ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL
    BOARD
    October 29,
    1992
    ESG WATTS,
    INC.,
    )
    Petitioner,
    v.
    )
    PCB 92—54
    (Permit Appeal)
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    KEVIN T. NCCLAIN APPEARED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER;
    PENNI S. LIVINGSTON APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT.
    OPINION
    AND
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by N. Nardulli):
    This matter is before the Board on an April
    10,
    1992
    petition for review filed by ESG Watts,
    Inc.
    (ESG).
    Pursuant to
    Section 40 of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Act),
    ESG seeks
    review of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency’s
    (Agency)
    denial of seven special waste stream permit applications.
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1040.)
    Members of the public
    attended a hearing held on August 11,
    1992
    in Rock Island,
    Illinois.
    On August
    13,
    1992, the Board denied ESG’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    DISCUSSION
    ESG owns and operates the Andalusia/Watts landfill in Rock
    Island County.
    On December 10,
    1991, ESG filed seven special
    waste stream applications.
    (R.
    Exh.
    l-7.)~ ESG sought these
    permits so it could accept paint skimmings,
    paint filters and
    debris, grinding dust,
    and trap and drain clean—out from various
    generators.
    (~~)
    On March
    9,
    1992, the Agency denied all seven
    applications, listing identical denial reasons
    in all seven
    denial letters.
    (R. Exh.
    15-21.)
    Because the Agency’s denial
    reasons frame the issues on review (Centralia Environmental
    Services,
    Inc.
    V.
    IEPA
    (May 10,
    1990), PCB 89—170), the Board
    will set out the denial reasons in full:
    1.)
    Agency inspections have revealed that there have been
    uncontrolled releases of leachate at this site.
    The
    waste may cause or contribute to the generation of
    a
    contaminated leachate.
    No demonstration has been made
    R.
    Exh.
    refers to the Agency Record which consists
    of various exhibits.
    01
    37-00t47

    2
    that this waste will not do so.
    The acceptance of this
    waste could or will exacerbate the water pollution
    problems at this site by contributing to the volume and
    intensity of the leachate generated.
    Specifically, the
    following relevant violations are noted which relate to
    improper leachate management and mismanagement of
    stormwater which causes more leachate generation
    through contact with waste or existing leachate.
    12(a)
    of the Act:
    Causing or allowing the discharge of contaminants so as
    to cause water pollution in Illinois.
    12(d)
    of the Act:
    Depositing contaminants upon the land in such place and
    manner so as to create a water pollution hazard.
    12(f)
    of the Act:
    Causing, threatening,
    or allowing the discharge of
    leachate into the waters of the state, without an NPDES
    Permit,
    or in violation of regulations adopted by the
    Board.
    21(p) (1)
    of the Act:
    Conducting the landfill operations in a manner
    resulting in refuse in standing or flowing water on or
    around the site.
    21(p) (2)
    of the Act:
    Conducting the landfill operations in a manner
    resulting in leachate entering the waters of the State.
    21(p) (3) of the Act:
    Conducting the landfill operations in such a manner
    resulting in leachate flows exiting the landfill
    confines.
    35 Ill. Adm.
    Code 302.203:
    Causing or allowing matter of other than natural origin
    in concentrations or combinations toxic or harmful to
    human,
    animal, plant or aquatic life to enter waters of
    the State.
    35
    Ill. Adm. Code 807.313:
    Ut
    37-OOL~8

    3
    Causing or allowing the operation of the landfill so as
    to cause or threaten to allow the discharge of
    contaminants so as to cause water pellution in
    Illinois.
    35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 807.314(e):
    Allowing the operation of the landfill in a manner that
    does not provide adequate measures to monitor and
    control leachate.
    2.)
    Waste
    at this facility has not been properly covered
    and contained.
    It has not been demonstrated that this
    waste stream is suitable for disposal without daily
    cover.
    Failure to comply with cover requirements can
    cause unpermnissible sic)
    migration, dust generation
    and excess generation of leachate from this waste.
    The
    frequency and severity of the following violations
    could or will be increased by disposing of this waste
    at this site.
    2l(p)(5)
    of the Act:
    Conducting the landfill operations
    in a manner
    resulting in uncovered refuse remaining from a previous
    operating day.
    21(p)(12)
    of the Act:
    Failure to collect and contain litter from the site by
    the end of each operation day.
    35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 807.302:
    Failure to comply with the terms of Permit #1972-72
    Condition #3:
    Each fill area,
    and daily cell area
    therein must be properly covered, graded,
    and
    maintained.
    35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 807.305(a):
    Failure to apply adequate daily cover to exposed
    refuse.
    35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 807.306:
    Failure to collect and contain litter from the site by
    the end of each operating day.
    3.)
    Proper management of this waste cannot be assured until
    the sections listed below are complied with.
    This may
    lead to violations of the Environmental Protection Act
    O~37-UOL~9

    4
    and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
    The
    consequences of such violations are the contamination
    and endangerment of the environment.
    Adding this waste
    to the site would increase the threat proportionately.
    21(d)(1)
    of the Act:
    Allowing the waste to be accepted may lead to
    conducting a waste—disposal operation in violation of
    any conditions imposed by a permit granted by the
    Agency.
    The following is a list of the permit
    conditions which disposal of this waste may violate:
    #3
    of Permit 1972—72 12/12/72
    Cover Requirements
    #8
    of Permit 1984—80l—SP 9/5/84
    No Process Discharge Without Permit
    #1 of Permit l988—277—SP 11/28/88
    Submitting Financial Assurance
    #5 of Permit 1988—277—SP 11/28/88
    Maintaining Financial Assurance
    #14 of Permit 1988—277—SP 11/28/88
    No Process Discharge Without Permit
    #2 of Permit 1991—l83—SP 8/20/91
    Financial Assurance
    #8 of Permit 199l—183—SP 8/20/91
    No Process Discharge Without Permit
    #2 of Permit 199l—292—SP 12/24/91
    Financial Assurance
    21(d) (2)
    of the Act:
    Allowing the waste to be accepted may lead to
    conducting a waste—disposal operation in violation of
    any regulation or standard adopted by the Board under
    the Environmental Protection Act.
    21.1(a)
    of the Act:
    Allowing waste to be accepted may contribute to
    conducting a waste-disposal operation without posting
    adequate performance bond or other security with the
    Agency for the purposes of insuring closure of the site
    and post—closure care in accordance with the
    3~37-G’O50

    5
    Environmental Protection Act and regulations adopted
    thereunder.
    The facility has been cited for a number of violations
    described in the January 30,
    1992 Enforcement Notice Letter.
    Acceptance of this waste stream would lead to continued
    violations and may cause an increase in the intensity or
    frequency of containment movement.
    It was not demonstrated
    how this facility will accept and dispose of this material
    without causing continued violations of the provisions
    cited.
    (R.
    Exh.
    15—21.)
    Testimony given by the Agency’s permit analyst who reviewed
    ESG’s permits indicates that the alleged existing violations at
    the site were a substantial basis for permit denial.
    Ronald
    Steward testified that he reviewed ESG’s applications and was
    aware that the site was very much out of compliance.
    (Tr. at
    104.)
    Steward testified that the Agency’s January 30,
    1992
    enforcement compliance letter
    (Exh.
    13) provided substantial
    justification for denial of the permits.
    (Tr. at 57—58,
    73-74,
    76.)
    Conversations with other Agency personnel also provided a
    basis for denial.
    (Tr. at 76,
    109.)
    These conversations
    “reinforced what was already stated in the January 1992 letter”.
    (Tr.
    at 82.)
    Steward testified that no violations other than
    those referenced in the enforcement letter were discussed.
    (~~)
    According to Steward, the violations alleged in the enforcement
    action affected his decision to deny the permits.
    (Tr. at 86.)
    Steward testified that,
    to demonstrate that issuance of the
    permits would not cause violations of the Act and regulations,
    ESG needed to demonstrate “that violations of the Act would not
    occur as had been occurring, which was evidenced by the
    enforcement notice letter.”
    (Tr. at 71—72.)
    According to
    Steward, he could not in good conscience grant permits where the
    applicant was not in compliance with the law in handling current
    waste streams.
    (Tr. at 112-13.)
    It is well established that the primary issue
    in a permit
    appeal before the Board is whether the applicant has met its
    burden of establishing that the application, as submitted to the
    Agency, demonstrates that no violation of the Act or regulations
    would occur if the permit was granted.
    (Joliet Sand
    &•
    Gravel
    v.
    IEPA (3d Dist.
    1987),
    163 Ill. App.
    3d 830,
    516 N.E.2d 955.)
    It
    is equally well established that permit denial is an improper
    substitute for an enforcement action.
    (Centralia Environmental
    Services, Inc.
    v.
    IEPA (October 25,
    1990), PCB 89—170 at 10—11;
    Waste Management v.
    IEPA (October
    1,
    1984),
    PCB 84—45,
    84—61
    &
    84—68
    (consolidated); Frink’s Industrial Waste,
    Inc. v.
    IEPA
    (June 30,
    19830, PCB 83-10.)
    The record establishes that the
    Agency has filed an enforcement action against ESG for alleged
    violations at the Andalusja/Watts’
    site.
    The record also
    U
    37-0051

    6
    establishes that the violations alleged in the enforcement notice
    letter form the basis of the permit denials.
    ESG contends that
    the Agency improperly denied its permits as a means of
    enforcement.
    The Agency responds that it denied the permits
    because it “received no assurance that ESG
    could take proper
    care of these wastes when ESGJ
    has not and was not taking proper
    care of the waste it received at the time of denial by operating
    within the limits and requirements of the law.”
    (Agency Brief at
    11.)
    Denial Reason
    #1
    The first denial reason relates to water pollution.
    The
    Agency reasons that because there have been prior uncontrolled
    releases of leachate at the site,
    new waste streams should not be
    permitted because they would exacerbate the water pollution
    problems existing at the site.
    In support of this finding, the
    Agency cites general statutory and regulatory prohibitions
    against water pollution (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, pars.
    10012(a),
    (d),
    (f);
    35 Ill.
    Admn.
    Code 302.203, 807.313), Section
    807.314(e)
    of the Board’s landfill regulations which prohibits
    operating a landfill without adequate measures to monitor and
    control leachate, and statutory prohibitions against operating a
    permitted landfill
    in a manner so as to allow refuse in water,
    leachate to enter water and leachate to exit confines of the
    landfill
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    11.
    1/2, pars.
    1021(p) (1),
    (2),
    (3)).
    The Agency’s denial reason
    is clearly based on conduct which
    has allegedly already taken place, or
    is allegedly still
    occurring,
    at the site.
    Ron Steward, the Agency’s permit
    analyst, testified that he “needed a demonstration that the
    approval of these permit applications would not cause violations
    as had previously occurred at the site with the waste they’d
    already accepted.”
    (Tr. at 72.)
    The Board recognizes that it is
    the applicant’s burden to demonstrate compliance in its
    application.
    However,
    Sections 21(p)(1),
    (2), and
    (3)
    of the Act
    prohibit certain conduct.
    Here, there
    is no conduct relating to
    the special waste streams as those wastes are not yet being
    accepted at the site.
    If these Sections are being violated at
    the site,
    the proper mechanism to address these violations is an
    enforcement action.
    The first denial reason also references concerns about
    leachate monitoring and control.
    Ron Steward, the Agency’s
    permit analyst, testified that he prepared a memorandum after
    speaking with Mitch Smith, who had inspected the site.
    (Tr.
    at
    93.)
    This memorandum stated that,
    on March
    9,
    1992,
    Smith had
    observed two leachate seepages at the site.
    (R. Exh.
    14.)
    Steward testified that a leachate seep is not necessarily
    a
    violation.
    (Tr. at 93-94,
    99.)
    Thomas Jones,
    a civil engineer
    employed by ESG, testified that he was familiar with ESG’s
    U
    37-0052

    7
    leachate monitoring and control procedures.
    (Tr. at 126-27.)
    He
    testified that he was notified of the seeps observed by Smith on
    March
    9,
    1992 and that the seeps were repaired.
    (Tr. at 129.)
    Mitch Smith did not testify at hearing.
    The only references to
    the alleged violations contained in the record are those set out
    in Steward’s memorandum and the enforcement notice letter.
    (R.
    Exh.
    13,
    14.)
    The record establishes that the Agency’s concerns about
    leachate control are based upon alleged violations at the site.
    Testimony at hearing indicates that to satisfy the Agency’s
    concerns, ESG would have had to present its defense to the
    enforcement action in this permit appeal.
    Steward was questioned
    as to what information was needed to demonstrate compliance.
    (Tr.
    at 65-72.)
    In response, he stated that “w)hat
    I needed was
    a demonstration that violations of the Act would not occur as had
    been occurring, which was evidenced by the
    Agency’s)
    enforcement
    notice letter.”
    (Tr.
    at 71-72.)
    However,
    if the Agency has
    concerns that ESG is not adequately monitoring or controlling
    leachate so as to cause water pollution,
    an enforcement action is
    the appropriate mechanism to address such violations.
    (See e.g.,
    Centralia Environmental Services v. IEPA (October 25,
    1990),
    PCB
    89-170 at 10-11.)
    Because the Agency’s denial reason is an
    improper use of permit process as an enforcement tool,
    the Board
    finds that the denial reason must be stricken.
    Denial Reason #2
    The second denial reason relates to improper cover and
    containment of waste at the site.
    The Agency cites statutory and
    regulatory prohibitions against leaving refuse uncovered,
    failure
    to collect litter on a daily basis,
    and failure to comply with
    a
    previous permit condition requiring cover.
    According to the
    Agency, the frequency of these violations could or will increase
    if disposal of the special wastes is allowed.
    The Agency alleges that the instant permits were not denied
    solely on the basis of the violations alleged
    in the pending
    enforcement action.
    Rather, the Agency asserts that the permits
    were denied because ESG failed to demonstrate that disposal of
    the special waste streams would not cause violations of the Act
    and regulations.
    The Agency’s reasoning appears to be that,
    because ESG has allegedly failed to apply daily cover and remove
    litter in the past,
    it cannot prove to the Agency that it will do
    so in the future and, therefore, ESG should not be permitted to
    accept additional wastes.
    However,
    if the Agency believes that a
    permitted facility has violated the Act or regulations so as to
    pose a continuing threat to the environment,
    it may file an
    enforcement action seeking revocation of permits.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1033(b); Waste Management
    V.
    IEPA
    (October
    1,
    1984),
    PCB 84—45,
    84—61
    & 84—68
    (consolidated)
    at
    37.)
    Additionally, the Agency has Section 39(i)
    of the Act at
    0137-0053

    8
    its disposal which allows the Agency to deny a permit
    if the
    operator has a history of repeated violaticns.2
    The Board finds
    that the second denial reason must be struck ~s an improper use
    of permit denial as a means of enforcement.
    Denial Reason #3
    The third denial reason concerns a general finding that
    adding special wastes to the site would increase the threat of
    contamination and endangerment to the environment.
    The Agency
    cites Section 21(d)(1)
    of the Act which provides that no person
    shall conduct a waste—disposal site in violation of any condition
    imposed in a permit.
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2,
    par.
    1021(d)(1).)
    The Agency then cites numerous conditions imposed
    on ESG in prior permits,
    including cover requirements,
    prohibiting discharging without a permit and financial assurance.
    Section 31(a) (1)
    of the Act provides that the Agency may bring an
    enforcement action for violation of a permit condition.
    (Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par. 1031(a)(1).)
    In Centralia
    Environmental Services,
    Inc.
    v. IEPA (October 25,
    1991), PCB 89-
    170 at 11, the Board recognized that an alleged failure to comply
    with terms of a previously granted permit may be addressed by an
    enforcement action and are an improper basis for permit denial.
    Consequently, the Agency may not rely upon ESG’s failure to
    comply with permit conditions as a basis for denial of the
    special waste stream permits.
    Next, the Agency cites Section 21.1(a)
    of the Act which
    requires that no person shall conduct a waste—disposal operation
    on or after March
    1,
    1985 without posting a performance bond or
    other security for the purpose of insuring closure and post-
    closure care.
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1021.1(a).)
    Section 807.661(d)
    of the Board’s regulations allow
    use of a trust fund as an alternative method of providing
    financial assurance.
    (35 Ill. Adm. Code 807.661(d).)
    At
    hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of John Taylor, an
    Agency financial assurance analyst, who testified that,
    as of
    February 29,
    1992,
    ESG’s trust fund was $140,000
    in arrears.
    (Tr. at 175.)
    In Centralia,
    the Board stated that an
    owner/operator’s obligation to submit payments into an
    established trust fund exists independent of
    its desire to obtain
    supplemental permits or,
    in the instant case,
    special waste
    2
    The Board notes that in this case,
    the Agency only
    presents evidence of alleged violations. The Board’s
    reference to Section 39(i)
    is not intended as
    a ruling
    on whether the Agency could properly utilize Section
    39(1)
    in the instant case.
    Moreover, the Board notes
    that while the Agency cites Section 39(i)
    in its brief,
    it did not rely upon this provision in its denial
    letters.
    0~
    37-0O5L~

    11
    For the foregoing reasons,
    the Board finds that the Agency’s
    denial reasons must be reversed as an improper use of the permit
    process as
    a means of enforcement.
    Therefore
    the Agency’s
    decision denying ESG’s seven applications for special waste
    stream permits is reversed and the Agency is directed to issue
    the permits.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act
    (Ill. Rev.
    Stat.
    1991,
    ch.
    111 1/2, par.
    1041)
    provides for the appeal of
    final Board orders within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    (But see also,
    35 Ill. Adm. Code 101.246, Motions for Reconsideration,
    and
    Casteneda v.
    Illinois Human Rights Commission
    (1989),
    132 Ill.
    2d
    304,
    547 N.E.2d 437.)
    I, Dorothy N. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that the above p~jnionand order was
    adopted on the ~2777~ day of
    ___________________,
    1992 by a vote
    of
    7
    -(
    .
    II
    Control Board
    0t37-0057

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