ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September 19, 1996
ILLINOIS LANDFILL, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
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PCB 95-162
(Variance - Land)
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD (by G.T. Girard):
On June 5, 1995 Illinois Landfill Inc. (ILI) filed a petition for variance from the
requirements of 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.104(c). On June 29, 1995 the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency (Agency) filed its recommendation that the petition be granted. On May
22, 1996 ILI filed an amended petition (Am.Pet.) and waived hearing. On June 10, 1996 the
Agency filed an amended recommendation (Am.Rec.).
On July 17, 1996 the Board received an objection and request for hearing filed by
William J. Regan. On August 1, 1996 the Board directed that a hearing be held. Hearing was
held before Board hearing officer Deborah Frank on August 21, 1996 in Danville, Vermilion
County, Illinois. Three members of the public testified at hearing. In addition, on August 26,
1996 the Board received a public comment (P. C.) from William J. Regan and ILI filed a
response (P.C. Res.) on August 28, 1996.
The Board previously granted a variance to ILI from the requirements of 35 Ill. Adm.
Code 814.104(c) until September 18, 1995. (Illinois Landfill, Inc. v. IEPA, PCB 94-200
(December 1, 1994) (hereinafter “PCB 94-200”.) ILI seeks an extension of that variance for
one year until September 18, 1996.
For the reasons discussed below, the Board will grant the variance as requested by ILI.
BACKGROUND
ILI currently owns and operates a landfill in Hoopeston, Vermilion County, Illinois.
(Am. Pet. at 2.) The landfill is a permitted facility with an area of 39.2 acres and a waste
boundary of about 33 acres. (Am. Pet. at 5.) The estimated remaining airspace volume for
refuse is approximately 1,402,044 cubic yards based on an April 1994 filed survey. (
Id.
)
ILI employs 18 full time employees and accepts waste generated within Vermilion,
Iroquois, and Ford counties. (Am. Pet. at 6.) The existing service area encompasses an
approximately 100 mile radius from the landfill. (
Id.
)
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On November 25, 1992 ILI submitted an application to the City of Hoopeston for siting
approval for expansion of the ILI landfill. Hoopeston approved siting, and that approval was
appealed to the Board. (Slates v. Illinois Landfills, Inc., PCB 93-106 (September 23, 1993)
(hereinafter PCB 93-106); Am. Pet. at 3.) The Board reversed Hoopeston’s siting approval
and on December 14, 1994 the Appellate Court reversed and remanded the decision of the
Board. (Illinois Landfills, Inc. v. IPCB, et al, 4-94-0041 (April 28, 1994) (4th Dist.).) The
mandate of the Appellate Court issued on April 28, 1995. (Am. Pet. at 3.) On November 7,
1995 the application for site approval for expansion was approved by Hoopeston.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In determining whether a variance is to be granted, the Act requires the Board to decide
if a petitioner has presented adequate proof that immediate compliance with the Board
regulations at issue would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship. (415 ILCS 5/35(a).)
Furthermore, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that its claimed hardship outweighs the
public interest in attaining compliance with regulations designed to protect the public.
(Willowbrook Motel v. Pollution Control Board, 135 Ill.App.3d 343, 481 N.E.2d 1032 (1st
Dist. 1977).) Only by such a showing can the claimed hardship rise to the level of arbitrary or
unreasonable hardship.
In addition, a variance, by its very nature, is a temporary reprieve from compliance
with the Board’s regulations, and compliance is to be sought regardless of the hardship which
eventual compliance presents an individual polluter. (Monsanto Co. v. Pollution Control
Board, 67 Ill.2d 276, 287, 367, N.E.2d 684, 688 (1977).) Accordingly, a variance petitioner
is required, as a condition to grant of variance, to commit to a plan which is reasonably
calculated to achieve compliance within the term of the variance, unless certain special
circumstances exist.
ILI is seeking variance relief from 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.104(c). The Board’s rules at
Section 814.104 require that all owners or operators of landfills file an application for
significant modification to permits for existing facilities. Section 814.104(c) states:
The application shall be filed within 48 months of the effective date of this Part, or at
such earlier time as the Agency shall specify in writing pursuant to 35 Ill. Adm. Code
807.209 or 813.201(b).
ILI had previously received a variance such that the application for significant
modification was due September 18, 1995. ILI is now seeking a variance to extend the
deadline for the filing of a significant modification permit application to September 18, 1996
for the ILI facility in Hoopeston, Illinois. (Am. Pet. at 2.) ILI is further requesting that the
Board grant the relief retroactively to September 18, 1995. (
Id.
)
HARDSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ILI in its previous variance request maintained that a hardship would exist if ILI was
required to submit the significant modification permit (sig mod) application for its site by
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September 18, 1994 because ILI was attempting to obtain siting approval for an expansion of
its landfill. (PCB 94-200 at 3.) ILI argued that the expense and effort of preparing and filing
a sig mod application in 1994 would be a hardship if the 1994 sig mod application were
rendered obsolete by successful siting approval, which would require submission of another sig
mod application. (
Id
.) The Board agreed that ILI’s claimed hardship outweighed the public
interest in having ILI comply with the September 18, 1994 deadline for submission of a sig
mod application and granted a variance until September 18, 1995. (PCB 94-200 at 5.)
ILI maintains that it was unable to comply by September 18, 1995 as the granting of
local siting approval was not complete. Thus, ILI would have been required to file a sig mod
application for the facility as the facility existed and a second sig mod application would have
been necessary when the siting process was complete. ILI states:
Being required to prepare multiple permit applications, at a potential cost
approaching several hundred dollars when one will potentially suffice is an
arbitrary and unreasonable hardship. Not only would it be a hardship for ILI in
terms of the timing and cost but potentially would also result in Agency review
and issuance of a separate permit for significant modification which would
become obsolete at about the same time as issued.
(Am.Pet. at 12.)
ILI maintains that the requested variance will have no effect on the environment as ILI
is required to continue to comply with its existing permits. (Am.Pet. at 10.)
CONSISTENCY WITH FEDERAL LAW
ILI asserts and the Agency agrees that granting this variance would be consistent with
federal law. (Am. Pet. at 12; Am. Rec. at 4.)
COMPLIANCE PLAN
ILI’s plan for compliance is to file the sig mod application by the end of the variance
period. (Am.Pet. at 10-11.) A number of the components of the sig mod application have
been prepared in conjunction with the siting approval application. (
Id
.) Further, ILI
maintains that the only alternatives for compliance, other than submission of two sig mod
applications, would be to seek a site-specific change in the rule. (Am.Pet. at 11.) ILI
believes that such relief would be more extensive than necessary for ILI. (
Id
.)
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION
The Agency “generally concurs” with the facts as presented by ILI in ILI’s amended
petition for variance. (Am. Rec. at 3.) The Agency “acknowledges” the duplicative nature of
filing two sig mod applications as well as the “arduous” task for both ILI and the Agency in
preparing and reviewing two sig mod applications. (Am.Rec. at 4.) The Agency “believes
that ILI’s requested relief is reasonable in duration, particularly when taking into consideration
the extenuating circumstances beyond ILI’s control.” (Am. Rec. at 4.) Therefore, the
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Agency recommends that ILI be granted a variance until September 18, 1996 to file its sig
mod application. (Ag. Rec. at 5.)
OBJECTORS
The testimony at hearing indicated that the adjacent farm of Mr. Regan has been
experiencing ponding on areas of the farm. (Tr. at 16.) In addition, the drainage tile for that
area is clogged with clay. (Tr. at 17.) The ponding and drainage problems are caused by the
landfill according to Mr. Regan, Mr. Sam Martin and Mr. Allen Decker. The problems have
resulted in a loss of crops from Mr. Regan’s farm. (Tr. at 18.)
Mr. Regan in his written comment asserts that ILI has a history of noncompliance with
the Board’s regulations and the provisions of the previous variance. (P.C. 1-2.) Mr. Regan
also asserts that ILI has not demonstrated that the claimed hardship outweighs the public
interest in attaining compliance. (P.C. 3-4.) Mr. Regan argues that the Board should deny the
requested variance. (
Id
.)
The Board is not persuaded that the objections raised by Mr. Regan have a direct
bearing on the variance requested by ILI. ILI is requesting the variance so that it may submit
one sig mod permit application to the Agency, rather than two. Mr. Regan’s objection is
based on allegations that, if found to be true, could lead to a finding that ILI has not operated
the landfill according to Illinois environmental law and Board regulations. However, the
Board does not make such findings in a variance proceeding. Rather, the finding that ILI may
have violated environmental law would be made in an enforcement proceeding.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of a variance has been stated many times by the Board and the courts. In
Monsanto Company v. Pollution Control Board, (June 1, 1977), 67 Ill.2d 276, 10 Ill. Dec.
231, 367 N.E.2d 684, 688, the Supreme Court, in determining whether variances can be
permanent, stated that the Act’s ultimate goal is for all polluters to be in compliance and that
“[t]he variance provisions afford some flexibility in regulating speed of compliance, but a total
exemption from the statute would free a polluter from the task of developing more effective
pollution-prevention technology”. The Appellate Court, citing to Monsanto in City of
Mendota v. Pollution Control Board, (3rd Dist. 1987), 112 Ill. Dec. 752, 757, 514 N.E.2d
218, stated “[t]he variance provisions of the Act are intended to afford some flexibility in
regulating the speed for compliance.” Finally the Appellate Court in Celotex Corporation v.
Illinois Pollution Control Board (4th Dist. 1978), 65 Ill. App. 3rd 776, 22 Ill. Dec. 474, 382
N.E.2d 864, 866, phrased the purpose as “[t]he issues in a variance proceeding focus upon
whether compliance should be excused for a period of time.”
The Board previously found a hardship which outweighed the public interest was
present for ILI. (PCB 94-200 at 5.) ILI has diligently sought siting approval during the time
that the original variance was in place and has been granted such approval. In this proceeding
ILI has committed to compliance no later than September 18, 1996. Therefore, the Board
finds that the hardship involved in submitting two significant modification permit applications
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outweighs the public interest in achieving immediate compliance. ILI is operating under
permits and ILI maintains it is complying with those permits. Therefore, granting this
variance will have no environmental impact at this time.
Retroactive Variance
ILI has requested a retroactive variance. The Board has determined that in the absence
of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the Board renders variances effective on the date
the Board order is issued. (LCN Closers, Inc. v. EPA, (July 27, 1989), PCB 89-27, 101 PCB
283, 286; Borden Chemical Co. v. EPA, (December 5, 1985), PCB 82-82, 67 PCB 3, 6; City
of Farmington v. EPA, (February 20, 1985), PCB 84-166, 63 PCB 97; Hansen-Sterling Drum
Co. v. EPA, (January 24, 1985), PCB 83-240, 62 PCB 387, 389; Village of Sauget v. EPA,
(December 15, 1983), PCB 83-146, 55 PCB 255, 258; Olin Corp. v. EPA, (August 30,
1983), PCB 83-102, 53 PCB 289, 291.) Although the Board does not generally grant
variances retroactively, upon specific justification retroactive variances have been granted.
(Deere & Co. v. EPA, (September 8, 1988), PCB 88-22, 92 PCB 91.) The Board stated that
the reasoning behind the general rule is to discourage untimely filed petitions for variance, i.e.
variances filed after the start of the claimed arbitrary or unreasonable hardship creating the
desire for a retroactive start, and because the failure to request relief in a timely manner is a
self-imposed hardship. (Fedders-USA v. EPA, (April 6, 1989), PCB 86-47, 98 PCB 15, 19,
DMI, Inc. v. EPA, (February 23, 1987), PCB 88-132, 96 PCB 185, 187 and American
National Can Co. v. EPA, (August 31, 1989), PCB 88-203, 102 PCB 215, 218.)
Timeliness of filing is a primary factor in considering “special circumstances”. First in
considering “special circumstances” the Board has routinely refused to apply a retroactive
inception date where either the petitioner filed late without explanation or where delay resulted
through some fault of the petitioner. LCN Closers, Inc., 101 PCB 283, 286; DMI, Inc., 96
PCB 185, 187; Borden Chemical Co., 67 PCB 3, 6; City of Farmington, 63 PCB 97, 98;
Hansen-Sterling Drug Co., 62 PCB 387, 389; Village of Sauget, 55 PCB 255, 258; Olin
Corp., 53 PCB 288, 291. Second, a “principle consideration in the granting of retroactive
relief is a showing that the petitioner has diligently sought relief and has made good faith
efforts at achieving compliance”. (Deere, 92 PCB 91.)
The Board finds that granting this variance from September 18, 1995 is consistent with
the Board’s previous decisions as ILI has timely and diligently sought relief. This case is
similar to Land and Lakes Company v. IEPA, PCB 96-198 (September 5, 1996), (Land and
Lakes) where the requested relief was mostly retroactive. In Land and Lakes, the Board
granted the relief because of the nature of the regulation involved, the diligence Land and
Lakes had shown and the similarities shared by Land and Lakes and other petitioners who have
received variances from these regulations. (Land and Lakes at 6.) ILI filed a petition
requesting an extension of its variance almost one hundred days prior to the expiration of the
variance. ILI did not receive siting approval until November 1995, over a month after the
expiration of the prior variance. Thus, the ILI timely sought the extension of the prior
variance while pursuing local siting approval. Therefore, retroactive relief is appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
ILI has diligently sought siting approval for expansion of ILI’s landfill during the
period of the previous variance. ILI has demonstrated that submission of a significant
modification permit for the ILI facility by September 18, 1995 would have been an arbitrary
and unreasonable hardship. Further, the record demonstrates that the granting of the variance
will have no adverse environmental impact. Therefore, the Board grants ILI a retroactive
variance for submission of ILI’s significant modification permit application beginning on
September 18, 1995 and ending September 18, 1996.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
ORDER
Illinois Landfill Inc. is hereby granted a variance from 35 Ill. Adm. Code 814.104(c)
which begins on September 18, 1995 and terminates on September 18, 1996.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
If petitioner chooses to accept this variance subject to the above order, within 45 days
of the date of this order, petitioner shall execute and forward to:
Robert J. Scherschligt
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
P.O. Box 19276
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield, Illinois 62794-9276
a Certification of Acceptance and Agreement to be bound to all terms and conditions of this
variance, and such certification shall be in the form specified by the Board. The 45 day period
shall be held in abeyance during any period that this matter is appealed. Failure to execute and
forward the Certificate within 45 days renders this variance void and of no force and effect as
a shield against enforcement of the rules from which this variance is granted.
CERTIFICATION
I (We), , hereby accept and agree to be bound by all
terms and conditions of the order of the Pollution Control Board in PCB 95-162, September
19, 1996.
Petitioner _____________________________________
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Authorized Agent ______________________________
Title _________________________________________
Date ______________________________
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/41 (1994)) provides for
the appeal of final Board orders within 35 days of the date of service of this order. The Rules
of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements. (See also 35 Ill.Adm.Code
101.246 "Motions for Reconsideration.")
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that
the above order was adopted on the _____ day of ___________, 1996, by a vote of
______________.
___________________________________
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board