ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL
BOARD
May
26,
1977
IN
THE MATTER
OF:
)
R74—1O
MOTOR
VEHICLE
NOISE
REGULATIONS
)
DISSENTING
OPINION
(by
Mr.
Young):
Although there is expressed authority for the Board to
adopt sound emission limitations or operational noise standards
delegated to the Board in Section 25 of the Environmental Pro-
tection Act, there is no authority in that Section or elsewhere
in the Act for the promulgation of equipment standards as the
Board has enacted in Rules 301,
302 and 313(b) of Chapter 8
as a result of the proceedings on regulatory proposal R74-l0.
When the first sentence of Section 25 is compared to Sections
10(g), l3(a)(9) and 22(d),
the language is virtually identical;
when that language is contrasted with Section 10(d), it is readily
apparent that the Board
may
not prescribe standards for any equip-
ment
under
Section
25
except
for
equipment
used
for
monitoring
noise.
The authority of the Board under Section 25 is restricted
to establishment of limitations on noise emissions which unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life, or with any lawful business,
or activity.
Nowhere in the record of R74-10 is the authority of the Board
to adopt regulations establishing equipment standards questioned
nor
is
there
any
indication
that
the
question
of
authority,
was
addressed
at
all.
It is my ooinion that the General Assembly has established
motor vehicle equipment standards in Chapter 95 1/2 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes
(Motor Vehicle Code), specifically by Section 12-602
of the Illinois Vehicle Equipment Law in regard to mufflers and
12-401 regarding tires.
The Board is
given
no authority in Chapter
95 1/2 to establish any rules, regulations or criteria for
motor
vehicle equipment;
that authority is given to the Department of
Transportation by the Motor Vehicle Code.
1.
See Currie, D.P., Pollution, Cases and Materials, West
Publishing Company
(1975),
p. 123, 124.
Since
the
General Assembly
specifically delegated such
authority
to
regulate
motor
vehicle
equipment
to
others,
Board
authority
nicy
not
be
inferred
by
interpretation
of
any
broad
arant
under
tiie
Environmental
Protection
Act
even
if
such
a
broad
orant
existed
Similarly,
penalties
for
violations
of
the Motor Vehicle
Code
are
established
by
that
statute.
The
Board may
not:
~uarc~e
its
jurisdiction
by
renacting
a
section
of
the Motor
Vehicle
Code
as
a
Board
regulation,
a
violation
of
which
is
subject
to
prosecution
before
the
Board,
unless
there
is
specific
statutory
authority
to
do
so
and
no such authority
~st
Vi
i
~uo
ot
Lonu ard v
IlUonois
Pollution Control
Board,
1l..
Sup.
Ct.
Docket
485(11
(May,
1977)
Rule
314 establishes operatlonal
limitations
upon
horns
and
other warning devices over and
above
those
set
forth
in
Section
l2—~Ol(a)aM
(b)
of
the
Illinois
Vehicle
Equipment
Law
and
for
the reasons set forth
above,
this
rule
is
questionable.
RuLe
315 rould make illeqal
the
operation
of
a
motor
vehicle
if done
in such
a manner
to
cause
squealing,
screeching
or
other
noise
from tires.
Cheoter 11
(Rules of the Road)
of the Motor
Vehicle
Code
overns
the operation of motor vehicles on the high-
ways of the State
and
in my opinion precludes Board regulation
under Rule
315.
I do concur in
the
general
proposition
to
impose
sound
emission:
limitation provisions
established
by
Rules
310
through
313
as
they
relat:e
to
operational
standards
and
I
believe
the
Board
has full statutory authority
to
adopt such limitations.
however, because of tee clear invalidity
of
Rules
301,
302
and
313(b)
and the doubtful character of
Rules
314
and
315,
I
would
not
have adopted these
regulations
until
those
rules
were
stricken.
~Jnes
L.
Young
1,
Christen
L.
Moffett,
Clerk
of
the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby
cerbi:fv the above Dissenting Opinion was submitted
to me on the
~
day
cf
~
1977.
~4LL~
Christan
L.
Moffe’~Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
25
—
678