ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    November
    4,
    1993
    SANGAMON
    COUNTY,
    )
    Complainant,
    )
    AC 93—6
    v.
    )
    Dockets A
    & B
    (SCDPH-93-AC—2)
    RUTH
    ANN
    SHEPPARD
    and
    )
    (Administrative
    STEVE
    SHEPPARD,
    )
    Citation)
    )
    Respondents.
    ROBERT L.
    SMITH, ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY,
    APPEARED
    ON
    BEHALF
    OF SANGANON COUNTY
    *
    RUTH
    SHEPPARD
    AND STEVEN
    SHEPPARD
    APPEARED
    PRO SE.
    OPINION
    AND
    ORDER
    OF
    THE
    BOARD
    (by
    C.
    A.
    Manning):
    This
    matter
    is
    before the Board pursuant to a petition for
    review
    timely
    filed
    by
    the
    respondents,
    Ruth Ann
    and
    Steven
    Sheppard, on February 22, 1993.
    Respondents have requested review
    of an administrative citation issued
    February
    1,
    1993
    by Sangamon
    County.
    Sangamon County is vested with the authority to bring such
    a citation pursuant to Section 31.1 of the Environmental Protection
    Act (Act)
    (415 ILCS 5/31.1) and a delegation of authority agreement
    with
    the
    Illinois
    Environmental
    Protection
    Agency
    statutorily
    authorized in Section 4(r) of the Act.
    (415 ILCS 5/4 (r).) The Board
    accepted the petition for review on March 11, 1993 and set the case
    for hearing.
    Hearing was held before Hearing Officer Orville
    S.
    Kahn on May
    13,
    1993
    in Springfield,
    Illinois.
    No post—hearing
    briefs were filed.
    The administrative
    citation alleges
    a
    single violation of
    Section 21(p)(l) of the Act
    (415 ILCS 5/21(p) (1)) which carries a
    statutory civil penalty of
    $500
    if the Board finds that such
    a
    violation occurred.
    For the reasons
    set forth bilow, the Board
    affirms the finding of Sangamon County that respondents, Ruth Ann
    and Steve
    Sheppard,
    have violated Section
    21(p) (1).
    The Board
    finds respondents liable for $500 and any associated hearing costs
    incurred by Sangamon County or the Board.
    PACTS
    Ruth
    Ann
    Sheppard is the owner of a salvage yard located in
    the Village of Berlin, Sangamon County, Illinois.
    (Tr. at 15.) The
    property is commonly known to the Agency and Sangamon County
    as
    • “Berlin/R.ShepparcP’.
    The site is being operated as an auto salvage
    •yard.
    (Complaint at
    1.)
    The Agency has
    designated the facility

    2
    with site code no.
    1670150004
    and the current operator of the
    facility is Steven Sheppard.
    (Tr. at 15.)
    The instant administrative citation
    is the second citation
    issued to Ruth and Steve
    Sheppard by Sangamon County
    for open
    dumping violations at the auto salvage yard.
    On May
    14,
    1992,
    Sangamon
    County
    filed
    the
    first
    administrative
    citation
    with
    the
    Board
    alleging
    a
    single
    violation
    of
    Section
    2l(p)(1)
    -
    open
    dumping in a manner resulting In litter.
    The respondents failed
    to
    file a petition for review and
    on June 23,
    1992,
    the Board
    entered a default
    order affirming Sangamon County’s finding of
    violation.
    (Sanaamon
    County
    v.
    Ruth
    Ann
    Sheopard
    and
    Steve
    Shetmard,
    (June 23,
    1992) AC 92-36,
    134 PCB 371.
    Photographs of
    the
    auto
    salvage
    yard
    entered
    as
    exhibits
    during
    the
    second
    administrative citation hearing indicate that a large number of
    used tires were among the litter.
    (Def.Exh. #2.)
    On December 23, 1992, the Sangaluon County.Department of Public
    Health conducted a
    “re-inspection”
    of
    the
    Sheppard facility to
    determine if the facility had been cleaned up.
    (Complaint at 1;Tr.
    at 14 and 17.)
    Testifying on behalf of Sangamon County at hearing,
    Allen Alexander,
    a Waste Management Specialist for the Sangamon
    County Department of Public Health, indicated that he observed a
    “large mound” of approximately 50 to 100 tires, both mounted and
    unmounted on tire rims, on-site.
    (Tr. at 19.)
    Alexander testified that in his opinion the respondents had
    caused open dumping resulting in litter because “of the way the
    tires were placed on the property.”
    (Tr.
    at
    21..)
    He further
    stated the tires “did not appear to be stored for any use.
    They
    were just mounded together in a pile.”
    (Id.)
    Also, the tire pile
    was out in the open where it
    could be rained or snowed
    on,
    and
    there was no coverage such as tarp.
    (~J
    Jerry Ferguson, also a Waste Management Specialist with the
    Sangamon County of Public Health, accompanied Alexander to the site
    and
    participated
    in
    the
    inspection.
    His
    testimony
    was
    substantially similar to Alexander’s: “the tires were open—dumped
    on the property.
    They were not covered in any way or properly
    stored.”
    (Tr. at 31.)
    As a result of the re—inspection, Sangamon County issued the
    second administrative citation which is the subject of this opinion
    and order.
    The inspection report regarding the December 13,
    1992
    Sangamon County site visit, entitled “Open Dump Inspection Report,”
    indicates
    that
    Alexander
    and
    Ferguson
    observed
    violations
    of

    3
    Section 21(p) (1)
    of the Act
    causing or allowing litter.1
    Steve Sheppard offered no testimony during hearing, nor was he
    called to testify by Sangamon County; however, Ruth Ann Sheppard
    offered testimony
    explaining the origin of the tire mound.
    She
    testified that as
    a result of the first administration citation
    order, Steve Sheppard spent $1700 hauling tires to ADM in Decatur.
    (Tr. at
    11..)
    The tire mound was intended “to be left there until
    he (Steve Sheppard
    had a full load to go to ADM.”
    (J~
    and Tr. at
    39.)
    Ruth Ann Sheppard explained the tires
    are
    hauled away from
    the auto salvage yard by ADM; however, ADM contacts Steve Sheppard
    to let him know when ADM is “ready for a load (of tires.”
    (Tr. at
    41.)
    It was also her testimony that other tire pick—up companies,
    such as those in Peoria or Chicago, are too expensive to use. The
    salvage yard has to pay the driver, the truck, and the company to
    take the tires.
    (Id.)
    Sheppard also testified there were approximately 73 tires in
    the
    pile
    and
    that
    only
    10
    to
    12
    were
    unmounted.
    (Tr.
    at
    51.)
    The
    unmounted tires were dumped on the property from gas stations
    (Tr.
    at 41)
    and by people who drive up on the road and dump on her
    property
    (Tr. at 52).
    Sheppard testified that the source of the
    tires at the salvage yard was the salvage yard business itself
    (Tr.
    at 39) and Steven Sheppard’s body shop (Tr. at 39) located down the
    street from the salvage yard
    (Tr. at 45).
    She thought the tires
    would
    be
    all
    right
    if
    they were
    mounted
    and that
    they
    were
    originally
    in
    “trouble” because Steven had taken the tires
    off
    their rims.
    (Tr. at 39.)
    She described the buildings on the property as not being big
    enough to store tires waiting to be hauled away (Tr. at 39 and 45),
    nor was there space for
    a building on the premises
    (Tr.
    at 46).
    She did not believe
    it would be practicable to take the time to
    store the large number of tires in a building in any event (Tr. at
    45).
    She also testified that it would not be cost-effective to put
    up
    a
    gate
    to
    keep
    dumpers
    from
    dumping
    “unrimmed”
    tires
    on
    her
    property
    -
    that
    they
    had tried
    to
    do
    so
    once
    and
    the effort failed.
    (Tr.
    at
    43.)
    1
    Additionally,
    the
    county
    inspector
    noted
    violations
    of
    the
    following sections of the Act or regulations:
    Section 807.201 and
    807.202
    of
    the
    Board’s
    regulations
    -
    causing
    or
    allowing
    the
    development and/or
    operation of
    a
    solid waste management
    site
    without a permit issued by the Agency; Section 21(a) of the Act
    -
    causing or allowing the open dumping of any waste; Section 21(d) of
    the Act
    -
    conducting any waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste—
    disposal operation without
    a
    permit granted by
    the Agency;
    and
    Section 55(a)
    (general violations section of the Used Tire Act 415
    ILCS 5/55 et.seg.).
    None of these alleged violations are before
    us in this proceeding,
    however.

    4
    Ruth
    Ann
    Sheppard
    further
    testified
    she
    understood
    that
    Sangamon County does not want tires “laying around,”
    (Tr. at 40)
    but Steve
    Sheppard was
    in the salvage business and there would
    always be tires
    at an auto salvage yard
    ~
    Sheppard also
    testified that her son had moved the business to an entirely new
    location and on the date of
    inspection,
    December 23,
    1992,
    the
    property was no longer being used as a salvage yard.
    The premises
    were completely cleaned up except for the tire mound
    (Pr. at 41,
    47,
    52,
    65—66).
    It was Ruth Ann Sheppard’s belief
    that
    even if
    the Sheppards paid the $500 penalty for the litter violation,
    it
    would have no effect, because the tire mound is gone and the auto
    salvage yard is no longer there.
    DISCUSSION
    The Act establishes that,
    in order to seek enforcement by way
    of the administrative citation process for violations of Section
    21(p), the Agency must establish that the person caused or allowed
    open dumping and must also prove that the open dumping resulted in
    litter, open burning or other specified conduct at the dump site.
    If the record demonstrates that such violation occurred then the
    Board must
    adopt
    an
    order
    finding
    a violation and
    impose
    the
    specified penalty.
    The only mitigation
    of
    a
    violation
    is
    if
    “...the person appealing the citation has shown that the violation
    resulted from uncontrollable circumstances” in which case the Board
    shall
    adopt
    an ordering which
    imposes no
    penalty.
    (415
    ILCS
    5/31.1(d) (2)
    (1992).)
    The administrative citation issued against Sheppard alleges
    that Section 21(p) subsection
    (1) of the Act was violated.
    Section
    21(p) (1)
    provides that no person
    shall
    in violation of Section
    21(a)
    of the Act.:
    Cause or allow the open dumping of any waste in a manner which
    results in any of the following occurrences at the dump site:
    1.
    litter;
    Section 21(a)
    •of the Act sets forth a general prohibition against
    open dumping by providing that “(no
    person shall cause or allow
    the open dumping of any waste”.
    Section
    3.24
    of
    the
    Act
    defines
    “open
    dumping”
    as
    “the
    consolidation of refuse from one or more sources at a disposal site
    that does not fulfill the requirements of
    a sanitary landfill”.
    (415 ILCS 5/3.24
    (1992).)
    Section 3.31 of the Act defines “refuse”
    as
    “waste”.
    (415
    ILCS
    5/3.31
    (1992).)
    Section
    3.53
    defines
    “waste”
    as,
    inter qua,
    “garbage...or other discarded material,
    resulting form
    industrial,
    commercial,
    mining
    and agricultural
    operations....”
    (415 ILCS 5/3.53
    (1992).)

    5
    In St. Clair County v. Louis Mund (August 22, 1991), AC 90-64,
    125 PCB 381, the Board adopted the definition of litter contained
    in the Litter Control Act:
    “litter”
    means
    any
    discarded,
    used
    or
    unconsumed
    substance
    or
    waste.
    “Litter”
    may
    include,
    but
    is
    not
    limited
    to,
    any
    garbage,
    trash,
    refuse,
    debris...abandoned
    vehicle...or
    anything else of an unsightly or unsanitary nature which has
    been discarded, abandoned or otherwise disposed of improperly.
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1990
    supp.,
    ch.
    38,
    par.
    86.3.)
    (415 ILCS
    105/3).
    In five previous Board opinions finding violations of Section
    21(p) (1),
    used tires were found to be litter2:
    IEPA v.
    Sickles,
    (September 17,
    1992)
    AC 92—47,
    136 PCB 83; IEPA
    V.
    Sickles,
    (July
    30,
    1992)
    AC
    92—47,
    135 PCB 223; IEPA v. Hillebrenner,
    (May 21,
    1992) AC 92—16,
    133 PCB 559; IEPA v. Loveless, (August 13, 1992) AC
    91—31,
    135 PCB 367; and IEPA v. Sprincnnan,
    (May 9, 1991) AC 90—79,
    122 PCB 147.
    In Hillebrenner, the litter included 500 tires in a
    ravine
    on
    rural
    property.
    (Hillebrenner,
    133
    PCB at
    559.)
    In
    sprinaman,
    a
    portion
    of the litter was an uncovered tire pile.
    (Springman,
    125 PCB at 151.)
    In Loveless, Hammond, and Sickles,
    used tires were merely among the litter found “open-dumped” on the
    site during inspection.
    (Loveless, 135 PCB at 371; Hammond, Slip
    Op. at 2; and Sickles,
    135 PCB at 223 and 136 PCB at 83.)
    Further, an auto salvage yard has been previously cited
    for
    a violation
    of Section
    21(p)(1).
    In Hammond
    infra,
    the Board
    affirmed the Agency’s issuance of an administrative citation for
    “open dumping” of used tires and other various types of waste at a
    junkyard.
    The tires at the site
    were rimmed and unrimmed, were
    located without cover in haphazard piles around the property.
    (~
    generally, Hammond, Slip Op. at 2.)
    Causing or Allowing Litter
    Mrs.
    Sheppard
    admits
    that
    she
    is
    the
    owner
    of
    the
    property
    inspected
    by
    Sangamon
    County.
    She
    further
    admits
    that
    the
    tires
    were
    on
    her
    property at the time of the inspection.
    According to
    Mrs.
    Sheppard’s
    testimony,
    her
    son
    operates a car salvage yard as
    well
    as
    a
    garage
    and body shop down the street
    from the
    site.
    These
    activities
    generate
    the
    tires.
    (Pr.
    at
    45.)
    Mrs.
    Sheppard
    testified that there were no fences or gates around the property to
    restrict access.
    According to the inspector Alexander, he believed
    open dumping had occurred “because of the way the tires were placed
    on the property.”
    (Tr. at 21.)
    Mr. Alexander also stated that the
    2Section 2l(p)(1) was formerly codified as Section 21(q)(1)
    and therefore a number of the cases are brought under Section
    21(q)
    (1).

    6
    tires were
    “just
    mounded
    together
    in
    a
    pile”.
    (Tr.
    at
    21.)
    Further,
    Mrs. Sheppard testified that “he
    (her son Steve
    has to
    wait for them (ADM
    to call him” before the tires are picked up.
    (Tr. at 45.)
    Thus,
    although Mrs. Sheppard claims that the tires
    are being
    stored on the property,
    there
    is no regular routine or
    schedule for the tires to be picked up.
    Therefore, after reviewing
    the evidence, the Board finds that open dumping of waste occurred
    on
    the
    property
    resulting
    in
    litter
    in
    violation
    of
    Section
    21(p) (1) of the Act.
    Mrs. Sheppard also points out that the litter had been cleaned
    up from the site and numerous tires had been removed from the
    property after the first administrative citation was issued.
    Also,
    the
    tires
    which
    were
    the
    subject
    of
    this
    citation
    have
    been
    removed.
    However, the Board has previously held that removal of
    the litter after the issuance of an administrative citation does
    not restrain the Board from a finding of violation.
    The Act, by
    its
    terms,
    does
    not envision
    a
    properly
    issued administrative
    citation
    being
    dismissed
    or
    mitigated
    because
    a
    person
    is
    cooperative
    or voluntarily
    cleans
    up the
    site.
    (IEPA
    v.
    Jack
    Wright (August 30, 1990), AC 89-227, 114 PCB 863.)
    Clean—up of the
    site is not a mitigating factor under the administrative citation
    program.
    (IEPA
    V.
    Dennis Grubaugh (October 16, 1992), AC 92—3, 136
    PCB 425.)
    PENALTY
    Penalties in administrative citation actions are prescribed by
    Section 42(b) (4) of the Act which states:
    In an administrative citation action under Section 31.1 of
    this Act, any person found to have violated any provision of
    subsection
    (p)
    of Section 21 of this Act shall pay a civil
    penalty of $500
    for each violation of each such provision,
    plus any hearing costs incurred by the Board and the Agency.
    Such penalties shall
    be made payable to the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Trust
    Fund
    to
    be used
    in
    accordance
    with
    the
    provisions of “An Act creating the Environmental Protection
    Trust Fund”,
    approved September 22,
    1979,
    as amended;
    (415
    ILCS 5/42(b)(4)
    (1992).)
    Respondent will therefore be ordered to pay a civil penalty of
    $500 based on the violation as found.
    Further, pursuant to Section
    42(b) (4) of the Act, respondents are also required to pay hearing
    costs incurred by the Board and the Sangamon County.
    The Clerk of
    the Board and Sangamon County will therefore be ordered to each
    file a statement of costs,
    supported by affidavit, with the Board
    and with service upon respondents.
    Upon receipt and subsequent to
    appropriate review, the Board will issue a separate final order in
    which the issue of costs is addressed.
    Additionally, Docket B will
    be opened to treat all matters pertinent to the issue of costs.

    7
    For the reasons stated in the above opinion, the Board finds
    that
    the
    respondents,
    Ruth
    Ann
    Sheppard
    and
    Steve
    Sheppard,
    violated Section 21(p) (1) of the Act.
    Accordingly, the respondents
    are liable for a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500.00).
    This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    1.
    Respondents, Ruth Ann Sheppard and Steve
    Sheppard are
    hereby found to have violated 415 ILCS 5/21(p) (1)
    (1992).
    2.
    Within 30 days of this order, the Respondents shall pay
    the sum of five hundred dollars
    ($500.00)
    by check or
    money order to the Illinois Environmental Trust
    Fund.
    The payment shall be mailed to:
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    Fiscal Services Division
    2200 Churchill Road
    Springfield,
    Il.
    62706
    Any such penalty not paid within the time prescribed
    shall incur interest at the rate set forth in subsection
    (a) of Section 1003 of the Illinois Income Tax Act,
    (35
    ILCS 5/1003
    (1992)),
    as now or hereafter amended, from
    the
    date
    payment
    is
    due
    until
    the
    date
    payment
    is
    received.
    Interest
    shall not accrue during the
    pendency
    of
    an
    appeal
    during
    which
    payment
    of
    the
    penalty
    has
    been
    stayed.
    3.
    Docket A in this matter is hereby closed.
    4.
    Within 30 days of this order, the Sangamon County shall
    file a statement
    of
    its hearing
    costs,
    supported by
    affidavit,
    with
    the
    Board
    and
    with
    service
    on
    the
    respondents.
    Within the same 30 days, the Clerk of the
    Pollution Control Board shall
    file a statement of the
    Board’s costs,
    supported by affidavit and with service
    upon the respondents.
    Such filings shall be entered in
    Docket B of this matter.
    5.
    Respondents
    are
    hereby
    given
    leave
    to
    file
    a
    reply/objection
    to
    the
    costs
    submitted
    pursuant
    to
    paragraph
    4
    of
    this
    order
    within
    45
    days
    of
    this
    order.
    IT
    IS
    SO
    ORDERED.
    Section
    41
    of
    the
    Environmental
    Protection
    Act
    (415
    ILCS
    5/41

    (1992).) provides for appeal of final orders of the Board within 35
    days.
    The rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois establish filing
    requirements.
    See also,
    35 Ill.
    Adm.
    Code 101.246, Motions for
    Reconsideration.
    I, Dorothy N.
    Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, here)~ycertify that• he above opinion and order was adopted
    on
    the
    ~-‘-1--~
    day
    of
    _______________
    ,
    1993,
    by
    a
    vote
    of
    _____.‘
    ~Dorothy
    .
    Gunn,
    clerk
    Illinoi
    ollution Control Board

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