999. Mot at 4; resp. at 3-4.
 
Waukegan did not have a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
Permit to discharge sewage from the lift station directly into a water of the State. Mot. at 5.
 
 
 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
 
In the four-count complaint, complainant alleges that Waukegan violated Sections 12(a),
12(c), and 12(f) of the Act and Sections 304.141(b), 306.102(a), 306.304, 306.305(c), and
309.102(a) of the Board’s regulations. Comp. at 4-6, 8, 10. In the motion for summary

 
 
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judgment, complainant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of the allegations
in the complaint. Mot. at 5-7. In its answer, Waukegan admits to all of the allegations in the
complaint except for one; Waukegan denies the alleged violation of Section 306.305(c) of the
Board’s regulations. Waukegan asks that complainant’s motion for summary judgment be
denied on Count III with respect to Section 306.305(c) only. (Waukegan does not contest the
other alleged violation in Count III which is Section 306.304 of the Board’s regulations.) Ans.
at 1-4; surrpely at 5.
 
Section 306.305(c) provides:
 
  
Section 306.305 Treatment of Overflows and Bypasses
 
All combined sewer overflows and treatment plant bypasses shall
be given sufficient treatment to prevent pollution, or the violation
of applicable water quality standards unless an exception has been
granted by the Board pursuant to Subpart D. Sufficient treatment
shall consist of the following:
 
* * *
 
c) Flows in excess of those described in subsection (b) shall
be treated, in whole or in part, to the extent necessary to
prevent accumulations of sludge deposits, floating debris
and solids in accordance with 35 Ill. Adm. Code 302.203,
and to prevent depression of oxygen levels; or
 
Complainant alleges that Waukegan violated Section 306.305(c) when Waukegan
bypassed its sewage treatment facility and pumped the untreated sewage from the lift station into
the drainage ditch. Comp. at 8; mot. at 6.
 
Waukegan denies that it has violated Section 306.305(c). Waukegan claims that the
sewage discharge from the lift station to the drainage ditch was not a “treatment plant bypass.”
Resp. at 4.
 
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
 
The parties present several arguments regarding the meaning, common understanding,
legislative intent, judicial interpretation, and federal definition of the term “treatment plant
bypass”. See Resp. at 5; Reply at 4; Surreply at 2-5.
 
After considering the facts and the record in this situation, the Board finds that Section
306.305(c) does not address the discharge of sewage to the drainage ditch in this situation.
Since, as a matter of law, Section 306.305(c) does not apply to the facts at hand, the Board
denies complainant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Section 306.305(c).
 

 
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Waukegan admits that it violated all of the other alleged violations in the complaint
except for Section 306.305(c). The Board can find no issues of material fact with respect to the
other alleged violations in the complaint. Complainant is entitled to summary judgment on those
allegations as a matter of law.
 
 
  
CONCLUSION
 
The Board denies complainant’s motion for summary judgment in Count III only with
respect to Section 306.305(c) of the Board’s regulations. The Board grants complainant’s
motion for summary judgment with respect to Sections 12(a), 12(c), and 12(f) of the Act and
Sections
 
304.141(b), 306.102(a), 306.304, 309.102(a) of the Board’s regulations.
 
 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
 
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that the
above order was adopted on the 23rd day of August 2001 by a vote of 7-0.
 
 
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board

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