ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
February 15, 2001
VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, )
)
Complainant, )
)
v. ) PCB 01-77
) (Enforcement – Land, Water)
SEARS, ROEBUCK, & CO., )
)
Respondent. )
ORDER OF THE BOARD (by S.T. Lawton, Jr.):
On November 1, 2000, the Village of Park Forest filed a complaint, alleging respondent,
Sears, Roebuck, & Co. (Sears), owned and operated a retail automotive service and gasoline
station
1
at 100 Victory Boulevard in Park Forest, Cook County, Illinois,
2
from 1965 to 1995, in a
manner which violated the Environmental Protection Act (Act). Sears filed a separate but related
cause of action in the circuit court on November 21, 2000. On December 6, 2000, Sears filed a
motion to stay the proceedings before the Board, and an application for submission not subject to
disclosure of portions of its December 6, 2000 motions, an agreement between the parties, and a
related complaint for breach of contract filed by the respondent in circuit court. Sears also
requested a prehearing conference as soon as practicable. The Board accepts this matter for
hearing, denies respondent’s motion to stay proceedings and grants respondent’s application for
non-disclosure, as explained below. The Board refers the respondent’s request for a prehearing
conference to the hearing officer in this matter for further consideration.
DUPLICITOUS/FRIVOLOUS DETERMINATION
This matter is before the Board pursuant to Section 31(d) of the Act (415 ILCS 5/31(d)
(1998)) and Section 101.202 of the Board’s new procedural rules (35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.202).
Under Section 31(d) of the Act, enforcement cases filed by citizens are placed on the Board’s
agenda to determine whether the case is frivolous or duplicitous. 415 ILCS 5/31(d) (1998). The
Board’s current procedural rules, which became effective January 1, 2001, define the terms
“duplicitous” and “frivolous.” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.202.
Allegations in the Complaint Are Not Frivolous
The Board’s new procedural rules state that a complaint is frivolous if the Board does not
have the authority to grant the requested relief, or if the complaint fails to state a cause of action
1
The retail automotive service and gas station allegedly owned and operated by Sears, which is
located at 100 Victory Boulevard in Park Forest, Illinois will be referred to as “systems.”
2
The location at 100 Victory Boulevard in Park Forest, Cook County, Illinois will be referred to
as the “site.”
2
for which the Board can grant relief. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.202.
3
The complainant in this
matter alleges that the respondent violated sections of the Act pertaining to open dumping, illegal
waste disposal, water pollution, and the creation of a water pollution hazard, under Sections
21(a), 21(e), 12(a), and 12(d) of the Act. See 415 ILCS 5/12(a), 12(d), 21(a), 21(e) (1998).
The Complaint Asks for Suitable Relief, Except for Attorney Fees and Litigation Costs
The complainant asks the Board to grant suitable relief in part by requesting that the
Board: (1) find Sears in violation of the Act; (2) order Sears to reimburse the Village for cleanup
costs due to such violations; and (3) award the complainant the costs of the proceeding, including
expert witness fees and attorney fees. Comp. at 4-9.
4
The complainant seeks suitable relief in requesting the Board to find that Sears violated
the Act and award cleanup costs that were a consequence of such violations. Comp. at 4-9.
Respondent challenged the existence of a private right of action to recover cleanup costs in this
case in its November 21, 2000 complaint with the Chancery Division of the circuit court of Cook
County. Section 31(d) of the Act permits citizens to file a complaint with the Board against any
person, which alleges a violation of the Act or any rule or regulation thereunder. 415 ILCS
5/31(d) (1998). The Board has the authority under Section 33(a) of the Act to grant cleanup
costs that result from respondent’s violations of the Act. 415 ILCS 5/33(a) (1998). Section
33(a) grants the Board the broad authority to make final determinations “as it shall deem
appropriate under the circumstances.”
Id.
The circuit court of Cook County recently upheld the Board’s authority to award clean-up
costs to a citizen in an underground storage tank case. Dalise Enterprises v. IPCB, 00-CH-12113
(September 12, 2000) (concerning Union Oil Co. of California v. Bargeway Oil Company, Inc.
(January 7, 1999), PCB 98-169). Moreover, “the Board has consistently held that it has the
authority to award cleanup costs to private parties for a violation of the Act.” Union Oil (January
7, 1999), PCB 98-169, slip op. at 7 (citing Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Ostro (July
30, 1992), PCB 92-80; Herrin Security Bank v. Shell Oil Co. (September 1, 1994), PCB 94-178
(citations omitted)). Since the Board has jurisdiction to hear possible violations of the Act and
can grant appropriate relief in this case, it finds the request for reimbursement of cleanup costs is
not frivolous under the Act and the Board’s procedural rules.
The complaint contains one request that the Board does not have the authority to grant.
The Board cannot award attorney’s fees and other ordinary expenses of litigation in citizen’s
suits. ESG Watts v. PCB and IEPA, 286 Ill. App. 3d 325, 337, 676 N.E.2d 299, 307 (3rd Dist.
1997). The Board strikes this requested relief from the complaint.
3
The Board utilized the same definition of frivolous prior to the adoption of the new procedural
rules. See Walsh v. Kolpas (September 23, 1999), PCB 00-35, slip op. at 2; Colony of
Longmeadow HOA v. Dominick’s (January 6, 2000), PCB 00-92, slip op. at 1; People v. State
Oil (August 19, 1999), PCB 97-103, slip op. at 3.
4
The complaint in this matter will be referred to as “Comp. at __.”
3
The Complaint Asserts Sufficient Grounds for Each Allegation.
The complainant establishes sufficient grounds for each of the four counts in the
complaint so that the allegations are not frivolous. The first count of the complaint is not
frivolous because the complainant provided sufficient information to properly allege that the
respondent caused or allowed the open dumping of waste in violation of Section 21(a) of the Act.
See 415 ILCS 5/21(a) (1998). The complainant alleged that Sears caused or allowed open
dumping by releasing waste in the form of gasoline, waste oil and other petroleum related
products and by-products onto the site when Sears owned and operated systems at the site.
Comp. at 3.
The second count of the complaint is not frivolous, where the complainant adequately
alleged that the respondent violated the illegal waste disposal section of the Act. Section 21(e)
of the Act states that no person shall:
dispose, treat, store or abandon any waste . . . ,except at a site or facility which
meets the requirements of the Act and of regulations and standards thereunder.
415 ILCS 5/21(e) (1998).
The complainant alleged that the respondent violated Section 21(e) of the Act by allowing waste
in the form of gasoline, waste oil, and other petroleum substances to leak from the underground
storage tanks (USTs) and possible other unknown sources at the site during its ownership and
management of the site. Comp. at 5-6.
The third count of the complaint is not frivolous, where the complainant alleged that the
respondent violated the water pollution section of the Act. Section 12(a) of the Act states that no
person shall:
[c]ause, threaten, or allow the discharge of any contaminants into the environment
in any State so as to cause or tend to cause water pollution in Illinois. 415 ILCS
5/12(a) (1998).
The complainant alleges that the respondent caused, threatened, or allowed water pollution by
allowing contaminants in the form of gasoline, waste oil, and other petroleum substances into the
environment, which leaked into and remained in the land and groundwater at the site. Comp. at
7.
Finally, count four of the complaint is not frivolous in that respondent allegedly
“[d]eposit[ed] any contaminants upon the land in such a place and manner so as to create a water
pollution hazard” in violation of Section 12(d) of the Act. 415 ILCS 5/12(d) (1998). The
complainant alleged that Sears created a water pollution hazard by allowing the release of
contaminants, including gasoline, waste oil, and other petroleum substances to leak into and
remain in the land and groundwater at the site. Comp. at 8.
The Complaint is Not Duplicitous
4
The Board’s new procedural rules define duplicitous as a matter before the Board that is
identical or substantially similar to one brought in this or another forum. 35 Ill. Adm. Code
101.202.
5
Neither party successfully identified any other actions, identical or substantially
similar to this pending in this or another forum.
The respondent did not challenge the complaint as duplicitous. However, in its motion to
stay the proceedings, respondent stated that it filed a contract dispute claim with the circuit court
on November 22, 2000, approximately one month after the Village of Park Forest filed a
complaint in this matter on November 1, 2000. The respondent alleged that its complaint for
declaratory judgment in the circuit court involves a breach of the confidentiality agreement
within the contract that pertains to the site in this matter, located at 100 Victory Boulevard in
Park Forest, Illinois. Specifically, respondent stated that its complaint “requests damages for
breach of contract, injunctive relief, indemnification pursuant to contract, and a declaratory
judgment regarding the parties’ respective rights.” Resp. Mot. to Stay at 2.
6
Respondent stated that the disposition in the contract dispute may resolve the issue of
liability in this matter and may in part or completely obviate the need for a hearing before the
Board. Resp. Mot. to Stay at 1. However, respondent also stated that:
“[t]here can be no doubt that these breach of contract claims are separate and
distinct from the claims asserted by the Village in this action. The facts and
circumstances that form the basis for Sears of breach of contract and injunction
claims in its circuit court [brief] are completely separate from the allegations
giving rise to the Village’s claims in its Complaint [before the Board].” Resp.
Mot. to Stay at 3.
The Board agrees that the contract dispute in the circuit court involves a separate cause of
action, which is neither identical nor substantially similar to the environmental violations alleged
in the complaint in this matter. The Board has previously found that complaints alleging
violations of the Act are not substantially similar to related cases concerning breach of contract
and fraud. See People v. State Oil Company (August 19, 1999), PCB 97-103, slip op. at 6 (citing
Morton College Board of Trustees v. Town of Cicero (January 8, 1998), PCB 98-59, slip op. at
5).
The question as to whether Sears violated the Act as alleged in the November 1, 2000
complaint is properly before the Board. If Sears later chose to file a case in circuit court for
breach of a confidentiality agreement with the Village of Park Forest, it does not affect the
Board’s ability and discretion to hear this environmental matter at this time.
5
The Board utilized the same definition of duplicitous prior to the adoption of the new
procedural rules. See Walsh v. Kolpas (September 23, 1999), PCB 00-35, slip op. at 2.
6
The respondent’s motion to stay proceedings and request for prehearing conference, filed with
the Board on December 6, 2000, will be referred to as “Resp. Mot. to Stay at __.”
5
Based on the information before us, and our own independent search of our database, the
Board finds that this action is not duplicitous. In summary, the Board finds that the complaint is
neither frivolous nor duplicitous, and accepts the case for hearing.
RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS IS DENIED
Respondent filed a motion to stay proceedings and request for a pre-hearing conference
with the Board on December 6, 2000. The Board’s procedural rules state that “[m]otions to stay
a proceeding must be directed to the Board and must be accompanied by sufficient information
detailing why a stay is needed . . . .” 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.514. The respondent failed to
provide sufficient information to show that the Board should grant a stay in this matter.
The respondent requests the Board to stay this proceeding even though the complainant
filed its complaint in this matter approximately one month prior to when respondent filed its
complaint for breach of contract in the circuit court. In its motion, respondent discusses the
contract issues before the circuit court, and states that “[t]he requested temporary stay will
promote judicial economy and efficiency because resolution of the issues currently pending
before the circuit court could obviate the need for a hearing before the Board altogether and/or
narrow the issues to be tried in this hearing.” Resp. Mot. to Stay at 1.
The Board finds that the case before the Board, which will determine whether or not
Sears is liable for violations of the Act, could not be obviated by the resolution of the contract
dispute in the circuit court. The Board, with its technical expertise, is well equipped to
determine whether Sears violated the Act. As stated above in the Board’s finding that this matter
is not duplicitous, this case involves a separate cause of action from the issue before the circuit
court. The circuit court case does not include allegations that Sears violated the Act.
Respondent does not cite to any statutory authority or case law in its motion to stay
proceedings that would otherwise support its position that the Board should stay this case.
However, the complainant alleges in its December 20, 2000 response to respondent’s motion that
it cannot consolidate both cases by refiling its environmental claim in the circuit court because “a
private parties (sic) sole remedy under this Act is before the Board.” Comp. Resp. at 7 (citing
People v. State Oil (August 19, 1999), PCB 97-103, slip op. at 7).
Respondent challenged this argument in its reply to complainant’s response, stating that
the complainant should file a counterclaim concerning the environmental violations in the circuit
court. Respondent argued that the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Fiorini decided under
similar circumstances that “to require that a portion of the instant action be heard before the
[Board] at this juncture would frustrate judicial economy and common sense.” Resp. Reply at 3
(citing People v. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d 318, 338, 574 N.E.2d 612, 619 (1991)). According to the
respondent, Fiorini held that “concurrent jurisdiction exists in the Circuit Court and the proper
administrative agency for actions alleging violations of the Act.” Resp. Reply at 3 (citing
Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at 339, 574 N.E.2d at 620).
Respondent takes the finding in Fiorini out of context that consolidating two matters
involving the Act in the circuit court is analogous to this matter. Resp. Reply at 3. The facts
6
underlying Fiorini differ significantly from the case before the Board. In Fiorini, the Illinois
Attorney General filed a complaint in the circuit court, where it alleged that the defendant,
Fiorini, violated land and air sections of the Act and Board regulations. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at
326, 574 N.E.2d at 614. The defendant, in turn, filed a counter-claim (which the court construed
to be a third-party complaint) against several third-party defendants. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at 326,
329, 574 N.E.2d at 614-15. The defendant, in the counter-claim, alleged that the third-party
defendants dumped waste on the defendant’s site, and requested the circuit court to grant
injunctive relief and cleanup costs pursuant to Section 21 of the Act. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at
329-
30, 574 N.E.2d at 615-16.
The defendant in Fiorini argued that Section 45(d) allows citizens to bring third-party
complaints from actions brought pursuant to the Act. Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at 331, 574 N.E.2d at
616. Section 45(d) allows defendants to recover actual cleanup costs from third parties. Fiorini,
143 Ill. 2d at 334, 574 N.E.2d at 617. Since Section 45(d) was enacted after the original action
was brought, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to retroactively apply the new law. However,
the Illinois Supreme Court accepted the third-party complaint in the State case “to avoid
frustrat[ing] judicial economy and common sense.” Fiorini, 143 Ill. 2d at
326, 329, 574 N.E.2d
at 614-15.
This matter involves an entirely different situation. The complainant properly brought a
citizen’s environmental enforcement action before the Board, and Sears subsequently filed a case
concerning breach of contract with the circuit court. As stated above, the cause of action in this
case is separate and distinct from the one that Sears later filed in circuit court. Unlike Fiorini, the
complainant in this matter is not requesting the circuit court to consolidate the environmental
matter with a like environmental issue in the circuit court. The Board finds the analogy is
stretched, and is not sufficient to cause the Board to stay this proceeding.
The respondent maintains the position in its December 29, 2000 reply that “[a]ll of the
claims between the parties should be heard in the circuit court action instead of having two
tribunals hear pieces of claims related to the same Agreement at the same time. . . .” Resp. Reply
at 3. The Board finds that this argument is irrelevant because the complainant chose the Board to
decide this matter in its earlier filing on November 1, 2000, and the Board is a proper forum to
hear this case. The respondent cannot force the complainant to switch venue and file a
counterclaim concerning respondent’s alleged violations of the Act in circuit court because
respondent later filed a complaint for breach of contract and wants the circuit court to adjudicate
both the environmental and contractual matters in a single proceeding.
The complainant, in its December 20, 2000 response to the respondent’s motion to stay
the proceedings, applied an Illinois Supreme Court test that determines when to stay a later
proceeding. Comp. Resp. at 5 (citing A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company v. Swift & Company,
84 Ill. 2d 245, 245, 419 N.E.2d 23, 27-28 (1980).). The Board has previously utilized this test
when determining whether to later stay a proceeding. Environmental Site Developers v. White
& Brewer Trucking; People v. White & Brewer Trucking (July 10, 1997), PCB 96-180, slip op.
at 4. The Board will not apply the Illinois Supreme Court test to the case at hand because the
complainant filed the separate cause of action before the Board on November 1, 2000, which was
well before the respondent filed its complaint in the circuit court on November 21, 2000. For the
7
reasons stated above, the Board denies the respondent’s motion to stay the proceedings. The
Board notes that the respondent still has the option to seek a stay of its later contract dispute in
the circuit court pending the resolution of the issue of liability in this case.
RESPONDENT’S APPLICATION FOR SUBMISSION NOT SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE IS
GRANTED
On December 6, 2000, respondent filed an application for submission “not subject to
disclosure” with the Board, pursuant to Section 101.161 of the Board’s procedural rules.
7
Section 7 of the Act states that all files, records and data of the Board are open to reasonable
public inspection, except for “information privileged against introduction in judicial
proceedings.” 415 ILCS 5/7(a)(ii) (1998). Since respondent filed its application on December 6,
2000, the Board reviews the request under its former procedural rules, which were effective until
January 1, 2001. Section 101.161(a) of the Board’s former procedural rules stated that the Board
can stamp certain materials “Not Subject to Disclosure,” including information privileged against
introduction in judicial proceedings and confidential data submitted by any person under the Act.
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.161(a)(2) and (a)(3).
8
Section 101.161(b) stated that an application for
non-disclosure had to contain:
1)
Identification of the precise material, or parts of the material, for which
non-disclosure is sought;
2)
Indication of the particular non-disclosure category into which the
material falls; and
3)
A concise statement of the reasons for requesting non-disclosure. The
application shall be verified by affidavit and contain such data and
information as will inform the Board of the nature of the material for
which non-disclosure is sought, the reasons why non-disclosure is
necessary and the number and title of all persons familiar with such
information, and how long the material has been limited from disclosure.
35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.161 (b).
Sears requested in its application that the Board order its application, motion to stay
proceedings, complaint in the circuit court, and an agreement between the parties to be subject to
non-disclosure under 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.161(a)(2) and (a)(3). Sears submitted “that the
Agreement and the discussion of terms and provisions of the Agreement in the Complaint and
Motion constitute Information Privileged Against Introduction as well as Confidential Data.”
Resp. Application at 2. Sears submitted copies of its complete application and motion, as well as
public copies, which excluded all information concerning the agreement. Sears stated in its
7
On December 6, 2000, respondent filed an application for submission “not subject to
disclosure” with the Board, which will be referred to as “Resp. Application at __.”
8
The Board has since adopted new procedural rules concerning materials not subject to
disclosure, which became effective on January 1, 2001. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 130, Subparts A,
D.
8
application and December 29, 2000 reply that the circuit court entered an order directing filing
under seal of the respondent’s complaint and agreement with the complainant. Sears also
attached the circuit court order to its motion.
In its December 29, 2000 reply to complainant’s response to its application, Sears states
that, “[p]ursuant to the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release between Sears and the
Village, both parties are prohibited from making any public statements concerning the subject
matter of the Agreement and both parties are required to ‘use all reasonable efforts to keep the
Agreement strictly confidential.’” Resp. Reply at 2. Sears discusses in the reply that the
“Circuit Court is the proper forum to determine the issues related to the other aspects of the
Agreement – namely the interpretation of the indemnity and release provisions of the
Agreement.” Resp. Reply at 2. Unlike its application to the Board on December 6, 2000, Sears
did not mark any material in its reply as redacted or attempt to exclude any information in the
document from public view.
The respondent provided sufficient information in its application to grant its request for
non-disclosure of its original motion, agreement, and circuit court complaint under Section
101.161 of the Board’s former procedural rules. In its application, Sears identified the portions
of its motions subject to the contract dispute, the agreement between the parties, and its circuit
court complaint as the information to be subject to non-disclosure under Section 101.161 of the
Board’s procedural rules. In the public copies of its application and motion to stay proceedings,
Sears removed all information that it stated could violate its agreement with the complainant in
the circuit court case. Sears identified the selected material as confidential data and information
privileged against introduction under 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.161(a)(2) and (a)(3), and briefly
stated how disclosing such information could place it in breach of a contract with the
complainant.
Sears also filed an affidavit with the Board on December 6, 2000, which complied with
Section 101.161 of the Board’s existing procedural rules by verifying the truth of the information
in its application. Sears alleged in its application that the agreement solely between it and the
complainant and the terms thereof were limited from public exposure since the date of execution
on December 11, 1995, through the date that the respondent filed its application with the Board.
Resp. Application at 3.
Complainant, in its December 20, 2000 response to respondent’s application, stated that
the “application is wholly insufficient and does not warrant ‘non-disclosable’ status before the
Board.” Comp. Resp. at 3. Complainant stated that Sears waived any argument for privilege by
filing a complaint concerning the contract dispute with the circuit court. Comp. Resp. at 3.
However, respondent correctly stated in its reply to complainant’s response that the circuit court
has sealed the complaint and other information relative to its contract dispute.
Complainant also argues that the information concerning the agreement, which Sears
requests to be not subject to disclosure, does not properly fall under the “confidential data”
exception of the Board’s former procedural rules. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.161(a)(3).
Complainant states that the Board discussed the nature of “confidential data” in the adjusted
standard,
In re
Petition of Horsehead Resource and Development Company, Inc (September 9,
9
1999), AS 00-2. In the adjusted standard case, the Board granted petitioner’s request to qualify
price lists and invoices to certain customers as non-disclosable information because disclosure of
such information would give petitioner’s “customers and competitors a ‘competitive advantage’
at [petitioner’s] expense.”
Id.
at 2-3.
The Board agrees that the respondent’s application, motion to stay proceedings, circuit
court complaint, and the agreement between the parties do not qualify as “confidential data.” The
documents that respondent alleges are confidential data do not resemble true data or confidential
material that requires protection from unfair competition. Unlike the price lists and invoices for
respondent’s business operation in Horsehead Resources, the application by the respondent in
this matter involves pleadings and a contract between the parties and concerns the site in this
case. The main reason to seal the contract from disclosure is also different from the need to
protect the respondent against an unfair competitive advantage. Unlike matters involving trade
secrets, the disclosure of the contract in this case may violate a breach of confidentiality
provision in a contract between the parties. Public disclosure of the contract between the parties
would not give the complainant or any other member of the public a competitive edge over
respondent by revealing the company’s price structure or quantity of products, as in the case of
Horsehead Resources.
Although the Board finds that the contract and respondent’s complaint, application and
motion are not confidential data, the requested information does qualify as “information
privileged against introduction in judicial proceedings” under 35 Ill. Adm. 101.161(a)(2) of the
Board’s former procedural rules. Although public view of the substance of the respondent’s
petition would not create an unfair competitive advantage, public disclosure of the terms of the
contract does potentially place the respondent in a position of violating a confidentiality clause,
which is the subject of a sealed matter in the circuit court.
In light of the contract dispute between the parties for breach of confidentiality, the Board
grants the respondent’s application. The Board orders the information not included for public
view in the respondent’s December 6, 2000 motions, the agreement between the parties, and the
complaint before the circuit court to be considered information not subject to disclosure under 35
Ill. Adm. Code 101.163(a)(2). The Board notes that all future information not within the
purview of the respondent’s application, including the respondent’s reply on December 29, 2000,
are not included in this order. If Sears finds that it must refer to parts of the contract in dispute in
a manner that may violate its agreement with the complainant, Sears must file an application in
accordance with Section 130 of the Board’s new procedural rules. 35 Ill. Adm. Code 130,
Subparts A, D
.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds the allegations in the complaint are neither duplicitous nor frivolous, and
accepts this matter for hearing. The Board denies the respondent’s motion to stay proceedings,
but grants its application for submission “not subject to disclosure.” The Board finds that the
information that was not included for public view in the respondent’s
December 6, 2000 motions, the agreement between the parties, and the complaint before the
circuit court are considered information privileged against introduction in judicial proceedings.
10
See 415 ILCS 5/7(a)(ii) (1998); 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.163(a)(2). The Board finds that this
information is not subject to disclosure under the Act and Board regulations. Finally, the Board
refers the request for a pre-hearing conference to the hearing officer for further consideration.
The Board directs that this matter proceed to hearing as expeditiously as practicable. The
Board will assign a hearing officer to conduct hearings consistent with this order and Sections
101.600 and 101.612 of the Board’s new procedural rules. See 35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.600 and
101.612.
The assigned hearing officer shall inform the Clerk of the Board of the time and location
of the hearing at least 30 days within advance of the hearing so that a 21-day public notice of the
hearing may be published. After hearing, the hearing officer shall submit an exhibit list, a
statement regarding credibility of witnesses, and all actual exhibits to the Board within five days
of the hearing.
Any briefing schedule shall provide for final filings as expeditiously as possible. It is the
responsibility of the hearing officer to guide the parties toward prompt resolution or adjudication
of this matter, through whatever status calls and hearing officer orders he determines are
necessary and appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Board Member R.C. Flemal dissented.
11
I, Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control Board, hereby certify that the
above order was adopted on the 15th day of February 2001 by a vote of 6-1.
Dorothy M. Gunn, Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board
