ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    December 3,
    1981
    ZYX DIXON CORP.,
    )
    )
    Petitioner,
    V.
    ILLINOIS
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    PCB 81—167
    Respondent,
    and
    COUNTY OF LEE,
    )
    Intervenor.
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by 3, Anderson):
    On November 19,
    1981 the Board directed the parties to this
    action to brief the applicability to and effect of SB
    172, P.A.
    82—0682.
    A brief was filed by each party on December 1,
    1981.
    As previously noted, ZYX submitted an application for a
    permit to develop a hazardous waste storage site to the Agency on
    July
    13,
    1981
    (Rec.
    Ex.
    1).
    The facility is to be located near
    Amboy
    in unincorporated Lee County, and it anticipates accepting
    waste from facilities
    located in Illinois,
    not necessarily
    restricted to Lee County
    (ZYX Appeal of October 27,
    1981 at 2).
    The Agency denied the permit on October
    8,
    1981
    (Rec.
    Ex.
    16).
    ZYX filed
    its appeal before the Board on October 27,
    1981.
    On November 12,
    1981,
    the Governor certified SB 172,
    P.A.
    82—0682,
    “An Act relating to the location of sanitary landfills
    and hazardous waste disposal sites.”
    The act states that “no
    permit for the development or construction of a new regional
    pollution control facility may be granted by the Agency unless
    the applicant submits proof to the Agency that the location of
    said facility has been approved by the County Board...if
    the
    facility is to be located in
    an unincorporated area.”
    A “new
    regional pollution control facility” is one
    “initially permitted
    for development or construction after July 1,
    1981.”
    There is no argument that the ZYX site is not
    a “new regional
    pollution control facility” within the meaning of the Act.
    The
    Agency and Lee County contend that the new county approval require-
    ment must be satisfied by ZYX before a permit can be issued, and
    44—19 1
    z
    that this appeal should be dismissed.
    ZYX argues that the
    new
    requirement should not be applied to it,
    and that this appeal
    should proceed.
    The Board is persuaded by the authority cited by
    the Agency,
    and will dismiss this action.
    Hogan v. Bleeker,
    29 Ill.2d 181,
    184
    (1963) establishes the
    proposition that
    “As
    a general rule...statutes will not be construed
    retroactively unless it clearly appears
    such is the
    legislative intention.
    But this general rule is not
    ordinarily applied to statutes which relate merely
    to remedies and forms of procedure and which do not
    affect substantive rights”
    (citations omitted).
    The statute applies to this action under either rule.
    On July
    1,
    1981 SB 172 was passed by the legislature.
    It
    defined “new regional pollution control facility” as one “not
    permitted on or before July 1,
    1981,” after which local approval
    certification was a requirement for Agency permit issuance.
    The
    Governor’s amendatory veto message of September
    24,
    1981 speci-
    fically referred to this date, stating clarifIcation was needed,
    as
    “Only those new sites seeking first—time approval after July
    1,
    1981 should be included.”
    The Senate accepted this amendatory
    veto with the July
    1 date on October 15,
    1981,
    as did the House
    on October 28,
    1981.
    The changes were certified by the Governor
    November
    12,
    1981.
    Senate Bill 172 contains no savings clause.
    As the Supreme
    Court noted in Board of Education v. Brittini,
    11 Ill.2d 411,
    143,
    N.E.2d 555,
    557—8
    (1957):
    “The legislature unquestionably knew of this Court’s
    holdings...to the effect that unless there
    is a
    savings clause all pending actions must abate unless
    in conformity with the amendatory act...
    There is no
    difference whether the cases were in the administrative
    stage,
    as here, or the court of record state... w)here
    a law is changed and given retroactive effect,
    reservation of any proceeding or parts thereof had
    under the old law must be expressly manifested”
    (citations omitted).
    In addition, the statute being given retroactive effect
    relates to changes in procedures.
    The Supreme Court has con-
    sistently directed that “such statutes should be complied with
    as far as is practicable in all pending and undetermined causes.”
    McQueen
    V.
    Conner, 385 Ill.
    455,
    459
    (1944).
    See also Nelson v.
    Miller,
    11 Ill.2d 378,
    143 N.E.2d 673
    (1957)
    and cases cited
    therein.
    44—192
    3
    It
    is the Board’s opinion that SB
    172 deprives the Agency of
    statutory authority to grant the permit
    in question here unless
    and until
    it receives certification of
    local approval.
    It is
    also the Board’s belief that the Board itself would
    lack statutory
    authority to order the Agency to issue this permit in contravention
    of SB 172’s requirements, even were the Board to find that the
    permit was improperly denied
    for the reasons stated pursuant to
    the Act as
    it existed October
    8,
    1981.
    While the unanticipated and unintended fundamental procedural
    flaws in this action could conceivably be cured by supplementation
    of the record consistent with Section 40(c)
    of the Act,
    the Board
    believes that all parties are ill—served by such course of action.
    The parties’ Section 41 right to a speedy appeal of this Order
    would be prejudiced by the resulting delay,
    and proper computation
    on remand of the statutory deadlines for various actions by local
    authorities, the Agency,
    and the Board would be rendered nearly
    impossible amidst the inevitable welter of argument concerning
    legislative intent under such peculiar, unimagined circumstances.
    Issuance of
    a permit by operation of
    law as a result of
    administrative uncertainty would run absolutely counter
    to the
    legislature’s intent in its passage of SB
    172.
    For the foregoing reasons, this appeal
    is dismissed.
    IT
    IS SO ORDERED.
    I, Christan L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
    Control Board,
    hereby certify that the above Order was adopted on
    the
    ~2~°
    day of
    Af~t~4~~Vt__
    ,
    1981 by a vote of
    ~‘—O
    Christan L. Moffe
    ,/~lerk
    Illinois Pollution
    b’ntrol Board
    44—193

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