ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD

September i~,1977

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Complainant,

v.

)

 PCB 73—30

W.

 F. HALL PRINTING COMPANY and

)

CHICAGO ROTOPRINT COMPANY,

)

Respondents.

Messrs. Lee A. Campbell,

 Special Assistant Attorney General;

 Dennis

R.

Fields, Assistant Attorney General;

 and Ms. Kathryn S. Nesburg,

Attorney, appeared for the Complainant.

Mr. Richard Troy and Ms. Gayle Haglund, Attorneys, appeared for

Respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD

 (by Mr. Goodman):

The original Complaint in this matter was filed by the Environ-

mental Protection Agency

 (Agency) on January 26,

 1973, over four

and one-half years ago.

 The Amended Complaint on which the case

is now before the Board, after 22 hearings resulting in thousands

of pages of testimony and exhibits, was filed on June 11,

 1973;

it

charges Respondents W.

 F. Hall Printing Company

 (Hall)

 and Chicago

Rotoprint Company

 (Rotoprint),

 a wholly owned subsidiary of Hall,

with violations of

 §9(a)

 of the Environmental Protection Act

 (Act).

Ill.

 Rev.

 Stat.,

Ch.

 111—1/2,

 §1009(a) (1975).

Those violations were alleged to have occurred throughout the

 period beginning

July

1,

 1970,

 and continuing through the filing

of the Amended Complaint until the present.

 The sources of the

violations are alleged to be adjacent, contiguous printing plants

operated by Hall and Rotoprint on the northwest side of Chicago,

stretching between Diversey and Belmont avenues approximately 4600

west.

 The cause of the violations was alleged to be the emission

of “ink solvent vapors, hydrocarbons, odors, particulate matter,

and other contaminants into the atmosphere...” by Hall and Rotoprint

from those plants.

The Agency never seriously attempted to prove any of the allega-

tions except odor emissions;

 ink solvent vapors, hydrocarbons, etc.

were discussed only to the extent that they impacted on the alleged

odor problem.

 That the Agency did not consider Rotoprint to be a

significant contributor to the alleged odor problem is plain

 in the

Agency’s Brief

 (at 7,

8):

—2—

An examination of the gravure press pperation

at Rotoprint shows that, despite emission of

tremendous quantities

 of solvents, the solvents

do not cause an odor problem..

Tihe

 discharge is invisible and is not near

as odorous as Hall~sheatset press emissions.

The allegations remaining before us, then, are only those of odor

emissions from the Hall Diversey plant.

The first five hearings

 in the matter, from March to July,

 1973,

resulted in only 215 pages of testimony, from only two witnesses.*

At the July

5,

 1973, hearing,

 it was noted that further hearings

-—

as to odor only

 had been enjoined by the Circuit Court of Cook

County on Complaint

by

 HalL.

W.

F.

 Hal.

 Printing Co.

 v. Environmental

Protection Agency of Illinois, No.

 73 CH 3587

 (Cir.

 Ct. Cook Co.,

 Ill.,

Mejda, J., ‘July

3,

 1973).

 The A9ency being unwilling to proceed on

the remaining allegations of the Amended Complaint,

(R.

4,

 7/4/73),

no further hearings were held pending appeal of the Circuit Court’s

decision.

The First District Appellate Court then reversed the Circuit

Court in W.

F.

 Hall Printing Co.

v,

 EPA,

 16 Ill. App.

 3d 864, 3ö6

N.E.

2d

595

 (1973)

 (Supp.

 Opinion on Denial of Rehearing, Jan.

25,

1974).

 The Appellate Court found that the Board did have juris-

diction and authority to hear cases alleging the emission of odors

in violation of the Act,** which are

(1)

 “injurious to

human, plant,

or animal life,

 to health,

 or to

property,”

or

(2)

 “unreasonably

interfere with the enjoyment of life~orproperty.”

 Ill. Rev.

Stat

Ch.

 111—1/2, §1003(b) (1977) .306 ~N.E.2d at 598.

 “Unreasonableness

is, in part, to~bemeasured in terms of those factors

 in §33(c)

of

the Act.***

 Id.,

 §1033(c)

(1)—(4.)

 306 N.E.2d at 598.

 March 19, May 21, June

 12, June 28, and July

5,

 1973.

 See also, ~y

 ap.I1l.

 Pollution Control Board,

 16 Ill. Ap~

778,

 306 N.E.2d574,

 aff’d. inpart~,

r~RL1in

part,

 60 I1l.2d 330,

321

N.E.2d

5

 (1973)

***

 Proof

 as to those factors in §33(c)

 of the Act remains, however

burden of Respondent to the extent that a factor is not a necessary

pa:

Complainant’s burden as to unreasonableness.

 Processing

 & Books v. PC

64 I1l.2d

 68, 351 N.E.2d 865

 (1976).

26-4~-

The matter returned to hearin~in November,

 1974,

 and an addi-

tional 15 hearins~were held through July,

 1976.

 At the conclusion

of this series of hearings, Complainant and Respondents jointly

 submitted to the Beard a “Tentative Settlement Agreement.”

 Although

that instrument contained other provisions, its principal feature

was a proposal that the parties conduct a “neighborhood survey” to

determine whether any odors emanating from Hall were causing air

pollutlon** at that time

 ~f fF~eparties concurred in a negative

analysis of the survey data, the~“Tentative Settlement Agreement”

contained further terms for final disposition of the case;

 if they

could not so agree, additional provisions called for the survey’s

submission to the Board along with additional testimony and evidence

to be taken concerning the post-Noventher,

 1975, period for decision

on the merits of the case.

Although the Board approved the ~‘TentativeSettlement Agreement”

in an Interim Order entered August

 5, i~76,and the survey was in

fact taken, th~parties were unable to agree on whether any alleged

odor problems at Hall had been solved.

 On December

 2, 1976, the

Board therefore granted the parties’

 joint motion and remanded the

matter for further hearing.

Two additional hearings wero h~ldon Remand:

 January 24 and

26,

1977.

 Pursuant to the parties’ motion,

 as well as the original

“Tentative Settlement Agreement,

 testimony and evidence introduced

at those hearings was limited to the period afterNovember,

 1975.

The parties also entered the results of the survey taken pursuant

to our August

5,

 1976,

 Interim Order,

 (Joint Rem.

Ex.

 1; Resp. Rem.

Ex.

 l5).***

 November 13,

14,

 15, and December

 17, 1974; June

27, July 12, August 5,

6,

 7, October 10,

 22, and November 4,

5, and 25,

 1975; July 12, 1976;

 constituting R.

 6 to R.

1368

in principal Record sequence, cited hereinafter without

additional information

 (date,

 “Remand,”

 etc.).

 Citations

to

the Record of hearings predating the principal sequence show

the date;

 the Record subsequent to the principal sequence is

indicated as “Remand.”

 This term was not defined in the “Tentative Settlement

Agreement.”

~

 Resp.

 Rem.

Ex.

 15 is a compilation of the results

of the neighborhood survey admitted by stipulation,

R.

 217,

indicating in tabular form the answers on 89 individual

questionnaires of three or four pages each.

7—

—

26-473-

Turning

 to the preliminary issues,

 Responden;~Hall alleged

(R.

89)

 that this Board’s hearing process inherently ~deiñes due

process of law.

 Hall claimed that the Hearing Officer’s lack of

authority to rule on substantive

 issues and the ~‘f

 act” that only

one member of the Board reviews the record

 (“The others do nOt e~en

read the transcript..,.,”

 Id,), result in violation of constitutional

guarantees.

 Hall also compT~inec~

 that because the Hearing Officer

could not rule at conclusion of Complainant’s case, Hall was unfairly

required to present its case,

 Section 33(a)

 of the Act requires

Board -—not Hearing Officer

 decision

 in Enforcement matters,

“after

 due consideration of the written and cral statements, the

testimony and arguments that shall be su1~ittedat the hearing...,”

Ill.

 Rev.

 Stat.,

Ch.

 ll1-~l/2,§1033(a)(L~7),

 Our protedures for

hearing and decision being designed to cuiply with this requirement,

these issues need not be further addressed.

Next,

 the Hearing Officer noted some reservations with regard

to the admission of Respondents’ Ex.

3,

 a “survey” performed by

Hall,

(R.

 593).

 That.survey, unlike another one whose introduction

was stipulated to by both sides,

(H.

 21, Re.;

 see, a~lso, “Tentative

Settlement Agreement,”

R.

 1334-1363) ~ was obje~d to by Complainant

Agency,

 (e.g.,. R.

 762).

 While we need not exclude that survey, as

Complainant argued, we feel that the circumstances preclude our

giving any significant weight to it,

 Without questioning the

veracity or intent of the survey taker

 (a paralegal for Respondents’

counsel), we feel that Respondent has not shown why this survey

should be accepted.

 Without some showing that a survey has been

properly designed, administered to a valid sample, and otherwise

kept free of bias,

 it remains highly questionable and carries

evidentiary weight accordingly.

Addressing the substantive issues of the case, we have aeline—

ated the tests and burdens applicable to §9(a)

 odor-related, matters

on many occasions.*

 Our applications of these tests have been

reviewed in the Appellate and Supreme Courts on numerous occasions,

as noted by both parties in extensive briefs.

 E.g~,., People v, North Shore Sanitary District, PCB

74223,

 229,

 19 PCB 192

(l975)T

“1.

 Was there in fact an odor?

“2.

 Was the odor caused by

 Respondent

...?

“3.

 Did the odor result in interference with the

lives, environment, enjoyment of property, etc.

 of the

citizens affected?

“4.

Was

 such interference unreasonable, such

unreasonableness being measured,

 in part,

 by the criteria

in §33(c)

 of the Act?”

See, also, People v. Forty—Eight Insulations, PCB 74-

480,

 23 PCB 563,

565

 (1976); EPA v.

 Darling

 & Co., PCB 71—

348,

 7273,

 11 PCB 535,

542

 (1974)

EXISTENCE OF ODOR

There can be little question of the fact that an odor

exists in the area of the Hall and Rotoprint plants.

 Although some

witnesses testified that they had never smelled anything unusual

or bothersome

 in the vicinity

 (e.g.,

R.

 564,

 588-91,

 693),

 a much

greater number were quite sure that an odor was present.

 Even

Respondents’ witnesses generally concurred in the presence of some

odor in the neighborhood,

 (e.g.,

 R. 720,

 558,

 562).

 A study com-

missioned by Hall

 (EPA Hz.

 “R,”

R.,

 1201-1202)

 also confirmed the

presence of some odor.

 Complainant’s n’nnerous witnesses were unaxni—

mous on the issue,

 and the jointly ent~n:cdsurvey

 (Joint Rem. Ex.

I)

adds confirmation that at least some o7c’

 is certainly detectable

in the neighborhood.

SOURCE OF ODOR

Hall did contest the testimony of several witnesses as to the

source of various odors being complained of,

 With regard to some

witnesses,

 Hall’s efforts were sufficient to discredit much of their

testimony.

EPA witness Miehaiski, for example, presented considerable

testimony potentially very damaging to Hall; however, he alleged

that odors identical to those he purportedly craced specifically

to Hall were also present on Easter Sunday, when Hall was not

operating,

(R.

 62—74,

 1035).

 Michaiski’s certainty and record

keeping were left doubtful.

Similarly, testimony by EPA witness Illarde, who lives over a

mile from Hall,

 seems questionable.

 Also,

 other witnesses were

apparently convinced as to the source of “the odor” by investigators

for Complainant,

 (e.g.,

R.

 295), who

 (we assume inadvertently)

asked neighborhood residents about odors

 ‘from

 Hall.’

Despite these inaccuracies, discrepancies, and suggestions,

the testimony and evidence is sufficient to show that Hall is,

if

indeed not the only identifiable contributor, at least the predominant

source of odors

 in the neighborhood.

EPA Ex.

R.

(R.

 1201), cited supra as to the existence of “an”

odor, was a study commissioned by Hall in which independent consultants

identified Hall as a source of odor.

 One of Hall’s own witnesses,

Alderman Laskowski,

 identified Hall as the source of an urtobjec—

tionable odor which he characterized as,

 “a very light fog with a

smog of ink...,”

 (P.. 720).

 A finding that Hall

 is the source of

the odor in question is the only conclusion that can be drawn from

the numerous witnesses and exhibits in this case,

~2

7-3:;3

~75

Hall

argued

~or.

~g~h

th-~t its

interfere

with

the

enjoyr~eit

c~ 1~Jc

p~~p’rt’

rhood

surro~nding

its

plant~.

Turn~nç1

~te

ru~s resp~.

hriefs,

c,~n—

not

miny

uh’~.

rgw

t1~i

~ites,

especially

its

63—page

ito;

 var:ous

soc

o~gi~

texts*

support

arguments

that

(1)

ltc

ne~gL~

~pp.

rferences

were

induced

h~torrey Cc~i~

(2)

 it h~ ~

 ~ rcd~~

 ~t~r

 general

social problems

ia,

(3)

 its ne~gnbor~all

art~

c~

r

ed

interferdnce are ~ veiting of ~J

it

cpecifi_

cally regardirg Hall

 ~‘ichas

c

 ~ r~i~c,the presence

of minority emplly

ill

~

 b ~ir

To the extent that t~

~re

 iot or~

~i

~

 ~oJ in the record,

these arguments ard c

a~~

~te

~d

t

 riot be considerçd

See,

 e.q., City of bonmouth

 ~ll.id

~

 ~13 N,E.2d 161,

T~ (~~4~)

 cr~s however,

they

are

not oo~vi~o~r;

:1

‘~.

Ii

c

‘~

such problems.

if they exist, actu ily caudll or

 irillcred

 c ma v odor complaints

of its

neighbors;

 turther, :ral n~sr~teven -~iowrthat these problems

seriously

affected its neighuo~s in ;~rcralor ~P1’’ wllnesses

specifically.

 No~h~sHall ad re~se~te

q

‘~

 cr, Cf

whether such

problems could rot be pre~ell~t tll. s~

-‘-‘~

 n odor problem.

There can be llltle qteston thct H

 ~ons have caused

interference wllh

 1-e e~oJnentof lli~

r.

 ~r~sty

 The Agency

brought a conside~an~~

 r ~nbrr ll

 t~io-~

 ~ritre~ce

 most of whom

complained of signific

 n i~terf~renc~~

 bcin,c

forced to

forego

the

 use of

ysc

 licing unih~st~. 2 ~ ito

crus

-s

 being

forced to mt5ve irctoorc, having

us~

 ~ir~condi

 ioning or to

keep

windows closed, etc.

 Ihe cixth

(H.

6-~81),

 ~e trth

(H

 88—163),

eighth

 (P..

 164~-220),~endninti

~n

ll313’

 1.earin~s, in November

and

December

 1974, are largely

cur

 i-sc4-imony

*

 E.g., Sher1f

 no Houl~nd, “JidgemenLa~.Processes

and Problems of Att2tad-

 Soo2al Jud~-’~~ll

 Yale University,

1961;

 Encyc1oped~a

ccio1~

usllT

~l

n

 Group,

1974;

Hollander

and

U~rt

)

Current_Perc~pe

~~cia1P~hoiog,

Oxford

U,

Press,

-~3

196

Some

 of this testimony was.questionable or discredited, but the

bulk

 remains valid and shows that Hall’s emissions do cause

significant interferences.

 Although not all witnesses were equally

affected and. some were not affected at all, the interference

was

sufficient to recruire further analysis as to reasonableness,

As respondents

argue,

the

Agency

has

been

unable

demonstrate

adequately that the

effects

claimed

 many

its

witnesses,

such

coughing,

 watering

eyes,

etc.

might

not

the

result

such

other

causes

high

ozone

concentrations,

emissions

from

other

sources.

 These effects

are

 subjectively different from witness to

witness, and we cannot know that the witnesses were not particularly

susceptible to such other causes.

 The Agency brought no expert

testimony to link a1T~

 physical ill effects

 to Hall’s emissions.

 See, e.g., Draper and Kramer

 v. PCB,

 40 Ill.App.3d 918, 353 N.E.

~l06,

109

(1976)

With

 regard to presence and

interfering

 quality of the

odor

itself,

however,

 we have

such

difficulty.

 There were sufficient

witnesses

and

testimony

indicate

that

Hall’s

emissions

were

sometimes so

unpleasant

 as to

require

that

the

 use of backyards be

given up, barbeques abandoned,

 etc.

 Regardless of whether or not

there were actual physical reactions,

 such as coughing or tearing,

to Hail’s emissions,

 an unpleasant odor may,

 in and of itself, be

sufficient

interference

constitute

violation’of

§9(a),

UNREASONABLENESS

The fact is,

 however, that while many of Hall’s neighbors

were interfered with in this manner,

 not all were so affected,

R~spondentsbrought considerable testimony to show that some of

its neighbors detected no odor at all in the

 area,

 and some that

did were not bothered by the odor which they detected,

 (e.g.,

P..

 558,

 562,

 564,

 725),

 Despite arguments to the contrary by the

Agency, the same can be seen in an examination of the survey taken

pursuant to the parties’ Tentative Settlement agreement,

 (Joint

Rem,

Ex,

1).

 While many of Hall’s neighbors experienced signifi-

cant interference, some merely detected an odor and some were not

affected at all.

This fact

 is a principal basis of Hall’s defense:

 How many of

its neighbors must be adversely impacted, and how adverse must that

impact

for

finding

 of §9(a)

 violation?

c~7

377

This issue

particuiarl1

~1evant

 this

 -‘s~inasmuch as

Hall has

 also alleged that the colls of controls

 :o completely

eliminate any odor from its emissions would be very high.

 Hall

claims that

 when measured against the

limited

 nu iber of people

adversely

 impacted,

 each of the factors

 in §33(c

of

 the Act mili-

tates for a finding that ite emissions are not

 ~un2edsonable.”

Hall argues that the character and degree of any injury

 from

its emissions

 is negligible in comparison to the social and

 economic

value of its

 plant.

 Hall claims that its plant

~eceded the

 houses

and apartments

 of its neighbors into a

 llncip~iIyindustrial

 area

imminently

 suited to its operations.

i

 s also argued

that

 even

if the large

 sums necessary were expen

 for emission control,

there is no

 emission control technology

 ~1-has been shown to

be practicable.

 Hall finally argues tll~.~pecific problems with

its plant make

 the addition of

 any. c.~n-~ro1technology impracticable.

All of

 these points, Hall feels, show Ltat its emissions are

not

unreasonable,

 as that term is used in the Act, and that it should

not be required

 to eliminate what

it

ohs

 “the common odor of

printers’ ink,”

Looking first at the issue of priority of location,

the

 Board

has often held

 that priority in locatlln can never provide

 a perma-

nent license

 to pollute.

 Odor discharges,

 like any other contaminaht

emissions,

 cannot be continued

~rmanentlysimply because they

 were

already

 there.

 it is one purpose of the Act

 co eliminate such

emissions as quickly

 and thoroughiy as

 is eccnomically and

 tech-

nically reasonable.

 Further, testimony presented by the Agency,

(R. 325),

 showed the area was at least partly residential

 when the

Hall plant was

built

1924.

 Other Agency witnesses also

 claimed

that the odors from Hall have increased as the Hall plant expanded,

(e.g.,

R.

 l68-’70),

 Priority

 in location cannot justify permanent

interference by emissions even if a plant were unchanged, and Hall

now operates

 what it readily admits

 is one of the world’s largest

printing

 plants under one roof.

 The massive emiss~orsfrom such a

source cannot be justified by the installation of a crnaller

 operation

in 1924.

Finally in this regard, the historic

zoning

 of an area is not

controlling;

examination

 of various aerial photographs

submitted

by

the parties shows

that

 the area surrounding Hall is largely

 residential

and has

 been

for

many

years,

 entitling the resid~ntct) protection.

TECHNICAL FEASIBII4TY; ECONOMIC REASONABLENESS

Hall’s emissions are pd.ncipally.hydrocarbon solvents, with

some of the actual inks and~p~Lgmentscarried along.

 The nature of

the solvents and the form ‘in which they are emitted depend on the

type of printing process utilized, and on the way in which the

solvents are dried

 (or evaporated) 6T? the printed surface.

The parties seem to ag~eethat the rotogravure printing method

used at Roto is not a serious source of odor emissions due to the

low temperature

 of drying, ‘despite the use of tremendous quantities

of inks and solvents.

 We shall,

 therefore, dismiss as

 to Roto,

lacking any evidence of vio1atio~by it.

The parties also agree that there

 is no -problem with emissions

from sheet—fed, letterpresses or sheet-fed offset presses.

 There are

apparently no dryers associated with these presses, and the solvents

oxidize or dry without significant emissions.

The remaining press~s,which are ‘alleged to be the principal

source of odor emissions,

 are web-fed offset presses.

 These presses

print on one or both sides of

 a continuous roll of paper

 (the web)

which moves at considerable speed,

 (P.. 865 et seq.).

 After passing

through the press,

 such ~ehs are dried

 (the solvents driven off)

by

one of two methods:

 (1) ‘direct flame impingement,

 in which ‘the web

is contacted briefly by flames and then travels through additional

forced hot air dryers

 as part of the same process;

and

(2)

 hot, or

forced, air dryers in which forced air is used to hasten solvent

evaporation.

 In either ça~e,exhaust air with the entrained solvent

vapors is then vented to the atmosphere through stacks mounted atop

the Hall plant.

The parties devoted considerable effort to presenting evidence,

testimonial and documentary, on the technical practicability and

economic reasonableness of controlling these emissions.

 The various

control technologies covered were, briefly:

1.

 Direct flame incineratfon

 Under this method

the hydrocarbon emissibns are passed through a flame and,

given the requisite temperature and residence time,

 broken

down into their inoffensive constituent parts,

 (e.g.,

P..

393,

 894)

2.

 Catalytic incineration

—

 This method involves

the use of

 precious-rttetal catalysts to reduce the

temperature needed

 (and thus the energy required)

for

incineration,

(R.

 893,

 897)

~

~

—10--

3.

 Ultraviolet inks

 The solvents are actually

caused to change form, and apparently solidify without

any emissions under this method,

 (P..

 992).

4.

 “Smog Hog”

 This involves the use of

 a “heat

wheel” to cool untreated exhaust gases prior to passage

through an electrostatic precipitator, and was covered

at great length by the parties at hearing and in their

briefs,

 (R. 424—32,

 513,

 1264,

 1268)

5.

 Johns-Manville high_energy air filtration

This device traps particulate from cooled exhaust gases

in a traveling bed of filter media,

(R.

 885).

6.

 Beltran Electrostatic Precipitation

—

 This

device operates on the same principle as the “smog hog,”

but without the “heat wheel,”

 (Rem.

P..

 97—99,

 122)

7.

 Ink reformulation

 This method would change

or eliminate odors by changing the nature of the solvents

and inks.

 It was used by Hall to eliminate an opacity

problem,

 in a program undertaken to satisfy emission

requirements of the City of Chicago, and is claimed by

Hall to have solved the odor problem

 (if any existed),

(R.

 940, et seq.)

8.

 Others

 Other control methods were discussed

principally

 in documents submitted by the parties,

 (e.g.,

Exs. M, N), but were not seriously considered at

 hearing.

These included adsorption, baghouses,

 scrubbing

CR.

 510-

512), masking unpleasant odors, with stronger, pleasant

odors, and “counteracting” odors by adding chemicals

to

change their nature,, (Ex. N, pp.

 135 et seq.,

 154,

 230,

Table

37)

The bulk of Complainant’s evidence on control technologies

covered the incineration methods and the “smog hog.”

 Respondents

concentrated on ink reformulation, and discussed other methods only

briefly or disparagingly.

 Because we have little information on

the “other” methods noted above, we shall not discuss them; none

seem

 relevant or applicable.

 “Ultraviolet inks” were touched upon

only briefly, and with regard to a situation which does not show

any technical feasibility

 (the ‘example plant

I.

S.

 Berlin

in

Chicago

-—

 is closed); we shall not discuss it either.

4S-48O~~

-11—

Some of these control techniques, especially

U-ic

 ~‘smocr

 hog,”

were cited by the Agency as being effective in

analogous

situations,

such as the metal coatings industry,

 (R. 412,

 992)

 Hail objected

strenuously

this,

claiming

 th~’tthe Agency had

 not. shown that

any

technology

useful

 one situation could be used to control

Hall’s printing industry emissions.

 While Hall did show some

differences,

 (e.g.,

P..

 992—94),

 these were not suf2icient to show

inapplicability.

 (See,

 e.g., Exs. M,

N.)

 The Agency met its burden

of showing a basic violation, with an apparently valid showing that

control technologies should be interchangeable.

The issue is mooted,

 however, with regard to the “smog hog.”

The Agency showed that if it were successful in controlling some

emissions

 (e.g:, Cadillac Printing,

P..

 426) ,it would be applicable

at Hall.

 But the Agency did not reach that first hurdle as to

success anywhere with the “smog hog.”

 Although Complainant attempted

to avoid the issue,

 (e.g.,

R.

 1259-63)

 Hall presented sufficient

testimony to show that the “smog

hog”

 is not adequate in those

applications cited.

 It has caused fires due to shorting in the

electrostatic section,

 It has not been shown to prevent emissions.

In short,

 its usefulness has not been proven, and the Agency has

presented no evidence to show that it can be proved,

 (e.g.,

 R. Rem.

149—213;

H.

 885—86, 1264—68).

 (We nonetheless sustain the Hearing

Officer’s ruling on certain testimony in this regard, against

Respondent,

P..

 129, Jan.

24,

 1977).

With regard to the Johns—Manville high energy air filtration

unit, the Agency argues that it would work for Hall,

 (Br. at 37).

The only evidence on the subject (from Hall)

 is opposite, however:

While emissions are acceptable, maintenance requirements are

so

high as to render the unit unacceptable.

 The cooling coils on

the unit soon become completely contaminated,

 (P..

 885).

 Without

additional evidence, we cannot see that this

 is a technically

feasible method to eliminate odors at Hall.

The Agency spent a great deal of time at hearing showing the

efficacy of both incineration and catalytic incineration.

 This

included testimony regarding success at other plants and the

economics of operating such units.

Hall also spent considerable effort on the subject,

 to support

its five objections to incineration or catalytic incineration:

(I)

gas unavailability,

 in light of the energy shortage;

(2)

 failure of

incineration to eliminate odors;

(3)

 technical problems resulting

from limitations of space,

 etc.

 at the Hall plant;

 (4) increased

emissions of oxides of nitrogen (NO~),creating a worse pollution

problem;

 (5) cost,

,‘3.~-

7---33/

The Agency was able to show that sufficient gas would

 probably

have been available to solve Hall’s problems had Hall acted before

recent gas shortages.

 Hall actually installed two catalytic burners,

using approximately 2,000 CFH of natural gas to control the exhaust

from two presses.

It

 is probable that even as

 late as 1975 Hall

could have obtained adequate ga~,*

In addition, Hall should have known of ability of

 incineration

to control emissions.

 The Agency presented adverse testimony

 (e.g.,

6/28/73,

R.

17,

19)

 and exhibits

 (Exs. M,

N)

 showing the widespread

application of incineration and catalytic incineration to pollution

control in the printing industry.

 Hall’s arguments that incineration

will not control odors are not adequately supported in the record;

 efficient incineration was shown to destroy the hydrocarbons which,

according to Hall, are the only constituents of its effluent gases.

Without such hydrocarbons, no odors would then be present.

Likewise,

 Hall offers little or no support for its arguments

that new, more dangerous pollutants would be created by incineration,

(see e.g.,

Ex.

N,

p.

 133)

We,

 therefore, need not discuss the

issue.

Hall offered more support for its claims

 as to the feasibility

problems associated with incineration technology specifically applied

to Hall.

 Hall showed that it is very difficult to construct, and

install the necessary equipment:

 This can only be done by cutting

away the roof, from inside the plant.

 However, Hall has already

done this twice, showing practicability.

Hall’s only real argument with regard to catalytic incineration,

for the period before the current gas shortage,

 is cost.

 Construction

of the necessary roof platforms and purchase, installation, and

operation of catalytic incinerators would cost a large sum.

The

units and platforms installed for two presses cost nearly $250,000,

(P..

 911-920,

 Ex. 13-15).

 Cost estimates for complete control at

Hall ranged from $650,000

 (by Hall,

Ex.

W)

 to $2.5 million

 (control

 of a similar facility,

R.

 407)

 or $80—100,000

 or more for each press

to be controlled.

We find that such costs for catalytic incineration would have

constituted a reasonable expenditure

 to provide odor control,

and

relief from the interferences described above,

 for the years covered

in the complaint and the future.

*

 Because of other testimony on the subject and the time periods

involved,

 we need not rule on an offer of proof by Respondent re-

garding cutbacks of gas availability,

 (P..

 112, Jan.

24,

 1977).

Hall’s princIpal efforts have been in ink reformulation.

In

addition to unsuccessful efforts in water—base inks costing $i25~OG0,

Hall spent $300,000 per year in the first 14 months following

adootion for reformulated inks

 These expenditures have apparently

been successful en abating an opacity problem, and may

 (Jt. Rem. Ex.

I)

have had some effect on the odor problem.

 They have not, however,

been enough; the odor problem still exists and still requires

solution.

 By a timely adoption of catalytic incineration, Hall

could have eliminated both the smoke and odor problems at a time

when gas was available.

There are other technologies

 (e.g..

 the Beltran unit)

and

advanced catalytic incineration which might be applicable at Hall,

However,

 the Record is weak on these methods,’ and we shall allow

Hall to do further study on them,

 as noted below.

F1NDINGS~

In summary, we find that while Hall may have pursued ink

substitution or reformulation in good laith to overcome excessive

smoke emissions,

 it has been tardy

 if not recalcitrant

——

in

facing or dealing with a substantial odor problem.

 Had Hail acted

in a timely manner, gas would have been available for incineration.

The Environmental Protection Act has been in force for approximately

seven

years.

 After

 so long a period, Respondent still has not even

admitted to a patent odor problem,

 let alone seriously undertaken

abatement,

In mitigation,

 however, we agree with Respondents’ arguments

that the printing industry has always been accompanied by an odor

of ink and solvents.

 Although that historical fact cannot jtstify

continuing odor emissions or similar odorous emissions on

 a scale

like that here,

 (“h..one of the largest printing plants

 in the world

under

one

roof

,..,“

 Resp,

 Br, at 11

 (emphasis in originalfl,

 it may

~~id~~artial

 explanation for the delay seen

here.

Likewise, we must consider the fact that not all

 Hall’s

neighbors are affected.

 While Hall~scontentions that the affected

individuals are particularly sensitive, or are persecuting it on

other grounds such as parking or race, these are not adequate to

disprove the unreasonable interferences we find; they do provide

some explanation for Hall’s failure to take the problem seriously.

Hall might reasonably have believed that some of these individuals

were indeed complaining for other reasons.

 However, Hall’s citation

to Proces~~&Books v. EPA, supra,

 that this

 is the type of

“trI~g

 inconvenience, petty~ñ~oyanceor minor discomfort” which

the Act does not protect against,

 is not convincing.

 351 N.E,2d

at 869.

 A significant number of Individuals have suffered a signifI-

cant, unreasonable interference.

~Hall’s

 emissions need not, as it

argues,

 be unbearable in order to constitute a violation of §9(a).

~7-3~E~

—1

We agree that Hall provides

 a considerable social and economic

benefit to its many workers.

 However, such benefit cannot justify

the unreasonable interferences its emissions cause;

 in fact, such

benefits would he increased by operations complying with the

 Act.

Finally, we agree with Hall that the fact that gas which may

 have been available in the past might not be available now;

 however,

we find a violation with regard to its past operations.

 Hall’s

ability to comply in the future will be considered in setting a

remedy.

In light of the many factors present, we feel that a large

penalty is not necessary here;

 such funds are better spent to

achieve compliance, albeit belated.

 Because of Hall’s reluctance

to even face the problem, however,

 and the Act’s mandate in §2(b)

that “adverse ~ffects upon the environment are fully considered

and borne by those who cause them,” some penalty is needed.

We

find that

 a penalty of $15,000, while small when compared to the

period of time involved and the potential costs of compliance, will

serve the purposes of the Act.*

We shall not require immediate compliance.

 In light of the

current gas shortage and the magnitude of the problem, we shall

require that Hall present to the Agency a plan for odor abatement

within 180 days of the entry of our Order.

As noted above, we shall dismiss those portions of the Imended

Complaint alleging violation by Rotoprint,

 as well as all alleged

violations by Hall other than odor.

This Opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions

of law of the Board in this matter.

ORDER

IT IS THE ORDER OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD that:

1.

 Respondent W.

 F. Hall Printing Company

 is found to

 have

operated its Chicago, Illinois, facility in such a manner as to

emit odors unreasonably interfering with the enjoyment of

 life

and

property

in

 violation of Section 9(a)

 of the Environmental Protection

Act.

*

 The Agency has requested a very large penalty,

alleging that Hall saved significant sums by not acting to

eliminate odors.

 However, we note that Hall has spent

significant sums on air po1lution~control.

0

2.

 Respondent W.

 F. Hall Printing Company shall pay

as a penalty for said violation the sum of Fifteen Thousand

Dollars

 ($15,000), payment to be made within thirty

 (30)

days of the date of this Order to following address:

Environmental Prctection Agency Fiscal Services Division

2200 Churchill Road

Springfield, IllinoIs

62706

3.

 Respondent W.

 F. Hall Printiag Company shall, within one

hundred eighty

 (180)

 days of the date of this Order, submit to the

Agency a full and complete plan for tha abatement of such unreasonable

odors in a timely fashion.

 If such plan requires construction or

equipment installation,

 it shall show a scheaule for such construction

or

 installation to be completed in the shortest practicable time.

4.

 Respondent W.

 F. Hall PrInting Company shall, upon approval

of such

plan,

 with any modifications found necessary or

desirable

by this Board, cease and desist all odor violations within the

time

frame permitted by such plan.

5.

 Those portions of the Amended Complaint in this matter

alleging violation by Respondent Chicago Rotoprln.t Company,

and

those portions alleging other than odor violation by Respondent

W,

 F. Hall Printing Company, are dismissed.

6.

 To the extent consistent with the requirements of this

Order,

 jurisdiction is retained in this matter.

I, Christan

 L. Moffett, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution

Control Board, hereby certify tI~eabove Opinion and Order were

adopted on the

~

 day of

 1977, by a vote of

~tanL.Mo~clerk

Illinois Polluti

 ontrol Board