1. to comply, and hereby orders:
      2. IT IS SO ORDERED.

ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
February
4,
1982
COUNTY OF PEORIA,
)
A Body Politic and Corporate,
)
Complainant,
v.
BACON’S
FARM,
Ltd.,
)
and
PCB 80-38
JOELL ALLEN,
Manager, Second Chance,
and
STEVE CORICH,
Manager, Second Chance,
d/b/a “Second Chance,”
Respondents.
INTERIM ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by J.D. Dumelle):
On December 21,
1981 the County of Peoria filed a motion
to compel compliance with the Board’s February 19, 1981 Order
in this matter.
No response
to that motion was
filed until
January 20,
1982 and that response was not accompanied by a
motion to file instanter,
despite
its being
filed three weeks
late.
However, apparently due to inadvertence,
no proof of
service accompanied the County’s December 21 filing
(now cured),
and since the response was filed prior to the matter coming
before the Board for decision, the Board will consider
it.
The County alleges that Second Chance has failed to prepare
and file a sufficient noise study pursuant
to the February 19,
1981 Order in that the submitted report does not include recom-
mendations
for attaining compliance,
copies of test data referred
to in the report, or an abatement plan.
It further alleges that
this was despite repeated requests for additional materials, and
that such conduct shows that Second Chance has
riot acted in good
faith.
Finally,
the County alleges that Second Chance continues
to emit unlawful
levels
of sound.
It therefore requests that
Second Chance be compelled to supply further information and that
a penalty be imposed for its failure to comply
in a timely manner
and act
in good faith.
~c—9c~

—2—
Second
Chance,
on
the
other
hand,
contends
that
it
did
in
fact
file
~i
timely
and
sufficient
report
and
that
it
has
already
p~3r~ormer~
all
of
the
work
recommended
by
the
consultant
to
att:~in
compliance.
If
all
had
proceeded
according
to
the
Board
Order
in
this
matter,
Second
Chance
would
have
hired
a
consultant
in
response
to
the
Order
and
submitted
a
detailed
study
of
the
noise
problem.
iuciuding
all
research,
recommendations
and
an
abatement
plan
to
the Illinois Environmental Protection agency (~gency),within 30
days of the February 19,
1981 Order
and the Agency would have
made recommendations
to the consultant and Second Chance within
20
days thereafter.
Finally,
Second Chance would have acted
upon
those
recommendations
in
good
faith.
That,
however,
was
not
the
course
of
events.
Instead,
of
hiring
a
consultant
in
response
to
the
Board Order,
Second
Chance
apparently
relied
upon
a
report
which
had
been
prepared
even
before
a
settlement
was
reached
in
this
matter.
It
then
did
file
a
timely
“Second
Chance
Agreed
Settlement
Report0
on
‘larch
11,
1981 which
is dated January 16,
1980
(though the T~oard
assumes that
it should be “1981”) which not only discusses
testi.ng and makes recommendations for compliance, but also
indicates
that all recommended repairs were
in fact completed
on July 22,
1980,
more than five months prior to the filing of
the Stipulation o~Facts and Agreed Settlement of this matter.
3.nd nearly
six months prior to the Board’s decision.
Second
Chance took nearly the full 30 days allowed for submittal of
this report to the Agency on March
18,
1981.
Next,
the Agency failed to respond
to anyone concerning
the sufficiency of that report.
The County apparently contacted
the Agency concerning this and discovered that due to budgetary
arid staffing cuts, the Agency would probably not be able
to
conduct further tests
(see Motion for Extension,
July
12,
1981).
Tiowever,
nothing was alleged concerning the Agency’s ability to
make recommendations as to the sufficiency of the report,
The
record. also gives
no indication of whether the noise tests
were
actually conducted by the County.
Second Chance, on the other hand, contends that due the
~\gency’sfailure
to respond “one must conclude that the
Illinois F~nvironmentalProtection Agency
is
satisfied that the
Consultant’s
report has met the requirements of this Board, and
further that the implementation of the consultant’s recommepd-
ations have eliminated any violation.”
‘Thy one “must conclude
that is puzzling
in light of the County’s July 12 allegation
that: several complaints had been received by the attorney for
the County and the County’s desire to conduct further tests.
A final complicating factor
in
this
matter
is that the
T~gency is not a party to this action and, therefore, cannot
be ordered to file any recommendation.
Rowever, the Board
45—256

—3—
accepted
the
agreed
settlement
on
the
basis
that
the
Agency
would
act
as a
neutral
overseer
of
the
compliance
process,
The
Agency
had
represented
its
willingness to do so.
Tha
present
state
of this proceeding appears
to be that
:ho County
is not satisfied that
it has enough information to
determine whether the submitted study is sufficient and, there-
fore,
desires
more
data.
Second
Chance
indicates
that
it
has
made good faith efforts at compliance,
thereby complying with
the February 19 Order.
The Agency has not participated and its
failure to do so has rendered
it impossible
for Second chance
to fully comply
with that Order.
It has, however, recently
indicated its willingness to participate.
The
Board’s intent in this proceeding has been to find a
method for insuring compliance as expeditiously as possible.
and
that remains its intent.
The
Board does not condone Second
Chance’s reliance
upon
unilateral actions taken prior to the
entry
of the Board’s Order as constituting compliance with that
Order or upon its after.the—fact conclusion that Agency inaction
serves as affirmance of its actions.
The Board also fails to
understand the County’s lengthy delay
in moving to compel
compliance.
Therefore,
the Board grants the County’s motion to
compel
in part,
but will not impose a penalty at this time for failure
to comply,
and hereby orders:
1.
That within 14 days of the date of this Order Second
Chance furnish the Board,
the Agency and the County
with all further information and data to which
it
has access and which has not been previously submitted
concerning noise testing before and after the abatement
measures were taken;
2.
That within 14 days of the date of this Order the
county furnish any and all information and data to
which
it has access, and which has not been previous’y
submitted,
to Second Chance,
the Agency,
and the
Board.
3.
That within 45 days o~the date of this Order the
Agency,
the County, and Second Chance submit to the
Board comments upon the present state of compliance
by Second Chance with applicable Board regulations
and any recommendations
as to further actions to be
pursued and any penalty to be assessed,
if appropriate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
I, ~hristan L.
Moffett,
Clerk of the Illinois Pollution
Control Board, hq~ebycerti~t at the above Interim Order was
on the
~
day of-i
____
,
1982 by a vote of
-
Christan L. Moffet
45 257
Illinots Pollutton
rd
Board

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