ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
November
4,
1993
SANGAMON
COUNTY,
)
Complainant,
)
AC 93—6
v.
)
Dockets A
& B
(SCDPH-93-AC—2)
RUTH
ANN
SHEPPARD
and
)
(Administrative
STEVE
SHEPPARD,
)
Citation)
)
Respondents.
ROBERT L.
SMITH, ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY,
APPEARED
ON
BEHALF
OF SANGANON COUNTY
*
RUTH
SHEPPARD
AND STEVEN
SHEPPARD
APPEARED
PRO SE.
OPINION
AND
ORDER
OF
THE
BOARD
(by
C.
A.
Manning):
This
matter
is
before the Board pursuant to a petition for
review
timely
filed
by
the
respondents,
Ruth Ann
and
Steven
Sheppard, on February 22, 1993.
Respondents have requested review
of an administrative citation issued
February
1,
1993
by Sangamon
County.
Sangamon County is vested with the authority to bring such
a citation pursuant to Section 31.1 of the Environmental Protection
Act (Act)
(415 ILCS 5/31.1) and a delegation of authority agreement
with
the
Illinois
Environmental
Protection
Agency
statutorily
authorized in Section 4(r) of the Act.
(415 ILCS 5/4 (r).) The Board
accepted the petition for review on March 11, 1993 and set the case
for hearing.
Hearing was held before Hearing Officer Orville
S.
Kahn on May
13,
1993
in Springfield,
Illinois.
No post—hearing
briefs were filed.
The administrative
citation alleges
a
single violation of
Section 21(p)(l) of the Act
(415 ILCS 5/21(p) (1)) which carries a
statutory civil penalty of
$500
if the Board finds that such
a
violation occurred.
For the reasons
set forth bilow, the Board
affirms the finding of Sangamon County that respondents, Ruth Ann
and Steve
Sheppard,
have violated Section
21(p) (1).
The Board
finds respondents liable for $500 and any associated hearing costs
incurred by Sangamon County or the Board.
PACTS
Ruth
Ann
Sheppard is the owner of a salvage yard located in
the Village of Berlin, Sangamon County, Illinois.
(Tr. at 15.) The
property is commonly known to the Agency and Sangamon County
as
• “Berlin/R.ShepparcP’.
The site is being operated as an auto salvage
•yard.
(Complaint at
1.)
The Agency has
designated the facility
2
with site code no.
1670150004
and the current operator of the
facility is Steven Sheppard.
(Tr. at 15.)
The instant administrative citation
is the second citation
issued to Ruth and Steve
Sheppard by Sangamon County
for open
dumping violations at the auto salvage yard.
On May
14,
1992,
Sangamon
County
filed
the
first
administrative
citation
with
the
Board
alleging
a
single
violation
of
Section
2l(p)(1)
-
open
dumping in a manner resulting In litter.
The respondents failed
to
file a petition for review and
on June 23,
1992,
the Board
entered a default
order affirming Sangamon County’s finding of
violation.
(Sanaamon
County
v.
Ruth
Ann
Sheopard
and
Steve
Shetmard,
(June 23,
1992) AC 92-36,
134 PCB 371.
Photographs of
the
auto
salvage
yard
entered
as
exhibits
during
the
second
administrative citation hearing indicate that a large number of
used tires were among the litter.
(Def.Exh. #2.)
On December 23, 1992, the Sangaluon County.Department of Public
Health conducted a
“re-inspection”
of
the
Sheppard facility to
determine if the facility had been cleaned up.
(Complaint at 1;Tr.
at 14 and 17.)
Testifying on behalf of Sangamon County at hearing,
Allen Alexander,
a Waste Management Specialist for the Sangamon
County Department of Public Health, indicated that he observed a
“large mound” of approximately 50 to 100 tires, both mounted and
unmounted on tire rims, on-site.
(Tr. at 19.)
Alexander testified that in his opinion the respondents had
caused open dumping resulting in litter because “of the way the
tires were placed on the property.”
(Tr.
at
21..)
He further
stated the tires “did not appear to be stored for any use.
They
were just mounded together in a pile.”
(Id.)
Also, the tire pile
was out in the open where it
could be rained or snowed
on,
and
there was no coverage such as tarp.
(~J
Jerry Ferguson, also a Waste Management Specialist with the
Sangamon County of Public Health, accompanied Alexander to the site
and
participated
in
the
inspection.
His
testimony
was
substantially similar to Alexander’s: “the tires were open—dumped
on the property.
They were not covered in any way or properly
stored.”
(Tr. at 31.)
As a result of the re—inspection, Sangamon County issued the
second administrative citation which is the subject of this opinion
and order.
The inspection report regarding the December 13,
1992
Sangamon County site visit, entitled “Open Dump Inspection Report,”
indicates
that
Alexander
and
Ferguson
observed
violations
of
3
Section 21(p) (1)
of the Act
—
causing or allowing litter.1
Steve Sheppard offered no testimony during hearing, nor was he
called to testify by Sangamon County; however, Ruth Ann Sheppard
offered testimony
explaining the origin of the tire mound.
She
testified that as
a result of the first administration citation
order, Steve Sheppard spent $1700 hauling tires to ADM in Decatur.
(Tr. at
11..)
The tire mound was intended “to be left there until
he (Steve Sheppard
had a full load to go to ADM.”
(J~
and Tr. at
39.)
Ruth Ann Sheppard explained the tires
are
hauled away from
the auto salvage yard by ADM; however, ADM contacts Steve Sheppard
to let him know when ADM is “ready for a load (of tires.”
(Tr. at
41.)
It was also her testimony that other tire pick—up companies,
such as those in Peoria or Chicago, are too expensive to use. The
salvage yard has to pay the driver, the truck, and the company to
take the tires.
(Id.)
Sheppard also testified there were approximately 73 tires in
the
pile
and
that
only
10
to
12
were
unmounted.
(Tr.
at
51.)
The
unmounted tires were dumped on the property from gas stations
(Tr.
at 41)
and by people who drive up on the road and dump on her
property
(Tr. at 52).
Sheppard testified that the source of the
tires at the salvage yard was the salvage yard business itself
(Tr.
at 39) and Steven Sheppard’s body shop (Tr. at 39) located down the
street from the salvage yard
(Tr. at 45).
She thought the tires
would
be
all
right
if
they were
mounted
and that
they
were
originally
in
“trouble” because Steven had taken the tires
off
their rims.
(Tr. at 39.)
She described the buildings on the property as not being big
enough to store tires waiting to be hauled away (Tr. at 39 and 45),
nor was there space for
a building on the premises
(Tr.
at 46).
She did not believe
it would be practicable to take the time to
store the large number of tires in a building in any event (Tr. at
45).
She also testified that it would not be cost-effective to put
up
a
gate
to
keep
dumpers
from
dumping
“unrimmed”
tires
on
her
property
-
that
they
had tried
to
do
so
once
and
the effort failed.
(Tr.
at
43.)
1
Additionally,
the
county
inspector
noted
violations
of
the
following sections of the Act or regulations:
Section 807.201 and
807.202
of
the
Board’s
regulations
-
causing
or
allowing
the
development and/or
operation of
a
solid waste management
site
without a permit issued by the Agency; Section 21(a) of the Act
-
causing or allowing the open dumping of any waste; Section 21(d) of
the Act
-
conducting any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste—
disposal operation without
a
permit granted by
the Agency;
and
Section 55(a)
(general violations section of the Used Tire Act 415
ILCS 5/55 et.seg.).
None of these alleged violations are before
us in this proceeding,
however.
4
Ruth
Ann
Sheppard
further
testified
she
understood
that
Sangamon County does not want tires “laying around,”
(Tr. at 40)
but Steve
Sheppard was
in the salvage business and there would
always be tires
at an auto salvage yard
~
Sheppard also
testified that her son had moved the business to an entirely new
location and on the date of
inspection,
December 23,
1992,
the
property was no longer being used as a salvage yard.
The premises
were completely cleaned up except for the tire mound
(Pr. at 41,
47,
52,
65—66).
It was Ruth Ann Sheppard’s belief
that
even if
the Sheppards paid the $500 penalty for the litter violation,
it
would have no effect, because the tire mound is gone and the auto
salvage yard is no longer there.
DISCUSSION
The Act establishes that,
in order to seek enforcement by way
of the administrative citation process for violations of Section
21(p), the Agency must establish that the person caused or allowed
open dumping and must also prove that the open dumping resulted in
litter, open burning or other specified conduct at the dump site.
If the record demonstrates that such violation occurred then the
Board must
adopt
an
order
finding
a violation and
impose
the
specified penalty.
The only mitigation
of
a
violation
is
if
“...the person appealing the citation has shown that the violation
resulted from uncontrollable circumstances” in which case the Board
shall
adopt
an ordering which
imposes no
penalty.
(415
ILCS
5/31.1(d) (2)
(1992).)
The administrative citation issued against Sheppard alleges
that Section 21(p) subsection
(1) of the Act was violated.
Section
21(p) (1)
provides that no person
shall
in violation of Section
21(a)
of the Act.:
Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in a manner which
results in any of the following occurrences at the dump site:
•
1.
litter;
Section 21(a)
•of the Act sets forth a general prohibition against
open dumping by providing that “(no
person shall cause or allow
the open dumping of any waste”.
Section
3.24
of
the
Act
defines
“open
dumping”
as
“the
consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a disposal site
that does not fulfill the requirements of
a sanitary landfill”.
(415 ILCS 5/3.24
(1992).)
Section 3.31 of the Act defines “refuse”
as
“waste”.
(415
ILCS
5/3.31
(1992).)
Section
3.53
defines
“waste”
as,
inter qua,
“garbage...or other discarded material,
resulting form
industrial,
commercial,
mining
and agricultural
operations....”
(415 ILCS 5/3.53
(1992).)
5
In St. Clair County v. Louis Mund (August 22, 1991), AC 90-64,
125 PCB 381, the Board adopted the definition of litter contained
in the Litter Control Act:
“litter”
means
any
discarded,
used
or
unconsumed
substance
or
waste.
“Litter”
may
include,
but
is
not
limited
to,
any
garbage,
trash,
refuse,
debris...abandoned
vehicle...or
anything else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature which has
been discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.
(Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1990
supp.,
ch.
38,
par.
86.3.)
(415 ILCS
105/3).
In five previous Board opinions finding violations of Section
21(p) (1),
used tires were found to be litter2:
IEPA v.
Sickles,
(September 17,
1992)
AC 92—47,
136 PCB 83; IEPA
V.
Sickles,
(July
30,
1992)
AC
92—47,
135 PCB 223; IEPA v. Hillebrenner,
(May 21,
1992) AC 92—16,
133 PCB 559; IEPA v. Loveless, (August 13, 1992) AC
91—31,
135 PCB 367; and IEPA v. Sprincnnan,
(May 9, 1991) AC 90—79,
122 PCB 147.
In Hillebrenner, the litter included 500 tires in a
ravine
on
rural
property.
(Hillebrenner,
133
PCB at
559.)
In
sprinaman,
a
portion
of the litter was an uncovered tire pile.
(Springman,
125 PCB at 151.)
In Loveless, Hammond, and Sickles,
used tires were merely among the litter found “open-dumped” on the
site during inspection.
(Loveless, 135 PCB at 371; Hammond, Slip
Op. at 2; and Sickles,
135 PCB at 223 and 136 PCB at 83.)
Further, an auto salvage yard has been previously cited
for
a violation
of Section
21(p)(1).
In Hammond
infra,
the Board
affirmed the Agency’s issuance of an administrative citation for
“open dumping” of used tires and other various types of waste at a
junkyard.
The tires at the site
were rimmed and unrimmed, were
located without cover in haphazard piles around the property.
(~
generally, Hammond, Slip Op. at 2.)
Causing or Allowing Litter
Mrs.
Sheppard
admits
that
she
is
the
owner
of
the
property
inspected
by
Sangamon
County.
She
further
admits
that
the
tires
were
on
her
property at the time of the inspection.
According to
Mrs.
Sheppard’s
testimony,
her
son
operates a car salvage yard as
well
as
a
garage
and body shop down the street
from the
site.
These
activities
generate
the
tires.
(Pr.
at
45.)
Mrs.
Sheppard
testified that there were no fences or gates around the property to
restrict access.
According to the inspector Alexander, he believed
open dumping had occurred “because of the way the tires were placed
on the property.”
(Tr. at 21.)
Mr. Alexander also stated that the
2Section 2l(p)(1) was formerly codified as Section 21(q)(1)
and therefore a number of the cases are brought under Section
21(q)
(1).
6
tires were
“just
mounded
together
in
a
pile”.
(Tr.
at
21.)
Further,
Mrs. Sheppard testified that “he
(her son Steve
has to
wait for them (ADM
to call him” before the tires are picked up.
(Tr. at 45.)
Thus,
although Mrs. Sheppard claims that the tires
are being
stored on the property,
there
is no regular routine or
schedule for the tires to be picked up.
Therefore, after reviewing
the evidence, the Board finds that open dumping of waste occurred
on
the
property
resulting
in
litter
in
violation
of
Section
21(p) (1) of the Act.
Mrs. Sheppard also points out that the litter had been cleaned
up from the site and numerous tires had been removed from the
property after the first administrative citation was issued.
Also,
the
tires
which
were
the
subject
of
this
citation
have
been
removed.
However, the Board has previously held that removal of
the litter after the issuance of an administrative citation does
not restrain the Board from a finding of violation.
The Act, by
its
terms,
does
not envision
a
properly
issued administrative
citation
being
dismissed
or
mitigated
because
a
person
is
cooperative
or voluntarily
cleans
up the
site.
(IEPA
v.
Jack
Wright (August 30, 1990), AC 89-227, 114 PCB 863.)
Clean—up of the
site is not a mitigating factor under the administrative citation
program.
(IEPA
V.
Dennis Grubaugh (October 16, 1992), AC 92—3, 136
PCB 425.)
PENALTY
Penalties in administrative citation actions are prescribed by
Section 42(b) (4) of the Act which states:
In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1 of
this Act, any person found to have violated any provision of
subsection
(p)
of Section 21 of this Act shall pay a civil
penalty of $500
for each violation of each such provision,
plus any hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency.
Such penalties shall
be made payable to the
Environmental
•
Protection
Trust
Fund
to
be used
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of “An Act creating the Environmental Protection
Trust Fund”,
approved September 22,
1979,
as amended;
(415
ILCS 5/42(b)(4)
(1992).)
Respondent will therefore be ordered to pay a civil penalty of
$500 based on the violation as found.
Further, pursuant to Section
42(b) (4) of the Act, respondents are also required to pay hearing
costs incurred by the Board and the Sangamon County.
The Clerk of
the Board and Sangamon County will therefore be ordered to each
file a statement of costs,
supported by affidavit, with the Board
and with service upon respondents.
Upon receipt and subsequent to
appropriate review, the Board will issue a separate final order in
which the issue of costs is addressed.
Additionally, Docket B will
be opened to treat all matters pertinent to the issue of costs.
7
For the reasons stated in the above opinion, the Board finds
that
the
respondents,
Ruth
Ann
Sheppard
and
Steve
Sheppard,
violated Section 21(p) (1) of the Act.
Accordingly, the respondents
are liable for a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500.00).
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER
1.
Respondents, Ruth Ann Sheppard and Steve
Sheppard are
hereby found to have violated 415 ILCS 5/21(p) (1)
(1992).
2.
Within 30 days of this order, the Respondents shall pay
the sum of five hundred dollars
($500.00)
by check or
money order to the Illinois Environmental Trust
Fund.
The payment shall be mailed to:
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
Fiscal Services Division
2200 Churchill Road
Springfield,
Il.
62706
Any such penalty not paid within the time prescribed
shall incur interest at the rate set forth in subsection
(a) of Section 1003 of the Illinois Income Tax Act,
(35
ILCS 5/1003
(1992)),
as now or hereafter amended, from
the
date
payment
is
due
until
the
date
payment
is
received.
Interest
shall not accrue during the
pendency
of
an
appeal
during
which
payment
of
the
penalty
has
been
stayed.
3.
Docket A in this matter is hereby closed.
4.
Within 30 days of this order, the Sangamon County shall
file a statement
of
its hearing
costs,
supported by
affidavit,
with
the
Board
and
with
service
on
the
respondents.
Within the same 30 days, the Clerk of the
Pollution Control Board shall
file a statement of the
Board’s costs,
supported by affidavit and with service
upon the respondents.
Such filings shall be entered in
Docket B of this matter.
5.
Respondents
are
hereby
given
leave
to
file
a
reply/objection
to
the
costs
submitted
pursuant
to
paragraph
4
of
this
order
within
45
days
of
this
order.
IT
IS
SO
ORDERED.
Section
41
of
the
Environmental
Protection
Act
(415
ILCS
5/41
(1992).) provides for appeal of final orders of the Board within 35
days.
The rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing
requirements.
See also,
35 Ill.
Adm.
Code 101.246, Motions for
Reconsideration.
I, Dorothy N.
Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board, here)~ycertify that• he above opinion and order was adopted
on
the
~-‘-1--~
day
of
_______________
,
1993,
by
a
vote
of
_____.‘
~Dorothy
.
Gunn,
clerk
Illinoi
ollution Control Board