ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    June 21, 2001
     
    JERSEY SANITATION CORPORATION,
    an Illinois corporation,
     
    Petitioner,
     
    v.
     
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
     
    Respondent.
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    PCB 00-82
    (Permit Appeal – Land)
     
     
     
    DISSENTING OPINION (by E.Z. Kezelis):
    I respectfully dissent. I believe the majority has erred by rejecting Board precedent to
    reach its decision. In permit appeals such as this, the Board has generally adhered to the
    principle that a condition previously imposed in a prior permit and not appealed to the Board
    cannot thereafter be appealed in a subsequent permit. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v.
    IEPA (January 21, 1999), PCB 98-102, slip op. at 13,
    aff’d,
    Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
    Company v. IEPA, 314 Ill. App. 3d 296, 734 N.E.2d 18 (4th Dist. 2000); Bradd v. IEPA (May 9,
    1991), PCB 90-173.
     
    I believe Panhandle and Bradd represent strong precedent that should be followed here.
    While the majority attempts to distinguish them on the grounds that different types of permits are
    involved here, I find that analysis to be flawed. The rationale underlying Panhandle and Bradd
    does not depend upon the nature of the permits at issue. Instead, these cases stand for the
    propositions that it is sound public policy to accept administrative agency decisions as final,
    absent timely appeals, and that it is not sound public policy to encourage permit applicants to
    delay appealing conditions until subsequent appeal possibilities present themselves.
     
    Accordingly, I would find Jersey Sanitation waived any objection to conditions C.1, C.2,
    C.3, C.4 and C.8, because each of these conditions was imposed in the prior permit issued to
    Jersey Sanitation, and Jersey Sanitation appealed none of them. Given those circumstances, I
    would therefore, deny Jersey Sanitation’s motion for summary judgment as to these conditions,
    and instead, grant the Agency’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
     
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    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from today’s majority opinion.
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
    Elena Z. Kezelis
     
      
      
      
      
    Board Member
     
     
    I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that the
    above dissenting opinion was submitted on the 25th day of June 2001.
     
    Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
    Illinois Pollution Control Board
     
     

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