ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
October 10, 1991
RICHARD WORTHEN, CLARENCE BOHN,
)
~IARRY PARKER,
GEORGE ARNOLD,
HARLES CRISWELL, THOMAS GIBSON,
)
ITY OF EDWARDSVILLE, CITY OF
)
~ROY,
VILLAGE
OF
MARYVILLE,
)
~1ILLAGE
OF
GLEN
CARBON,
)
SAVE
ALL
FARMLAND
AND
)
ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES,
and
)
~ADISON
tOUNTY CONSERVATION
)
ALLIANCE,
PCB 91—106
Petitioners,
)
(Landfill Siting
Review)
V.
VILLAGE
OF ROXANA and
)
LAIDLAW
WASTE SYSTEMS
(MADISON),
INC.,
Respondents.
GEORGE J. MORAN,
SR., APPEARED ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS;
BRIAN E. KONZEN,
LUEDERS, ROBERTSON
& KONZEN APPEARED ON BEHALF OF
RESPONDENT
LAIDLAW
WASTE SYSTEMS
(MADISON),
INC.; and
LEONARD F. BERG APPEARED ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT VILLAGE OF ROXANA.
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by M. Nardulli):
This case is before the Board on a June 24, 1991 petition for
hearing to contest the May
20,
1991 decision
of
respondent
the
Village of Roxana (Roxana).
Petitioners Richard Worthen, Clarence
Bohm, Harry Parker, George Arnold, Charles Criswell, Thomas Gibson,
the
City
of
Edwardsville,
the
City
of
Troy,
the
Village
of
Maryville,
the
Village
of
Glen
Carbon,
Save
All
Farmland
and
Environmental Resources,
and Madison County Conservation Alliance
(collectively,
petitioners)
ask that
this
Board
review Roxana’s
decision granting site approval to respondent Laidlaw Waste Systems
(Madison),
Inc.
(Laidlaw)
for
expansion
of
its
Cahokia
Road
landfill.
The petition for review is brought pursuant to Section
40.1 of the Environmental Protection Act
(Act).
(I11.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch. lii 1/2,
par.
1040.1.)
This Board held a public hearing
on the petition for review on August 23,
1991.
126—455
2
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On
December
28,
1990,
pursuant to Section 39.2 of
the Act,
Laidlaw filed an application with Roxana for siting approval of a
vertical and horizontal expansion
of
its existing Cahokia Road
landfill.
This proposed facility had previously been the subject
of two siting proceedings before the Madison County Board.
The
Madison County Board denied the first application on February 8,
1988,
and the second application was withdrawn by the applicant
before
a, decision was made.
(Application for Regional Pollution
Control
Facility
Site
Approval
for
the
Cahokia
Road
Sanitary
Landfill, Village of Roxana,
Illinois
(hereafter “App.”),
Vol.
I,
p.
27.)
The
site
of the facility was subsequently annexed to
Roxana,
pursuant
to
an
agreement
between
Laidlaw
and
Roxana.
Laidlaw then applied to Roxana for siting approval of the proposed
expansion,
and Roxana granted that request on June 18,
1990.
On
appeal to this Board,
the Board found that Laidlaw’s application
to Roxana was filed less than two years after the disapproval of
a previous, substantially similar request for siting approval,
in
violation of Section 39.2(m)
of theAct.
Therefore,
this Board
held that Roxana had no jurisdiction to consider the application,
and reversed the siting approval.
(Worthen v. Village of Roxana,
PCB
90-137
(November 29,
1990).)
Laidlaw appealed the Board’s
decision
to
the
appellate
court,
where
that
case
is
currently
pending.
In addition to appealing this
Board’s decision in Worthen,
Laidlaw
also
filed
a
new application
for
siting
approval
with
Roxana.
It is this application, filed on December
28,
1990,
that
is the subject of the instant
appeal.
Public hearings
on this
application were held by the Roxana Regional
Pollution Control
Hearing Committee on April
8,
10,
11, and
15,
1991.
On May
20,
1991, the Roxara Village Board approved the siting application.
(C. 9879—9880.
STATUTORY
FRAMEWORK
At
the
local
level,
the
siting
approval
process
is
governed
by Section 39.2 of the Act.
Section 39.2(a)
provides that local
authorities are to consider as many as nine criteria when reviewing
an application for siting approval.
Only if the local body finds
that all applicable criteria have been met can siting approval be
granted.
The Roxana Village Board of Trustees found that Laidlaw’s
application met all of the applicable criteria,
and thus granted
siting approval for the proposed expansion.
(Ordinance No.
613,
1
The local record will be denoted by “C.”
,
and references
to the transcripts
of the local
hearings will be
indicated by
“Tr.”.
References to exhibits introduced at the local hearing will
be indicated by “Applicant’s Ex.”, “Intervenor’s Ex.”, or “Madison
County Ex.”.
126—456
3
adopted May 20,
1991,
C.9879—9883.)
When reviewing a local decision on the criteria, this Board
must determine whether the local decision
is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
(McLean County Disposal,
Inc.
v.
County
of McLean (4th Dist.
1991),
—
I11.App.3d
___,
566 N.E.2d 26,
28—
29; Waste Management of Illinois,
Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1987),
160 Ill.App.3d 434,
513 N.E.2d 592, 596—597; E&
E Hauling,
Inc.
v.
Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1983),
116
Ill.App.3d 586,
451 N.E.2d
555,
aff’d
in part
(1985),
107 Ill.2d
33, 481 N.E.2d 664.)
A decision is against the manifest weight of
the evidence
if the opposite result is clearly evident, plain, or
indisputable from a review of the evidence.
(Harris v.
Day
(4th
Dist.
1983), 115 Ill.App.3d 762, 451 N.E.2d 262,
265.)
The Board,
on
review,
is
not
to
reweigh
the
evidence.
Where
there
is
conf1ir~ting evidence,
the Board
is
not
free
to
reverse
merely
because the lower tribunal credits one group of witnesses and does
not
credit
the
other.
(Fairview
Area
Citizens
Taskforce
v.
Pollution Control Board
(3d Dist.
1990),
198 Ill.App.3d 541,
555
N.E.2d 1178,
1184.)
Merely because the local government could have
drawn
different
inferences and conclusions
from the conflicting
testimony
is
not
a
basis
for
this
Board
to
reverse
the
local
government’s findings.
File v.
D
& L Landfill,
Inc.,
PCB 90-94
(August 30, 1990), aff’d File v. D & L Landfill
(5th Dist. October
3,
1991),
No.
5—90-0630;
see also Steinberg
v.
Petta
(1st Dist.
1985),
139 Ill.App.3d 503,
487 N.E.2d 1064,
1069.
Additionally, the Board must review the areas of jurisdiction
and fundamental
fairness.
Section 40.1
of the Act requires the
Board to review the procedures used at the local level to determine
whether those procedures were fundamentally fair.
Petitioners have
not
raised
any
claims
that
the
local
procedures
were
not
fundamentally
fair,
nor
do
they
contend
that
there
are
any
jurisdictional problems in this case.
Based upon a review of the
record, the Board finds that the procedures used at the local level
were fundamentally fair.
CHALLENGED CRITERIA
Petitioners have raised challenges to two of the statutory
criteria
set
forth
in
Section
39.2:
whether the
facility
is
necessary to accommodate the waste needs of the area it is intended
to
serve
(Section
39.2(a)(l)),
and
whether
the
facility
is
consistent with the county’s solid waste management plan (Section
39.2 (a) (8))
The Board
notes
that petitioners
contend that because
the
facts
in this case are not in dispute, the legal effect of those
facts becomes a matter of law, and thus the manifest weight of the
evidence standard of review is not applicable.
In support of this
contention, petitioners cite General Motors Corp.
v. Bowling
(1st.
Dist.
1980),
87 Ill.App.3d 204, 408 N.E.2d 937.
That case involved
126—457
4
administrative review of an Illinois Department of Labor decision.
However,
petitioners
have
not
cited
any
cases
involving
the
landfill siting process under Sections 39.2 and 40.1 of the Act,
and
have not
made
any
argument beyond
the
assertion
that
the
manifest weight
standard should not apply
here.
The appellate
courts
have
repeatedly held that
the Board
is
to
review
local
government findings
in landfill siting cases under the manifest
weight standard.
(McLean County Disposal, Inc. v. County of McLean
(4th
Dist.
1991),
____
I11.App.3d
____,
566
N.E.2d
26;
Waste
Management of Illinois, Inc.
v. Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1987),
l’60 Ill.App.3d
434,
513 N.E.2d
592;
City
of Rockford
v.
Pollution Control Board
(2d Dist.
1984),
125 Ill.App.3d
384,
465
N.E.2d 996.)
In fact,
the appellate court held that it was error
for the Board to consider to review the evidence in the record on
a de novo basis.
(City of East Peoria v. Pollution Control Board
(3d
Dist.
1983),
117
Ill.App.3d
673,
452
N.E.2d
1378.)
Additionally, contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the Board finds
that many of the
areas of dispute
involve questions
of
fact or
mixed questions of fact and law.
Therefore, the Board will review
petitioners’ challenges to the criteria under a manifest weight of
the evidence standard.
Need and Service Area
The
first
criterion
which
the
local
decisioninaker
must
consider in ruling upon an application for local site approval
is
whether “the facility is necessary to accommodate the waste needs
of the area it is intended to serve”.
(Il1.Rev.Stat. 1989,
ch.
111
1/2,
par.
1039.2(a) (1).)
In
its findings
of
fact,2 the Village
Board
found
that
“t3he
proposed
facility
is
necessary
to
accommodate the waste
needs
of the proposed service
area which
consists principally of Monroe, Madison, and St. Clair Counties.”
(C. 9882.)
Petitioners have raised two claims of error related to this
criterion.
First,
petitioners contend
that
Laidlaw’s proof
of
necessity was fatally defective because it described and attempted
to prove a service area consisting only of Madison, St.
Clair, and
Monroe Counties although it had “contracted” with Roxana to serve
an area of 100 miles in radius from the proposed site.
Petitioners
point out that Article
II, Section IX of the annexation agreement
states “Record Owner agrees that it will not accept solid waste
from communities or customers located more than one hundred
(100)
miles
from the existing
sanitary
landf
ill site.”
(C.80l4-
2
The
Regional
Pollution Control
Hearing
Committee
of
the
Roxana Village Board made findings of fact and recommendations to
the
full Village Board
on May
20,
1991.
(C.9881—9883.)
Those
findings of
fact and recommendations were adopted by the Village
Board and
incorporated
into the village ordinance approving the
siting application.
(C.9879—9880.)
126—458
5
8036.)
Petitioners maintain that this
language
means
that the
intended
service
area
is
an
area
within
100
miles,
and
that
Laidlaw’s representation at hearing that the service area consists
of
three
Illinois
counties
conflicts
with
the
“contract”.
Petitioners argue that the testimony presented by Scott Schreiber,
Laidlaw’s regional engineer, shows that the intended service area
is
a 100 mile radius,
rather than the three county area described
in Laidlaw’s application for siting approval.
In
response,
Laidlaw
contends
that
the
language
in
the
annexation agreement is a prohibition, not a requirement.
Laidlaw
states that the language prohibits Laidlaw from accepting
solid
waste
from customers over 100 miles
away,
but that the
language
does not state or imply what the service area should or will be.
Laidlaw cites Metropolitan Waste Systems, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board
(3d Dist.
1990),
201 Ill.App.3d 51,
558 N.E.2d 785,
for the
proposition that
the service
area
is
determined
solely
by
the
applicant,
not by the local board.
Therefore,
Laidlaw maintains
that even
if
petitioners’
“strained”
reading
of the annexation
agreement were correct, only Laidlaw, not the annexation agreement,
can define the service area.
Laidlaw argues that its application
and the testimony presented in support of the application show that
the
intended
service area
for
the
facility
consists
solely
of
Madison,
St. Clair,
and Monroe Counties.
After a review of the record and the parties’ arguments,
the
Board finds that the proposed service area for this facility
is
indeed the three county area defined in Laidlaw’s application, and
not a
100 mile radius.
The language of the annexation agreement
quoted by petitioners simply states that Laidlaw will not accept
waste from outside a 100 mile radius.
The agreement does not use
the
term
“service
area”,
nor does
it
indicate
in any way that
Laidlaw must accept waste from the entire area within a
100 mile
radius.
The Board finds that the language in Article II, Section
IX of the annexation agreement is a prohibition against accepting
waste from more than 100 miles away,
and does not require that the
facility accept waste
from
all
areas within
a
100 mile radius.
Laidlaw’s application clearly states that its proposed service area
consists of Madison,
St.
Clair,
and Monroe Counties.
(App.,
Vol.
I,
pp.
28,
30.)
Additionally, Mr. Schreiber testified repeatedly
that the intended service area is Madison,
St.
Clair,
and Monroe
Counties.
(Tr.
30,
60,
162.)
The service area is defined by the
applicant (Metropolitan Waste, 558 N.E.2d at 787), and Laidlaw has
defined
its
proposed
service
area
as
the
three
county
area.
Therefore, the Board finds that Laidlaw’s proof of necessity, which
focused on the three county
area,
is not “fatally defective”,
as
alleged by the petitioners.
Second, petitioners argue that Laidlaw did not prove that the
proposed facility
is necessary to accommodate the waste needs
of
the area it is intended to serve.
Petitioners contend, based upon
data from the 1990 report of available waste disposal capacity in
126—459
6
Illinois,
issued by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency),
that Madison
County has between
16.2
and
25
years
of
remaining capacity,
St.
Clair County has fr~n5 to
13
years
of
landfill space, and the two counties considered together have about
16
years
of
remaining
capacity.3
Petitioners
assert
that
the
appellate court has held that a proposed expansion of a landfill
was
not
necessary where
existing
landfills were
sufficient
to
handle
waste
production
for
10
years.
(Waste
Management
of
Illinois v. Pollution Control Board (2d Dist. 1984), 123 Ill.App.3d
1075, 463 N.E.2d 969.)
Petitioners also maintain that Laidlaw has
filled most of the disposal space in the Cahokia Road landfill
in
a short time, thus greatly reducing its previously projected life.
Petitioners thus conclude that any shortage of landfill
space
in
Madison County was created by Laidlaw’s own actions, and argue that
Laidlaw should not be allowed to profit from its own wrong doing.
Petitioners further contend that Laidlaw presented an incomplete
and
inaccurate
assessment
of
the
area’s
waste
disposal
needs.
Petitioners state that Laidlaw’s needs assessment included the fact
that
60
percent
of
the
waste
disposed
of
in
the three
county
service
area
is
imported
into
that
area,
but
that
the
needs
assessment did not consider whether the area from which the waste
is imported
(generally the St. Louis
area)
has adequate space to
handle its own waste.
Petitioners contend that their witness who
testified on the needs issue, Frank Boyne, was the only witness who
considered the waste needs and capacities of the whole St. Louis
area,
and that his testimony shows
that current waste
disposal
facilities are sufficient.
In
response,
Laidlaw
contends
that
petitioners’
argument
contains two key errors.
First, Laidlaw maintains that petitioners
erroneously assume, without legal authority
or expert testimony,
that the only way to assess need is by estimating landfill
life
expectancy.
Laidlaw argues that the appellate court has found that
it is better to rely on projected changes in refuse generation in
the service area,
future development of other disposal sites,
and
other factors,
rather than determining need by application of an
arbitrary
standard
of
life
expectancy
of
existing
disposal
facilities.
(Waste Management of Illinois
v.
Pollution Control
Board
(2d Dist.
1988),
175 Ill.App.3d
1023,
530 N.E.2d 682,
691.)
Laidlaw
contends
that
techniques
of
estimating
site
life
expectancies are unreliable,
and points to another landfill in the
service area whose life expectancy went from 18 years to 44 years
to 27 years to 32 years
in a four-year period, with no permitted
increase in capacity.
Laidlaw maintains that petitioners rely only
on estimates of landfill life expectancy because all other evidence
in the record
(such
as waste
generation
projections,
projected
population increases, continued loss of disposal sites, and a lack
~ Petitioners
state that figures
for Monroe County are
not
furnished because the amounts of waste generated and disposed of
are quite small.
126—460
7
of competition
in the service
area
after
1995
if the proposed
facility is not expanded) confirms the need for additional disposal
capacity in the service area.
Laidlaw asserts that even estimated
life expectancies of landfills within the service area demonstrate
need,
since
at
current
intake
rates
landfill
capacity will
be
exhausted in as little as five to ten years.
Laidlaw
argues
that
petitioners’
second
error
is
their
estimation
of
landfill
life
expectancies,
using
“nonexistent”
intake
rates.
Petitioners
argue
that
plenty
of
service
area
capacity
exists,
as
long
as waste
intake
rates
are limited
to
amounts
generated
within
the
service
area.
However,
Laidlaw
contends that there is no evidence in the record that any landfill
in the area, with the “possible” exception of Laidlaw, will confine
its disposal to waste generated within the three county service
area.
(Tr.
97-99.)
Laidlaw maintains that importation must be
considered in determining need,
since the record shows
that the
historic trend of importation of waste into the service area will
continue
.~
Initially, the Board notes that petitioners argue that Laidlaw
did
not
prove
that
the
proposed
facility
is
necessary
to
accommodate the needs of the service area.
This contention raises
questions involving both facts and law.
As discussed above,
the
applicable standard of review is whether Roxana’s finding that the
proposed expansion is necessary is against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
That
is the standard with which
we
review
this
criterion,
not whether Laidlaw proved that need exists.
After
a review of the record, the Board finds that Roxana’s
decision that need exists is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Laidlaw included a needs assessment in its application
(App.
Vol.
I,
pp.
30-86),
and
presented
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Schreiber
in
support
of
its
contentions.
(Tr.
37—64.)
Mr.
Schreiber testified that the service area will run out of disposal
space
as
soon
as
1995,
based upon projected
population
growth,
waste generation rates, projected recycling programs, area disposal
capacity,
and the historical importation of waste into the area.
(Tr.
37-38.)
Mr. Schreiber also stated that without the proposed
expansion, all landfills in the service area would be owned by one
company after
1995,
and alleged that
increased capacity
in
the
service area owned by another company would keep disposal prices
at an affordable level.
(Tr.
43—46.)
Additionally,
Mr. Michael
Coulson,
manager
of
environmental
planning
for
the
East—West
Gateway Coordinating Council,
testified that a needs
assessment
prepared for Madison,
St.
Clair,
and Monroe Counties in February
1989,
using 1988 data, estimated that the area had eight years of
‘I
Laidlaw
notes
that
although
petitioners
object
to the
importation of waste into Illinois, they have not objected to the
fact that Madison County exports waste to Missouri.
126—46 1
8
disposal capacity remaining.
(Tr.
580—581.)
In sum,
the
Boarc~
finds that there
is sufficient evidence in the record to support
Roxana’s decision that the proposed facility is necessary to serve
the needs of the area.
The Board notes that the appellate court
decision
cited
by
petitioners
(for
the
proposition
that
ar
expansion was not necessary where there were ten years of remaining
capacity in the area) merely held that the decision of the local
government
that
there
was
no
need,
and
this
Board’s
decisior
upholding it, were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
That case did not hold that the existence of ten years of remaining
disposal capacity meant that there was no need.
Waste Management
of
Illinois
v.
Pollution
Control
Board
(2d
Dist.
1984),
123
Ill.App.3d 1075,
463 N.E.2d 969.
Consistency With County Solid Waste Management Plan
The
eighth
criterion
which
the
local
decisionmaker
must
consider in ruling upon an application ~or local site approval
is
whether “if the facility
is to be located in a county where the
county
board
has
adopted
a
solid
waste
management
plan,
the
facility is consistent with that plan.”
(Ill.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch.
111 1/2, par. l039.2(a)(8).)
In its findings of fact, the Village
Board found that “tjhe
drafts of the Madison County Solid Waste
Management
Plan,
as
presented
by
the
evidence,
documents
and
testimony,
are considered as
if
such plan
is
in
full force and
effect; the facility is consistent with such plan.”
(C.
9882.)
Petitioners
contend
that
the
proposed
facility
is
not
consistent with the solid waste management plan adopted by Madison
County.
Petitioners
state
that they
consider
the
solid
waste
management 5plan adopted by the Madison County Board on February 21,
1991
sicJ
as being
in
full
force
and
effect,
and argue
that
Laidlaw’s
siting
application
does
not
conform
to
that
plan.
Petitioners state
that Mr.
Coulson, who was the project manager
during
the
preparation
of
the
solid
waste
management
plan,
testified that the plan calls for a three—year moratorium on the
siting
of
landfills.
(Tr.
562.)
Petitioners
contend that the
language
of
the February
20,
1991
plan supports
Mr.
Coulson’s
interpretation.
Finally,
petitioners maintain that this siting
application
is
inconsistent with the Madison County solid waste
management plan because it allows Laidlaw to disrupt the planning
authority given
to
counties under
the Solid Waste
Planning and
Recycling Act.
(Ill.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch. 85, par. 5951 et.
seq.)
Laidlaw
makes
two
arguments
in
response
to
petitioners’
claims.
First, Laidlaw argues that Madison County did not have an
adopted
solid
waste
management
plan.
Laidlaw
contends
that
~ Petitioners’ argument refers to a February 21,
1991 plan;
however, the Board believes that petitioners intend to refer to a
February 20,
1991 plan.
126—462
9
according to the county’s own timetable, the plan was still subject
to review by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
(Agency)
during the local hearings on this application, so that the plan was
still
in draft stages.
(Tr.
65-71,
586; Applicant’s
Ex.
82 and
83.)
Laidlaw maintains that the latest draft
of the plan states
that it was not scheduled for final adoption until September 1991.
Laidlaw points out that the Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act
requires the county
to consider any Agency
recommendations
and
adopt
a revised plan (Ill.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch.
85,
par.
5954(b)),
so
that
a
county
cannot
have
a
final,
adopted
solid
waste
management plan until the Agency returns the plan to the county.
Because Madison County did not have a final,
adopted plan,
Laidlaw
contends
that
criterion
eight
is
not
applicable
to
this
application.
Second,
Laidlaw contends that its application
is consistent
with the proposed county plan.
Laidlaw maintains that the proposed
facility
is
consistent
with
the
waste
management
hierarchy
contained
in the draft
plan,
in that
in promotes recycling and
composting,
and provides
a
disposal
site
for
residue ash
from
waste—to—energy or incineration projects.
Laidlaw points to the
information
in
its application
(App.
Vol.
I,
December
26,
1990
letter
from
Nick
R.
Sturzl
to
Scott
Schreiber)
and
to
Mr.
Schreiber’s testimony that the application
is consistent with the
proposed plan
(Tr.
75-82).
Laidlaw argues that all the evidence
in the record, with the exception of Mr. Coulson’s testimony,
shows
that the proposed facility
is
consistent with
the
draft
county
plan.
Therefore,
Laidlaw maintains that
it was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence for Roxana
to conclude that the
proposed facility is consistent with the draft county plan.
The Board has reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments,
but
is unable to determine whether Madison County had an adopted
solid waste management plan when Roxana made its decision on this
application.
The record contains at least two different documents
titled “Final Preferred Waste Management System Plan:
St. Clair,
Madison,
and
Monroe
Counties,
Illinois”.
Neither
of
those
documents are themselves dated, but one contains a Madison County
resolution dated June
20,
1990
(Intervenors’
Ex.
44), while
the
other
contains
a
February
14,
1991
Madison
County
resolution
(Intervenors’ Ex. 45).
Nothing in the record shows if the plan was
actually
submitted
to the
Agency,
as
opposed
to
the
numerous
schedules
for implementation,
which
state that the plan will be
submitted to the Agency by March
1,
1991 and resubmitted
(after
consideration
of
Agency
comments)
by
September
1,
1991,
with
implementation to begin on September 1,
1992.
(Applicant’s Ex.
82
at
73; Applicant’s
Ex.
83
at
48;
Intervenors’
Ex.
44
at VI-14--
VI—15;
Intervenors’
Ex.
45 at VI-25——VI-26.)
In
sum,
the Board
cannot determine, based on the record before it, whether the plan
was “adopted” within the meaning of Section 39.2(a) (8) of the Act.
However,
Roxana’s findings
of fact
specifically
state
that
126—463
10
“(t)he drafts of the Madison County Solid Waste Management Plan,
as
presented
by
the
evidence,
documents
and
testimony,
are
considered
as
if
such plan
is
in
full
force
and
effect;
the
facility is consistent with such plan.”
(C. 9882.)
Therefore, the
Board will review Roxana’s finding that the facility is consistent
with the county plan to determine whether that finding is against
the manifest weight
of the evidence.
Again,
this
issue
raises
questions of fact.
The record does contain conflicting testimony
as to whether the county plan envisions a moratorium on the siting
of landfills.
However, Mr. Coulson admitted that the text of the
plan doe~not expressly state that there will be no new landfills
during
the
three-year
evaluation
period.
(Tr.
592-593.)
Additionally,
the
record
shows
that
the
Madison
County
Board
approved the siting of a new landfill (unrelated to this facility)
after it “adopted” its solid waste management plan.
(Applicant’s
Ex.
81;
Tr.
52—56,
595-596.)
The
Board
finds
that
there
is
sufficient evidence in the record to support Roxana’s decision that
the proposed facility is consistent with the county plan, and that
Roxana’s decision on criterion eight was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Merely because Roxana could have drawn
different conclusions from the conflicting testimony is not a basis
for this Board to reverse the local government’s decision.
File
v.
D
& L Landfill,
Inc.,
PCB 90—94
(August
30,
1990),
aff’d File
v.
D
& L Landfill
(5th Dist. October
3, 1991),
No.
5-90-0630; see
also Steinberg v. Petta
(1st Dist.
1985),
139 Ill.App.3d
503,
487
N.E.2d
1064,
1069.
The
Board
disagrees
with
petitioners’
contention that this
siting
application
is
inconsistent
with
the
county
solid
waste
management plan because it allows Laidlaw to “disrupt” the planning
authority given
to the counties.
As Laidlaw points
out,
this
argument
alleges
that
all
applications
for site
approval
in
a
county with an adopted plan should be before the county,
instead
of any municipality.
However, Section 39.2(a)
of the Act clearly
states
that municipalities have exclusive jurisdiction over siting
facilities within their municipal boundaries.
Section 39.2 merely
requires
the
local
decisionmaker,
whether
the
county
or
a
municipality,
to
determine
whether
a
proposal
facility
is
consistent with the county plan.
Neither Section
39.2 nor the
Solid
Waste
Planning
and
Recycling
Act
take
siting
approval
authority from municipalities.
In sum, the Board finds that Roxana’s decision granting site
approval for the proposed expansion was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
This opinion constitutes the Board’s findings
of
fact and
conclusions of law.
ORDER
The
May
20,
1991
decision
of
the Roxana Village
Board
of
126—464
11
Trustees,
granting
site
approval
to
Laidlaw
Waste
Systems
(Madison),
Inc.
for
expansion
of
its
Cahokia Road
landfill
is
hereby affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.
1989,
ch.
111 1/2, par.
1041)
provides for appeal of final orders
of the Board within
35 days.
The rules
of the Supreme Court
of
Illinois establish filing requirements.
J.D.
Duluelle dissented,
and J. Theodore Meyer was present but
did
not
vote.
I,
Dorothy
N.
Gunn,
Clerk
of
the
Illinois
Pollution
Control
Board, hereby certify that the7~ab
ye
Opinion
and
Order
was
adopted
on
the
/C
c~/-
day
of
________________,
1991,
by
a
vote
of
_____.
~
‘-k.
Dorothy N. ~
Clerk
Illinois P~X1utionControl Board
126—465
