ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL
    BO1~RD
    January 14, 1976
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC~ION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Complainant,
    )
    v.
    )
    PCB 75—278
    BOYD WITVOET, SR.,
    )
    Respondent.
    Messrs. Marvin
    I. Medintz and Jeffrey Herden, Assistant
    Attorneys General, appeared for the Complainant;
    Mr. Frank
    E.
    Glowacki, Attorney, appeared for the Respondent.
    OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by Mr.
    Zeitlin):
    This matter is before the Board on a formal Complaint filed
    by the Attorney General on July 21,
    1975, alleging that Respondent
    operated a solid waste management site in Cook County,
    Illinois,
    without the required operating permits from the Environmental
    Protection Agency
    (Agency.),
    in violation of Sections 21(b)
    and 21(e)
    of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Act),
    and Rule 202 (b) (1)
    of the
    Board~sSolid Waste Regulations.
    Ill.
    Rev. Stat.,
    Ch.
    111—1/2,
    SS 1021(e).,
    1021(b)
    (1975); PCB Regs., Chapter
    7:
    Solid Waste,
    Rule 202(b) (1).
    An Amended Complaint filed September 30,
    1975, added
    an additional count alleging violation of Section 21(b) of the Act
    and Rule 314(f)
    of Chapter
    7,
    in that Respondent was alleged to have
    operated the same site in such a manner as to allow the infestation
    of the surrounding area with vectors
    (cockroaches).
    A hearing was
    held on October 17,
    1975,
    in Chicago.
    The record in this matter shows clearly that Respondent operated
    the site in question without the required permits from the Agency.
    Respondent himself admitted accepting refuse at the site for a fee
    and that, although a permit application had once been submitted to
    the Agency, no permits had ever been received,
    (R.
    7,
    8,
    33,
    38,
    39).
    Respondent did not ever consider closing the site after the permit
    application had been denied by the Agency in 1974,
    (R.
    34).
    Instead,
    Respondent testified that the site was closed on October 15, 1975,
    two days before the hearing in this matter and several months after
    the original Complaint had been filed,
    (R.
    7).
    Respondent also
    admitted that he was aware of the permit requirement,
    (R.
    30—32).
    19
    673

    —2—
    We have no difficulty finding a violation of the permit require-
    ment from August
    27,
    1974 until October 15,
    1975 and, therefore,
    violation of Section 21(e) of the Act and Rule 202(b) (1) of Chapter 7.
    (In accord with substantial Board precedent, the allegation of violation
    of Section 21(b) of the Act as regards this permit violation will be
    dismissed.)
    Nor do we have any difficulty in finding a violation of Rule 314(f)
    of Chapter
    7.
    In addition to considerable citizen testimony on the
    subject, the Attorney General ably presented testimony and exhibits
    from Agency and Cook County Department of Public Health employees
    showing that:
    1.
    There were large numbers of cockroaches on
    Respondent’s site
    (e.g.,
    R.
    48,
    74, Compi.
    Ex.
    7,
    9).
    2.
    There was a significant infestation of the
    area surrounding the site,
    (e.g.,
    R.
    11,
    16,
    19,
    23).
    3.
    The site
    in question was the source of the
    cockroaches infesting the site’s neighbors,
    (e.g.,
    R.
    14,
    15,
    21,
    48).
    The citizen testimony at hearing indicated that the problem here
    is quite serious
    One witness testified that it was necessary to
    protect a child’s crib with insect netting,
    (R.
    16).
    Another stated
    that,
    to control the insects,
    it was necessary to use chemicals harmful
    to her children,
    (R. 19).
    Other citizen testimony indicated that
    massive numbers of very large cockroaches,
    (see Compl.
    Ex.
    7, consisting
    of bottled specimens),
    infested the area, considerably interfering with
    the normal enjoyment of life and property in the area of the site.
    Turning to the factors in S33(c) of the~Act,we find the following:
    1.
    The character and degree of the injury caused by Respondent’s
    violations was significant.
    The Permit System is designed by the Board
    to protect against just the sort of injury seen here,
    and Respondent’s
    wilifull operation without the required permits adds to the magnitude
    of such injury.
    2.
    The social and economic value of a properly permitted and
    operated solid waste management site cannot be questioned.
    Here,
    however, there was evidence that the site,
    in addition to failing to
    have the required permit, was not operated properly.
    Respondent failed
    to properly cover the refuse accepted at the site,
    (R.
    44), apparently
    adding to the vector problem.
    Roaches were seen to be emerging from
    the soil on the site,
    (R.
    48,
    74,
    79).
    The social and economic value
    of an improperly run site,
    leading to the problems seen here,
    is
    considerably diminished when weighed against the damage caused by such
    operation.
    19—674

    —3—
    3.
    The
    operation
    of
    this
    site,
    in
    light
    of
    the
    problems
    caused
    by such operation was, under the circumstances, patently unsuitable
    for the area in question.
    We need not judge the suitability of a
    properly permitted and operated site for the area in question here;
    this site was unpermitted and improperly operated.
    Because the problems
    here began within the last three or four years,
    and because the permit
    violation dates only from August 27,
    1974, priority in location is not
    in issue here.
    4.
    Nor is the technical practicality and economic reasonableness
    of eliminating the vector problem in issue.
    Respondent agreed at the
    hearing that,
    should the Board find that there is
    a vector problem, he
    would engage professional exterminators to eliminate it,
    (R.
    94).
    As
    regards the permit violation, we find that where
    a
    site is
    suitable for
    operation as a sanitary landfill,
    it
    is both economically reasonable
    and technically practical to obtain the required permits.
    Looking next to the defenses raised by Respondent,
    we find them
    to be without merit.
    Respondent first claimed that he could not
    properly be charged here,
    as the site in question is operated by a
    partnership of which he
    is only one member.
    While the Hearing Officer
    acted improperly in denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on this
    ground at hearing,
    (such motion should have been referred to the Board),
    the issue is nonetheless moot.
    Respondent admitted full responsibility
    for the operation of the site
    (R.
    7), as a partner, and can be held
    individually responsible.
    Nor in any case
    is there a requirement that
    the Board have before it all the partners in this type of situation.
    Respondent then pointed to efforts that he had made to control the
    vector problem.
    The testimony showed that Respondent’s efforts were
    notably without success, and were weak at best.
    Respondent was sure of
    neither the name of the “chemical outfit,”
    (R.
    25-26),
    that he asked for
    advice, nor the name of the chemicals that he ultimately used,
    (R.
    25-27).
    In light of the problems testified to, Respondent’s occasional sprayings
    over limited areas
    (active areas only)
    of the site were clearly
    insufficient.
    Respondent also attempted to show that there were other landfills
    in the area, apparently in an effort to prove that the vectors may have
    come from such other sites.
    In light of the direct testimony elicited
    by the Attorney General, any such proof would have had to have been of
    considerable weight; it was, on the contrary, quite weak.
    In fact,
    Respondent never attempted to show anything except the bare existence
    of
    such
    other
    sites.
    19
    675

    —4—
    Respondent last attempted to show that the site in question
    accepted only “clean” fill,
    such as demolition debris.
    While Respondent
    may have felt that the fill he accepted at the site should not cause
    a vector problem, the testimony at hearing showed that it in fact did
    cause the problem.
    One Agency witness testified that the berm around
    Respondent’s site was composed of a combination of dirt and “wrecking
    material”; the same witness observed multitudes of cockroaches emerging
    from cracks in the berm, and the antennae of many others visible just
    below the surface,
    (R.
    48).
    In light of the factors discussed above,
    including the testimony
    and evidence presented at hearing, the considerations in S33(c)
    of the
    Act and Respondent’s attempted defenses, we find that a penalty of $1,500
    is appropriate here.
    $1,000 is necessary,
    we feel,
    to aid in protecting
    the permit system set up under the Act and our Rules; the additional $500
    is necessary to aid in the enforcement of our Rule on vectors, particularly
    in light of the seriousness of the problem here.
    In addition, we shall
    take Respondent up on his offer
    to retain professional help in eliminating
    that problem, and order him to do so.
    Since Respondent has already closed the site, our cease and desist
    order will present no hardship;
    we shall also require that the site remain
    closed until the problems here have been remedied.
    It appears that
    Respondent has filled the site to two—thirds of the original 150,000
    yard capacity which it had after Respondent’s original use of the site
    for sand extraction,
    CR.
    93).
    While we find a violation of Rule 314(f), we must dismiss the
    alleged violation of Section 21(b)
    of the Act in connection with the
    vector problem.
    Operation in violation of Rule
    314(f) cannot be equated
    with the operation of an open dump,
    or with open dumping.
    This Opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of
    law of the Board in this matter.
    ORDER
    IT
    IS
    THE ORDER OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD that:
    1.
    Respondent Boyd Witvoet,
    Sr., is found to have
    operated a solid waste management site in Cook County,
    Illinois, without the required permits from the Environ-
    mental Protection Agency, and in such a manner as to cause
    a vector problem,
    in violation of Section 21 (e) of the
    Environmental Protection Act,. and Rules 202(b) (1) and
    314(f) of Chapter
    7: Solid Waste,
    or the Pollution Control
    Board Rules and Regulations.
    19
    676

    —5—
    2.
    Respondent shall pay as a penalty for the
    aforesaid violations the sum of Fifteen Hundred
    Dollars
    ($1,500.00), payment to be made by certified
    check or money order within thirty
    (30) days of the
    date of this Order,
    to:
    Environmental Protection Agency
    Fiscal Services Division
    2200 Churchill Road
    Springfield, Illinois
    62706
    3.
    Respondent shall continue to cease and desist
    all operations at said solid waste management site until
    the aforesaid violations have been remedied.
    Such
    violations shall have been remedied when Respondent has
    received all appropriate permits for said site from the
    Environmental Protection Agency.
    4.
    Respondent shall engage the services of
    professional exterminators, to eliminate all vector
    problems on said site,
    in conformity with all applicable
    Rules and Regulations of this Board.
    I, Christan L. Moffett,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
    Control Board,
    hereby certify the above Opinion and Order w re
    adopted on the
    Ji44’
    day of
    ,
    1976 by a vote of
    -o
    Illinois Pollution
    Board
    19
    677

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