ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 3, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Complainant,
v.
DOREN POLAND, LLOYD YOHO, and
BRIGGS INDUSTRIES, INC. a/k/a BRIGGS
PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Respondents.
BRIGGS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Third-Party Complainant,
v.
LOREN WEST and ABINGDON
SALVAGE COMPANY, INC.,
Third-Party Respondents.
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PCB 98-148
(Enforcement – Land)
PCB 98-148
(Enforcement – Citizens, Land)
(Third- Party Complaint)
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by E.Z. Kezelis):
This enforcement action is before the Board on two matters: first, an appeal by Briggs
Industries, Inc. (Briggs) of a March 19, 2001 hearing officer order admitting several documents
into the record, and a motion to strike; second, a motion by Briggs for leave to file a response
to new matters raised in complainant’s reply brief, or alternatively a motion to strike. Briggs’
appeal and motion for leave were both filed on March 29, 2001. On April 9, 2001, complainant
filed a response to Briggs’ motion seeking leave to respond to complainant’s reply brief. On
April 12, 2001, complainant filed its response to Briggs’ appeal of the hearing officer ruling and
Briggs’ motion to strike.
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1
The March 19, 2001 hearing officer order shall be referred to as “HO Ord. at __.” Briggs’
appeal and motion to strike shall be referred to as “App. at __.” Complainant’s response to the
appeal shall be referred to as “Resp. at __.” Briggs’ motion for leave to file response to
complainant’s reply brief shall be referred to as “Mot. at __.” Complainant’s response to
Briggs’ motion for leave shall be referred to as “Resp. to Mot. at __.”
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BACKGROUND
This enforcement action, filed on April 30, 1998, involves violations alleged to have
occurred at a permitted landfill (old landfill) and an unpermitted site (new landfill) in Abingdon,
Knox County, Illinois. The complaint alleges that respondents Doren Poland (Poland) and Lloyd
Yoho (Yoho) owned both the old and new landfills and that respondent Briggs sent its process
waste, including ceramic material, vitreous china, and plaster molds, to the old and new landfills
during the period 1979-1997.
During the course of a hearing conducted on November 28-29, 2000, a dispute arose
regarding the existence of documents allegedly prepared for Briggs by Andrews Environmental
Engineering firm of Springfield, Illinois (Andrews) that had not been produced to complainant.
Both at hearing and again in ruling on the motion to compel formalized in writing by
complainant, the hearing officer ordered that the documents be produced. The Board affirmed
the hearing officer’s directives in its own order dated February 15, 2001. People v. Poland
(February 15, 2001), PCB 98-148.
The two documents (Andrews documents) Briggs ultimately produced on February 21,
2001, in response to these orders were:
1.
a two-page letter dated October 26, 2000, from an Andrews Engineering
employee providing advice regarding obtaining an inert landfill permit for the new
landfill; and
2.
a four-page facsimile dated November 10, 2000, from Andrew Rathsack of
Andrews Engineering to Briggs’ attorney forwarding findings and leachate test
results generated by an outside lab.
After Briggs produced the Andrews documents, complainant sought to have them
admitted into evidence. Over Briggs’ objection, the hearing officer granted complainant’s
motion and admitted the Andrews documents on March 19, 2001. HO Ord. at 2. On
March 29, 2001, Briggs filed this appeal with the Board.
APPEAL OF HEARING OFFICER ORDER
In its appeal, Briggs argues that the hearing officer erroneously admitted the Andrews
documents as business records because complainant failed to lay the proper foundation for their
admission. App. at 3. Briggs argues that it “has been deprived of its right to challenge (e.g.,
cross-examine) both any foundation witnesses’ testimony and the documents themselves or to put
on additional evidence regarding matters raised in the documents.” App. at 3-4. Briggs claims
that it and the other respondents have been prejudiced by the admission of these documents, and
seeks to have the hearing officer’s March 19, 2001 order overturned and the documents stricken
from the record. App. at 5.
Complainant responds to Briggs’ appeal by placing the blame for the lack of a
conventional foundation on Briggs itself. Resp. at 2. Specifically, complainant argues,
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Briggs has no legitimate grounds to complain that the posture of the proceeding
deprives it of the usual opportunity to challenge the admissibility of documents,
and to attack the weight of such evidence through cross-examination and other
testimony, and argument. Complainant was similarly deprived of opportunities
to bolster its case through further testimony. Resp. at 2.
Furthermore, complainant asserts that information supporting the introduction of the Andrews
documents as business records was already addressed on the record at hearing. Resp. at 5.
According to complainant, the documents were generated at the request of Briggs, they were
prepared by an environmental engineering firm, and, their content pertains to the new landfill.
Id
. Complainant also urges the Board to take official notice pursuant to Section 101.630 of the
Board’s procedural rules (35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.630) that the documents were prepared by a
consulting engineer in the regular course of business within a reasonable time of the acts at issue.
Resp. at 6. Finally, complainant maintains that evidence must be competent, relevant, and
material for it to be admissible, and, having demonstrated the competency of the documents,
argues that Briggs does not challenge the Andrews documents’ relevancy or materiality. Resp.
at 4-5. Accordingly, complainant asks the Board to affirm the hearing officer’s order admitting
the Andrews documents into the record.
Id
.
We find that Section 101.626 of the Board’s procedural rules (35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.626) guides this issue. Regarding business records, Section 101.626 provides, in pertinent
part:
To be admissible, the writing or record will have been made in the regular
course of business, provided it was the regular course of business to make the
memorandum or record at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event.
. . . [a]ll other circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including
lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be admitted to affect
the weight of the evidence, but will not affect admissibility. 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.626.
In light of the Board’s procedural rules, the hearing officer properly admitted the two Andrews
documents. The documents meet the requirements of Section 101.626 for admission of business
records. These documents are of the type typically generated by an environmental engineering
firm in the course of its investigations of a site such as a landfill, and the documents were
developed within a reasonable time of the event. The hearing officer’s order of March 19,
2001, is affirmed and the documents are admitted into the record. Briggs’ motion to strike is
denied.
BRIGGS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINANT’S REPLY
The second matter before the Board involves Briggs’ request that it be given an
opportunity to respond to complainant’s reply brief. Briggs maintains that a response is
necessary in order for it to address new matters raised by the complainant’s reply. In the
alternative, Briggs asks the Board to strike those portions of complainant’s reply that contain the
“new” material.
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Briggs identifies five statements or arguments that it claims are not properly raised in
complainant’s reply. They are: (1) a new argument regarding the burden of proof; (2) a new
legal theory regarding “capability of control”; (3) new arguments regarding remedy; (4) new
and inaccurate statements regarding evidence; and (5) new arguments regarding the Andrews
documents. Mot. at 1-2.
Briggs argues that it will be denied due process if it is not afforded an opportunity to
respond to each of these new arguments. Mot. at 3. As a remedy, Briggs asks the Board to
accept a response brief attached to its motion, or alternatively, to strike those portions of
complainant’s brief which contain the purportedly new arguments or statements.
Complainant responds to Briggs’ motion by arguing that the Board’s procedural rules do
not allow for such a response without a showing of material prejudice, and that Briggs has not
made such a showing. Resp. to Mot. at 3. Complainant refers the Board to Section 101.500(e)
of the Board’s procedural rules (35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.500(e)) which applies to the filing of
motions and responses. Section 101.500(e) allows the hearing officer or Board to allow
additional briefings of a motion when necessary to prevent material prejudice. 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 101.500(e).
Complainant also argues that, with regard to the Andrews documents, Briggs does not
come to the Board with “clean hands.” Resp. to Mot. at 5. Complainant maintains that it is
because of Briggs’ own failure to disclose and produce the documents in a timely fashion during
discovery that a full and complete examination of those documents could not be had by either
party.
Id
. Complainant maintains that it too has been deprived of an opportunity to further
bolster its own case by the late disclosure of these documents.
Id
. Finally, complainant argues
that its reply is a proper response to Briggs’ post-hearing brief and that any elaboration on
arguments first presented in its own brief is proper. Resp. to Mot. at 6. Accordingly,
complainant asks the Board to deny Briggs’ motion.
Although not directly applicable, the Board finds the standards of Section 101.500(e) to
be helpful in considering Briggs’ motion. Therefore, we consider whether Briggs has
demonstrated that its response is necessary to prevent material prejudice. Having carefully
examined the post-hearing briefs of both parties, we find that complainant’s reply does not
improperly inject new theories or arguments into the case, and that Briggs has not demonstrated
material prejudice.
The Andrews documents, however, come to us with an abbreviated airing in the record.
Of necessity, argument concerning the Andrew documents has trailed briefing of other issues.
Leave to submit a supplemental response concerning the Andrews documents is hereby granted
despite the fact that the necessity giving rise to this supplemental response was occasioned only
by Briggs’ failure to timely produce the documents in question. Accordingly, Briggs’ motion for
leave to file a response to complainant’s reply brief is denied in part and granted in part, but
only as Part IV at pages 14-15. Briggs’ motion to strike portions of complainant’s reply brief is
denied.
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Except for arguments concerning the Andrews documents, this case is now fully briefed.
Complainant argues that it, the party bearing the burden of proof in this case, must be afforded
an opportunity to “close the argument.” Resp. to Mot. at 5. Complainant is hereby granted
leave to file a supplemental response concerning Part IV at pages 14-15 of Briggs’ response to
complainant’s reply brief. Its supplemental response must be filed within seven days of the date
of this order.
CONCLUSION
The Board affirms the hearing officer’s ruling admitting the two Andrews documents into
the record. The Board grants Briggs’ motion for leave to respond to complainant’s reply brief,
but only insofar as the response relates to complainant’s arguments regarding the Andrews
documents. All other portions of Briggs’ supplemental response are stricken.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
the above order was adopted on the 3rd day of May 2001 by a vote of 7-0.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board