ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
    December
    6,
    1991
    WALTER
    J. MAQUET and MARLENE
    J. MAQUET,
    d/b/a MAQtJET’S 66,
    Petitioners.,
    PCB 90—136
    v.
    )
    (Underground Storage
    )
    Tank Fund)
    ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
    )
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    )
    )
    Respondent.
    FREDERICK A. BERNARDI, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER;
    RONALD SCHALLAWITZ, ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
    APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT.
    OPINION
    AND
    ORDER OF THE BOARD
    (by B.
    Forcade):
    This matter is before the Board on a petition for review
    filed on July 23,
    1990,
    by Petitioners Walter J. Maquet and
    Marlene J.
    Maquet, doing business as Maquet’s
    66
    (hereinafter
    “the Naquets”).
    The petition sought review of a decision by the
    Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
    (hereinafter
    “Agencytt)
    on June 20,
    1990, determining that a $50,000 deductible should
    apply to the Maquet’s request for reimbursement from the
    underground storage tank fund.
    A hearing was held on this matter
    in Pekin,
    Illinois on August 29, 1991.
    On October
    1,
    1991,
    Petitioner filed a Brief.
    On October 17,
    1991,
    the Agency filed
    a Post Hearing Brief.
    On October 30,
    1991, Petitioner filed
    a
    Reply Brief.
    On November 22,
    1991,
    Petitioner filed a letter
    making a one-word correction to the October 30,
    1991 Reply Brief.
    This proceeding involves a retail gasoline dispensing
    station owned by the Maquets at 1311 N.
    8th Street in Pekin,
    Illinois.
    In early 1989, the Maquets were considering a sale of
    the station to the Illico Independent Oil Company
    (hereinafter
    “Illico”).
    On Monday June
    5,
    1989, and continuing for two or
    three days afterward,
    the underground storage tanks, pump islands
    and concrete pad were removed.
    Soil samples were taken during
    tank removal; these soil samples later showed contamination.
    Since the tanks were removed in early June,
    1989,
    contamination
    from the tanks must have occurred prior to that time.
    The
    question in this proceeding is whether the Maquets had actual or
    constructive knowledge of the contamination on the statutorily
    established date of July 28,
    1989.
    After contamination was
    found,
    the appropriate state agencies were informed and the
    contamination was cleaned up.
    128—2 7

    2
    As a result of the expenditures associated with clean up of
    the contamination, on May 22,
    1990 the Maquets submitted an
    “Application for Reimbursement from the Underground Storage Tank
    Fund for Corrective Action Costs” to the Agency.
    The Agency’s
    determination of June. 20,
    1990
    (and the amended determination of
    August 22,
    1990)
    concluded that the Maquets met all of the
    prerequisites for eligibility and reimbursibility under the
    Illinois Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter “the Act”),
    Ill. Rev.
    Stat,
    ch.
    111 1/2, para.
    1001,
    et.
    secT.
    The Agency
    further determined that the appropriate deductible was
    $50,000.’OO, because the Maquets had “actual or constructive
    knowledge” prior to July 28,
    1989,
    that a release had occurred.
    The Naquets disagree that they had such knowledge.
    If the
    Maquets did not have such actual or constructive knowledge, the
    appropriate deductible under that provision would be $10,000.
    This presents the sole issue in the proceeding and it is
    primarily an issue of fact.
    The provision of the Act governing the dispute in this
    proceeding is Section 22.l8b(d) (3) (C) (ii), which provides:
    ii.
    If the costs incurred were in response to a release of
    petroleum which first occurred prior to July 28,
    1989,
    and the owner or operator had actual or constructive
    knowledge that such a release had occurred prior to
    July 28,
    1989, the deductible amount under subparagraph
    (A)
    of paragraph
    (3)
    of this subsection
    (d)
    shall be
    $50,000 rather than $10,000, unless subparagraph
    (B) (I)
    applies,
    in which case the deductible amount shall be
    $100,000.
    If the costs incurred wer.e in response to a
    release of petroleum which first occurred prior to July
    28,
    1989, but the owner or operator had no actual or
    constructive knowledge that such
    a release had occurred
    prior to July 28,
    1989, the deductible amount shall be
    as provided under subparagraph
    (A)
    or
    (B)
    of paragraph
    (3)
    of this subsection
    (d), whichever is applicable.
    It shall be theburcien of the owner or operator to
    prove to the satisfaction of the Agency that the owner
    or operator had no actual or constructive knowledge
    that the release of petroleum for which
    a claim is
    submitted first occurred prior to July 28,
    1989.
    FACTUAL DISCUSSION
    The Naquets leased the station from about
    1967 until 1985
    when they purchased the station.
    (Tr.
    163).
    In early 1989 Mr.
    Brent Glassey,
    an agent with Clifton-Strode Real Estate Agency
    approached the Maquets about selling the station to Illico.
    On
    April
    10,
    1989 Illico caused soil samples to be taken from the
    property and sent for analysis to Randolph and Associates
    (Randolph and Associates subsequently became Environmental
    128—28

    3
    Science and Engineering,
    Inc.;
    all subsequent references to
    either name will be “ESE”).
    Laboratory analyses showed no
    contamination.
    (Tr. 47; Pet. Ex.
    1).
    Subsequently,
    a “Contract to Purchase Real Estate” was
    negotiated between the Maquets and Illico.
    That contract was
    signed April 28,
    1989, and an addendum was signed May
    8 and 15,
    1989; the contract called for a closing date on or before June
    25,
    1989.
    (Tr.
    130—132; Record 000053—000054).
    Illico retained
    Misco Services to remove the underground storage tanks
    (Tr.
    17);
    1~hatremoval took place from about June 4 to June 6.
    (Tr.
    81-
    82).
    During the removal Mr. Donald May of Illico was present and
    took soil samples from the tank bed for conveyance to ESE.
    (Tr.
    83).
    The closing did not take place on June 25, because the real
    estate agent,
    Mr. Glassey, had moved to Florida and the soil
    sample analysis results were not finished.
    (Tr.
    15).
    On July 19,
    the soil an~1ysisresults from ESE were received by Illico, they
    showed significant contamination; Illico did not inform the
    Maquets of the soil analysis results.
    (Tr.
    19).
    Nine~dayslater,
    July 28,
    1989,
    is the statutory time of significance.
    In September 1989 Mr. Stropes of the Stropes Real Estate
    Agency approached the Maquets about selling the station and
    entered into an exclusive listing contract with them on September
    14
    or 17,
    1989.
    (Tr. 43,
    51,
    136).
    Mr. Stropes approached Mr.
    Golwitzer of Illico about purchasing the station and on October
    25,
    1989 a Contract to Purchase was signed.
    (Tr.
    52; Record
    000055).
    Mr. Golwitzer and Illico kept the results of the June
    5,
    1989 soil samples from the Maquets until after this October
    25,
    1989 signing.
    On October 27,
    1989, the Maquets received the
    test results
    (showing contamination)
    for the first time.
    (Tr.
    55—
    56,
    148).
    On behalf of the Naquets, Mr. Stropes contacted the
    Emergency Services and Disaster Agency on October 27,
    1989,
    to
    report the release.
    (Record 000003).
    On November 10-14,
    1989,
    the Maquets signed a contract with ESE to develop a clean up
    proposal.
    They had never previously had a contract with ESE or
    any other organization regarding testing at the station.
    (Tr.
    137-139; Pet.
    Ex.
    2).
    The contamination was subsequently cleaned
    up and the Maquets applied for reimbursement from the fund.
    I. Agency Position
    The Agency does not specifically argue that the Maquets had
    “actual” knowledge of the contamination before July 28,
    1989.
    The Agency states that it had no information to establish actual
    knowledge and premised its decision on “constructive” knowledge.
    (Tr. 251-253).
    The Agency decision was premised upon two
    factors.
    The first factor was a telephone conversation of June
    14,
    1990 between Mr. Bur Filson of the Agency and Mr. Don May of
    Illico.
    The second factor was the Agency’s assumption that ESE
    was retained for the June
    5,
    1989 sample analysis by the Maquets,
    rather than by Illico.
    128—29

    4
    The June 14, 1990 telephone conversation forms the primary
    basis for the Agency decision.
    Mr. Filson of the Agency
    initiated the call because he had information indicating that,
    “there should have been some knowledge that the release first
    occurred prior to July 28,
    1989.”
    (Tr. 205).
    Mr. Filson
    summarized the conversation with Mr. May of Illico on an Agency
    telephone conversation record sheet.
    (Record 000063-000064).
    That record attributes the following statement to Mr. May,
    “Everything was’ fine around the UST’s, however a problem was
    discovered around one of the islands.
    At that point some
    additional digging was done to try to find the extent and
    I left
    the site.”
    (Record 000063).
    At hearing, Mr Filson elaborated to
    state that Mr. May had identified the problem as petroleum
    contamination.
    (Tr. 205).
    Several of the comments attributed to
    Mr. May during that conversation specifically state or clearly
    imply that Mr. Maquet knew or should have known of the problem.
    (Record 000063—000064; Tr.
    202—207).
    The second factor relied upon by the Agency was an
    assumption regarding the relationship between ESE and the
    Maquets.
    When the application for reimbursement was submitted,
    ESE was an Agent for the Maquets.
    ESE did the analytical testing
    on the June
    5 soil samples which showed contamination, and ESE
    had the results on July 13,
    1989.
    (Record 000056).
    Mr. May in
    his conversation with Mr. Filson indicated that the testing on
    June 5,
    1989 was left up to the Maquets.
    (Record 000063).
    Consequently, the Agency was under the impression that ESE was an
    Agent of the Maquets in June and July 1989,
    and that ESE had
    knowledge of the contamination prior to July 28,
    1989.
    (Tr. 249-
    250).
    Therefore, the Agency concluded that the Naquets had
    constructive knowledge of the contamination prior to the
    statutory date and that a $50,000 deductible should apply.
    II. The Macmet’s Position
    The Maquets asserted that they had no actual knowledge of
    contamination and that they had no agents to whom knowledge could
    be attributed.
    Mr. Naquet testified that he did not retain
    anyone to analyze soil samples prior to July 28,
    1989,
    and that
    none of the people involved in the business transaction regarding
    the sale informed him that the property was contaminated prior to
    July 28,
    1989.
    (Tr. 138—141).
    Prior to July 28,
    1989 neither ESE
    nor Illico was an agent of the Maquets.
    (Tr. 138-142).
    During
    tank removal Mr. Maquet would occasionally view the operation;
    but the smell of gasoline did not indicate to him that
    contamination was present.
    (Tr.
    145).
    Mr. Maquet testified that
    from about 1985 until the tanks were removed there was no loss of
    inventory which would indicate leakage and that the pumps
    dispensing gasoline never lost their prime
    (a pump losing prime
    would indicate leakage).
    (Tr. 146-148).
    128—30

    5
    Mr. May of Illico also provided testimony for the Maquets.
    Mr. Nay’s testimony highlighted that he had misunderstood the
    relationship between the Maquets and ESE.
    Throughout his
    participation in the tank removal and continuing through his
    conversation with Mr. Filson of the Agency, Mr. May thought that
    ESE had been retained by the Maquets to conduct the soil
    analysis; Mr. Nay now understood that ESE had been retained by
    Illico throughout this time period to do the analysis.
    (Tr. 85,
    94).
    Mr. Golwitzer, President of Illico, testified that he had
    retained and paid ESE to do all of the analytical work during
    June an& July of 1989 on behalf of Illico.
    (Tr.
    17—22).
    Additionally, Mr. May testified that he did not tell Mr.
    Filson in the phone conversation that the problem surrounding
    tank removal was a petroleum contamination problem because in
    June of 1989 Mr. Nay did not know that there was a petroleum
    contamination problem at the site.
    (Tr.
    90,
    101).
    When Mr. May
    discussed the problem during that conversation, he was referring
    to the problem of the property sale not taking place on time due
    to the sample results not being ready.
    (Tr.
    95-96).
    CONCLUSIONS
    The statutory burden placed on the Maquets
    is to prove they
    had no actual or constructive knowledge of the contamination on
    the date in question.
    Section 22.l8b(d)(3)(C)(ii).
    The Maquets
    provided information to the Agency in the form of
    a June
    6,
    1990
    letter from ESE which repeatedly stated that the Maquets first
    became aware of the contamination on October 27,
    1990.
    (Record
    000058-000059).
    The Agency accepted this as true.
    (Tr.
    236).
    The Board finds that ESE did have actual knowledge of the
    contamination of July 13,
    1989 and that Illico had actual
    knowledge on July 19,
    1989.
    This much is undisputed.
    The Agency
    has argued that Illico became the agent of the Naquets when
    Illico agreed to remove the tanks,
    a burden placed on the Maquets
    in the original contract.
    The Agency cites no legal precedent to
    support a conclusion that contract negotiations between a seller
    and buyer regarding duties and purchase price makes the buyer an
    agent of the seller.
    The Board has reviewed the remaining Agency
    arguments imputing ESE or Illico’s knowledge to the Maquets and
    finds those arguments without merit.
    The Board finds that
    neither ESE nor Illico was an agent of the Maquets prior to July
    28,
    1989 such that their knowledge can be attributed to the
    Maquets.
    Consequently, the Board finds no basis for the Agency
    determination that the Maquets had “constructive” knowledge of
    the contamination prior to July 28,
    1989.
    Accordingly, the
    Board
    will reverse the Agency determination and remand the matter for
    further action consistent with this Opinion.
    128—3 1

    6
    PROCEDURAL MATTERS
    At page 23 of the Respondent’s Post Hearing Brief the Agency
    states,
    “Because of the error of the hearing officer in not
    allowing an offer of proof to be made by the Agency, the Agency
    requests a SANCTION of either....”
    This presents several
    problems.
    First, while not specifically required by the
    Procedural Rules, requests for sanctions are traditionally
    presented to the Board by motion rather than by a request in the
    middle of a Brief.
    Second,
    sanctions are traditionally sought
    regardii~gconduct of a party of other person for unreasonably
    failing to comply with a procedural rule or order of the Board or
    hearing officer.
    See 35
    Ill. Adm. Code 101.280
    -
    281.
    Here, the
    Agency seems to seek a sanction against the Maquets premised on
    a
    ruling of the hearing officer.
    When the Agency contests a ruling
    of the hearing officer, the appropriate mechanism is to seek
    review of that ruling pursuant to 35 Ill.
    Adm. Code 101.247(b),
    either in interlocutory appeal or upon final Board review of the
    proceeding.
    Finally, the Agency asserts as a basis for its procedural
    contentions, “The hearing officer did not let Respondent’s
    counsel make any offer of proof
    (see top of page 76 of the
    hearing transcript).”
    (Respondent’s Brief,
    p.
    22).
    At this stage
    of the proceeding the Agency was conducting recross examination
    of Mr. Stropes during the petitioner’s case in chief.
    Upon
    objection by petitioner, the hearing officer ruled that
    a
    question by the Agency was beyond the scope of redirect.
    At that
    point, the Agency attempted to call the witness during the
    petitioners case in chief,
    a request the hearing officer denied.
    The Agency then stated its intention to call the witness during
    its case in chief.
    The hearing officer noted that the Agency had
    not subpoenaed the witness,
    and that the hearing officer lacked
    the authority to hold the witness there.
    Then on page 76 of the
    transcript:
    Agency:
    So, although this is an adversarial proceeding
    --
    H.O.:
    I’m not arguing with you, counsel, over my rulings.
    I
    have ruled.
    I don’t have to argue with you.
    Agency:
    Thank you very much.
    At no point in this exchange, or the transcript as a whole, does
    the Agency request an opportunity to make an offer of proof.
    Absent some request by the Agency to make an offer of proof,
    the
    Board can find no error in the record.
    The Board finds the
    Agency’s concerns about procedural impropriety by the hearing
    officer and respondent’s counsel without merit.
    128—32

    7
    This Opinion constitutes the Board’s findings of fact and
    conclusions of law in this matter.
    ORDER
    The June 20,
    1990 Agency determination of a $50,000.00
    deductible in this matter is hereby reversed and this matter is
    •remanded to the Agency.
    Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act,
    Ill.
    Rev.
    Stat.
    1987,
    ch.
    111½, par.
    1041, provides for appeal of final
    Orders of the Board within 35 days.
    The Rules of the Supreme
    Court of Illinois establish filing requirements.
    IT IS SO ORDERED
    Board Member J. Anderson Dissented.
    I, Dorothy N. Gunn,
    Clerk of the Illinois Pollution Control
    Board, hereby certify that the aboye Opinion and Order was
    adopted on the
    ~‘/~1-day of
    /i~(~-,-x2~~-&--’
    ,
    1991,
    by a
    vote of
    _______
    Ill
    Control Board
    128—33

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