ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
September
6,
1984
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTiON AGENCY,
)
)
Complainant,
PCB 82—154
CITY OF MOLINE,
)
Respondent.
MS.
ANNE
L.
RAPKIN
(ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND MR.
E. WILLIAM
HUTTON APPEARED ON BEHALF OF COMPLAINANT.
MR. RICHARD
3.
KISSEL OF MARTIN, CRAIG, CHESTER & SONNENSCHEIN
AND MR. LARRY A WOODWARD, CITY ATTORNEY, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by 3.
Marlin):
This matter comes before the Board upon a December 30,
1982
complaint filed by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
alleging that the City of Moline
(Moline) operated its
North Slope sewage treatment plant
(North Slope)
in
such
a
manner
as
to
violate
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
~ct
(Act)
and
various
water
regulations
under
35
Iii.
Adm.
Code
302,
304
and
309,
These alleged violations were to have occurred approximately
between
a
three
year
period,
1979
to
1982.
An
Amended
Complaint
filed on April
21,
1983
alleged
that
Moline
dumped
sewer
cleanings
into
a
storm sewer between January
10 and 20,
1983.
Hearings
were
held on December 13 and
14,
1983 in Moline, Illinois~
Members
of
the public and press attended.
Preliminary
Issues
Moline contends that
it
had a binding oral contractual
agreement
with the Agency which provided that the Agency would
not
enforce the Act against Moline while Moline was in the
grants
program.
(Resp. Brief at
1,
8.)
Moline supports this contention
by
referring to the testimony of Agency personnel who were pre-’
sent
at meetings between the Agency and Moline on September
9,
1980
(Resp. Brief at
6 citing R.
181) and May 12,
1982
(Resp.
Brief
at
11,
12).
Moline also cites the answer of Mr. Brom that
he
thought Moline was doing what it could to comply
(Resp,
Brief
at
7
citing
R.
328).
60-01
In the first place, the Board finds that there was no contract
between the parties.
The Agency does not have the authority to
enter into such a contract,
“It is fundamental that an Agency
charged with implementation of a statutory framework ordinarily
possesses no authority to deviate from or abdicate its statutory
responsibilities.”
~
19 ERC
2091,
2096
(6th Cir,
1983).
Although the Agency may use its
discretion to delay an enforcement case when a grant proposal
is
pending, this conduct neither constitutes a binding contractual
agreement nor estops the Agency in an enforcement proceeding~
The proper vehicle for obtaining relief, in such cases
is the
variance procedure provided for in Section 35 of the Act,
Moline
could have sought a variance at any time,
if it determined that
immediate compliance would cause it to suffer arbitrary or
unreasonable hardship,
Moline did not seek a variance.
Secondly, even if one assumes that there was a contract,
a
contract to continue to violate the law is fundamentally illegal~
Was~yv. Hammer,
223 U.S.
85,
32
S. Ct,
187
(1912),
Contracts
to do that which
is unlawful are
void,
A contract of the nature
alleged by Moline would be inconsistent with the right of the
public to a healthful environment
(ILL. CONST,
art,
XI,
§
2), the
policy of the Clean Water Act
(33
U~S.C. S 1251 et
~.),
and the
Illinois Environmental
Protection
Act
(Ill.
Rev.
Stat,
1983, ch~
111½, parse
1002,
1011).
Furthermore, i~wo~T~
be against public
policy
(ILL, CONST,
art,
XI,
§
1).
~
383 Ill~ 454,
50 N,E,2d 467
(1943).
Similarly, the Agency personnel
have no authority to bind
the State
to such an illegal agreements
Thirdly, the Clean Water Act
(33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et ~
pro-~
vides that municipalities shall meet Section 301 effluent standards
(Id.
§
1311).
This
is accomplished by the Section 402 NPDES
permit system and may be financed by the awarding of Title
Ii
federal grants for pollution control equipment
(Id.
§5 1342,
1282).
Even though Moline was in the grant program,
it must
comply with the effluent standards where
it was technically and
financially able.
The receipt
of grant
funding is not a condition
precedent to the duty
to comply with effluent standards~ State
Water Control Board v. Train,
559 F.2d 921,
924
(4th Cir, 1977)~
U~S.v.WavneCou~~~ra.
If it were,
the Agency “would be
pragmatically restricted to seeking compliance only in actions
where it would guarantee federal funds to effect the compliance
judgments obtained,
This was patently not the intent of
C~ongress~”Id. at 2096.
Fourthly, Moline
repeatedly refers
to the inaction of the
Agency (Moline
“Reply” Brief,
4,
7,
10,
38) and appears to imply
that the defenses of estoppel,
waiver
and laches would bar this
proceedings
In ~
.
Amoco Oil
Corn an
,
580
F.
Supp.
1042
(W,D, Missouri,
1984)
(ruling
on a
motion for Summary Judgment)
60~O2
suit was not filed until
four and one-half years after the first
of the alleged ‘violations occurred,
the court rejected the very
same arguments.
The court found the following:
1)
laches does
not apply where the government
is acting in its sovereign
capacity;
2)
there is no estoppel
in the absence of some af-
firmative misconduct on the part of the government;
and 3) no
defense of waiver can be asserted against the government since
“public officers have no power or authority to waive the enforce~
merit of the law on behalf
of the public.”
580 F.
Supp. at 1050.
The Board finds that~likewise Moline has not shown a valid defense
to this proceeding.
Although the Amoco Oil court stated that
“failure to take action more promptly may arguably have some
bearing on the amount of any penalty to be imposed,” the Board
has already considered this
in setting the penalty.
An Agency motion filed February
14,
1984 requested the Board
to reverse certain hearing officer rulings.
The Agency asserts
that Respondent~sExhibit 81/ should not be admitted because
it
was hearsay, that
it contained hearsay, and that it referred to
the issue of enforcement,
Under the business records exception
of the hearsay rule located at 35
Ill. Adm. Code
103.208, the
lack of knowledge of the entrant goes to the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility.
This rule
is more liberal than either the
federal or state rules and should be read in conjunction with 35
Ill, Adm.
Code 103.204.
However, Respondent~s
Exhibit
8 does
contain enforcement decisions,
A Board Order dated November
3.
1983 provides that “questions as to when and how the Agency
and/or the Attorney General choose to take enforcement action
would be irrelevant,”
Although the respondent may offer mitigating
evidence, this evidence must not be contained in documents relating
to enforcement decisions,
The Board therefore reverses the
ruling of the hearing officer and denies admission of Respondent~s
Exhibit
8.
Regarding Respondent~sExhibit
9, the ruling of the hearing
officer
is reversed for the same reasons supporting exclusion of
Respondent~sExhibit 8.
Regarding Count V1
the Agency attempted to introduce as
evidence the testimony of the Agency~srecords witness Mr. Callaway
and proposed C.
Exh,
12,
Moline objected and the hearing officer
denied their admission,
The Agency
proceeded with an offer of
proof.
The Agency requests that the Board reverse the ruling of
the hearing officer and accept the offer of proof and the exhibit
as evidence.
The Board finds that to allow the offer of proof
and the exhibit as evidence would unduly surprise Moline.
The
Complainant had almost one year to fulfill its duty to disclose
that it would present a
records
witness and the Respondent had a
right to depose that witness before trial,
The order of the
hearing officer is affirmed.
T~e~pondent’sExhibits are incorrectly marked Petitioner’s
Exhibits;
e.g., Resp.
Exh,
8 is
marked Pet,
Exh.
8,
60-~03
The Agency also requests that the Board overrule the hearing
officer
in denying admission to part of the Agency investigator’s
response at page 99 of the transcript.
There is too much
subjectivity, uncertainty, and a lack of connecting up in the
investigator’s “appeared
.
.“
answer,
The hearing officer
ruling is hereby affirmed.
in a similar vein, Complainant~sGroup Exhibit 11,
photograph 4~3was properly denied admission by the hearing
officer,
Although this photo is what the investigator saw on
January 20,
1983,
it was not connected up to any particular
occurrence relating to this enforcement action,
Regarding the Agency motion at hearing to amend the complaint
on its face to include January
6,
1983 in the sewer cleaning
counts
(VI,
VII,
VIII), the hearing officer is affirmed.
The
Agency under 35
111. Mm.
Code 103.210 could amend the complaint
as
long as there was no undue
surprise.
There appear to have
been many dates and different
places
discussed relating to alleged
sewer cleaning
(R.
142).
The Agency had time to amend the
complaint before trial and that to do so at hearing would have
evoked undue surprise.
The offer of proof containing Mr.
Hill’s
testimony is denied.
Regarding the admissibility of the testimony of James Huff,
the hearing officer
ruled that his qualifications
as an expert
were subject to the
qualifications of
the individuals he relied
on being established
(R.
278-9),
Moline offered the resumes of
three individuals who purportedly were experts as Respondent’s
Exhibits
4,
5 and
6 for identification and the Agency objected
hearsay grounds
(R,
284),
The Board notes that if the resumes
were offered to show that Mr.
Huff is an expert, then the
tendered documents are hearsay.
However, where there
is a joint
report and the joint author resumes are offered to support its
validity, then the resumes are admissible,
Any questions would
go the weight of the evidence,
Herein, the
hearing officer’s
conditional ruling was erroneous,
The question of whether Mr.
Huff
is an expert is an independent question and should not be
subject to the establishment of the qualifications of the joint
study authors that he relied upon.
Respondent’s Exhibits
4,
5
and 6, the resumes of the joint study authors are admitted as
evidence to support the validity of the joint study but not to
show that Mr. Huff is an expert.
The testimony of Mr. Huff
is
hereby admitted as expert based on the qualifications in his
resume and testimony
(Respondent~sExhibit
3,
R.
289~90).
Discussion
The North Slope,
a
secondary treatment
plant located in
Moline,
Illinois was
constructed with
about $3,000,000
in federal
60.fl4
-.5—
grant
funds.
It has
a design
average flow of
5.5 million gallons
per
day
(MGD),
It employs a contact stabilization
mode
of activated
sludge process.
Sewage passes through a bar screen into a wet
well where it is pumped to a splitter
box,
This box divides flow
to two circular primary clarification tanks with any flow over
13.75 MGD sent to three excess flow rectangular primary clarifier
tanks.
From the two circular primary tanks,
flow
is to two
contact aeration tanks wherein microorganisms commonly called
activated sludge digest the sewage nutrients.
From there flow
is
to two square secondary clarifiers where the activated sludge
settles to the bottom.
The effluent from the two square secondary
clarifiers is chlorinated or sent to the excess flow rectangular
primary clarifier tanks for additional settling before discharge
to Sylvan Slough of the Mississippi River,
Meanwhile, the activated sludge
is sent to four reaeration
tanks where they are given a chance to digest the sewage they
picked up in the contact tanks.
After four hours, they are
returned to the two contact aeration tanks to begin a new cycle
and the sludge is purged from the
process,
thickened, and sent to
a sludge holding tank,
Sludge from the two
primary clarification
tanks has already been removed and both sludge types are now
mixed
in the sludge holding
tank,
Sludge
from the tank
is dewatered
onto vacuum filters and
trucked for disposal
off—site.
An average
of 45,000 dry pounds of sludge
per day must
be removed from the
plant to prevent overloading
of the facility
with solids
(C.
Exh.
5),
The North Slope NPDES permit #1L0029947 was issued to Molir,e
on June 22,
1977 for discharge into the Mississippi River and
reissued on February
3,
1983,
The 1977 permit established,
inter
alia, the following discharge
limitations.
Quanti~
Concentration
30-day
7-day
30-day
7-day
avera~
avera~
BOD~
417 kg/day
625 kg/day
20 mg/i
mg
/
1~
TSS
521 kg/day
781 kg/day
25 mg/i
mg
/
I
Fecal Coliform
Daily maximum 400
(No, per 100 ml)
Chlorine Residual
Daily minimum
0.20 mg/I
Daily
miximum 0,75 mg/I
—6—
Attachment A, paragraphs 2(a), 2(b),
and
2(6) of Respondent’s
NPDES
permit
provides
that
the
plant
be
operated
efficiently,
optimally,
and
with
adequate
operating
staff
to
insure
compliance
with
permit
conditions.
The
ninth
provision
of
the
permit’s
Attachment
B
established
that
if
the
permittee
does
not
comply with
limitations
in
the
permit,
it
should
notify
the
Agency
in writing
Notices
of
Noncompliance
(NON5))
(C.
Exh.
1—A).
(On
February
3,
1983
Respondent’s NPDES permit
was
reissued.
C.
Exh.
1—B.)
The
Agency
alleges violations by t4oline in eight counts.
Count
I alleges that on or about April 1, 1979
through
December
30,
1982,
Moline
discharged
into
Sylvan
Slough
effluent
containing
five-day
biochemical
oxygen
demand
(BODj,
total
suspended
solids
(TSS), fecal coliform bacteria, and residual chlorine (Cl2) in
quantities
and/or
concentrations
in
excess
of
limitations
set
forth in its NPDES
permit,
in
violation
of its
NPDES
permit, 35
Ill. Ada.
Code
309.102, and Section 12(f) of the
Act.
Section
Tiff
)j~ovides:
No person shall:
f.
Cause,
threaten
or
allow
the
discharge
of
any
contaminant into the waters of the State, as defined
herein, including
but
not limited to, waters to any
sewage works, or into any well or from any point source
within
the
State,
without
an
NPDES
permit
for
point
source
discharges
issued
by
the
Agency
under
Section
39(b) of this
Act,
or
in
violation
of
any
term
of
condition imposed by such
permit,
or
in
violation
of
any
NPDES permit filing
requirement
established
under
Section 39(b), or in violation of any regulations
adopted by the
Board
or
of any order adopted by the
Board
with
respect
to
the
NPDES
program.
35
Ifl~~4!•
Code
309.102
provides:
Except as in compliance with the provisions of the Act,
Board regulations, and the CWA, and the provisions and
conditions of the NPDES permit issued to the discharger,
the
discharge
of any contaminant or pollutant by any
person
into
the
waters
of
the
State
from
a
point
source
or
into
a
well
shall
be
unlawful.
This
section
was
later
amended
by
adding
a
subsection
(54
PCB
411, November 18,
1983, R82—10).
The
new
subsection
does
not
change the meaning of the section for
purposes
Of
this
case.
Count
II
alleges
that
on or about
June
12,
1979
through
December
30, 1982 Moline discharged effluent into
Sylvan
Slough
sea
containing
obvious
color,
turbidity and sludge solids in violation
of
35 IlL Adm~Code 3O4~1O6and Section 12(a) of the Act.
Section 12(a) provides:
No person shall:
a,
Cause
or
threaten
or
allow
the
discharge
of
any
contaminants
into
the
environment
in
any
State
so
as
to
cause or tend
to
cause
water
pollution
in Illinois,
either alone or in combination
with
matter
from
other
sources,
or so as
to
violate
regulations
or
standards
adopted by the
Pollution
Control
Board
under
this Act.
35
111.
Adm.
Code
304.106
provides:
In
addition
to
the
other
requirements
of this Part, no
effluent shall
contain
settleable
solids,
floating
debris,
visible
oil,
grease,
scum
or
sludge
solids.
Color,
odor
and
turbidity
must
be
reduced
to
below
obvious
levels.
Count III alleges that on
or about December
11,
1979 through
December
30,
1982
Moline
discharged effluent
so as to
cause
or
allow
the
presence
of
floating debris and
unnatural color in
Sylvan
Slough
in violation
of
35
111. Adm. Code
302.403
and
Section
12(a)
of
the
Act
(~p~).
35 III. Mm.
Code
302.403
provides:
Waters subject to
this
subpart
shall
be
free
from
unnatural
sludge
or
bottom
deposits,
floating
debris,
visible
oil,
odor,
unnatural
plant
or
algal
growth,
or
unnatural
color
or
turbidity0
Count
IV
alleges
that
on
or
about
April
1,
1979 through
December
30,
1982
Moline
failed
to
operate
its
facility as
efficiently
as
possible
and
to provide optimal
operation
and
maintenance
of its
facility
in
violation
of
Attachment
A,
paragraphs
2(a)
and
2(d)
of
its
NPDES permit,
35
Ill. AdSL Code
309.102
(~j~a)
and
Section
12(f)
of
the
Act
(!~2~)~
Count
IV further
alleges
that
on or about
December
21,
1978
through
December 30, 1982
Moline has failed to
provide an
adequate
operating staff
to
carry
out
necessary
activities
at the
facility
in violation
of
Attachment
A,
paragraph
2(b)
of
its
NPDES
permit,
35 Ill. Adm~Code
309,102
(~p~)
and
Section
12(f)
of the Act (sup~a),
Count V alleges
that
on
or
about
July
5,
1980
through
December
30,
1982
Moline
failed
to
inform
the
Agency
that
Moline
did
not
comply
with
effluent
limitations
specified
in
its
NPDES
permit
and failed
to
provide
the
required
information
within
five
60~07
days
of becoming aw~re
of
the
condition
in
violation
of
Attachment
B,
paragrao~
9 of
its NPDES permit,
35
Ill,~Mm, Code 309.102
(~~a),~
Es~tior
12(f)
of
the
Act
(~~ra).
Cour~V~a~.egesthat between January
10
and January
20,
1983
Molire
Thscia~:ed
contaminants
from
storm
drains
into the
Mississ~pp~
Jver
without
an NPDES Permit
in
violation
of Section
12(f)
of btc ~ct (su2~)~
Ccurt
\,~1
a~3ges that between
January
10 and 3anuar~20,
1983
Mo,
cc discharged effluent containing sludge,
solids, un~
natural co
ci
ond odor into storm drains
in vioiatior of
35 111,
Mm,
Cods 30~ 1&6 (s~1~)
and
Section
12(a) of the Act
~uraT,
Coun’
\~IIIalleges that between
January
10 and January
20,
1983 Molin. dl3charged contaminants from storm drains
so a’ to
cause
or allow the presence of sludge, debris,
odor
and nnnatural
color
in the Mississippi
River
in
violation
of
35
111,
Mw.
Code
302.403
(~p~a)and
Section
12(a)
of
the
Act
~
To
prove
a
violation
under
Section
12(a)
of
the Act
complainant
must
show
by
a
preponderance
of
the
evidence
that.
respondent
caused,
threatened
or
allowed
water
pollution.
AllaertRend~fj~Inc~v.IPCB
and
IEPA,
91 Ill,
App~
3d 15~
414
N,E.2d
492
(3d
Dist~
1980),
Regarding Count
I,
the
discharge
monitoring
reports
(C.
Group
Exh.
2)
required
by
law
to be
filed
by
Moline
were
jiOt
rebutted
and
show
that
Moline
has
violated
its
permit
conditions
and
Secti
r
1~
~f) of the
Act
by
discharging
cortaminants in ~ the
enviro~unent
V~o1ations
were
between
April
1,
1979 an~
December
30.
i982,
inclusive,
for
BOD~, TSS,
fecal
coliform
and
Cl~. Thc was
a
45
month
perioth
Th~re were
no BODr violations
during
7’79
817
10/79,
8/82,
9/82,
10/82 and I1/8~
rfthre
were no
~b~i
vi ~‘ationsduring 5/82,
8/82,
10/82 and 11!8e
~ite
fecal colifor~ribacteria
limitation
was
not
violated durinu the
following thirteen months:
4/79,
7/79,
10/79,
12/79,
3/80, 4/~0
5/80,
4/80,
2’81,
2/82,
4/82,
6/82
and
11/82.
Likewise the (12
limitation was not violated during the following eleven mocths
12/79,
3/80
4/80,
7/80,
11/80, 7/81,
5/82,
6/82,
7/82,
9
2?
i
d
11/82,
i~
~ummary, BOD
was
violated
38
months,
TSS
41 i.~cntth
fece
coliform 32 monthL
and Cl2
34 months,
As
for Counts
II and
III,
Moline
attacks
the capabilit~
credib~.
ry,
ana credentials of the Agency investigator
(Res’
Brief
2’
26).
The Board
notes
that
observation
is sufficien~to
deter~nirs
the violations alleged in this
case,
The inves~9at~r~
experierce
~n the field
certainly
qualified
him to comment ~
those
mathers
for
which he testified,
The eyewitness test~mo;iy
(R, 40~68lof the
investigator
as
to
the
visits
and
inspecthone
triroughccf’
a t~eeyear period coupled
with
the
photographs
of
60~08
.im9..
some
of
tho:s
‘isits
is
unrebutted
testimony
that
Moline
violated
the
reaulattons
as
charged
in
Counts
II
and
III.
Supporting
photogrr, h~
ii ~hh1ude
C
Group
Each.
6
#3,
C.
Group
Each.
7
#1
and
#4, C
t~roipflIt
8
*1
tot color, turbidity
and
sludge
solids
violati us.
The l
owing
twelve
days of violatior.s have
been
proven
for
cc’nt
II
6/13/79, 6/29/79, 12/5/79,
12/1.179
6/18/80,
6/25/80
7/30/
1, 9/23/81, 11/12/81, 2/9/82, 4/15/82 and 6/23/82.
Supporti.ig
pliotographc
for
water
quality
violatto is
oL
3cum,
foam.
aa
diecoorat:on
include
C.
Group
Each.
7
#1
and
:
Group
Each.
r
c
The
10’
w..ng
five—days
of
viola
ions
ha’:
bent
prover, to
lrn.t
Il.
12/5/79,
12/11/79, 9/23/81,
i...’i
81 and
2/2/82
Reg~.rdinjthe
alleged
operating
and
nai
.er.ance
~~~‘~
ons
in
Court
IV,
the
Agency
investigator
testified
that
the
North
Slope
was
.esigred
to
accept
sludge
solids
from
th
w’n’
~al
water
filttat’on
plait
CR.
69).
Moline’s
Superirt.ende.t
fo.
Water
Pol
lution
Control
testified
that
the Noth
lope
aecanc.
operational
in
1978.
In
March, 1979
it
began
to
receive
Ludge
solids
from
the
filtration
plant
and
after
six
weeks,
it
became
apparent
that
sludge
transportation
away
frost
the
ftc.
..
.ty
would
be
critically
necessazy
CR.
195).
The
Agercy
investigator
visited
the
North
Slcve
or
Fe’etrber
21,
1978 and again on June 12,
13,
28,
29,
1979
and
fourd
the
pimary
and secondary
clarifiers, the chlorine contact
and
storsreter
settling
tanks
were discharging excessive amounts of sLudqe
R.
32-35).
addatsorally, the sludge thickener aid
thc.
‘act
silter
were rot
it operation
(R.
35, 39-40).
On
December
5,
29 ~ the
invest:c,a.rr Co nd the primary clarifier,
one
conta
t
an)’,
~nd
the
T
rr
I
ecor 1ar~
aifier
inoperable.
“w..
of
h
‘0
t.ormwatst
tanks
were out
CR. 45-46).
Photographs in C
Group Ext
nd
transcript pages 48-49 support the findings of this vii ft.
On
June
:
~
1
‘0
the
investigator
found
excess
mix
d
laauo’
‘t
Ate
activatea
udge
flow
unevenly split
between
tie
tvo
sea
i
ry
~laritiers,
sludge
being
discharged
from
the
south
secondi y
clari!ser
and
bad
color
in
the
activated
sludge/secondary
clarifiers
CR.
52,
53).
On
June
25,
1980
as
on
June
18
the
investijotrr fourd excessive sludge in the
treament
ns
s
and
the fiti’
s.fluent was laced with
sludge
and a
gray-brown
turt
Id
color
CR
.5
56).
The investigator testified
one
year later
that on Jcly 30,
1981 sludge was still being disctarged from the
treatment units and being recycled to the head of the p’art
‘R
58).
“F~
results were the
same
on his
November
12,,
1.981 vis4t
CR. 61).
3n
tebruary
2,
1982
the
investigator
found
that
tie
mechanteal
~peration
of
the
plant
was
almost halted.
FJcw
to
the
primary
clarifier
was
restricted
because
of
exce.sive
solac’.
jammsnr
the
ollector
mechanisms
of
the
various
treatment
cr
ts
CR.
62,
?e
•
On an April
15,
1982 visit there ~asaome
imprcvever’
-
olids
were
6,000
mg/l
in
the
contact
tank
and
1.3
OCO
ng/i
r
the
reaeratlon
tank.
Moline
had
the
vac.i.w
80-09
—10—
operating
at
two
shifts/day
and
had
hired
an
additional
truck
and
driver
to
haul
sludge
away
C65—67).
A return visit on
June
23,
1982
found
elevated sludge levels with 13,000 mg/l solids in the
contact
tank and 26,000 mg/l in the reaeration
tank.
This
elevation
is
corroborated
by
the
DMR’s
•
The
Agency
witness
testified
that
plant
operating
records
showed
that
only 8½
truckloads
of
sludge
per
day
were
hauled
away
in
June
compared
with
10
truckloads
per
day
in
April
CR.
67-69).
Moline
claimed
that
no
reduction
was
made
CR.
222).
The
record
supports
the
Agency
on this
point.
As
to
Count
IV,
Moline
called
as
a
witness
the
manager
of
the
Agency’s
Water
Permit
section,
a
Moline
Superintendent,
and
two
consultants.
Moline
argued
that
it
complied
with
its
NPDES
permit
as
reasonably
as
possible,
adequately,
and
as
efficiently
as
possible
CResp.
Brief
28).
These
arguments
lack
merit
based
on
the
evidence
previously
discussed.
The
Agency
has
met their
burden
as
to
Count IV and the Board finds that Moline has
violated its NPDES permit, Sections l2Cf) and 309.102 for
thirteen days:
12/21/78, 6/12/79, 6/13/79, 6/28/79, 6/29/79,
12/5/79, 6/18/80, 7/30/81,
11/12/81, 2/2/82, 4/15/82 and 6/23/82.
Regarding the violations charged in Count V, the Agency has
not proved
these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence
and therefore no violation is found
CSee Preliminary Issues, p.
2, supra).
Regarding the sewer cleaning Counts VI, VII, and VIII, the
Agency
investigator testified that on January 29, 1983,
based
on
an anonymous phone call, he
visited
Moline’s
Sewer
Maintenance
Department facilities
located
at
39th
Street
and
River
Drive.
There
he
observed
two
Moline
employees
dumping
sewer
cleanings
into
a
storm
sewer.
A
City
of
Moline
pick-up
truck
with
license
M1464
was
perked
there.
The
investigator
also
stated
that
the
cleanings
were
black, had a septic sewage odor and a
strong
chemical solvent odor
CR. 90—102).
One employee testified that
he and
another
employee did
discharge sewer cleanings into
manhole #1 CSee C.
Each.
10) on January 20, 1083
and
that
they
were ordered to do it by their supervisor
CR. 137—139).
Photographs in C. Group
Bach.
11 support the investigator.
The
investigator
testified
further
that
on the
same
day at 3:45 p.m.
he
observed
a
fifty
foot
long
plume
of black liquid along the
south
shore line of the Mississippi River
CR. 98—100).
The
Board
finds
that
by
discharging
the
sewer
cleanings
into
a
storm
sewer,
Moline
violated
the
regulations
charged
in
Counts
VI,
VII and
VIII,
specifically
Sections
l2Ca)
and
Cf) of
the
Act:
caused,
threatened,
or
allowed
the
discharge
of
a
contaminant
into the waters of the state.
Sections 302.403
and
304.106 were
violated because of the visible color and
odor
of the effluent.
60-10
-~11—
~y~tin/Mitin~~rs
Once
violations
are
found,
aggravating
arid
mitigating
factors
are
scrutinized.
A
number
of aggravating factors
add
to
the
seriousness
of
the
violations
in
this cases
The
extent
and
duration
of
the
violations
is an aggravating
factor
itse1f~
TSS
was
discharged
by
a
factor
of
twelve
to
twenty
times
over
the
permit
limit~
Fecal
coliform
bacteria
was
discharged
four
to
eight
times
over
the
limit,
with
instances
of
1,070
and
565
times
the
limit
(C~ Group
Exh~ 2),
Violations
persisted
for
three
years~
Moline
waited
until
“the
eve
of
enforcement”
to
comply
with
the
Act
and
Board
regulations~
An
enforcement
notice
letter
was
mailed
to
Moline
on
September
15,
1982
and
Moline
was
in
compliance
in
Ocotober,
1982
(C~ Exh,
3;
Agency
Brief
32)~
Another
aggravating
factor
is
the
amount
of
financial
savings
realized
by
Moline
by
failing
to
haul
adequate
amounts
of
sludge
from
the
plant~
Complainant~s
Exhibit
9
computes
the
amount
of
sludge
by
subtracting
the
quantity of
TSS
that
could
be
legally
discharged
during
the
42 months of TSS
violations
from
the
quantity
that
was
discharged.
The
quantity
of TSS
discharged
in
excess
of
legal
limits
was
calculated
by the
Agency
as
10,374,577
lbs~
between
April
1979
and
September
1982
(C~ Exh,
9,
Agency
Brief
33)
Molin&s
own
figures
evince
a
higher
amount
of
excess
TSS
discharge.
Based
on
Respondent~sfourth
response
to
complainant~s
second set
of
interrogatories,
Moline must
remove
45,000
dry
pounds
of
sludge
per
day
on
an annual average
from
North
slope
to
prevent
overloading
the
facility
with
solids
(C~ Exh~ 5)~
Between
April
1979
through
September
1982
this
would
amount
to
57,487,500
lbs~ that
should
have
been
removed
at
a
cost
of
$3,050,943.75
(Id.,
Respondent~s
second
response
to
complainant~s
second
request
for
admissions;
Agency
Brief
at
34,
35).
According
to
Respondent~s
third
response
to
complainant~s
second
request
for
admissions,
32,554,000
lbs.
of
TSS
were
removed at a cost of
$1,699,040
(C.
Exh.
5).
The
difference
is
24,933,500
lbs. of
TSS
discharged
in
excess
of
the
legal
limits,
The Agency
calculated
that
Moline
avoided
costs
of
$1,351,903.75
by
failing
to
remove,
transport,
and
dispose
the
quantities
of sludge in excess of
the
legal
limitations
(Id.).
First,
Moline
asserts
that
the conduct
of
the
parties
was
a
mitigating
factor,
This
contractual issue
was
discussed
with
the
preliminary
issues.
The
conduct of the parties herein
was
not
a
mitigating
factor,
Moline
had
an
affirmative
duty
to
correct
deficiencies
at
the
plant
in
order to comply
with
the
legal
limitations
and
failed
in
its duty.
In fact,
Moline
never
even
petitioned
the
Board
for
a
variance from the
legal
limitations,
60~
II
Second,
dol_ne asserts that its improvement eftorts were
mitigating
f~ictor~.
These
efforts
included
purchasing a new
truck2/
~.
Fo~ruary1980
(II,
197)
and additional hoppers
sometime
in
1981
,R.
~
prioritizing
truck
repairs
in i~9i
(Id,),
installing
ttcck tire shields
(Id.), hiring a co~tra~t
hauler
(R.
204~5~and chta
fling extra landfill hours in late
sum’ner 1982
(R.
225).
ii
ncd:tion Moline spent $100,000 to consn:uct a sludge
pad, purdace a tractor loader and initiate conv~vormodification
in 1982
(F.
~)
Mnl~riecn~a~lca~tby May,
1979,
if not seo~
that
sludge
I d
~c’~d
i~
critical to plant oper~t.
~
195~6),
yet
it
m~~kes
tie weak assertion that debugging ani oTher problems
preventec
~i5pur~ation prom being identifleL
it
~weakest
part of
the operition~until September,
1980
(P
~i~i
200). This
case preserta a very simple problem.
If sufficient solids are
not removed
~t~m the treatment plant as sludge
fiat material
will exit with the effluent
causing
permit
viol~ions~ Removing
adequate sludne costs money but allows compliance
IT adequate
sludge r?iroval saves money but causes violatio
s.
~lLne
s
multi~year effort to ~identify” the problem
is a~odds with the
simplicity of the problem.
Moline put off so1ving the elant~s
problems untal
threatened with enforcement, and then quickly came
into compliance. Mcline~slate compliance and lethaicic compliance
efforts are in no way outweighed by the alleged mitigating factors.
The
Board
holds that
Moline
knew
that
its
transportation
and
sludge
hauling was inadequate by May of 1979, could have
corrected
the associated problems within one year, and had the financial
resources
to no so given the fact that it eventu~lF~’
tame
ifltO
complia~
ucjng iTh
OWl
funds,
Th~rd Mol~n~asserts that there was a lad o~env~ronmental
harm
from dc d~schargesand that this is a mTh1c~
ifid
:tor.
The Boar~,u~
weigh tht
S
33(c) factors
in an e~ Lr~i~action
when impc’dnc penalties~
~
PCB,etal.,
64
Ilt.
2d 68
(1976);
Southern Illinois Asj~halt,
et al. v
9Gb
~t al., ~0 Ill.
2d 204,
326 N,E.2d 406
‘1975);
~y~kma~pevPCB,etal,,
60
Ill.
2d 330,
328 N E,2d
c
‘975),
The Board must look to the
reasonableness
of the dincharge.
Moline
expert testified that according to hia ~tudy ot June
1983, no ervironmental harm
occurred
to
the receiving stream,
In
fact, Moline argues that their discharges had a he~efat
(Resp.
Brief,
2~)
The argument is twofold:
(1) that taking sludge
that
wa~forroily discharged into the river from the water
purification plant and transferring
it
to
North
Slope for
treatment
reduced The amount of
sludge
going
into ~he river;
and
(2)
that the devated organic content downstream was beneficial
2/As
ear~
a.~April,
1979~ the
City
petitioned
tic
Agency
for
a
grant for ~ ~rd~se
of an additional truck
(R
at 2d).
This was
denied ~r
n’
at
or
September
and
the
City
final~y
cbtained
one
fcr ~60,0(3
ii
February of
1980.
for
the henthic organLsms, raising the productivity of Molin&s
argument under
(1), Moline assumes that all the sludge from the
purifioiThon
plant
was
effectively
removed
from
the
North
Slope,
transported
and disposed,
The record shows otherwise.
Up to
twenty~fi’~ecillion
pounds
of
sludge
were discharged.
In
fact,
Moline argue~tiat discharging the sludge from the water
filtration pc~fitwas one of
its options
(Resp.
Brief
19,
ftn,
1.)
The water tilfration plant, however, must also neet the
applicabfi ~Ther standards.
As for
(2), testiaony
or. both sides
showed tha
the dficharge point was in an area or
~ift water and
that
sic~fiticat organic deposition was not to
bE’
xpec.ted at
that
poirt
Eton
though there was some deposittcn
J
astream
there is
o evidence of an environmental benefit
r~oinc
argument
ib
not
supported by the record,
The objoi iive of Congress in enacting the ClE’c~
Water Act
and the N~~ESprcgram was to
improve
the
qualitJ
of the nation~s
waterways.
This objective likewise
carries
over
to
the
ttate
Act
and
the
Board~s rules
and
regulations
(Section
Il
of
the
Act),
The fact that the evidence did not show environriEntal harm at the
outfall
is not the issue.
The excessively discharged contaminants
did adversely impact the riverine environment and
the health,
safety and general welfare of the people under t~çtiOnsi1~ 12
and
33(c)
of the Act.
The evidence shows enormous amounts of
contaminants
discharged
over
a
substantial
time
period.
The
Congress and the Illinois General Assembly have determined that
discharges
over
the
legal
limits
as
in
this
case
do
lam
the
environment
and
are
threats
to
the
health,
safety
and
welfare
of
the
people.
For the Board
to
hold
that
there
~
no
adverse
envi:onme~ :~
1~aC~
wbrtsoever,
or
an
envirorr~~ri~ bere~t
as
Moline adc5e~ would be a travesty.
If Moline~
-in
cirents
are
accepted there would remain no reason for contro ling smtlar
dischergoi fi other cities
along
major riverE.
~te re~ult gould
be a sigrtitit~ntattack on the public~sright
L.o uno
n-rd ~r~oy
the water~and contignous properties of the state
The effluent
standards are based on technological achievabalaty.
A violation
is not encused because a discharger has demonstrated,
or tried
to
demonstrate
after the fact”,
that
it has not used up the as—
similatve capacity of
its segment of the receiving
waters~
The
Board does not have t
look for evidence of
a fish kill o; other
signs of degradation.
The water quality standards are an enforce-
able benchmark, not an invitation to abandon the poirt source
effluent standards control strategy for improving water quality.
Another potential mitigating factor is the suitability of
the pdlution source
to the surrounding area under
§
33 c).
There is no doubt that this facility
is needed, but it is needed
in an eftecdve operating condition.
There
is no amount of
mitigation here as there is none with the last en’imerated factor
of Sectitat 33(c)~-thatof technical practicability and economic
reasonabno~ass.
r~he
record shows Moline had the means to come
into tomofinoce long before
it did
in October
1982,
—14—
There are other Section 33(c)
factors for the Board to
consider
in determining the reasonableness of the discharge. The
economic and social value of the North Slope,
a publicly owned
sewage treatment plant, must be addressed,
This value is based
on its capacity to ~restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.
(Clean Water
Act,
33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)),
As the Board has previously stated,
a
treatment
plant~s
social
and
economic
value
is
reduced
by
in~
adequate
maintenance and operation.
IEPAv,City2fCar~roUton,
47
PCB
405,
411
(PCB 81—145,
1982).
The North Slope plant was
built
with $3,000,000 of public
funds.
Moline inadequately
operated
and maintained the plant and only complied with the
NPDES permit and the regulations on the eve of enforcement.
Moline
accepted construction grant money and then failed to
discharge
it.s duty to properly run the plant.
The Board does not
find the social and economic value of the improperly operated
North
Slope
plant as a mitigating factor herein,
Moline asserts that
it
is
important
that
the
Board
note
that
Moline supplied the DMR5 which
show
that it violated its permit.
The fact that Moline supplied these documents is supposed to be
taken as a sign of
good
faith
(Resp.
Reply
Brief,
2
and
24).
The
Board notes that Moline did in fact supply the DMRs, and that
Moline
was
required
to
do
so by law
(35 Ill. Adm. Code
305.102).
In enforcement cases the Board may award a civil penalty if
it
is
necessary
to
aid in the enforcement of the Act and upon
consideration
of
the
§
33(c) factors above; punitive considerations
are secondary.
Southern Illinois
As
halt,
~y~gtik~e,
~ra;
Wasteland,Inoi,etal.,v.
IPCB and IEPA,
118
Ill. App.3d 1041
(3d Dist.
:1983); Allaert_Rende~~,
~
The Board
i.e vested
with
broad
discretion
in imposing this penalty.
Marblehead
Lime
CovPCb,
42 Ili
App
3d
116
(1st
Diet
th’S
The
severity of
t.he penalty should bear some relationship to the
seriousness of the infraction or conduct.
Southern Illinois
~~alt,
s~p~a.
The penalties imposed in Southern and the consolidated case
Airtex were invalidated because the records showed that the
violations had ceased long before the Agency brought an enforcement
action
(Id. at
8,
slip.
op.).
Southern had inadvertently failed
to obtain a permit and had
in good faith relied upon its supplier.
Airtex had diligently tried to comply.
The record did not indicate
that Airtex was dilatory or recalcitrant.
However, Moline finally complied only on the eve of enforcement,
seemingly so it could claim
it was
in compliance and that no
penalty was justified.
The violations in this case were largely
caused by the buildup of solids.
The record shows that correction
of this problem could have been accomplished at any time by
improving sludge handling and removing sludge from the plant.
It
6044
—15~
was both technno’liy and economically feasible for I~oiineto
correct, this problem prior to Spring of
1980.
The cecord shows
that
Moline
‘as
dilutory and recalcitrant,
In
:opc~
s
‘ag
c
~
i
penalties
in
enforcement
eec’ e,
tIe
Board
will reasocah~y‘:otth
tfr~eamount allowed by the
?ic~
where
it is
feasible to do so.
Fo~a violation
of
5
12(a),
§
ln,a) of the
Act allows the impocition of $10,000 per violataon p~ius$1,000
for each da~ the vio’ation continues. The imposition of $10,000
per day
fit
‘,aa~~iun
ci
NPDES permit condifiona
or.
12~f)of
the Act
is afio~eiby
§ 41(b) notwithstanding the dlcwable
penaltiet
In ~ 4~,a)
The fcllcw&ng chart lists each count, the law(’)
violated,
the time period involved,
the allowable penalty pursrant to
Section 42
or.
the. Act for each violation, and a total of those
penalties.
In rufirn
on a motion for
summary
judgment
ir.
L.S.v,
Amoco Oil Ccthany,
580 F. Supp.
1042,
1050
(W,D,
.licnouri,
1984),
a federal
district judge held that
I c~nelude, accordingly, that a “violaThe’a~
as that
tnoin is used in
§ 1319(d), clearly may to comething
drch
is measured
in more than a single day~speriod of
tire.
That being so,
I also conclude that where
effluent
limitations
are set on son~ebasfi other than a
~
limit
—
that
is,
for example, wtie~ethey are
set
a~.a weekly maximum limit,
or a week y
~rage limit,
cc
-~
mcrth1y maximum or monthly average imit,
etc.
—
a
~violation~ necessarily encompasses all the days
involved in the time period covered by the limitation.
Thus,
for exa~rple,where effluent liwi~ca~eset on a
~monLfiy average’s basis,
a “violation”
cx. that limit
would be a violation
covering
and
including
all
of
the
30 days of that
monthly
period,
and
a
civil
penalty
“not to exceed
$10,000”
could
be
imposed
for
each
of
those 30 days.
As
Section
42 of the
state
Act
parallels
federal
subsection
1319(d)
in
substance,
the
Board
adopts
the
Amoco
reasoning.
Therefore, where a monthly
average
violation
occurred,
a
penalty
may be imposed for each day of that month,
Count
I
~NPDES, § 30L 102 and
§ 12(f) viol,
from 4/1/79
through 12/3u/82:
BOD5
sF9,000/day of viol.
x (45—7)
mo,
x 30
$
11,400,000
8045
—16—
TSS
$10,000/day of viol.
(45—4) mo. x 30
12,300,000
Fecal
Coliform
$10,000/day of viol.
(45—13)
mo,
x 30
9,600,000
$10,000/day of viol.
(45—11)
mo. x 30
=
10,200,000
Sum
$43,500,000
Count II:
color,
turbidity,
sludge solids
—5
12(a) and
5 304.106 viol.
6/12/79 through
12/30/82
$10,000/violation
$
10,000
$
1,000/day
(12 days)
~~000
Sum
$
22,000
Count III:
floating debris, unnatural color
—S
12(a) and
§ 302.403
viol.
12/11/79 through
12/30/82
$10,000/violation
$
10,000
$
1,000/day
(5 days)
____
Sum
$
15,000
Count_IV:
inefficient operation,
inadequate staff
—NPDES permit,
S 309.102 and S
12(f)
viol,
4/1/79 through 12/30/82
$10,000/day of
viol,
(13 days)
$
130,000
Sum
~
CountV:
failure to submit NON’s
-
S 12(f)
no~violation
—0—
Count
VI:
—S l2rfr viol., discharge with no NPDES permit
$10,000/day of viol,
(1
day)
L~Q~OOO
Sum
$
10,000
Count VII:
—S 12(f) and
§ 304.106 viol,; discharge sludge
solids, unnatural color and odor into storm
drains
$10,000/day of viol,
(1 day)
$
10 000
Sum
10,00
6046
—17—
Count VIII:
—5
12(a)
and
5 302.403 viol,; discharge sludge,
debris, odor and unnatural color from storm
drains
into
Mississippi
River
$10,000/viol.
(1
day)
$
10,000
Sum
$
10,000
Total $43,697,000
Given that Moline avoided
costs
of
over
$1,3
million by
failing to properly operate
and
maintain the North Slope
Plant,
the Board must assess a penalty.
Furthermore, the imposition of
a miniscule fine in the nature of a “slap on the wrist” that
could easily be hidden ~n an operating budget
could
be viewed as
rewarding Moline’s actions.
A Moline witness testified that
increased expenses at the treatment plant was a major factor
in
raising rates by 165 percent in 1983
(R.
209).
Timely compliance
would have required raising them sooner,
Other
cities
have
in
good faith
spent their taxpayers’
money to operate treatment
plants properly. Cities and sanitary districts
must not
be
led to
believe they can reduce their expenditures
by improper
operation.3/
By providing fines of up to $10,000 per day of violation, Congress
and the General Assembly clearly signaled
their intent
that NPDES
permit violations be taken seriously and
that
statutory penalties
be sufficiently large to remove any
economic incentive
for non-
compliance.
The interests of fair play,
the
integrity of the
State’s pollution control regulations and the purposes of the Act
demand
that
a
substantial
fine
be
imposed.
On the other hand, the Board does not desire to set a fine
so high as to cause Moline hardship.
A fine ~approachingthe
potential allowable penalty under the law is unnecessary to serve
the purpose of the Act.
The projected 1982-83 operating budget
of the North Slope facility was $1,016,341
(C. Exh,
5),
This is
less than the costs Moline avoided by violating the regulations
and should once again emphasize the monetary advantage Moline
realized during its years of violations,
The Board holds that Moline shall be fined $90,000.
This
penalty amount is a sufficient percentage of the economic savings
realized by Moline and will deter future violations of this
type.
The Board will not impose a fine for Counts VI through
VIII,
This recognizes the fact that Moline took prompt and
3/
The record shows that the Moline City Council through its
aldermen, knew of
the
WWTP situation,
Some aldermen flew to
Duluth, Minnesota on October 30,
1981 to observe land application
of sludge
(R.
261-2).
A few aldermen attended
an Agency meeting
in
May
1982
(R.
207),
One witness for respondent was evasive
when asked whether the Sewer Maintenance Department
had ever
asked the City Council
for additional appropriations
for
the
North Slope since 1979 and whether the City
Council ever
provided
additional funds
(R.
224—5),
6047
—18—
effective action against those responsible for
these
violations:
two employees received reprimands,
two received
suspensions
without pay,
and the supervisor of the Sewer Maintenance Division
01’ the iiater Pollution Control Department was discharged
(R.
213).
This was the entire work force of that division
(R.
209).
Although WWTP’s are vitally
needed
in this
society,
they are
needed in a viable, efficient,
operative state,
The residents of
Moline and those people downstream are afforded a right to a
healthy environment pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution of
the State of I’linois.
However, there is a complementary policy
that those responsible for pollution
pay
for
it,
The City of
Moline is responsible for its pollution.
The cost of this fine
will most probably be passed on to the system users in the form
of higher sewer taxes and fees.
This is as
it should be since
these same users avoided
past
costs of over $1.3 million due to
noncompliance,
Even if one were to argue that the Agency’s
computations are excessive,
the actual penalty being imposed
is
far less than the economic savings that could be computed.
In summary, the Board finds that the City of
Moline
has
violated its NPDES permit,
35
Ill. Adm, Code 302.403,
304,106,
and 309,102, and Sections 12(a) and 12(f)
of
the Act
as alleged
in Counts
I,
II,
III,
IV,
VI,
VII and
VIII.
The City
of Moline
will
be
ordered
to
cease
and
desist
from
further violations
and
to
pay
a
penalty
of $90,000 to aid in the enforcement of the Act,
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of
law in this matter,
ORDER
It is the Order of the Illinois Pollution
Control
~oard
that:
1.
The Respondent,
the
City of Moline, has violated the
conditions of its NPDES permit,
35
Ill. Adm. Code 302,403, 304.106
and 399.102, and Sections 12(a) and 12(f) of the Illinois
Environmental Protection
Act.
2.
By December
1,
1985, the Respondent,
City
of Moline,
shall pay a penalty of $90,000 by certified check or money order
payable to the State of Illinois, which
is to be sent to the
following:
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
Fiscal Services Division
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
IL
62706
6048
—19—
3,
The
Respondent,
City
of
Moline,
shall
cease and desist
from further violations,
4.
The Hearing
Officer’s
ruling
admitting Respondent’s
Exhibit
8 into evidence is hereby reversed.
5,
The Hearing Officer’s ruling
admitting Respondent’s
Exhibit
9 into evidence is hereby reversed,
6.
The Hearing Officer rulings to
deny
admission
to the
following are hereby affirmed:
a)
Testimony
of
Agency
witness
Roger
Callaway;
b)
The Agency investigator’s
statement at page
99 of
the transcript:
“It
appeared
,..
discharged.”
c)
Photograph #3 of Complainant’s
Group
Exhibit
11;
7.
The Hearing Officer’s ruling to
deny admission
to
Complainant’s Exhibit 12 for identification is
affirmed
and
the
corresponding offer of proof is denied,
8,
The
Hearing
Officer’s
ruling
to
deny the
motion to
amend
the
complaint
to
include
January
6, 1983 in Counts
VI,
VII,
VIII
is
hereby
affirmed
and
the
corresponding offer of
proof
is
denied,
9.
Respondent’s
Exhibits
4,
5
and
6
are
admitted
as
evidence
only
to
support
the
validity
of
the
joint
study.
10.
The
testimony
of
James
Huff
is
admitted
as
expert
testimony.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
Board
Member W.J. Nega concurred.
Board Member J,D, Dumelle dissented,
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board, her by certify th t the above Opinion and
Order
was adopted
on
the
____
day
of
______,
1984 by a
vote of
L~
~-
~
Dorothy M.
nn, C
er
Illinois P0 lution
Control
Board
6049
