ILLINOIS POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
May 25, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF:
)
LINCOLN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
)
Respondent,
v.
)
AC 89—26
(IEPA Docket No. 9417—AC)
ORDER OF THE BOARD
(by J.
Marlin):
On April
27,
1989,
the Board received
a letter
from the
Lincoln/Logan County Chamber
of Commerce
(Chamber) which requests
that the Board rescind
its March
23, 1989 Order which imposed
a
$500 civil penalty
in this matter pursuant to Section 42(b)(4)
of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act
(Act).
The Board
construes this filing
as
a motion
to vacate.
In accordance with Section
31.1
of
the Act the Board issued
its
March
23,
1989
Order
because
the
Chamber
did
not
file
a
petition
for
review
within
35
days
after
it
received
the
citation.
The
citation
alleged
a
litter
violation
pursuant
to
Section 21(q)(l)
of the Act.
Now,
the Chamber
requests that the
default Order
be vacated since
it has subsequently cleaned
up the
site.
Specifically,
the Chamber
asserts that
20,000 scrap tires
have been removed from the site.
Section 31.1(d)(l)
states:
If
the
person
named
in
the
administrative
citation
fails
to
petition
the
Board
for
review
within
35
days
from
the
date
of
service,
the Board shall adopt
a final order,
which
shall
include
the
administrative
citation
and
findings
of
violations
as
alleged
in
the citation and
shall
impose
the
penalty
specified
in
subdivision
(b)(4)
of
Section
42.
(emphasis added)
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1987,
ch.
1111/2,
par.
1031.1.
The words of Section
31.1 are unambiguous.
If
a petition
for review
is not filed within 35 days of service of the
citation,
the Board must issue
an order with
a finding
of the
violation
as alleged
by the citation and
the imposition
of
penalties
as mandated by the Act.
In issuing such
an order the
Board does not substantively review the allegations of the
Agency.
99—325
2
The Board views administrative citations as
being analogous
to a traffic ticket.
The Agency or unit
of
local government may
only issue citations based
on violations observed by an
inspector.
If
a petition
for review
is filed,
the Board may then
review the Agency’s findings pursuant
to
a hearing.
Specifically,
the Board must determine whether
the violation
occurred;
the Agency has burden
of proof for that showing.
If
the person who receives the citation proves that the violation
“resulted from uncontrollable cirz~umstances”, the Board must
issue an order which “makes no finding
of violation and imposes
no penalty”, pursuant
to Section 31.1(d)
of the Act.
Ill.
Rev.
Stat.
1987,
ch.
11)~-/2, par. 1031.1(d).
Alternatively,
if the citation recipient does not contest
the citation,
that person must pay the penalty prescribed by the
citation,
just
as one must pay an uncontested
traffic ticket.
In
such
a situation,
the issue
of whether the violations occurred or
whether
they were uncontrollable are not substantively
explored.
Like an uncontested traffic
ticket,
a promise of
future good behavior
is
irrelevant
to
the legal obligation to pay
the penalty prescribed by an uncontested citation.
Even
in the
context of
a contested violation, post—citation activities
of the
Citation recipient are not material
to the Board’s review
pursuant
to Section 31.1(d)(2)
of the Act.
The administrative citation procedure
is not structured
to
encourage
the needless expenditure
of state resources.
Under
the
statutory scheme,
the issuance
of an order concerning
an
uncontested administrative citation
is automatic.
The Board does
not need
to expend
its resources substantively reviewing the
citation.
The administrative citation process was designed
as
providing
a fast and effective means
of enforcing
of the Act at
a
minimal cost to the state.
This view
is further
bolstered by the
fact that
a citation recipient must pay hearing costs
if that
person unsuccessfully contests
a citation.
No other
enforcement
mechanism under the Act contains
such
a provision.
Reconsidering
a Board order which was issued automatically under
Section
3l.l(d)(1)
for
reasons such as those stated by the Chamber
in
its
motion
is not consistent with the clear
intent
of the legislative
language which established
the administrative citation process.1
Additionally,
the administrative citation process
is
structured
to provide
an inherent
incentive
to people
to comply
with
the Act.
It
is clear
that
if
the recipient
of
an
administrative citation does not correct an on—going violation,
the Agency can issue subsequent citations to that person.
In
1 Of course
if the Agency improperly issued
a citation such
that the person complained
of has not had
the opportunity
to
contest the citation
to extent allowed by the Act,
a motion
seeking
to vacate
a Section 31.1(d)(1)
order might
be
warranted.
However,
that is not the situation at hand.
99—326
3
theory,
the threat of swift
and additional penalties prescribed
by subsequent citations should provide sufficient incentive for
compliance.
As
a result,
the counts and penalties of past
citations need not be modified
to prompt future compliance.
The request
at hand
is directly analogous to one brought by
the Agency in
In the Matter
of:
John R. Vander,
AC 88—99
(March
9, 1989).
There,
the Agency filed
a motion to vacate
a
previously—issued default Order on the grounds that the
respondent had commenced
a clean-up program.
The Board found
that the motion was neither proper
nor appropriate given
the
language of the Act
and the
intent behind
the administrative
citation process.
As
a result,
the Board denied the Agency’s
motion.
The same rationale applies here.
The Board
notes that on
May 11,
1989,
the Agency notified the Board that the Chamber had
paid the civil penalty
in this matter.
The Chamber’s motion
is
denied.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
I, Dorothy M.
Gunn,
Clerk of
the Illinois Pollution Control
Board,
hereby certify that the above Order was adopted on
the
25~•
day
of
_______________,
1989,
by
a
vote
of
~.
~
Dorothy
M. ç3~nn, Clerk
Illinois PoWlution Control Board
99—327