ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    July
    21,
    1982
    VILLAGE OF HANOVER PARK,
    )
    Petitioner,
    v.
    )
    PCB 82—69
    COUNTY BOARD O~Du PAGE,
    )
    THE
    Du
    PAGE
    COU~1TY FOREST
    PRESERVE
    )
    CO~1MISSION AND
    H
    &
    H
    HAULING,
    INC.,
    Respondents.
    ORDER OF
    THE
    BOARD
    (by J. Anderson):
    On July 15,
    1982, the County Board
    of Du Page
    (County) and
    the Fo:rest Preserve District of Du Page County (District) peti-
    tioried the Board to
    review
    the Hearing Officer’s orders concerning
    discovery in this matter:
    a written Order of July
    6,
    1982
    (and
    petitioner’s July 7,
    1982
    written Interrogatories propounded
    thereunder)
    and the oral rulings of the Hearing Officer on July 9,
    1982 “denying the Respondents’ objections
    to almost all of the
    Interrogatories
    set
    forth
    in
    Exhibit B.”
    Specifically the County
    and
    the
    District
    object
    to
    interrogatorios propounded to their
    members
    concerning
    pci itical
    campaign
    contributions
    and
    “ex—parte”
    contacts
    (H.O.
    O~c1.crII),
    presence
    at
    the
    public
    hearing
    and
    ~‘ihether
    transcripts
    were
    reviewed
    (H.O.
    Order
    III).
    The
    Village
    of
    Hanover
    Park
    (Village)
    filed
    its opposition thereto on
    July
    19,
    1982.
    Interrogatory
    answers
    were
    ordered
    to
    be
    filed
    July
    14,
    1982.
    No answers having been filed, on July 15 the Village moved the
    ~3oardfor an Order compelling comoliance.
    The Village additionally
    requested that the Board find that, by their failure to timely
    respond to or appeal the Hearing Officers’
    Order, the County and
    the District had waived the 90—day statutory decision deadline.
    On July
    16, 1902,
    H
    & H Hauling resronded to the latter request,
    stating that it believed the decision deadline could not be
    entencled without its consent.
    On July 19,
    1982 the Village filed
    a
    memorandum
    in support of its
    motion.
    The
    County
    and
    District
    filed
    their
    response
    on
    July
    21,
    1902.
    Finally,
    on
    July
    19
    the Village requested that the Board
    issue
    a
    number
    of
    hearings
    subpoenae
    which
    include
    document
    demands
    relating
    to
    the
    camoaign
    contribution
    and
    “ex-parte”
    issues.
    It also requested that deposition subpoenae be issued,
    a request which
    had
    been
    stayed
    by the Hearing Officer pending
    47-441

    2
    answers to the interrogatories complained of.
    The Village
    asserts
    that
    emergency
    consideration
    should
    be
    given
    to
    these
    requests,
    as
    the
    required
    public
    hearing
    in
    this
    matter
    has
    been
    scheduled
    for
    August
    2,
    1982.
    The
    Count~’
    arid
    District
    ffi.le1
    their
    response
    on
    July
    21,
    1982.
    Currently,
    decision in
    this
    matter
    must
    be
    rendered
    by
    the
    Board
    on
    August 19,
    1982.
    Section 40.1(a)
    of the Act charges the Board,
    in
    an
    58—172
    ¶3ttl.ng decision appeal,
    to consider “the fundamental
    fairness of
    the
    procedures
    used
    by
    the
    county
    board..
    .
    in reaching
    its decision”.
    Section
    39.1. establishes some
    of
    the procedural
    requirements to
    h~met by the county
    in the process of reaching its decision:
    written notice of public hearing,
    a public hearing itself,
    a
    “zritten
    decision
    based
    on statutory criteria, and so on.
    Other
    ‘statutes
    impose
    other procedural requirements,
    such as the
    reaching
    of
    decisions
    at
    open
    meetings,
    quorum
    requirements,
    ~nd
    so
    forth.
    Whether
    such
    requirements
    have
    been
    met
    are
    the
    pro~er
    3ubjecb
    of
    Board
    review.
    It
    is
    the
    Board’s
    opinion
    that
    the Section 40.1(a) directive that
    it
    not
    hear
    “new
    or
    additional
    e~itdencein support of or
    in opposition to any finding, order,
    :~t5rminat~ofl,
    or
    decision
    of
    the
    appropriate
    county
    board”
    does
    not
    bar
    discover~’ of
    and
    introduction
    at
    hearing
    of
    evidence
    relating
    to
    the
    meeting
    of
    these
    procedural
    requirements.
    The
    record
    of
    a
    “public”
    hearing
    might
    not,
    by
    way
    of
    extreme
    example,
    reveal
    on
    its face
    that
    some
    or
    most
    members
    of
    the
    public
    were
    purposefully
    excluded
    from
    participating
    in
    a
    hearing,
    and
    a
    written decision of a
    county
    hoard
    might
    not
    on
    its
    face
    reveal
    that
    it
    was
    arrived
    at
    during
    a
    meeting
    at
    which
    a
    voting
    quocu~
    was
    not
    present.
    Such
    facts
    must
    naturally
    he
    made
    available
    for
    Board
    consideration
    if
    its
    “fundamental
    fairness”
    review
    is
    to
    have
    any
    meaning.
    These motions raise,
    for the first
    time
    in
    this
    type
    of
    appeal, the issue of whether the Board
    is charged to review the
    motives of the county hoard members in reaching their decision.
    If
    so,
    the
    questions
    which
    seek
    to
    discover
    whether
    board
    members
    received
    things
    of
    value
    from
    H
    &
    H
    Hauling,
    arguably
    in
    exchange
    for
    a favorable vote,
    are
    relevant
    and
    should
    be
    answered;
    if
    net,
    nob.
    The Board has
    long
    held
    in
    the
    context
    of
    its
    review
    of
    Agency perndtting decisions that the motives
    per
    se
    of
    the
    decisionmaker were not within the scope of its review, and so
    finds
    in
    this
    context
    as
    well.
    The
    Board
    does
    not
    believe
    that,
    in
    the
    90
    days
    allotted
    to
    it
    for
    review
    of
    these siting
    decisions,
    that
    the
    legislature
    has
    charged
    it
    to
    go
    behind
    the
    recorri
    and
    to
    essentially
    conduct
    a
    mini—investigation
    into the
    possibility
    of corrupt practices or bad faith on the part of
    the elected officials making the decision.
    Other, and more
    appropriate, forums exist for an investigation and redress for
    any
    such
    illegal
    actions.
    47-442

    3
    The
    Board also finds
    the
    “exparte” contacts questions to
    be improper.
    As the County and
    the District point cut,
    as co—
    applicants with H
    &
    E,
    the District members may necE~artiyhave
    had contact with
    H
    &
    H COncerning the Districts’
    application,
    vthich,
    in their capacity as County Board members, they were later
    to render an
    ~i3—i72
    siting
    decision upon.
    As the Board
    indicated
    in
    its June 10, 1982 Order,
    the issue of whether the Act itself
    has
    created
    a fundamentally unfair procedure by which an individual
    in
    his
    or her capacity as member must adjudicate an application
    made by
    that
    individual
    in another official capacity is a
    proper
    subject
    for
    Board
    review;
    in
    the
    factual
    context
    of
    the
    instant
    appeal,
    “e~ parte”
    contact
    isa
    meaningless
    term.
    The
    Board
    finds
    that,
    while
    questions
    concerning
    Board
    members’
    attendance
    at
    the
    public
    hearing
    is
    a
    relevant
    and
    d~scoverabie
    concern,
    general
    questions
    concerning
    their
    reading
    of
    the
    hearing
    transcripts
    are
    not.
    A
    “fundamental
    fairness”
    review
    may
    properly
    concern
    itself
    with
    whether
    the
    decisionmaker
    had
    an
    opportnnity~
    to
    review
    evidence
    either
    by
    a)
    in
    person
    attendance at hearing or by b)
    review
    of
    transcripts
    physically
    available
    to
    that
    individual
    prior
    to
    the
    making
    of
    the
    decision;
    it
    is
    inappropriate
    to
    query
    that
    individual
    as
    to
    whether
    every
    word
    of
    a
    transcript
    was
    read
    as
    it
    would
    he
    to
    query
    whether
    attention
    was
    paid.
    to
    every
    word
    spoken
    at
    hearing.
    In
    sum,
    Point
    II of the
    Hearing
    Officer’s
    Order
    is
    reversed
    in whole,
    and Point lit
    is reversed as
    it relates to reading of
    transcripts.
    given
    the
    Board’s
    finding
    that
    only
    questions
    relating
    to
    presence
    at
    hearing
    need
    he
    answered,
    the
    motion
    to
    issue
    depo-
    sition suhpoenaes
    is denied,
    as
    the
    purpose
    for
    taking
    depositions
    would
    appear
    to
    he
    inquiry
    into
    matters
    not
    properly
    discoverable.
    The
    motion
    for
    issuance
    of
    hearing
    suhpoenae
    is
    denied
    on
    the
    same
    ground.
    This
    ruling
    doa~ not
    foreclose
    direction
    to
    the
    Hearing
    Officer
    of
    motions
    for
    issuance
    of
    subpocnae
    which
    seek,
    for
    articulated reasons,
    to
    compel
    testimony
    on
    relevant
    subjects.
    The remaining issue is the effect of the Villa.ge’s failure
    either to timely
    answer
    discovery requests or to timely appeal the
    Hearing
    Officers’
    production
    order.
    The
    Board
    agrees
    with
    its
    Hearing Officer that “assertions of timely, thoughtful
    discovery)
    objections...clo not constitute a waiver”
    of
    the
    90 day decision
    deadline
    (11.0.
    Order
    V~.
    Ho~evor,
    the
    Board finds that failure to
    take
    any timely appropriate action does constitute such a waiver,
    as to nold otherwise
    would
    allow
    respondents——who
    alone
    can
    extend
    the decision period——to deprive petitioners of meaningful
    Board
    review by willful failure
    to
    respond
    to
    legitimate
    orders.
    In
    response
    to
    H
    &
    H’s
    argument
    that
    it
    has
    not
    been
    party
    to
    this
    delay,
    the
    Board
    finds that,
    in this sort of appeal, delay of
    one
    respondent nay be properly attributed to all to avoid any
    possibility
    of
    collusive
    prejudicing
    of
    petitioners’
    rights.
    47-443

    4
    1~
    the
    ::onring Officer,
    in
    hth
    verbal
    order
    o~ July
    9,
    19fl2
    ~
    ~
    ~
    ~
    Y:c~u’
    •~
    ~‘.~Y1to
    ree~ond to
    discovery,
    Lu~
    ~
    ~p~j
    ~
    ~
    3
    c~1~iy~
    ~
    roe~ondas
    ~:ell
    ~
    f~ thc
    ~.1
    ~‘:y
    ~.s
    a~oa1 h:ts delayed
    this
    ~~:occeding
    ~/days, the
    ~v~1
    n-l~ ~
    ~he
    :~eiston
    n~~iod
    h~i~
    been t:aivod ~or 7 days
    ~
    ~e~e:
    of dn~s
    actually
    taken
    for
    di~ove:y
    production
    ?~T~
    ~D
    this
    tT 13 ~
    I,
    t~taa
    !,.
    ~‘2fett,
    t~ir~rk
    of
    the
    fllinoic;
    Pollution
    ~ntr
    1
    ~oar
    1.
    here’~y certif’~’ that
    the
    ~vo
    O::de~
    t’~s
    ac1optrd
    sa tho
    ~
    ‘~.ays~!
    ~
    ~
    ._.
    ~
    by
    a
    vote
    ~r:
    Chri~tart L,
    offett,~Clerk~
    Illinoi~
    ?oilution
    Control
    Board
    47-444

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