ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
December 19, 1991
DM1,
INC.,
)
Petitioner,
PCB 90—227
v.
)
(Variance)
)
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
)
PROTECTI~NAGENCY,
Respondent.
STEPHEN F. HEDINGER,
MOHAN, ALEWELT, PRILLAMAN AND ADANI APPEARED
FOR THE PETITIONER.
RENEE A. STADEL APPEARED FOR THE RESPONDENT.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by R.C.
Flemal):
On December
5,
1990,
DM1,
Inc.
(“DM1”)
filed a petition for
variance from
35 Ill. Adm.
Code 215.204(j),
the volatile organic
material emissions limits,
for its facility located in rural
Woodford County.
On February 4,
1991,
in response to a Board
Order, DM1 filed an amended petition for variance and on February
28,
1991,
DM1 filed an open waiver at the Board’s request.
On
February 7,
1991,
the Board accepted the amended petition.
DM1
is requesting that if a variance is granted,
the Board grant the
relief,
retroactively,
from September
1,
1990 until such time as
site—specific relief is granted or until one year after site—
specific relief
is denied.
On February
4,
1991,
the Board
received a Petition for Site-Specific Rulemaking and on July 11,
1991,
the Board proceeded to First Notice in that rulemaking.
(See In the Matter of Petition of DM1,
Inc.
for Site-Specific Air
Regulation:
35 Ill.
Adm.
Code 215.215, R91-9).
The Board notes
that DM1 has incorporated the record from the rulemaking
proceeding into this proceeding.
On March 11,
1991, the Board received the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency’s
(“Agencyt’) recommendation.
The
Agency recommended that the variance be granted with certain
modifications.
In addition,
the Agency specifically objected to
DMI’s request for retroactive relief.
Hearing was held on August 27, 1991 in Eureka, Woodford
County,
Illinois.
In addition to the DM1 and Agency
representatives,
the Department of Energy and Natural Resources
participated
in the hearing.
No members of the public were
present.
Post hearing briefs were filed by DM1 and the Agency on
October 1., 1991 and October 29,
1991, respectively.
DM1 also
filed a Motion for Leave to File a Reply Instanter and the Reply
on November
4,
1991.
That Motion
is hereby granted.
128—241
2
Based on the record before
it, the Board finds that DM1 has
presented adequate proof that immediate compliance with Section
215.204(j) (3) would result in the imposition of an arbitrary or
unreasonable hardship.
Accordingly, the variance will be granted
retroactively from September 15,
1990,
subject to the conditions
in the attached Order.
BACKGROUND
DM1 manufactures farm implements at its rural Woodford
County plant.
DM1
is employee-owned and currently employs 289
people.
DM1 asserts that it is Woodford County’s largest
employer.
(Am.
Pet.
8).
As part of the manufacturing process,
DM1 paints its machinery in two separate permitted processes,
the
paint room and the paint deck.
(Am.
Pet.
3-4).~
This petition
only concerns the operation of the paint deck, which results
in
the emission of volatile organic material
(VON)
,2
(Am.
Pet.
4).
DM1 has been subject to a previous variance on this operation,
which expired in 1989.
(See DM1,
Inc.
v.
Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency,
PCB 88-132,
96 PCB 185.)
DM1 sought
compliance with 35
Ill.
Admn. Code 215.204(j), by shifting to a
water—based dip system, installing a bake oven and expanding its
spray booths.
(Am.
Pet.
4).
This process allowed DM1 to comply
with the regulations.
(Am.
Pet.
4).
However,
DM1 discovered
that the water-based paint did not properly bind to the equipment
and the paint supplier was unable to ameliorate the paint
problem.
(Am.
Pet 4).
DM1 filed a petition for a provisional variance with the
Agency on September 17,
1990.
The Agency denied the Provisional
Variance on September 26,
1990 as being outside the scope of
relief provided by
a provisional variance.
(Am.
Pet.
Exh.
5,
p.
5).
Therefore,
DM1 sought variance relief with the filing of
this variance petition.
(Am.
Pet.
4-5).
PAST EFFORTS
DM1 began its search for compliant paint
in 1984,
but DM1
was unable to find “any system that even appeared to be
acceptable until
1989”.
(Am.
Pet.
11).
In order to use the
water-based compliant paint DM1 installed a system at a cost
in
1
The Amended
Petition will
be cited
as
“Am.
Pet.”;
the
transcript
of the hearing will be
cited
as
“Tr.”;
Petitioner’s
Brief
is cited
as
“pet.
Br.” and the Agency’s Brief
is cited
as
“Ag. Br.”.
2
DM1 uses the terms “Volatile Organic Material
(VON)”
and
Volatile Organic compound (VOC)” interchangeably throughout.
(Pet.
Br.
2).
The Board will use the term “VON”.
128—242
3
excess of $225,000.
(Am. Pet.
12).
Use of the compliant paint,
•however, resulted in several problems which resulted in DM1
receiving customer complaints and a “loss of market share and
customer goodwill”.
(Am. Pet.
13 and 26).
Therefore,
DM1
continued to search for a compliant paint that would alleviate
the problems resulting from the use of the water—based compliant
paint.
However,
in September 1990, DMI’s paint supplier informed
DM1 that the supplier had exhausted its efforts to solve the
problems and thç~supplier was unable to develop a compliant
paint.
(Am. Pet.
13).
In addition to DMI’s current supplier,
DM1 contacted other
paint suppliers in an attempt to locate a compliant paint.
Mr.
Robert McClure, plant engineer, testified on behalf of DM1 at
hearing.
Mr. McClure stated that DM1 had ongoing contact with
two paint suppliers and had contacted a total of five suppliers
including the current supplier in an attempt to find
a compliant
paint.
(Tr.
35-36).
However, at this time DM1 has been unable
to find a paint that will meet the needs of DM1 and meet the
standards of 35
Ill. Adm.
Code 214.204(j).
COMPLIANCE
PLAN
DM1 has set forth two methods to achieve compliance.
DMI’s
preferred method is to be granted a site-specific rule change.
As noted earlier,
DM1 filed its petition for site-specific
rulemaking on February 4,
1991.
(See In the Matter of Petition
of DM1,
Inc.
for Site—Specific Air Regulation:
35
Ill.
Admn. Code
215.215, R9l—9).
The site-specific rule would raise the allowed
emissions for the DM1 plant until the year 2000 and require DM1
to continue to investigate compliant paints.
The Board has not
ruled on the site-specific petition.at this time.
The second method that DM1 has set forth for compliance,
if
the site-specific relief is not granted,
involves the
installation of an afterburner to reduce emissions.
Installation
of the afterburner would cost around $300,000 and the yearly cost
of running the afterburner would exceed $35,000 according to DM1.
(Am. Pet.
16).
The Agency
is in support of the Board’s granting site
specific relief.
(See P.C.
5,
p.
6).
However,
if site specific
relief were not granted, the Agency believes that the afterburner
system would allow compliance.
The Agency specifically states in
its recbmmendation that “ejven
though the site specific relief
may be a viable alternative, the Agency believes that the
afterburner system would allow DM1 to achieve compliance.”
(Ag.
Rec.
8).
Thus,
the Agency indicates that compliance could be
achieved under either method proposed by DM1.
CONSISTENCY WITH FEDERAL
LAW
128—243
4
Both the Agency and DM1 agree that the granting of this
variance would be consistent with Federal Law.
DM1 is located in
an ozone attainment area and the additional VOM emissions would
be within federal guidelines.
(Am. Pet.
30).
The Agency states
that it does not believe the variance will need to be submitted
to the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA)
as
a
revision to the State Implementation Plan (SIP).
However, the
Agency further states that it “believes that if the Board grants
DM1 a variance as requested,
its order should be approvable as a
SIP revision”.
(Ag.
Rec.
5).
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION
The Agency recommends that the variance be granted with the
following conditions:
a)
Petitioner’s relief should be limited to the paint
in the dip tank on the paint deck.
This relief
should be limited to its requested limit of 4.2
lb/gallon prior to solvent addition and limiting
solvent addition 61 lb/day on a 30 day average.
b)
Relief is unnecessary and unwarranted for the
spray coat paint which is presently limited
to 3.5 lb/gallon in 35 Ill.
Adm. Code
215.204(j) (3)
and its operating permit.
c)
Relief should only be granted prospectively.
d)
The Variance should expire upon granting of
site specific relief or January
1,
1993,
whichever comes first.
e)
DM1 should also be required to continue the
testing of potential compliant dip tank
coatings.
DM1 should test coatings at the
rate of two per year.
f)
DM1 should also .be required to submit
quarterly reports detailing the progress made
in achieving complete compliance with 35 Ill.
Adm. Code 215.204(j)(3).
(Ag. Rec.
8—9).
DM1 agrees with the conditions except the condition with
regard to prospective relief (condition c).
DM1 “emphatically
does not acquiesce in” prospective relief and has specifically
requested retroactive relief.
(Pet.
Br.
6).
HARDSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
128—244
5
DM1 asserts that immediate compliance with Section
215.204(j) would pose an arbitrary and unreasonable hardship upon
DM1 because the water-based painting system, although compliant
with the VOM emission levels,
is inadequate to meet DMI’s
reasonable quality standards and DNI’s- customers’ expectations.
(Am. Pet.
26).
The Agency,
in noting that DM1 has already expended $225,000
in the iiistallation of its paint system in trying to achieve
compliance,
states that:
“DMI
is also a~small business relative
to its competitors who have obtained similar site specific
relief.
The Agency agrees that the environmental impacts are
minimal.
Therefore, the Agency agrees that an arbitrary and
unreasonable hardship is present.”
(Ag. Rec.
7).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the Agency recommends that the variance be
granted to DM1, prospectively; DM1 requests a variance
retroactively.
Thus,
the sole issue in contention
is whether or
not DM1 should receive a retroactive variance.
Before addressing the specific arguments,
the Board will
first discuss the issue of retroactive variances.
The Board
notes that as a general rule,
in the absence of unusual or
extraordinary circumstances, the Board renders variances as
effective on the date of the Board order in which they issue.
(LCN Closers,
Inc.
v.
EPA,
PCB 89-27,
101 PCB 283,
286
(July 27,
1989);
Borden Chemical Co.
v.
EPA,
PCB 82-82,
67 PCB 3,6
(Dec.
5,
1985); City of Farmington
V.
EPA,
PCB 84-166,
63 PCB 97,
98
(Feb.
20,
1985); Hansen-Sterling Drum Co.
v.
EPA, PCB 83-240,
62 PCB
387,
389
(Jan.
24,
19856); Village of Sauget v.
EPA, PCB 83—146,
55 PCB 255,
258
(Dec.
15,
1983); Olin Corp.
V.
EPA, PCB 83—102,
53 PCB 289, 291
(Aug.
30,
1983).)
A variance is not retroactive as a matter of law,
and
the Board does not grant variance retroactivity unless
retroactive relief is specially justified.
Deere
&
Co.
v.
EPA,
PCB 88-22,
92 PCB 91-94
(Sept.
8,
1988)
(citations omitted).
Absent
a waiver of the statutory due date,
Section 38(a)
of
the Environmental Protection Act requires the Board to render a
decision on a variance within 120 days of the filing of a
petition.
(See Ill.
Rev. Stat.
1989 ch.
111
1/2,
par.
1038(a)
(amended from 90 days by P.A. 84—1320, effective Sept.
4,
1986)).
For this reason,
a. petitioner that wishes a variance to commence
by a certain date must file its petition at least 120 days prior
to the desired inception date.
(See EPA v. Citizens Utilities
128—245
6
Co. of Illinois,
PCB 79—142,
56 PCB 1,
4
(Jan.
12,
1984)).
(Enforcement action in which inception date of variance was at
issue).
The rationale behind this general rule
is twofold, and the
Board has set it forth in prior opinions.
First,
To grant retroactive relief as requested would
encourage other companies to file in an untimely
manner.
DM1,
Inc.
v.
EPA, PCB 88—132,
96 PCB 185,
187
(Feb.
23,
1987).
Further,
The Board is inclined not to grant retroactive relief,
absent a showing of unavoidable circumstances, because
the failure to request relief in a timely manner is
a
self-imposed hardship.
American National Can Co.
v.
EPA, PCB 88-203,
102 PCB
215,
218
(Aug.
31,
1989)
However, the Board~hasgranted variances with “retroactive”
inception dates under certain circumstances.
The nature of the
circumstances has dictated the inception date in each case.
The Board has made the variance retroactive to the date on
which we would have rendered
a decision——i.e.,
120 days from the
date the petition was filed--where there was a delay of the
proceeding through no fault of the petitioner.
Allied Signal,
Inc.
v.
EPA, PCB 88—172,
105 PCB 7,
12
(Nov.
2,
1989)
(procedural
delay); Morton Chemical Div.
v. EPA, PCB 88-102,
96 PCB .169,
181
(Feb.
23,
1989)
(confusion over interpretation of federal
regulations, the Agency changed its view during the course of the
proceeding,
and the petitioner sought compliance during the
pendency); Union Oil Co.
of California, PCB 84-66,
63 PCB 75,
79
(Feb.
20,
1985)
(delay was beyond the control of the petitioner).
We have used a shorter period than the statutory time for
decision to back—date a variance where we have otherwise viewed
the petition as timely filed prior to the date on which the
petitioner required the relief.
Monsanto Co.
v.
EPA, PCB 88-
206(B),
98 PCB 267,
273
(Apr.
27,
1989)
(filed 92 days before
compliance deadline).
However, this type of “backdating”
is
entirely consistent with the Board’s repeatedly—enunciated
disinclination to grant retroactive variances.
In these cases,
the Board did little more than confer an inception date of the
latest date on which the Act would have required a Board
decision, were it not for a waiver of that deadline.
Under
certain circumstances, such as those in the instant case,
there
is
a legitimate interest on the part of the Board and all parties
128—246
7
that the petitioner grant a waiver of the 120-day period,
and
this merely serves to avoid penalizing a petitioner for having
submitted such a waiver.
The Board has applied an inception date earlier than the 120
days where there are unavoidable, special, or extraordinary
circumstances.
American National Can Co.
102 PCB 218
(11 days
after filing, where petitioner diligently sought compliance and
there was no reason to anticipate the need for a variance until
it was tpo late to timely file); Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co.
v.
EPA,
PCB 89-58,
102 PCB 223,
226
(Aug.
31,
1989)
(day after filing, where petitioner learned of error that
resulted in non-compliance only shortly before filing); Fedders—
~,
98 PCB 19
(date of filing, where extended proceeding for
prior varianceended only a short time before filing); Pines
~ailer
Co.
V.
EPA, PCB 88—10,
90 PCB 485,
488
(June 30,
1988);
Bloomington/Normal Sanitary District v.
EPA, PCB 87-207,
87 PCB
21,
22
(Mar.
10,
1988)
(nine days after filing, where there were
unexpected construction delays and the petitioner made a good
faith effort at compliance); Classic Finishing Co.
v.
EPA,
PCB
84—174(b),
70 PCB 229,
233
(June 20,
1986)
(date of filing first
amended petition, where there was
a change
in company ownership,
an ongoing compliance effort that resulted in updating of the
petition and eventual compliance before the date of the Board
decision, and due to nature of the materials involved and the
technology-forcing nature of the underlying regulations); Chicago
Rotoprint Co.
v.
EPA, PCB 84-151,
63 PCB 91
(Feb.
20,
1985)
(35
days after filing, where need for variance was not known
earlier).
The Board has also occasionally applied
an effective
date that ante-dates the filing of the petition under the extreme
of such circumstances.
Deere
& Co.,
92 PCB 94
(Sept.
8,
1988)
(20 days prior to filing, where petitioner diligently sought
relief and good faith efforts appeared to have resulted in
compliance prior to the Board decision); Midwest Solvents Co.
of
Illinois v. EPA, PCB 84—5,
57 PCB 369,
371
(Apr.
5,
1991)
(nine
days before filing, where the petitioner was diligent in seeking
relief and the delay in filing arose through procedural confusion
over the extension of
a prior provisional variance).
Other cases underscore the fact that the timeliness of
filing is a primary factor in consideration of the “special
circumstances.”
First,
there are those
in which the Board
routinely refused to apply a retroactive inception date where
either the petitioner filed late without explanation, or where
delay resulted through some fault of the petitioner.
(~
Closers,
Inc.,
101 PCB 286;
DM1,
Inc.,
96 PCB 187; Borden
Chemical Co.,
67 PCB
6; City of Farmington,
63 PCB 98; Hansen-
Sterling Drug Co.,
62 PCB 389; Village of Sauget,
55 PCB 258;
Olin Corp.,
53 PCB 291).
Second is the existence of other
factors relating to the petitioner’s diligence and efforts at
compliance:
128—2 47
8
A principal consideration in the granting of
retroactive relief is a showing that the petitioner has
diligently sought relief and has made good faith
efforts at achieving compliance.
Deere
& Co.
V.
EPA, PCB 88—22,
92 PCB 91,
94
(Sept.
8,
1989)
(citations omitted).
Now to the specific arguments in this case,
DM1 requested
that the variance be retroactive to September 1,
1990.
However,
DM:t stated that the September 1 date was chosen for convenience
and “i)n
fact,
relief was not necessary until September 15,
1990”
(the date that DM1 began using the noncompliant paint).
(Pet.
Br.
12).
DM1 stated that it “recognizes that retroactive
relief is somewhat of an extraordinary remedy, granted only in
the face of unusual or extraordinary.circumstances”.
(Pet.
Br.
12).
DM1 maintains that such extraordinary or unusual
circumstances are present in this case due to
DMI’s unflagging good faith efforts to
achieve compliance,
the expense and
inconvenience to which DM1 has already
submitted itself in its efforts to achieve
compliance,
the utter lack of any harm to the
environment from DMI’s actions, and the
emergency nature of DMI’s request for relief.
(Pet.
Br.
12).
DM1 stated that after its paint supplier notified DM1 that
a
compliant paint could not be found to meet the needs of DM1,
DM1,
on September 5,
1990,
“contacted the Agency. to see if it had any
suggestions or ideas,
to which the Agency responded negatively”.
(Pet.
Br.
15).
DM1 then informed the Agency that it had no
choice but to cease using the water—based paint and return to the
high-volatility paint.
DM1 began using the high-volatility paint
on September 15,
1990.
(Pet.
Br.
15—16).
In further support of DMI’s request for retroactive relief,
DM1 stated that “September in particular,
and the early autumn
season in general are critical times in the farm implement
market.”
(Pet.
Br.
16).
DM1 president, William Schmidtgall,
testified that 87 percent of DMI’s product will have been shipped
to dealers while only 32 percent will have been sold to end users
during this time.
(Pet.
Br.
16, Tr. 21-22).
Thus,
DM1 maintains
that had it not demonstrated to its dealers by late fall,
1990
that it had resolved the paint quality issue DM1 expected to
receive substantially fewer early orders.
(Pet.
Br.
16-17).
The Agency argues that no “extraordinary or unusual”
circumstances exist which would warrant the granting of
retroactive relief.
(Ag.
Br.
2).
The Agency maintains that DM1
“should have ~nown to request an extension of its variance or to
128—2 48
9
timely file another variance based on its past experience”.
(Ag.
Br.
12).
In support of its position the Agency points to
testimony by DM1 president, William Schmidtgall, who stated that
DM1 received complaints
in early 1990 from dealers concerning the
paint quality.
(Ag. Br.
3).
The Agency goes on to state that:
DMI’s variance did not expire until July
1,
1989 or
when a compliant paint was found.
DM1 certainly could
have filed.for an extension of its variance by April
1,
1990, some 120 days prior to the end of its variance.
Even when complaints continued,
DM1 seemed to hope that
the problems would go away and did not come to the
realization that it could not be solved until September
1990 when the fall sale season was beginning.
DM1 then
after months of acknowledgment of the problem abruptly
switched back to high volatile coatings prior to
seeking relief.
(Ag. Br.
3).
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that denial of a retroactive variance would
impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship.
The Board is not
persuaded by the Agency’s argument that DM1 “should have known,
based on past experience” that a retroactive variance was
necessary.
In fact,
DM1 had a reasonable expectation that the
compliant paint would be acceptable.
Mr. Schmidtgall testified
that “our preliminary tests
indicated to us that it the
compliant paint
did give us the quality expectations that our
customers had and that matches the market position that DM1 takes
within a very competitive environment”.
(Tr.
16).
Further DMI’s
paint supplier did not inform DM1 that the supplier could not
meet DMI’s needs until September of 1990.
DM1 could have
reasonably expected that the supplier could provide a paint until
that time.
In addition, the Agency misstated the position DM1 was
in
with regard to the previous variance.
DM1 could not have filed
for an extension of the previous variance because that variance
had expired by its terms no later than July 1989.
In addition,
DMI’s requested relief and its compliance alternatives are
significantly different in the instant case than in the previous
variance.
Therefore,
filing a new variance petition was DMI’s
only recourse.
As previously discussed,
this is DMI’s second variance
request.
The Board granted DM1 a variance in 1989, and granted
relief retroactively to 120 days from the filing of the petition
for variance.
Since the granting of that variance,
DM1 did
achieve compliance.
When use of the compliant paint was no
longer satisfactory to DMI’s customers,
it continued to search
for a compliant paint until DMI’s paint supplier indicated that
it was not possible to find a paint which would meet DMI’s needs.
128—249
10
DM1 then sought relief first in the form of
a provisional
variance, which the Agency denied, and then with a variance
petition before the Board.
The Board also notes that DM1 also states that the variance
would “pose no adverse environmental impacts”.
(Pet.
Br.
10).
The Agency does not agree that there would be “no adverse”
impacts; however, the Agency does state that the granting of the
variance would result in “minimal environmental impacts”.
(Ag.
Br.
2).
,DNI points out in its petition that DM1 is located in
rural Woodford County which is an attainment area for ozone.
(Pet.
18).
In addition,
the Agency indicates that DM1
is located
“in a long—standing attainment area” and that the variance would
be “approvable” as a SIP revision.
(Ag. Rec.
5).
Thus, the
granting of this variance should not affect the Federal approval
of the SIP.
The Board finds that relief
is unnecessary and unwarranted
for the spray coat paint which
is presently limited to 3.5
lb/gallon in
35
Ill. Adm.
Code 215.204(j) (3)
and its operating
permit.
The Board is concerned with the granting of retroactive
variances and does not generally grant such a variance.
(See
Modine Manufacturing Corp.
v.
IEPA, PCB 88-25, July 25,
1991).
However,
under certain circumstances, such as those
in the
instant case where,
DM1 has diligently sought relief and after
having made a good faith effort to maintain compliance and could
not have reasonably anticipated earlier that variance would be
needed, the Board has granted retroactive relief.
Therefore,
the
Board will grant DM1 retroactive relief to September 15,
1990.
This Opinion constitutes the Board’s finding of fact and
conclusions of law in this matter.
ORDER.
1.
Petitioner DM1,
Inc.,
is hereby granted variance from
35
Ill. Adm. Code 215.204(j)
for its facility located
on Route 150
in Woodford County,
Illinois, subject to
the following conditions:
a)
Relief is limited to the paint in the dip
tank on the paint deck.
Such paint is
further limited to a VOM content not to
exceed 4.2 lb/gallon prior to solvent
addition and solvent addition is limited to
61 lb/day on a 30 day average.
b)
Variance begins retroactively on September 15,
1990.
128—250
11
c)
Variance expires upon granting of site
specific relief or January
1,
1993,
whichever comes
first.
d)
DM1 shall continue the testing of
potential compliant dip tank coatings.
DM1 shall test coatings at the rate of
no less than two per year.
e)
DM1 shall submit quarterly reports
detailing the progress ñiade in achieving
complete compliance with 35 Ill.
Adin.
Code 215.204(j) (3).
The reports shall
be submitted to:
Regional Manager
Division of Air Pollution Control
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
5415 North University
Peoria,
Illinois 61614
2.
Within forty-five days of the date of this Order,
Petitioner shall execute and forward to Renee Stadel, Division of
Legal Counsel,
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency,
P.O. Box
19276,
2200 Churchill Road,
Springfield, Illinois 62794—9276,
a
Certificate of Acceptance and agreement to be bound to all terms
and conditions of the granted variance.
The 45-day period shall
be held in abeyance during any period that this matter is
appealed.
Failure to execute and forward the Certificate within
45—days renders this variance void and of no force and effect as
a shield against enforcement of rules from which this variance is
granted.
The form of Certificate is as follows:
128—25 1
12
CERTIFICATION
I
(We),
hereby accept and agree to be bound by all terms and conditions
of the Order of the Pollution Control Board in PCB 90-227,
December 19,
1991.
Petitioner
By:
Authorized Agent
Title
Date
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act,
Ill. Rev.
Stat.
1989,
ch.
111 1/2 par.
1041, provides
for
appeal of final
Orders of the Board within 35 days.
The Rules of the Supreme
Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
J.D. Dumelle concurred.
I,
Dorothy M. Gunn,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby
cer~tj~
that the abov
Opinion and Order was
adopted on the
~
day of ______________________________
1991 by a vote of
‘7—o
~
Dorothy N.
G32fr,
Clerk
Illinois Po1(,~/utionControl Board
128—252
