ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October 27, 1994
CONTINENTAL WASTE INDUSTRIES
)
OF ILLINOIS,
INC.,
Petitioner,
)
PCB 94-138
(Siting Review)
v.
CITY OF MT. VERNON,
ILLINOIS,
)
Respondent.
FRED
C.
PRILLAMAN,
MOHAN,
ALEWELT,
PRILLAMAN
&
ADAMI
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF
PETITIONER;
DAVID
R.
LEGGANS APPEARED
ON
BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
OPINION
AND
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by E. Dunham):
This matter comes before the Board on a petition for review
filed on April 26,
1994, by Continental Waste Industries of
Illinois,
Inc.
(C.W.I).
C.W.I. requests review of the City of
Mt. Vernon’s (City)
denial of local siting approval to
regionalize the existing transfer facility.
A hearing in this matter was held on June 21,
1994,
in Mt.
Vernon,
Illinois before hearing officer John Hudspeth.
C.W.I.
filed its brief on August 11,
1994.
The City of Mt. Vernon filed
its brief on September 8,
1994.
C.W.I.
filed its reply brief on
September 22,
1994.
The Board’s responsibility in this matter arises from
Section 40.1 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act)
(415 ILCS
5/40.1
(1992)).
The Board is charged, by the Act, with a broad
range of adjudicatory duties.
Among these is adjudication of
contested decisions made pursuant to the local siting approval
provision for new regional pollution control facilities, set
forth in Section 39.2 of the Act.
More generally, the Board’s
functions are based on the series of checks and balances integral
to Illinois’ environmental system: the Board has responsibility
for rulemaking and principal adjudicatory functions, while the
Board’s sister agency, the Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency
(Agency)
is responsible for carrying out the principal
administrative duties,
inspections, and permitting.
The Agency
does not have a statutorily-prescribed role in the local siting
approval process under Sections 39.2 and 40.1, but would make
decisions on permit applications submitted if local siting
approval
is granted and upheld.
ISSUES
Petitioner seeks reversal of the City’s decision on one or
2
more of the following grounds:
1) Section 39.2 of the Act
violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution;
2)
Section 39.2 violates the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution;
3) the City of Mt. Vernon’s decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence; and 4)
petitioner
was denied fundamental fairness.
(Pet.
Br. at
3•)1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October
6,
1993,
C.W.I.
filed a request for siting
approval for a regional pollution control facility with the City
of Mt. Vernon.
(C-3.)
C.W.I. sought local siting approval for
expansion of services at an existing waste transfer station
located in the City of Mt. Vernon.
(C-i.)
The proposed expanded
facility would be a regional waste transfer station accepting
waste from throughout Jefferson County and surrounding areas. (C-
1..)
No waste would be disposed in Jefferson County.
(C-i.)
On
January 10,
1994,
a hearing on C.W.I’s request was held before
the City Council of Mt. Vernon.
(C-19.)
In March of 1994,
the
City Council of Mt. Vernon passed a resolution denying C.W.I’s
request for siting approval.
(C-219
-
C-225.)
JURI
SDICTION
The constitutional issues raised by C.W.I. would,
if valid,
serve to deprive the Board of jurisdiction.
It is appropriate
that those issues be discussed first.
Though the Board is a
creature of the statute that created it, and the statutory powers
given the Board do not include the power to definitively decide
constitutional issues, for reasons given below we believe that
the authority cited by C.W.I. does not serve to deprive the Board
of jurisdiction because we believe that no valid constitutional
issues were raised.
Petitioner’s first challenge to jurisdiction is premised
upon the application of TENNSV.
Inc.
v. Gade,
(Nos.
92—503
& 92-
502
(S.D.
Iii. Oct.
22,
1993).
Petitioner argues that TENNSV
supports its argument that the siting requirement contained in
Section 39.2 of the Act is unconstitutional.
The TENNSV court
held Section 39.2,
as well as Section 3.2 and 22.14(a),
unconstitutional as applied to interstate municipal solid waste.
In the context of this case, petitioner’s reliance upon TENNSV is
misplaced because it
is readily distinguished based upon facts
and the issue before us.
1
Petitioner’s
Brief
filed
on
September
8,
1994
will be
referenced as Pet.
Br. at
____.
Reply Brief of Petitioner filed
on September 22,
1994 referenced as Reply at
___.
References to
the
record
filed by Mt.
Vernon will be referenced
to
the page
number
(C-i through C-239).
The transcript from the Board’s June
21,
1994 hearing will be referenced as Tr. at
_____
3
In TENNSV, the court was deciding whether a rail shipment of
municipal solid waste
(MSW)
into Illinois from New York was
required to undergo the Section 39.2 siting approval process for
the MSW to be unloaded from the train for shipment to a landfill
in Illinois.
Citing Fort Gratiot Landfill
(1992),
—
U.S.
___
112 S.Ct.
2019,
119 L.Ed.2d 139, the Second District found that
the defendants in TENNSV had not offered any proof that MSW
generated outside the boundaries of any local general purpose
unit of government poses any different health risks to the public
than MSW generated locally.
In Fort Gratiot Landfill, the
Supreme Court held that a Michigan landfill siting law violated
the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution because it required
counties within the State of Michigan to affirmatively permit the
receipt of interstate shipments of waste.
In this case,
C.W.I.
sought local siting approval from the
City of Mount Vernon to be allowed to expand the service area of
an existing waste transfer facility which was originally only
accepting waste from within the City and therefore not subject to
the siting approval process of the Act.
The approval sought
involved the expansion of the service area,
and did not entail
any changes in the operation of the facility.
The effect of the
expansion of the service area would be to increase the amount of
waste received and handled at the existing facility.
The
expansion of the service area was requested “to take waste from
throughout Jefferson County and surrounding counties, as
its
primary service area.”
(C—i.)
At no time during the hearings
before the City or the Board did the petitioner refer to an
interstate service area.
For the first and only time, petitioner
raises this issue in its reply brief, arguing that the requested
area did not specifically exclude interstate waste, and thus it
“may” accept interstate waste if siting approval is given.
(Reply
at
3.)
Clearly, the facts are different than those in TENNSV and
Fort Gratiot Landfill.
Here we are dealing with intrastate
transfers of waste.
Contrary to petitioner’s argument, the
record contains no evidence that the waste to be handled at this
transfer station will come from beyond Illinois’ boundaries.
Therefore, there is no factual basis to support this
constitutional challenge.
At issue here is the increased amount
of waste to be handled at this particular transfer station, not
its
source of origin.
Therefore, the Board finds that TENNSV
does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction in this case.
Petitioner’s second challenge involves the application of
the supremacy clause.
The supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution provides that the laws of the United States shall be
the supreme law of the land.
(U.S.
Const., art.
VI.)
The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires states to
submit a solid waste plan to the U.S. EPA for approval.
(42
U.S.C.
§6947)
Illinois submitted a plan which was approved by
4
the U.S. EPA.
(See 47
Fed.
Reg. 9004
(March 3,
1982).)
The
Illinois plan identifies the Agency as the lead agency, the
entire State of Illinois as the planning region, the Agency as
the planner and local governments as the implementors.
(Plan at
24.)
Petitioner contends that the provisions of Section 39.2 of
the Act are inconsistent with the Solid Waste Plan submitted by
Illinois and therefore violates the supremacy clause.
Petitioner
contends that “~i)ncontrast to the regionalized planning
approach mandated by the Plan, Section 39.2 allows local bodies,
* *
*
who have not been designated as the planning entity for a
region,
to unilaterally grant or deny siting approval for
regional pollution control facilities on essentially an ad hoc
basis.”
(Pet.
Br. at 10.)
The Board finds no inconsistency with the role of local
governmental bodies in reviewing a siting application and the
solid waste plan approved by the U.S.
EPA.
Section 39.2 provides
certain criteria that the local governmental body must consider
in reviewing the siting application.
The decision of the local
governmental body can be appealed to the Board and the Board’s
decision may be appealed to the Appellate Court.
The Agency,
in
issuing permits for the facility plays an integral role in the
siting review process.
Finding no inconsistency, the Board
believes that there
is no violation of the supremacy clause of
the
U.S.
Constitution.
FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS
Section
40.1
of
the
Act
authorizes
the
Board
to
review
the
proceedings before the local decisionmaker to assure fundamental
fairness.
In E
& E Hauling,
(2d Dist.
1983),
116 Ill.App.3d 586,
451 N.E.2d 555, aff’d in part
(1985)
107 Il1.2d 33,
481 N.E.2d
664, the appellate court found that although citizens before a
local decisionmaker are not entitled to a fair hearing by
constitutional guarantees of due process, procedures at the local
level must comport with due process standards of fundamental
fairness.
The court held that standards of adjudicative due
process must be applied.
(E
& E Hauling, 451 N.E.2d at 564; see
also Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce (FACT)
v. Pollution Control
Board
(3d Dist.
1990),
198 Ill.App.3d 541, 555 N.E.2d 1178.)
Due
process requires that parties have an opportunity to
cross—examine witnesses, but that requirement is not without
limits.
Due process requirements are determined by balancing the
weight of the individual’s interest against society’s interest in
effective and efficient governmental operation.
(Waste Management
of Illinois Inc. v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1988),
175
Ill.App.3d 1023,
530 N.E.2d 682,
693.)
The manner in which the
hearing is conducted,
the opportunity to be heard, the existence
of ex parte contacts, prejudgment of adjudicative facts,
and the
introduction of evidence are important, but not rigid, elements
5
in assessing fundamental fairness.
(Hediger v.
D
& L Landfill,
Inc.
(December 20,
1990), PCB 90—163.)
Petitioner contends that it sought the input and approval of
the City in selecting an acceptable site for a regional transfer
station.
(Tr. at 11.)
After several months of reviewing sites
and working with the city manager it was determined that no
location was more acceptable than where the existing transfer
station was located.
(Tr. at 13 and 15.)
During this same time
period, petitioner also pursued the siting of a transfer station
on the outskirts of Mt. Vernon and submitted a siting request to
Jefferson County.
(Tr. at 16.)
The City objected to the siting
of the transfer station on the outskirts of the City.
(Tr.
at
18.)
At the request of Jefferson County, hearing was delayed
in
that siting procedure to allow the City to act on a petition for
the existing facility to operate as a regional transfer station.
(Tr. at 18.)
C.W.I asserts that it was denied fundamental fairness
because:
1)
the City assisted in finding a better site, but could
not;
2) the City opposed the siting of C.W.I.’s regional
pollution control facility on the outskirts of the City;
3) the
resolution of the City shows that the City ignored the expert
testimony and other testimony in favor of siting; and 4) the City
ignored the “implicit finding” of the Agency in relation to the
health, safety and environmental factors that C.W.I. believes
accrued to it via the Agency permitting process.
The City of Mt. Vernon states that the issue of fundamental
fairness was not raised at the hearing before the City Council,
and is therefore waived.
While waiver of some fundamental
fairness issues may be possible, the siting review process
mandates that the Board assess ~the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding below.
The City also argues that,
on the merits, the
proceedings before the City Council were fundamentally fair.
The
City also points out that the proceedings before the City Council
are presumed at law to be fundamentally fair,
and therefore, the
burden of proving fundamental unfairness is on the petitioner.
The landfill siting process as defined in Section 39.2 of
the Act places city and county boards in the position of
adjudicating the siting petitions of prospective regional
pollution control facilities on the merits.
Many local
administrators find the transition from their normal legislative
function to an adjudicatory function very difficult.
In this
case, the City,
in attempting to assist the petitioner in finding
a suitable location for a regional transfer station, was
attempting to fill the normal role of
a concerned city council.
Later, the Council objected to the siting of a new regional
facility on the outskirts of the City,
in a proceeding which is
not before the Board, presumably in the role as advocates for the
constituents in the City.
Later still,
the City Council sat in
6
an adjudicatory hearing and conducted itself very well in that
function, granting all parties present time to state their
respective cases for and against the siting request.
C.W.I. states that the City Council was unfair for first
trying to help C.W.I. because C.W.I.
received an adverse
adjudicatory result.
C.W.I. has pointed to no portion of the
hearing transcript to indicate where bias was shown by the City
Council in the conduct of the hearing, and the Board finds that
no such bias can be shown on the record.
The Board finds that the City Council’s resolution shows
appropriate attention was given to all of the witnesses before
the City Council,
and that the resolution in and of itself does
not support a finding of fundamental unfairness.
The fact that
the resolution of the City Council may be contrary to testimony
presented by expert witnesses does not result in the resolution
being unfair.
The grant of permits by the Agency for a local pollution
control facility is based on a review of similar factors as
considered by the local governmental body in reviewing the siting
application.
However, the mere existence of a permit does not
prohibit a finding by the local governmental body that the
facility may threaten the public, health, safety and welfare.
The Board finds that the findings of the Agency and the local
governmental body are two independent decisions.
In addition,
the Board notes that the permit issued by the Agency was not
entered into the record.
STATUTORY CRITERIA
At the local level,
the siting process is governed by
Section 39.2 of the Act.
Section 39.2(a) provides that local
authorities are to consider nine criteria when reviewing an
application for siting approval.
These statutory criteria are
the only issues which may be considered when ruling on an
application for siting approval.
Only if the local body finds
that all applicable criteria have been met by the applicant can
siting approval be granted.
The City of Mount Vernon denied siting approval because,
in
its belief, petitioner failed to prove its case with respect to
five of the criteria.
The City found that criteria
1,
2,
3,
5
and
6 were not met.
When reviewing a local decision on the criteria, this Board
must determine whether the local decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
(McLean County Disposal.
Inc.
v. County
of McLean (4th Dist.
1991),
207 Ill.App.3d 352,
566 N.E.2d 26,
29;
Waste Management of Illinois,
Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board (2d Dist.
1987),
160 Ill.App.3d 434, 513 N.E.2d 592;
E
& E
7
Hauling.
Inc. v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1983),
116
Ill.App.3d 586, 451 N.E.2d 555, aff’d in part (1985)
107 Ill.2d
33,
481 N.E.2d 664.)
A decision is against the manifest weight
of the evidence if the opposite result is clearly evident, plain,
or indisputable from a review of the evidence.
(Harris v. Day
(4th Dist.
1983),
115 I11.App.3d 762, 451 N.E.2d 262,
265.)
The
Board, on review,
is not to reweigh the evidence.
Where there is
conflicting evidence, the Board is not free to reverse merely
because the lower tribunal credits one group of witnesses and
does not credit the other.
(Fairview Area Citizens Taskforce
(FACT)
v. Pollution Control Board
(3d Dist.
1990),
198 Ill.App.3d
541, 555 N.E.2d 1178,
1184; Tate v. Pollution Control Board
(4th
Dist.
1989),
188 I1l.App.3d 994,
544 N.E.2d 1176,
1195; Waste
Management of Illinois,
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1989),
187 Ill.App.3d 79,
543 N.E.2d 505,
507.)
Merely because
the local government could have drawn different inferences and
conclusions from conflicting testimony is not a basis for this
Board to reverse the local government’s findings.
(File v. D & L
Landfill,
Inc. PCB 90—94
(August 30,
1990), aff’d File v.
D
& L
Landfill,
Inc.
(5th Dist.
1991),
219 Ill.App.3d 897, 579 N.E.2d
1228.)
However, where an applicant made a prima facie showing as
to each criterion and no contradicting or impeaching evidence was
offered to rebut that showing, a local government’s finding that
several criteria had not been satisfied was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
(Industrial Fuels
& Resources/Illinois,
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board (1st Dist.
1992),
227 Ili.App.3d
533,
592 N.E.2d 148.)
As noted above, the Board is not permitted to substitute its
judgment for that of the local decisionmaker.
The Board
is only
able to reverse the City’s finding if the City’s holding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Criterion
1
—
The facility is necessary to accommodate the waste
needs
of the area it
is intended to serve.
The City of Mount Vernon stated merely that:
“Inadequate and
insufficient evidence was presented so that it cannot be
determined whether the facility is necessary to accommodate the
waste needs of the area it is intended to serve.”
(C—220.)
C.W.I. states that 135,000 cu. yds. per year of MSW are
generated in Jefferson County.
Consolidation of wastes could
reduce the number of vehicles traveling to out—of-county
landfills by 75 to 80 per cent.
(C—4.)
Petitioner also states
that it can handle approximately 10,000 additional cubic yards of
waste
(C-47), and will increase traffic by only 2 to 3 vehicles
per day (C—40).
No record of economic benefit or detriment was
presented beside the conclusory “It is extremely inefficient and
expensive to transport wastes in the smaller collection vehicles
rather than the larger transfer vehicles.”
(C—4.)
8
C.W.I. contends that the information presented on the need
criterion was not contested.
(Pet.
Br. at 18.)
In fact, the City
Council at hearing disputed the waste volume numbers that formed
the basis for C.W.I.’s need arguments at length.
(C—44 to C-55.)
C.W.I. presented letters from three municipalities that tend
to support the need for the regional transfer facility, but the
largest city, Centralia, merely indicates that it would consider
the option of using the waste transfer station if it were
available.
(C-212.)
The Village of Ina stated that it “would
like the opportunity of disposing of trash collected from
residences of ma,
the Village of ma and surrounding residences
at the transfer station of Mt. Vernon, Illinois.”
(C-211.)
The
letter from the Village of Belle Rive speaks of a “long
discussion with Mr. Frank Volini on
4 Nov.
1993 about landfills
in the Southern Illinois Area” and then the “undue problems and
unnecessary added costs to many small villages in the area
...
(C—210.)
The record does not offer an argument against these letters
representing a purported need.
However, the Board cannot state
that
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence to
conclude that letters of interest in using the proposed transfer
station are insufficient evidence to satisfy the need criterion
especially where the amount of waste to be recieved at the
proposed transfer station is disputed.
Since the record contains sufficient rationale for the
respondent’s statement regarding insufficient information
regarding criterion 1, the Board finds that the decision of the
City on criterion 1 was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Criterion
2
-
The facility is so designed,
located and proposed
to be operated that the public,
health, safety and welfare will
be protected.
The City Council of Mt. Vernon found that the proposed
transfer station did not satisfy criterion 2 for the following
reasons: 1)insufficient and inadequate evidence was presented as
to the capacity of
the proposed facility so that it cannot be
determined whether the facility is capable of accommodating
additional waste;
2) there is flooding in the area immediately
adjacent to the site which flooding contributes to the runoff and
off-site deposit of rain water contaminated with garbage and
waste spillage;
3) increase of the present rodent and pest
problem in the immediate area;
4)
increase of the present fly
problem in the immediate area;
5)
increase in the present odor
problem in the area;
6) design and procedure for the disposition
of liquid waste and/or water from the transfer station adversely
affects the public health, safety and welfare; and
6)
liquid
spills from trucks entering and leaving the area.
(C—221 and C—
9
222.)
The Board finds that there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support the City Council’s finding on criterion 2.
Residents who testified before the City Council complained of
flies in the area of the transfer station.
(C-65 and C-73.)
The
residents also complained of rats
(C—l06) and odors
in the area
(C—69 and C-75).
Residents also reported that the area around
the transfer station has a drainage problem that results in
flooding of the area.
(C-77 and C—80.)~
Criterion
3
—
The facility is located so as to minimize
incompatibility
with
the character of the surrounding area and to
minimize
the
effect
on
the
value
of
the
surrounding property.
The
City
Council
stated
that
the
proposed
facility
was
compatible with the industrial operations
in the area but was not
compatible with the surrounding residential area.
(C-222.)
The
City Council also found that the facility was not located to
minimize the effect on property values in the area.
(C-223.)
The sole evidence placed in the record by C.W.I. to satisfy
this criterion is the testimony that the transfer station has
been operating at this site for about a decade,
and that
expansion of the service area should not affect local property
values.
The appellate courts have found in File v. D
& L Landfill.
Inc.,
(5th Dist.
1991),
219 Ill.App. 3d 897 and Waste Management
of Illinois,
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board,
(2nd Dist,
1984),
123 Ill.App.3d 1075 that pre-existence of a landfill does not
entirely satisfy the incompatibility criterion for an expansion.
Though C.W.I argues that the transfer station will not change its
physical boundaries as a landfill would, the Board notes that
significant increases in usage and addition of a second loading
dock for outgoing trailers do constitute expansion of the
currently permitted facility.
The Board concludes that the City’s finding that criterion
3
was not met is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Petitioner relies on the pre—existence of the transfer station to
prove that the expansion is compatible.
Pre—existence of a
facility does not guarantee that an expanded facility will remain
compatible.
In addition, the testimony received from residents
surrounding the facility challenges the assumption that the
existing facility is compatible.
Criterion
5
—
The plan of operations for the facility is designed
to minimize’ the danger to the surrounding area from fire,
spills,
or other operational accidents.
The resolution states that,
“the
plan of operation for the
10
facility is designed to minimize the danger of the surrounding
area from fire and other operational accidents,
but the plan of
operation for the facility is not designed to minimize the danger
of the surrounding area from water runoff from the facility, from
spills from trucks entering or leaving the facility, and from
rain water and other liquids pumped onto the surface at the
facility.”
(C—223.)
Petitioner contends that water runoff,
spillage from trucks
and pumping rainwater and liquids onto the ground around the
facility are not the type of dangers with which criterion
5 is
concerned.
Petitioner bases its argument on the finding in E
& E
Hauling,
Inc.
v. PCB
(2d Dist 1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 586,
614,
aff’d,
107
Ill.2d
33
(1985)
that
the
threat
of
leachate
migration
does
not
fit
in
to
criterion
5
which
is
“concerned
with
the
sudden
calamities
and
disasters.”
Therefore,
petitioner
contends
that because the City considered
the
wrong
type
of
evidence in
reaching its decision on criterion 5,
it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
The Board finds that the types of spills and accidents
considered by the City in connection with criterion 5 are within
the scope of the criterion.
These types of spills represent
potential areas for sudden calamities and disasters.
The City’s
determination that the plan submitted by C.W.I. does not meet
criterion
5 is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Criterion
6
-
The traffic patterns to or from the facility are so
designed as to minimize the impact on existing traffic flows.
The resolution states that insufficient evidence was
presented to decide this criterion.
(C-223.)
The resolution
further recognized an existing traffic problem that would likely
be exaggerated by the regionalization of the facility.
(C—223.)
The City determined that C.W.I’s plan does not meet this
criterion.
(C—223.)
Petitioner
contends
that
the resolution is contradictory in
that
it
first
states
that
there
is
insufficient
evidence
and
then
reaches
a
decision
on
this
criterion.
Petitioner further argues
that
it
is
not
required to submit a traffic plan.
Petitioner
also
argues
that
the
statute
only
requires that the effects of
traffic
be
“minimized”
and
does
not
require
that
there
be
no
effect on existing traffic flow.
The present facility accepts garbage from about 12 vehicles
a day.
(C-44.)
Respondent anticipates a 20
increase in vehicle
traffic for a regional transfer station.
(C—45.)
At the hearing,
a member of ‘the City Council questioned the increase in vehicles
as compared to the increase in the service area.
(C—45.)
A
citizen also testified on previous traffic problems in the area
but admitted that there has been an improvement.
(C-73.)
11
Respondent contends that the increase in traffic is minimal and
therefore the impact on traffic flow will be minimal.
(C-6.)
Given the limited testimony on traffic flow in the area,
the
Board finds that the conclusion reached in the resolution is not
unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The
Board finds that there is sufficient evidence to rebut
petitioner’s position that the impact on traffic flow will be
minimal.
CONCLUSION
In summary the Board finds no basis for the constitutional
arguments presented by petitioner that Section 39.2 violates
provisions of the U.S. Constitution so as to deny the Board
jurisdiction in this matter.
The Board also finds that
petitioner has failed to show that it was denied fundamental
fairness in the landfill siting procedures before the City of Mt.
Vernon.
In addition, petitioner has not shown that the decision
of the City of Mt. Vernon is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of facts and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Board affirms the denial of
siting approval by the City of Mt. Vernon for regionalization of
the transfer station in the City of Mt. Vernon operated by
Continental Waste Industries Of Illinois,
Inc.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act,
(415 ILCS
5/41 (1992)), provides for appeal of final orders of the Board
within 35 days of the date of service of this order.
The Rules
of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
(See also 35
Ill.
Adm. Code 101.246, Motion for Reconsideration.)
J. Theodore Meyer concurred.
I,
Dorothy M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above opinko~nand order was
adopted on the
~~7”~-
day of __________________________
1994, by a vote of
~
~
/2~~-
~
~
\~1~
~~1~1~—-I34~~.
Dorothy M.
Gun~i,
Clerk
-,
Illinois Pollittion Control Board
