ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October 27,
1994
SANGAMON
COUNTY,
)
)
Complainant,
)
v.
)
AC
93—42
)
(Administrative Citation)
NORMAN
CLARK
AND
BRENDA
)
(SCDPH-93-AC-9)
BERTRAND,
)
Respondents.
ROBERT SMITH,
SANGAMON COUNTY ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY,
APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
SANGAMON
COUNTY;
NORMAN
CLMU( AND
BRENDA
BERTRAND APPEARED
PRO
SE.
OPINION
AND
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by
G.
T.
Girard):
This matter comes before the Board upon an administrative
citation filed by Sangamon County
(County) pursuant to Section
31.1 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
(Act)
(415 ILCS
5/31.1
(1992)).
The citation was filed on September 13,
1993,
and alleges that respondents, Norman Clark,
and Brenda Bertrand,
as owners of property located in Sangamon County,
Illinois, have
violated Section 21(p) (1)
and
(3)
of the Act.
Specifically, the
Agency alleges that the respondents violated Section 21(p) (1)
by
causing or allowing open dumping of waste resulting in litter,
and Section 2l(p)(3) by causing or allowing open dumping of waste
resulting in open burning.
Respondents filed a letter with the Board requesting a
hearing on September 23,
1993.
Accordingly,
a hearing was held
on February 2,
1994,
in Springfield,
Illinois, before the Board’s
hearing officer, Deborah Frank.
No members of the public
attended the hearing.
The County presented one witness, Mr. Allen Alexander,
Solid
Waste Specialist with the Sangamon County Department of Public
Health who inspected the site.
Mr. Clark and Ms. Bertrand
testified on their own behalf.
Complainant’s brief was filed on
February 9,
1994,
and respondents’ brief was filed on February
10,
1994.
Complainant’s reply brief was filed on February 18,
1994, and respondents’ reply brief was filed on March 3,
1994.
For the reasons enunciated below,
the Board finds no
violation to have occurred in this case.
APPLICABLE
LAW
The administrative citation issued against respondents
alleges violations of subsection
(1) and
(3)
of Section 21(p)
of
2
the Act.
Section 21(p) provides that no person shall in
violation of 21(a) of the Act:
Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in a manner
which results in any of the following occurrences at the
dump site:
1.
litter;
*
*
*
3. open burning;
*
*
*
Section 3.24 of the Act (415 ILCS 5/3.24) defines “open
dumping” as the “consolidation of refuse from one or more sources
at a disposal site that does not fulfill the requirements of a
sanitary landfill”.
The Act defines “refuse” as “waste”, where
“waste”
is defined in Section 3.53 of the Act as “garbage...or
other discarded material...”
(415 ILCS 5/3.53).
The Board has adopted the definition of litter used in the
Litter Control Act.
(See St. Clair County v. Louis Mund,
(August
22,
1991), AC 90-64).
“Litter” means any discarded, used or
unconsumed substance or waste and may include:
...any garbage,
trash,
refuse, debris...or anything else of
an unsightly or unsanitary nature which has been discarded,
abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.
(415 ILCS 105/3)
Pursuant to Section 31.1(d) (2)
of the Act, the County bears
the burden of proof in this case.
(415 ILCS 5/31.)
Also,
pursuant to Section 31.1(d) (2)
of the Act,
if the Board finds
that the alleged violation occurred, then the final order issued
shall include a finding of violation, and shall impose the
penalty of $500 per violation as specified in subdivision
(b) (4)
of Section 42 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
This action concerns property on Sandhill Road in
Springfield Township, Sangamon County.
The proPerty is owned by
Norman Clark and Brenda Bertrand (Tr. at 13)
and has been
1
The transcript in this proceeding will be cited as “Tr.
at
“;
the administrative citation is unnumbered therefore the
page numbers are established beginning with 1 and the citation
3
assigned EPA site code number 1678220072.
At hearing, County
employee Allen Alexander testified that he inspected the property
on August
2,
1993,
and believed it to be in violation of Section
21 of the Act.
(Tr.
at 6.)
Mr. Alexander stated that he had
previously inspected the property before August
2,
1993, and
spoken to Mr. Clark on the telephone to inform him that the
problems must be taken care of by the end of July 1993.
(Tr. at
5.)
Mr. Alexander submitted an affidavit attached to the
administrative citation which stated that the inspection report
he completed “is an accurate representation of affiant’s
observations” with respect to the subject property.
The inspection report attached to the administrative
citation has checks in the blanks opposite “causing or allowing
litter” and “causing or allowing open burning” under the heading
of
“Site Observation”.
Also attached to the citation is a page
headed “Summary of Apparent Violations”.
Under that heading,
Mr.
Alexander indicates that open burning was checked because:
This apparent violation was marked on the checklist
because open burning and/or evidence of open burning of
waste was observed at the site.
(AC at 11.)
On a second page also titled “Summary of Apparent Violations”,
Mr. Alexander indicated that causing or allowing litter was
checked because “demo
sic)
and other materials dumped at the
site”.
(AC at 12.)
The County specifically alleges that the following materials
were dumped on the property:
demolition debris, including
dimensional lumber, boards, and boards with nails sticking out of
them; what appears to be parts of window frames; boxes;
carpeting; and other construction material.
(Tr. at
6,
10 and
11.)
Attached to the inspection report are several pictures
which, according to Mr. Alexander, picture the dimensional
lumber,
a piece of carpeting,
and burned areas.
(Tr. at 10—11;
Compl.
Exh.
5.)
At hearing, Mr. Clark testified that his property was first
inspected on June 2,
1993, by the Sangamon County Department of
Public Health, and that thereafter he proceeded to clean up the
property.
(Tr. at 52.)
Mr. Clark testified that there was no
“permanent dumping” on the site.
(Tr. at 14.)
Specifically, he
testified that he intended to use the materials allegedly dumped
at his property:
the lumber was to be used to construct a
12’ X
16’ storage shed and the carpet was used as a safe area for his
three children under age four.
(Tr. at 14,
15, and 16.)
Concerning the open burning, Mr. Alexander testified that
will
be
cited
as
“AC
at
“.
4
“there was a large scorch area where it appeared that such things
as dimensional lumber and other demolition debris had been
burned” at the site.
(Tr. at
6,
44-45.)
Mr. Alexander described
the photograph of the burn area to show some of the ashes and
debris in that area.
(Tr. at 11.)
He further testified that he
believed that burning occurred at the property based on his
opinion of the size of the burn area,
and because the ashes made
it appear that “things such as dimensional lumber...boxes and
things of that nature had been burned at the site”.
(Tr. at 12.)
Mr. Clark’s testimony concerning open burning was limited to
statements that he was clearing the woods, giving some of the
timber away,
and burning the trees and shrubbery.
(Tr. at 21.)
He cited the open burning provisions of the Act in support of his
burning activities.
(Tr. at 28-29.)
In later testimony, Mr.
Clark stated that he did not burn dimensional lumber on his
property.
(Tr. at 31.)
DISCUSSION
Section 31.1(d) (2) specifically provides that if there is a
review requested for an administrative citation the “burden of
proof shall be on the Agency or unit of local government”.
Thus,
the County bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate that
the alleged violations occurred.
In this proceeding the County’s
evidence consists of the inspection report, photographs, and
testimony of the inspector.
The Board will examine the evidence
with ~respectto each alleged violation.
First, the County alleges that the respondents caused or
allowed open dumping resulting in litter.
(AC at 2.)
The
inspection report indicates that on the site were “demo materials
and other materials dumped at the site”.
(AC at 12.)
Mr.
Alexander testified that he saw various pieces of construction
debris at the site as well as carpet.
(Tr. at
6,
10 and 11.)
However, Mr. Clark testified that the lumber was to be reused at
the site and that the carpet was
a safe area for his children to
play while he worked at cleaning the site.
(Tr. at 14,
15, and
16.)
The only non-testimonial evidence is the photographs taken
at the site which show lumber stacked in disarray and a carpet
spread out in the area.
The Board is not persuaded that the violation of open
dumping resulting in litter occurred.
The evidence does not
support Mr. Alexander’s interpretation of the site.
Mr. Clark’s
testimony is supported by the photographs.
Although the lumber
is in disarray there is no indication that the lumber has been
finally disposed.
The Board further notes that the photograph
shows only used lumber and no other materials which would lead
the Board to find that open dumping leading to litter occurred.
Further, the inspector’s photograph of the carpet shows that it
was spread out on the ground which is supportive of Mr. Clark’s
5
testimony that it was a play area for his children, rather than
Mr. Alexander’s interpretation that it was disposed.
Therefore,
the Board finds that the County has not proven that open dumping
resulting in litter occurred.
In adjudicating the County’s allegation that open dumping
resulting in open burning occurred (AC at 2),
the Board is placed
in a difficult position.
The evidence brought forward by the
County alleging violation supports both the County’s allegations
and Mr. Clark’s defense.
A further complicating feature is that
the Board’s hearing officer found at hearing that Mr. Clark’s
testimony on open burning was not credible.
While the Board
regards this credibility finding seriously, we will not find Mr.
Clark in violation based solely on this ruling.
Rather, we will
disregard Mr. Clark’s testimony on this issue
in his defense, and
will,
instead, determine if the County’s evidence is sufficient
to find a violation,
since the burden of proof is on the County
in this case.
The Board finds that the County has failed to carry the
burden of proof by establishing that open dumping leading to open
burning has occurred.
The inspection report indicates that Mr.
Alexander made a legal conclusion that open dumping resulting in
open burning occurred, but the inspection report does not include
the specific observations that led to that conclusion.
The
photographs do not support a finding of open dumping leading to
open burning.
The only evidence of open dumping leading to open
burning is the testimony of Mr. Alexander at the Board hearing,
when he remembered details of the ashes,
including the
allegations that nails were found.
In summary, the evidence
collected contemporaneously with the inspection supports Mr.
Clark’s defense, while the inspector’s testimony at hearing
supports a finding of violation.
Therefore, the County did not
carry its burden of proof
in this proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons and based on the facts presented
in this case, the Board finds that the respondents did not
violate Section 21(p) (1)
or 21(p) (3) of the Act on August
2,
1993.
This opinion constitutes the Board findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
The administrative citation
(AC 93-42)
is hereby dismissed
against respondents Norman Clark and Brenda Bertrand,
for the
reasons given above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
6
Chairman Claire
A. Manning and Board Member Marili McFawn
concurs.
Board Members 3. Theodore Meyer and Ron C. Flemal dissent.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS
5/40.1) provides for the appeal of final Board orders within 35
days of service of this decision.
The Rules of the Supreme Court
of Illinois establish filing requirements.
(But see also,
35
Ill. Adm. Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration.)
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn, Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, hereby certify that the above opinion and order was
adopted
on, the
~?7~
day of
((~‘/-~
,
1994,
by a
vote of
.i~/~-
~
/
(
——
I
-~
Dorothy H. G~3r~h,Clerk
Illinois Pollution Control Board