ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
June
 22,
 1989
SEXTON FILING AND GRADING
CONTRACTORS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
 )
 PCB 88—116
ILLINOIS ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
 )
Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
 (by J.
 Anderson):
I must respectfully dissent from the holding
 of
 the
majority.
 As
 in the previous case
 involving this Petitioner
 and
a Closure/Post—closure Care
 (CPC)
 plan
 (John Sexton Contractors
Co.
 v.
 EPA, PCB 88—139, decided February
 23, 1989),
 the Board
majority,
 inter
 alia,
 ignores
 its own prior statements
 and the
uncontroverted history of
 the adoption
 of the CPC plan program
 in
Illinois.
 The several
 flaws
 in the majority’s
 logic
 in that case
are detailed
 in the lengthy Dissenting Opinion,
 which
 is equally
applicable
 and expressly
 incorporated herein.
There
 remain
 a few matters which deserve further comment
 in
this proceeding.
First,
 the majority asserts
 (p.
 4)
 that Sexton “fails to
 recognize”
 that the Board promulgated the CPC plan
 requirements
of R84—22C pursuant
 to Sections
 5,
 22 and
 27
 of the Act,
 rather
than simply Section 21.1.
 The majority then cites
 to page 19943
of
 the Illinois Register
 of December
 6,
 1985,
 as support
 for
 this
statement and
 as justification for characterizing CPC plan
applications as permit applications.*
 It
 is
 interesting that the
majority did not mention
 its own formal Opinion adopted
 in R84—
22C (see attached), which Opinion
 is
 customarily excluded
 from
publication
 in the Illinois Register.
 Had the majority cited
 to
that Opinion, which articulates the bases
 for
 its rulemaking,
 it
*
 The majority did not cite
 to page 18944
 of
 the December
 6,
 1985
Illinois Register, which unequivocally
 states that “these rules
implement the requirements
 of Section
 21.1
 of the Environmental
Protection Act that operators
 of non—hazardous waste
 landfills
provide
 financial assurance
 for closure and post—closure
 care”.
No mention
 is made of any other Section
 of the Act or
 any other
purposes of the rules.
100-2~5
—2—
would have been unable
 to find
 a single line of text
 in support
of
 its position.
 The reason for this lack of support
 is clear:
as noted
 in the dissenting opinion
 from PCB 88—139,
 the majority
has chosen
 to “rewrite the history of the Board’s closure
 and
post—closure
 rules”
 (p.
 5).
 It
 is true that Sections
 5,
 22 and
27
 of the Act were invoked
 in R84—22C, but not with
 respect
 to
the substantive CPC plan requirements
 (the opinion of
 the Board
in R84—22C includes
 a segment headed “STATUTORY PROVISIONS”
 (pp.
6—7).
 Sections
 5,
 22 and
 27 are not mentioned;
 only Sections
21(d)
 and 21.1 are included).
 Moreover,
 the core
 assumption upon
which
 the majority now grounds
 its holding
 (i.e.,
 that the
technical closure and post—closure requirements stand
 alone,
without
 reference
 to determining closure
 and post—closure
 care
costs)
 flies
 in
 the face of the Board’s enunciated
 “Phase—in
Provisions”
 as set
 forth
 on page
 8
 of the opinion
 in R84—22C,
which states
 that operators on March
 1,
 1985 “could avoid
 the
financial
 assurance requirement
 by ceasing
 to accept waste and
initiating
 closure
 pursuant
 to
 existing
 permit
 conditions”
(emphasis
 added).
 The
 emphasized
 language
 makes
 clear
 that
closure requirements have meaning only within
 the context
 of
financial assurance requirements
 and do not stand
 alone;
otherwise,
 the technical closure
 and post—closure care
requirements would have applied
 immediately to sites existing on
March
 1,
 1985.
Second,
 the majority inaccurately characterizes Sexton’s
arguments.
 On page
 3,
 Sexton
 is claimed
 to argue
 “that
 the
Agency cannot
 review an aspect of
 site management
 vital
 to
environmentally
 sound closure
 and post—closure care”.
 In
truth,
Sexton
 nowhere makes
 this argument.
 Rather, Sexton argues that
the Agency cannot,
 in
 the guise of
 review of
 a CPC plan
application,
 revisit
 and
 rewrite
 the
 underlying
 permit.
 The
difference
 is crucial;
 this case presents an example
 of
 the
application of
 that difference
 and
 illustrates
 the pitfalls of
the majority’s approach.
In
 its opinion
 (p.
 14),
 the
majority attempts
 to justify
the
imposition
 of special condition
 12 by noting
 the
 location
 of
 the
three monitoring
 wells
 and by suggesting
 that
 1987 monitoring
data,
 notwithstanding
 the testimony of Sexton’s expert witness
and the results of 15 years*
 monitoring data
 to
 the contrary,
“casts
 a
 significant doubt on the reality of Sexton’s simple
model
 of groundwater
 flow”.
 Upon reflection,
 it
 is
 clear that
not only does such apparently aberrent data scarcely arouse
“significant doubt”,
 but such doubt
 as may exist has relevance
primarily
 to
 the design and operation of the landfill,
 rather
than to closure
 and post—closure care.
It
 i~inThed
 disincjcnuou~
 to
 SU~dost.
 thnL ~ny
 IC
 LC
 ni
 in
a
 groundwater
 monitoring
 program
 is
 oE
 consequence
 to
 the
 CPC
plan
 but
 not
 to
 the
 design
 and
 operating
 permits
 upon
 which
 that
CPC
 plan
 is
 founded.
 The requirements which must
 be satisfied
100—206
—3—
during closure and post—closure care of necessity must be keyed
to
 the realities of design and operation as previously permitted
by
 the
 Agency;
 to
 hold
 otherwise
 is
 to
 effectively
 submerge
 the
design
 and
 operating
 permit
 into
 the
 CPC
 plan,
 the
 “condition”
thereby
 swallowing
 the
 permit.
Finally,
 the
 majority
 finds
 that
 the
 Agency
 has
 not
presently applied
 the draft GMN guideline in
 a way that gives it
the effect
 of
 a rule
 (p. 8).
 I disagree.
 The majority
acknowledges
 that “adherence
 to the provisions of
 the resource
cannot establish compliance”
 (p.
 7) yet
 ignores the fact that
special condition 12 provides
 for just that.
 Condition
 12 states
that one
 of two alternative modes
 of compliance available
 to
Sexton
 is
 for Sexton
 to “submit
 a revised groundwater monitoring
plan
 in
 accordance
 with
 the
 draft
 “Groundwater
 Monitoring
Network”, enclosed
 “(emphasis
 added).
 If
 this
 does
 not
 amount
 to
proclaiming
 that adherence
 to the draft guidelines establishes
compliance,
 I
 am
 at
 a
 loss
 to
 say
 what
 does.
For
 the
 foregoing
 reasons,
 I
 respectfully
 dissent.
~/~ToanG. Anderson
I,
 Dorothy
 M.
 Gunn,
 Clerk
 of
 the
 Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
 hereby
 certify
 that
 the
 abo~~eDissenting
 Opinion
 was
submitted
 on
 the
 ~
 day
 of
 _____________,
 1989.
I
 f
/
//
 ~/
 I
?-
(L~1
 ~//).
 /•
Dorothy M./~unn, Clerk
Illinois
 ?Dilution
 Control
 Board
100--20 7